

CHAPTER 9: CONTENDING WITH ATTEMPTS TO COMMUNIZE CHINA

1. THE NANJING INCIDENT

Comintern capitalizes on Northern Expedition


Immediately after the sudden death of Sun Yat-sen, the contradictions inherent in the United Front came to light. As they surfaced, Chiang Kai-shek was gaining prominence and military strength. He was eager to move forward with the Northern Expedition, maintaining that it would help unite China. He prevailed, and the NRA (National Revolutionary Army), with Chiang as its commander in chief, marched out of Guangdong in July 1926, completing its mission two years later, in August 1928, in Beijing. During the expedition NRA troops committed numerous unlawful acts against the persons of Japanese and other foreign residents, as well as their property and interests. The CCP was responsible for most of those crimes. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 was not spur of the moment; the path to it was paved with historical developments, among them violent anti-Japanese acts with the telltale signs of communist terrorism.

The objective of the Northern Expedition, launched by Chiang's NRA, was the defeat of the Beiyang warlords, who enjoyed free rein in northern China. They were (1) Wu Peifu, with his 250,000 men in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, and Guizhou; (2) Sun Chuanfang, with 200,000 men in the five provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, and Jiangxi; and (3) Zhang Zuolin with his 500,000-man-strong Fengtian, Hebei and Shandong armies, as well as substantial forces in the three eastern provinces (Manchuria), as well as Rehe, Chahar, Hebei, and Shandong. In contrast, the NRA had only 100,000 men divided among eight armies. On July 9 the NRA issued the beginning of its campaign. On the following day, July 10, NRA troops occupied Changsha. From there, Chiang's armies advanced in three directions: left, center, and right.

Once it became clear that the Northern Expedition would come to pass, the CCP did an about-face, prompted by the Comintern, and came out in enthusiastic support of the mission. Borodin issued strict orders that CCP members were to establish and expand the party's political strength after each NRA victory, and to make a concerted effort to escalate the activities of CCP labor movements in Wuhan and Shanghai, and peasant associations in other regions. Accordingly, as the Northern Expedition progressed, the CCP poured all its energy into its peasant movements (in Guangdong, Hunan, Jinan, and Hubei) and labor movements (in Shanghai and Hankou). The party suddenly began to believe itself the guiding force in the national revolution. The communists, in high spirits, stood at the head of the expedition forces, and at every destination launched their peasant- and labor-related campaigns. Some of the results of their efforts are shown in the following table.¹

¹ Hatano Ken'ichi, *Kyōsantō shi* (History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1961).

	1925	1926	1927
Labor union members	450,000	1,200,000	2,800,000
GMD members	994	12,000	57,900
Peasant association members	200,000	3,000,000	9,800,000



Moscow ecstatic about new Wuhan communist government

NRA campaigns met with spectacular success. In September Nationalist forces occupied Hanyang, and then Hankou. With the fall of Wuchang on October 10, they had gained control of the three cities of Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang, which were combined to form the city of Wuhan in 1926. When Wuhan was defeated, the CCP refused to obey Chiang Kai-shek's orders to attack Nanchang. Instead, the communists formed an alliance with Tang Shengzhi, the most powerful warlord in the Wuhan region, their objective being to establish Wuhan as a base for CCP and left-wing GMD members.

Chiang's reaction was to temporarily ignore the communists' machinations and concentrate on assaulting Shanghai and Nanjing, while resolving to reach a compromise with the Wuhan forces. On February 21, 1927 GMD headquarters announced that the government had been moved to Wuhan. This was a communist government administered by the CCP and the GMD's left wing.

The Comintern was ecstatic about the news that the Wuhan government had been established. Before the Northern Expedition commenced, Moscow's attitude toward the Chinese revolution had been rather enigmatic. But as tensions between the left and right wings of the GMD began to surface when the NRA occupied Wuhan, the Comintern's China operations, channeled through the CCP, became more brazen. And since Stalin, with his predilection for defending the west and advancing eastward, had seized real power in the Comintern, the organization's operations in China became steadily more aggressive.

The first instance of blatant Soviet interference took the form of the December Resolution issued by the Comintern in 1926. The document laid out the path the CCP was to take — a path of violence — directing it to arm the Chinese peasantry and to engage in an all-out battle with the right wing of the GMD.² It also thoroughly discredited the Three Principles of the People.³ The document was said to have been confiscated in April 1927 when Zhang Zuolin's government conducted a search of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing.

The December Resolution further fueled the arrogance of the CCP, a trait that had never been in abeyance. It obstructed Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition, and eventually led to the hatching of even wilder schemes and radical tactics intended to overthrow Chiang. In March 1927 the Wuhan government relieved Chiang of his position as NRA commander in chief.

Though Chiang was no longer nominal commander in chief, he ignored the demotion and continued with his mission. After all, he enjoyed a tremendous amount of military power. By the waning days of March 1927, his forces had occupied the environs of Shanghai, as well as Hangzhou and Nanjing. He was in control of almost the entire area south of the lower reaches of

² Jane Degras, "Extracts from the Resolution of the Seventh ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Situation" in *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents*, vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1971); <https://archive.org/details/communistinterna0002comm/page/26/mode/2up>.

³ Nihon Gaiji Kyōkai (Foreign Affairs Association of Japan), *Shina ni okeru kyōsan undō* (The communist movement in China) (Tokyo: Nihon Gaiji Kyōkai, 1933).

the Yangzi River. Chiang's forces gradually assembled in Nanjing, and friction between the Nanjing and Wuhan factions intensified.

Retrocession of British Concession; reaction from Western powers

Ahead of the Nanjing Incident, which occurred during the Northern Expedition, another incident erupted involving the seizure of British concessions in Jiujiang and Hankou (Jiangxi province). That certainly seemed like a bad omen.

In Hankou there were British, Japanese, and French concessions. The British Concession was located in the city's commercial center, where Japan's main banks and shops were also located. On the evening of January 3, 1927 the British Concession in Hankou was seized by the Chinese, as was its counterpart in Jiujiang on January 7.

The commandeering of the two concessions by the Nationalist government was a huge shock to the UK and other Western powers. It was understandable for them to take urgent action to defend their concessions in Shanghai, where their Chinese interests were concentrated. Whether or not one condones them, the concessions were established in accordance with international treaties. As long as the Chinese were going to recover them by force, the Western powers had no choice but to use force to prevent their seizure. In mid-January Japan, the UK, the US, and France devised a contingency plan to maintain a presence of 4,000-5,000 soldiers in Shanghai.

On March 21 the NRA, marching northward from Hangzhou, reached a location four miles from southern Shanghai; martial law was declared in Shanghai. The Shanghai Public Works Bureau mobilized volunteer soldiers and police officers, and then asked for assistance from the navies of Western powers. In response, the US, Japan, and other nations sent landing parties. The number of troops from Western nations swelled to a total of 12,500 (9,000 from the UK, 1,500 from the US, 1,500 from Japan, 400 from France, and 50 from Italy⁴). Additionally, a total of 31 ships, including 11 from Japan, 11 from the UK, and five from the US, assembled at Shanghai.

The feared collision between the NRA and foreign units upon the former's entry into Shanghai was avoided, thanks to policing on the part of the Western powers.

Nanjing Incident breaks out

Though a confrontation between the NRA and foreign legations in Shanghai was circumvented, Nanjing was not so fortunate during its occupation by the NRA.

For the expedition, the NRA was divided into three armies, the organization of which is shown in the following table

⁴ These figures do not include volunteers from Shanghai.

NRA Army	Commander	Itinerary
Western Route Army	Tang Shengzhi	Head north along Jinghan Railway; engage with Wu Peifu's army in Henan
Eastern Route Army	He Yingshin (commander in chief) Bai Chongxi (former enemy commander)	Attack Zhejiang from Fujian and Jiangxi
Central Route Army		
Yangzi Right Bank Army	Cheng Qian	Second and Sixth corps advance eastward along the southern bank of the Yangzi; attack Nanjing
Yangzi Left Bank Army	Li Zongren	Advance eastward along the northern bank of the Yangzi to Bengbu, a strategic point on the Tianjin-Pukou Railway

At 7:00 p.m. on March 22, when the northern warlords' forces were near annihilation, Japanese Consul Morioka Shōhei had all Japanese women and children evacuate their residences and take shelter at the Japanese Consulate in Nanjing. Joining him and the refugees were Lt. Araki Kameo from the destroyer *Hinoki*, accompanied by nine sailors and one signalman. On the following evening, retreating troops from the warlord armies surged into Nanjing through the South Gate, rushing past the gate of the consulate, and headed for the city's Xiaguan district. At that point Morioka instructed all Japanese men to join the others inside the consulate. About 100 Japanese sought refuge there. When night fell the front gate was closed, and sandbags and machine guns brought inside for protection. The sailors, armed with rifles, stood guard.

At about 5:30 a.m. on March 24 NRA troops advancing from the south began to pour into Nanjing, bearing the blue-and-white GMD flag. They passed by the consulate and headed for Xiaguan. Since it is usually defeated straggler units who plunder as they retreat, with the entry of NRA troops into Nanjing the fear of looting had subsided. In any case, it would have been absolutely impossible for 10 sailors to fend off several thousand Chinese troops. Therefore, the consul decided that it would be prudent to remove the sandbags and machine guns expeditiously, and Lt. Araki agreed with him. After getting rid of the sandbags and machine guns, and disarming the guards and storing their weapons, the consular staff opened the front gate.

Unfortunately, before long approximately 50 regular NRA soldiers clad in uniforms and regulation caps and carrying pistols, burst into the consulate, invading its offices and living quarters. When Consular Police Chief Kimura Mitsui attempted to stop them, not only was he captured and all his possessions stolen, but someone also fired a rifle at him from close range. The bullet penetrated his forearm. The NRA soldiers ordered Maj. Nemoto Hiroshi, a military attaché who was in the office, to supply the key to the safe. When he refused, they struck him in the back with the butt of a rifle. From the office the intruders began shooting at the dining room. Then, at the signal of a whistle, they attacked the consul's residence, which they began to plunder. They did not spare even Morioka's sickroom (the consul had been confined to his bed for about a month, unable to walk due to a gangrenous leg). The hordes of NRA soldiers proceeded to steal everything in sight, loading their booty into automobiles, horse-drawn carriages, and rickshaws they had brought for the purpose. According to a report written by the consul, "The evacuees were pursued from all

directions like flocks of sheep pursued by wolves. The women were forced to undergo innumerable, agonizing ‘physical examinations.’ Their screams were more than I could bear.” The trespassers stooped so low as to steal even Morioka’s nightclothes and bed linen. They shot at him twice, but fortunately missed. Both military attaché Kimura and Maj. Nemoto were bayoneted. Since Lt. Araki and the nine sailors under his command were in uniform, they decided not to provoke the NRA troops and sought refuge in the servants’ quarters.

It is important to remember that at that time, the memory of the Nikolayevsk Massacre was still fresh in their minds. The Japanese evacuees appealed to the landing party to adhere strictly to the principle of nonresistance. Consul Morioka begged Japanese military personnel to temporarily remove any insignia or caps revealing their ranks. Lt. Araki acquiesced for the sake of the evacuees. Eventually the number of NRA invaders swelled from some 150 to more than 200; the looting lasted for more than three hours. Chinese soldiers, now reduced to rabble, waved their flags and joined in a chorus of slogans: “Down with Japanese and British imperialism!” “*Hua E yijia*” (China and the Soviet Union are one!). Morioka’s report describes how before long several hundred Chinese civilians, including women and children, joined the looters, and the mob stole everything in sight, even floorboards, toilets, and empty bottles.⁵

That evening all Japanese, civilians and military personnel, vacated the consulate and were accommodated on board a battleship moored on the Yangzi. On March 29 Lt. Araki attempted suicide on board the cruiser *Tone* to take responsibility for the indignities suffered by his compatriots.

The NRA also looted the British and American consulates, and schools and offices. To rescue their civilians, both nations shelled the city of Nanjing from battleships on the Yangzi at 3:40 p.m. on March 24 for about an hour. They expended some 200 shells. Commander Araki Jirō was on board a Japanese destroyer on the Yangzi. But since he was not aware of the fate of Japanese residents in Nanjing, he did not join in the attack launched by the British and Americans, fearing that doing so would trigger a massacre.⁶

According to Chinese diplomatic sources the shots fired from the British and American battleships killed 12 persons and wounded 20.

⁵ Usui Katsumi, *Nitchū gaikōshi: hokubatsu no jidai* (A history of diplomatic relations between Japan and China) (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō, 1971); Etō Shinkichi, “Nankin jiken to Nichi Bei” (The Nanjing incident and US-Japan relations) in *Higashi Ajia seijishi kenkyū* (Research on East Asian political history) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1968), 149-76; Sasaki Tōichi, *Aru gunjin no jiden* (Autobiography of a career soldier) (Tokyo: Futsūsha, 1963).

⁶ “Nankin jiken minami gun no bōkō jōkyō” (Acts of violence committed by southern forces in Nanjing) in *Gaimushō kiroku* (Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Tokyo: National Archives of Japan, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records).

A total of seven foreign nationals died in the Nanjing Incident: one each from Japan, the US, Italy, France, and Denmark, with two persons unaccounted for.⁷

Comintern wields clandestine control

Who was behind the Nanjing Incident? Consul Morioka reported that it was a systematic, xenophobic uprising planned and perpetrated by CCP officials and junior officers in the NRA Army, in concert with members of the Nanjing branch of the CCP. On the basis of that report, Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō concluded that the incident was a desperate attempt to undermine and ultimately overthrow Chiang Kai-shek.

NRA officials agreed, telling the Japanese that the incident was the result of a conspiracy hatched by delinquent soldiers and CCP members based in Nanjing.

John K. Davis, American consul at Nanjing, sent the following statement concerning the malefactors to the US Secretary of State in Washington, D.C.:

I am convinced beyond the slightest possibility of doubt, that all were regular Kuomintang troops who were operating under orders. From all reports from all other Americans and other nationals I am certain that this condition was uniform, and that not in a single instance was an American or other foreigner molested on March 24th by any defeated northern soldiers.⁸

US Minister in China John V. MacMurray telegraphed Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 28, as follows:

As I am absolutely convinced this campaign of terrorism and insult to foreigners was not only officially countenanced by [sic] and directed but even prearranged, the incident could hardly have been more outrageous.⁹

There is no doubt that the Nanjing Incident was the work of Chinese communists who had infiltrated the ranks of the NRA. We may also assume that it was the result of suggestions, or even orders, from the USSR. One item of evidence is a secret document containing instructions for the Soviet military attaché in China. Right-wing members of the GMD acquired this document, which was partially destroyed by fire, but here is an excerpt, the fifth item of the instructions:

⁷ “Nankin ni okeru Shina hei no bōkō oyobi ryakudatsu jiken” (Acts of violence and looting committed by Chinese troops in Nanjing) in *Gaimushō kiroku* (Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Tokyo: National Archives of Japan, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records).

⁸ US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Letter from Consul John K. Davis at Nanking to the Secretary of State, 28 March 1927, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1927v02/d136>.

⁹ US Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Telegram, The Minister in China John V. MacMurray to the Secretary of State*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1927v02/d135>.

5. It is necessary to take all measures to arouse the masses of the people against the foreigners ... To bring on internal interference by foreign Powers, do not hesitate to use any measures, including even robbery and beatings. In case of clashes with European troop detachments make broad use of these incidents for agitation.¹⁰

These instructions clearly pinpoint the scheme that culminated in the incident, crafted by the Comintern and the CCP, whose objective was to foment clashes between the NRA and the masses, and foreign nations, thus bringing about the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek, and to eliminate the right wing of the GMD, thereby communizing the party in one fell swoop.

Masterminding the plot was Borodin, the Soviet adviser, as usual. According to *Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times*, Borodin's henchmen were CCP members Lin Boqu and Li Fuchun, heads of the political departments of the Sixth Army and Second Army, respectively. Add to them Cheng Qian, commander of the Central Route Army, whom Lin and Li used to their advantage. On March 23, the eve of the incident, Borodin convened a meeting of the CCP Central Committee, where Lin proposed that Cheng Qian be appointed to head the Jiangsu Political Council (which had jurisdiction over Shanghai and Nanjing). Cheng, eager to gain a foothold in Jiangsu, threw his lot in with the CCP. On the day of the Nanjing Incident, the aforementioned Second and Sixth armies were the first to enter Nanjing.

The international community also agreed that the Nanjing Incident was a CCP plot. On May 9, 1927 Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made the following remarks in a speech before the British House of Commons:

The looting of foreign property at Nanking and the shooting of foreigners were the culmination of a continued policy of agitation, rapine, terrorism and murder; the tools of this policy were the unpaid soldiery of the Nationalist armies and the mobs of the great cities, but its organisation and driving force were borrowed, directly or indirectly, from the Third International. ... The organised side of the Nanking outrages appears to have been an attempt to embroil Chiang Kai-shek with the foreign Powers.

(...)

[The incident] has split the Communist wing from the Kuomintang party, and—most important of all—it has deeply discredited the Communists and their foreign advisers in the eyes of all China.

(...)

¹⁰ Furuya Keiji, *Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times* (New York: St. John's University, 1981), 189 (abridged translation of Shō Kaiseki hiroku (Private files of Chiang Kai-shek), serialized in the *Sankei Shinbun* from August 15, 1974 to the end of 1976).

We have added that His Majesty's Government reserve to themselves full liberty of action as to the future, and in particular in respect of any further outrages which may be perpetrated on the British flag, British nationals and British property.¹¹

Three days later British authorities raided the Soviet Trade Delegation and confiscated documents found therein. On May 17 Britain severed diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Every sort of circumstantial evidence demonstrates that the Nanjing Incident was a premeditated act perpetrated by communist elements that had infiltrated the NRA. Additionally, including the aforementioned secret instructions from Moscow, the large number of secret documents (to be discussed later) confiscated at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing by Zhang Zuolin prove beyond any doubt that the incident was a rampage planned and informed by the Comintern's revolutionary strategy.

PRC textbooks pervert the facts

What does the aforementioned Chinese textbook, *Chinese History*, have to say about the Nanjing Incident?

The imperialists attempted to destroy the revolution in order to protect their reactionary rule in China. On March 24 the Northern Expedition forces occupied Nanjing. That night England, the US, Japan, and other imperialist nations fired on the city like maniacs, killing or injuring more than 2,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians.

Not one word was devoted to a description of the brutal acts committed by Chinese troops; the account makes it seem as though the Western assault on Nanjing was completely unprovoked. Additionally, by stating that the attack on Nanjing took place at night, the authors of the textbook give the mistaken impression that the shelling was indiscriminate. In fact, the assault took place in daylight, at 3:10 p.m., and lasted approximately one hour. To make matters worse, the textbook account accuses the Japanese, who steadfastly maintained a stance of non-resistance, of participating in the shelling. A prime example of historical falsification, it takes the art of exaggeration to astonishing limits by increasing the number of Chinese casualties by a factor of 60!

Also conspicuous for its prevarication is Hu Hua's *History of the New Democratic Revolution in China*, which offers the following account:

When reactionary forces were fleeing Nanjing, violent acts and looting occurred. On that evening, consuls representing England, the US, Japan, France, Italy, and other nations ordered their battleships moored on the Yangzi to fire on Nanjing. As a result more than 2,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded.¹²

¹¹ Hansard, HC Deb 09 May vol 206 cc19-25, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1927/may/09/sir-a-chamberlains-statement#S5CV0206P0_19270509_HOC_135.

¹² Hu Hua, *Zhongguo xin minzhu zhuyi geming shi* (History of the new democratic revolution in China) (Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1955).

The author not only places the blame for the rioting on the northern forces, *not* on the NRA advancing from the south, but also maintains that the Japanese participated in the shelling.

Similarly, in his widely read *Chiang Kai-shek: Enemy of the People*, Chen Boda devotes not one word to NRA violence in Nanjing, instead stating that “when the NRA captured Nanjing, American and British battleships fired on the city; the shelling continued for the entire day.” To make the UK and US look like villains, Chen prolongs the length of the assault.¹³

These are the sort of accounts about the Nanjing Incident that are found in government-designated modern Chinese history textbooks. The “information” therein is instilled in the minds of young people in every school in China. It is not difficult to imagine how they must feel about Japan when they grow up, after indoctrination of this sort. When I contemplate this situation, I am filled with pessimism about future relations between Japan and China. Nevertheless, the Chinese persist in expounding on friendship between our two nations. All the while, they denounce Japan’s history textbooks for “distorting historical fact” and insist that we “present the true facts.” But look at their history textbooks. We must always be mindful that the Chinese are masters at distorting and inventing historical fact, as well as arousing hateful sentiment toward Japan.

Secret Comintern directives discovered

On April 6, not long after the Nanjing Incident, Zhang Zuolin, now the dominant figure in Beijing, raided the Soviet Embassy, where he discovered a great number of CCP members hiding. He had them arrested and confiscated documents that served as evidence of communist maneuvering, among them secret directives. Zhang had 20 CCP members, including Li Dazhao, executed. It became increasingly clear that the events in Nanjing were part of Stalin’s plan to communize the world. In Shanghai, too, the communist Shanghai Civil Government was established upon Borodin’s advice. The CCP’s politics of terror had been set in motion. Chiang Kai-shek’s anticommunist sentiments had solidified. On April 12 he conducted a huge anti-CCP purge, and immediately proceeded to establish a government in Nanjing.

In February of the same year, the left wing of the GMD and the CCP had set up a communist government in Wuhan. Moscow was thrilled by this development, but this change of government produced a communist Wuhan government at the middle reaches of the Yangzi and an anti-communist government in Nanjing at its lower reaches. To these we must add Zhang Zuolin’s Beijing government; China now had three competing governments. In what other nation would one find a situation like that? This chaotic disunity offered vivid evidence that the hopes for China expressed at the Washington Conference were nothing but a fantasy.

Chiang Kai-shek’s April 12 Purge in Shanghai shocked the Comintern, which in the following month issued a directive referred to as the May Instructions. They ordered the CCP to move forward with radical agrarian revolution and land reform. Their main points were: (1) arm workers

¹³ Chen Boda, *Renmin gongdi Jiang Jieshi* (Chiang Kai-shek: enemy of the people) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1954).

and peasants, destroy Chiang Kai-shek, and when the time is right, defeat his army; and (3) establish secret CCP organizations within labor unions and peasant associations.

These Comintern directives encouraged the communist radicals, and enlivened the peasant movement in Hunan. But they also increased wariness toward the left-wing members of the GMD in Wuhan. In the midst of all this, a situation arose that utterly astonished the left wing of the GMD in Wuhan. In early June the Comintern sent a secret telegram based on the May Instructions to Manabendra Roy, a leading Indian communist operating in Hankou at that time, ordering him to organize an armed peasant uprising. Roy showed the telegram to Wang Jingwei. Its key points were:

- (1) The masses must seize land at once; do not wait for orders from the GMD or the Wuhan government.
- (2) Form an army of 20,000 CCP members from Hubei and Hunan, as well as one of 50,000 peasants and workers, to replace the NRA.¹⁴
- (3) Dispose of reactionary elements in the CCP's Central Committee; replace them with heads of peasant associations and labor unions.
- (4) Establish a revolutionary court and put reactionary officers on trial there.¹⁵

Borodin attempted to move forward with covert operations, but they were unsuited to conditions in China. Roy, who was blind to the fact that the communists in Wuhan were losing their stature, showed the secret telegram (unofficially) to Wang who, along with his leftist cronies in the GMD, was dumbfounded by its contents. Now, at long last, they had finally awakened to the fact that what the CCP was planning not the realization of the Three Principles of the People, but a communist revolution.

United Front disintegrates

In July 1927 the Wuhan government announced that the United Front had been dissolved. Cooperation with the CCP ceased, and Borodin and his staff of Soviet political and military advisers were sent packing.

The separation between the GMD and the CCP was now complete, with both entities' revealing their true colors. An alliance that had endured for three years and seven months, since January of 1924, had come to an end. For the GMD, joining forces with the Soviet Union and tolerating communism were means to an end: the revolution they desired. And for the CCP, collaboration with the GMD was a step toward the communization of China. As long as the CCP was weak, the party would exploit even an antagonistic entity, when convenient. It would make a concerted effort

¹⁴ However, we find "Mobilize about 20,000 Communists, add about 20,000 revolutionary workers and peasants from Hunan and Hubei, form several new army corps, use the students at the officers' school as commanders and organize your own reliable army before it is too late" in Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (Paris: Foreign Languages Press, 2021), 247; <https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/C28-Marxism-and-the-National-and-Colonial-Question-1st-Printing.pdf>.

¹⁵ Robert C. North & Xenia J. Eudin, *M.N. Roy's Mission to China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 106-7; <https://archive.org/details/mnroysmissiontoc0000robe/page/n7/mode/2up>.

to strengthen itself, and when it had acquired sufficient power, destroy the enemy and bring about a communist revolution. This has been the communist *modus operandi* throughout history. We can safely say that during the United Front, CCP conspiracies took advantage of Sun Yat-sen's goodwill and optimism. The eventual dissolution of the alliance was to be expected, as the two parties were completely incompatible.

By bidding farewell to the CCP, the Wuhan government eliminated a major cause of conflict with Nanjing. Wuhan government leader Wang Jingwei proposed uniting the two governments, and in response Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Nanjing government, consented and announced the merger.

On September 6, an agreement was signed, and two GMD governments became one, with its seat in Nanjing.