THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

THE NANKING MASSACRE:

Fact Versus Fiction
THE NANKING MASSACRE:
Fact Versus Fiction

A Historian’s Quest for the Truth
By

HIGASHINAKANO Shudo
Professor of Intellectual History
Asia University, Tokyo

Translated by Sekai Shuppan

Sekai Shuppan, Inc., Tokyo

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction
Published by Sekai Shuppan, Inc.
Shin Sakuma Building 3F
2-13-14, Nishi-Shimbashi,
Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0003
Japan

Copyright c2005 by Higashinakano Shudo
Original Japanese Language edition
Published by Tendensha, Tokyo, Japan 1998.
English edition first published by Sekai Shuppan, Inc.
in soft cover 2005.
Hard cover edition published by Sekai Shuppan, Inc. 2006.

All rights reserved, including the rights of
reproduction in whole or in part in any form.

Designed by Hidaka Miki

First edition

Printed in Japan.

ISBN 4-916079-12-4 (sc.)
ISBN 4-916079-13-2 (hc.)

Translator’s Note
Japanese personal names have been rendered surname first, in accordance with Japanese custom.
The hanyu pinyin Romanization system has been used to translate Chinese personal and place names, with the exception of Wade-Giles translations that are still in common use (e.g., Yangtze River, Chiang Kai-shek).

PREFACE
In this book we present newly unearthed information pertaining to the occupation of Nanking by Japanese military forces in 1937. We also outline the points in dispute, in the hope of inspiring a fair debate on the subject.
Japanese military personnel have been accused of slaughtering great numbers of civilians and prisoners of war over a period of several weeks, beginning with the fall of Nanking on December 13, 1937, in what is referred to as the “Nanking Massacre.” The conventional wisdom concerning this topic is typified by a review of Iris Chang’s Rape of Nanking that appeared in the Washington Post. In it George Will wrote, “Japanese soldiers murdered tens of thousands of surrendered Chinese soldiers, and almost certainly more than 300,000 noncombatants.”1 The western world is beginning to realize that Chang’s book relies on faked photographs and hugely exaggerated accounts. However, the myth of a massacre’s having been perpetrated in Nanking, which has endured for several decades, remains largely unshattered.
If Japanese scholars had countered the massacre accusations with irrefutable evidence at an early stage, the current situation regarding this problem might be somewhat different. However, since they didn’t, the “Nanking Massacre” has been accepted as fact to the point that it might as well have been etched in stone. Contemporary scholars hoping to discover the truth about events that took place a half-century ago are faced with tremendous challenge, requiring them to expend a huge amount of time and energy. The intention of this book is to establish a framework for the facts relating to situational and environmental factors prevailing in Nanking at the time of Japanese occupation. To that end, we have conducted a scrupulous examination of virtually every historical resource relating to the fall of Nanking in 1937, and a meticulous investigation of all available evidence. The results presented herein, substantiated by definitive historical records, are the fruit of research that consumed 15 years
The 13 fundamental facts laid out below describe the situation in Nanking when the city was occupied by the Japanese in 1937.
1.
Most of the cities on the Eurasian continent were fortified or walled, hence the German word Burg, which means “fortified town.” Until the 20th century, Chinese cities were fortified for defensive purposes, as were ancient Athens, Rome, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Constantinople, Moscow, Hamburg and Paris until the February Revolution. Nanking was surrounded by immense walls. Once the city was captured, its gates were under tight military control. The Japanese did not allow ordinary citizens free access to those gates until two and a half months had elapsed. Nevertheless, 20 days before and immediately prior to the fall of Nanking, the city’s population was 200,000, according to Europeans and Americans who were there at the time. Eight days after the fall and on Christmas Eve, it was still 200,000. No one indicated a vast decrease in population due to mass slaughter. Confronted by these facts, how can anyone claim that 300,000 noncombatants were murdered in Nanking?

2.
The situation in Nanking in 1937 was similar to that in Iraq in 2004: prior to the capture of the city, Chinese troops stripped off their uniforms and mingled with the civilian population. By doing so, they became unlawful combatants not protected by the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Hague Convention. No Chinese military personnel inside the city walls surrendered to the Japanese. Accordingly, during the 11-year period spanning December 13, 1937, the day Nanking fell, to December 1948, when the Tokyo Trials ended, no one accused Japanese troops of having killed prisoners of war in violation of the aforementioned regulations. Confronted with these facts, how can anyone claim that the Japanese murdered prisoners of war?

3.
The Japanese are accused of having murdered 7,000 persons each day, i.e., 300,000 persons over a period of six weeks. But according to “Daily Reports of Serious Injuries to Civilians,” the only killing witnessed by a European or American in Nanking was one “lawful execution.” The contents of these reports (issued on a daily basis and submitted to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking) are corroborated by data gathered from the testimonies of European, American and Chinese residents in Nanking, and from

Japanese military records (all of which data has been computerized and analyzed).2 How do we explain a massacre with no witnesses?

4.
One of the foundation upon which the massacre myth is based is What War Means, edited by Harold Timperley. In it, he wrote that the “following selection of cases” (from the daily reports of serious injuries to civilians in Nanking) “completes the story of the first two months of the Japanese Army’s occupation of Nanking.”3 The aforementioned reports were appended to the book, but contained absolutely no eyewitness accounts of unlawful murders. The book, however, also includes a section (written under an assumed name) that refers to “frequent murder” attributed to Japanese. How do we explain this inconsistency.

5.
Rev. Miner Searle Bates and George Fitch submitted material for What War Means (both used pseudonyms). The ostensible intent of the book, edited by Timperley, was to impress upon the reader the horrors of war via accounts written by disinterested parties (European and American residents of Nanking). But Timperley was, in fact, an advisor to the Nationalist government’s Ministry of Information. Rev. Bates, a famous Christian missionary who taught at the University of Nanking, was also an advisor to the Ministry of Information. And Mrs. Fitch was a close friend of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek.4

It has also become clear that What War Means is a propaganda book compiled and published by the Counterintelligence Division of the Nationalist Ministry of Information’s International Propaganda Section. Timperley was paid by the Ministry of Information for editing the book.5 Thus, What War Means, perceived as proof of the “Nanking Massacre,” was not written from an impartial standpoint. On the contrary, it can be viewed only as war propaganda.

6.
Also perceived as proof of the “Nanking Massacre” are articles carried in the Chicago Daily News and the New York Times. They refer to reports of “frequent murder”6 committed by the Japanese during the three days following the fall of Nanking. However, it

turns out that that Bates was the source of the reports. Bates’ report describing those three days was used in What War Means (Chapter 1), edited by Timperley. But a look at the daily reports that Bates personally delivered to the Japanese Embassy reveals not one case of witnessed murder. Nevertheless, foreign residents of Nanking described “frequent murder.” Aren’t Rev. Bates’ report and American newspaper articles inconsistent with contemporaneous records?

7.
Although we have leaned that What War Means is a propaganda book issued by the Nationalist Ministry of Information, we cannot immediately dismiss its contents. But we must present some important information that cannot be ignored.

Rev. Bates inserted language to the effect that 12,000 civilians and 30,000 soldiers had been killed in Nanking into Chapter 3 of What War Means. The Ministry of Information should have been delighted to disseminate news of a massacre with some 40,000 victims. However, Bates claim was deleted not only from the Chinese translation of What War Means (published simultaneously with the English-language edition), but also from four other books published at about the same time.7 Doesn’t this deletion signify the refusal of the Ministry of Information to lend credence to Bates’ claim that 40,000 Chinese were massacred?

8.
A top-secret document issued by the Ministry of Information in 1941 and entitled “Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department, Ministry of Information” never mentions a massacre. The document contains a summary of crimes (“rapes, arsons and lootings, violations of … basic standards of human decency”) that are mentioned in the description of Nanking as a living hell in What War Means, but does not mention a massacre. Doesn’t this mean that the Ministry of Information had no knowledge of the “Nanking Massacre?”

9.
According to the aforementioned top-secret document, the International Information Department (a branch of the Ministry of Information established not long before the fall of Nanking) sponsored 300 press conferences for foreign journalists between December 1, 1937 and October 24, 1938. During that time,

emergency press conferences were called whenever important news broke (even in the dead of night, according to reports), and the news was transmitted all over the world. But no press conference was ever called to announce a massacre in Nanking. Why not? Doesn’t this information tell us that the Ministry of Information did not believe that there had been a Nanking Massacre?

10.
The July 9, 1938 issue of China Forum, which was published by the Ministry of Information seven months after the fall of Nanking, carried a feature entitled “One Year of Sino-Japanese War: Review Questions for Study Groups.” One of the questions was “What was the attitude of China after the fall of Nanking? The answer (intended to serve as a model) was “General Chiang Kai-shek said on December 16, 1937: ‘No matter how the present situation may change, we must not surrender but march onward.’” The Ministry of Information never alluded to a “Nanking Massacre” Neither did Mao Zedong, who criticized Japanese military strategy in one of his famous lectures, stating that Japanese troops committed a strategical error by not annihilating enemy soldiers in Nanking. Wasn’t Mao, too, refuting the massacre argument?

11.
As we demonstrated in Nankin jiken “shoko shashin” wo kensho suru [Analyzing “the Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre],8 the photographs circulating the world, allegedly substantiating the massacre argument are fakes whose origins can be traced to propaganda books (Japanese Military Atrocities Witnessed by Foreigners, issued by the Ministry of Information in July 1938; and Record of Atrocities Committed by the Japanese Enemy, issued by the National Military Council of the Nationalist Government, also in July 1938). All the photographs are montages, staged, or falsely captioned. Not one of them is proof of a massacre in Nanking.

12.
When Hitler rose to power in 1933, many Jews in Germany fled to other countries. Many nations refused to open their doors to the Jews, but Maj.-Gen. Higuchi Kiichiro, head of the Harbin Special Agency, welcomed them. Higuchi lent his support to the

first conference of Jewish communities in the Far East, held at Harbin in December 1937. Three months later, he helped a great number of Jews who had traveled through Siberia to enter Manchuria from Otpor, across the Soviet border. His name is inscribed in the Golden Book of the Jewish National Fund in Israel.9 Note that just a year later in May 1939, 936 Jewish refugees on board the German luxury liner St. Louis were denied entry to the United States. Eventually, the passengers reached Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, each of which agreed to accept some of them. The Jews who went to Great Britain survived, but the others were sent to the gas chambers when the Germans occupied France and the Netherlands.10 How could the same institution have risked Nazi retaliation by openly allowing Jews to enter Manchuria, which is not so distant from Nanking, in March 1938 and secretly perpetrated “the forgotten holocaust of World War II” between December 1937 and January 1938?

13.
On January 27 and 28, 45 days after the fall of Nanking, the Japanese military transported approximately 1,000 refugees (from Shanghai and its environs) who had fled to Nanking and had expressed the desire to return to Shanghai. They also transported all displaced Chinese to their homes in the Nanking area, beginning on January 29.11 The transport was in compliance with orders issued by the Japanese commander in chief, General Matsui Iwane to that effect (see p. 63). If the same people who showed such kindness also massacred thousands of Chinese, we would have to ascribe (incorrectly) a Jekyll-and-Hyde nature to the Japanese military.

As we stated at the beginning of this Preface, the conventional wisdom concerning the Japanese occupation of Nanking is that 300,000 persons were massacred in that city. This is a perception that is seemingly engraved in the annals of history, and thus is difficult to dispel. It is our hope that this book will serve to dislodge, however slightly, that perception. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction is based on “Nankin Gyokusatsu” no Tettei Kensho [An exhaustive examination of the Nanking Massacre] (written seven years ago and examining the situation in 1937 Nanking from every conceivable perspective) and two research papers that, combined, are the fruit of 15 years of research on my part. One of the research papers is “The Nanking Massacre as War Propaganda,” which I read at the International Commission of Military History held in Bucharest in August 2003. It is included in the 29th International Congress of Military History: War, Military and Media from Gutenberg to Today, issued in Bucharest by Military Publishing in 2004. The other paper was serialized in the Sankei Shinbun from January 3-8, 2005 under the title “Shin chikyu Nihon shi: 147 kai-152 kai” [New Japanese history from a global perspective: Nos.147-152]. It was subsequently included in Shin chikyu Nihon shi 2 [New Japanese history from a global perspective 2], edited by Nishio Kanji and published by Fusosha in 2005. I recommend that readers begin with the final chapter (Chapter
17: New Evidence Leads to the Conclusion that There Was No Massacre in Nanking ) on p.287.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE i
CHAPTER 1:
THE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING 1
CHAPTER 2:
NANKING BEFORE THE FALL 23
CHAPTER 3:
ASSAULT ON THE GATE OF NANKING 43
CHAPTER 4:
THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS” 59
CHAPTER 5:
INTERPRETATION OF POINTS IN DISPUTE (1):
“ALL PRISONERS OF WAR ARE TO BE KILLED
IN COMPLIANCE WITH A BRIGADE ORDER” 65
CHAPTER 6:
INTERPRETATION OF POINTS IN DISPUTE (2):
“TAKE NO PRISONERS OF WAR” 77
CHAPTER 7:
INTERPRETATION OF POINTS IN DISPUTE (3)
“WE ARE TOLD TO KILL ALL PRISONERS;
ALL UNITS DESPERATELY SHORT OF FOOD” 85
CHAPTER 8:
FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALLS OF
NANKING AFTER THE FALL OF THE CITY 101
CHAPTER 9:
THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING 111

CHAPTER 10: REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONERS OF WAR 125
CHAPTER 11: DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1) 149
CHAPTER 12: DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2) 167
CHAPTER 13:

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED CORPSES POSE THREATS 185
CHAPTER 14:
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE” 211
CHAPTER 15:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE” 239
CHAPTER 16:
THE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA 251
CHAPTER 17:
NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO MASSACRE IN NANKING 287
SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER:
READING RABE’S DIARY 301 AFTERWORD 315 NOTES 319 BIBLIOGRAPHY
367 INDEX 385 AUTHOR PROFILE
395
CHAPTER 1:

THE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE
OF NANKING

The 1930’s: A Divided China
In the 1930’s, China was fraught with internecine strife, with the exception of Manchuria. Consequently, foreign nations with Chinese concessions stationed troops in North China to protect their citizens. Chiang Kai-shek controlled less than half the mainland at that time, a fact that, apparently, has escaped even some specialists. For instance, Utsunomiya University Professor Kasahara Tokushi, an East Asian history scholar, has asserted that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government had unified all of China by 1931.1 Accordingly, we believe that it would be useful to provide an overview of the political situation in China in the 1930’s.
The Atlas of World History published by Ringensha includes a map entitled “China Under Nationalist Rule: 1928 -1937.”2 According to that map, only four provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi) were controlled by Chiang and his Nationalist Party in 1928. In 1929, Hubei Province fell into Nationalist hands, followed by Henan in 1930, and Fujian in 1934. By 1937, the Nationalists also controlled Guizhou and Guangdong provinces. Between 1935 and 1937, Guangxi and Sichuan provinces, more than half of Gansu Province, and nearly half of Shaanxi Province entered the Nationalist sphere. However, Shandong Province was controlled by Han Fuju until 1938. Shanxi was ruled by Yan Xishan, Xinjiang by Soviet sympathizer Sheng Shicai, and Hunan by He Jian. According to Hallett Abend’s Tortured China,3 Manchuria, the homeland of the Nuzhen (Manchurian) people, was unaffected by the turmoil that plagued China.
Conversely, Mao Zedong had been defeated by Nationalist forces and, in October 1936, finally succeeded in establishing a base at Yan’an, in northern Shaanxi Province. The Communist Party was unable to regroup until after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Thus, China was clearly a divided nation in the mid-1930’s.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident
In 1937, foreign troops from Japan, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy were stationed in North China to protect the citizens of their respective nations. Their authority to be present there was based on an agreement concluded between foreign powers and Li Hongzhang in 1901, subsequent to the Boxer Rebellion (1900). The agreement, the Final Protocol Relating to the North China Incident, afforded nations affected by the rebellion the right to station troops at 12 locations between Beijing and Shanhaiguan, a town on the coast of the Bo Hai.4 Foreign troops were permitted to hold maneuvers, without reporting where and when they were to be held, as long as they did not use live ammunition.5
That is how Japanese troops came to be stationed at Marco Polo (Lugou) Bridge, situated 12 kilometers west of Peiping (Beijing), as well as in other areas. On July 7, 1937, they were engaging in final maneuvers on the left bank of the Yongding River, which is spanned by the Marco Polo Bridge, in preparation for a company training inspection to be held two days later.6 The soldiers were using blanks. At 10:40 p.m., they were attacked without warning by Chinese troops, who were using live ammunition.7
It was difficult for the Japanese soldiers to gain access to their ammunition because it was stored, as usual, in heavy cardboard boxes securely bound with yards of cotton string. To make matters worse, they were not wearing helmets. Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to fire on them. The fourth attack occurred on the following day at
5:30 a.m., when the sun had risen and visibility was good. Seven hours had elapsed since the first shots were fired.
Not until then did the Japanese retaliate by firing against the 29th Chinese Army. The battle between Japanese and Chinese troops, or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, took place not on July 7, as has so often been reported, but on July 8.
Jin Zhenzhong, commander of the garrison guarding the Marco Polo Bridge, wrote his recollections of the incident in The July 7th Incident, compiled by the Historical Accounts Committee of the National Political Consultative Conference, People’s Republic of China (1986). Jin claims to have heard the “thundering of tanks” and “loud gunfire” on July 7.8 However, the Japanese artillery unit did not arrive on the scene until 3:20 a.m. on July 8. Additional reinforcements, a tank unit, did not appear until about July 10.9
Jin also describes the night of July 7 as rainy and pitch-dark,10 but the skies were clear that night, according to Japanese military records.
Further substantiation is provided by The Peiping News, a copy of which was located by Nihon University professor Hata Ikuhiko. The newspaper reports that the weather was clear on the 7th, and cloudy on the 8th.11
Jin writes that Japanese troops “fabricated a story about a missing soldier” in order to gain entry into the walled city of Wanping (approximately 1 kilometer due south of the site where final maneuvers were held). However, the missing soldier, Private 2nd Class Shimura, returned to his unit at about 11:00 p.m. on July 7 (20 minutes after the first Chinese attack).
Furthermore, the Japanese apprised Wang Lingzhai, the mayor of Wanping, of Shimura’s return at 2:00 a.m. on July 8.12
Therefore, Jin Zhenzhong’s allegation that Japanese troops demanded admittance to the town of Wanping “at about 8:00 a.m. on July 8” under the pretext that one of their soldiers was missing was clearly of his own invention, as Professor Hata and Dokkyo University professor Nakamura Akira have indicated.13 Since it is obvious that Japanese troops were engaging in lawful maneuvers on July 7, Jin may have been attempting to place the blame for the incident on the Japanese.
The Japanese military had no intention of engaging in hostilities with Chinese troops. As defense attorney Lazarus indicated in his opening statement at the Tokyo Trials (International Military Tribunal for the Far East),14 Lieutenant-General Tashiro, commander-in-chief of the North China Garrison, was gravely ill at the time. In fact, he died shortly after the incident occurred, so obviously was in no position to issue orders from his sickbed.
Then, who fired the first shots at Marco Polo Bridge? Professor Hata believes that the soldiers of the 29th Chinese Army did, but accidentally. Professor Nakamura concurs that the 29th Army was responsible, but concludes that even if the first shots were fired by accident, the subsequent, intentional escalation was perpetrated by communist elements within the 29th Army.15
On two occasions, the Japanese resolved to send out a punitive expedition, but withdrew the orders both times. The Nationalist government, however, instigated the Langfang (July 25) and Guanganmen (July 26) incidents, violating the armistice. On July 28, the Japanese abandoned the non-aggressive stance they had maintained during the three weeks following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and went to battle. A renewed, massive Japanese offensive resulted in Chinese troops’ abandoning Beijing and Tianjin and fleeing south. On July 29, the Japanese completed their sweep of Beijing and Tianjin.
However, reports of the events that had transpired distorted the facts. The Nationalist-controlled Nanking Broadcasting Company emitted a spurious bulletin, i.e., that Chiang Kai-shek had routed Japanese troops at Marco Polo Bridge, and then resolved to overthrow the autonomous, anti-communist Yidong government headed by pro-Japanese Yin Rugeng of Tongzhou. The soldiers of Tongzhou believed this fabrication. Then, either because they deemed it prudent to change sides in the face of a Nationalist attack, or because they harbored resentment against the Japanese, they brutally massacred Japanese settlers in that city, located 25 kilometers east of Beijing.16

The Tongzhou Massacre
According to an official statement, issued on August 2, and an oral report (presented on August 4 by the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Overseas Information Division, and recorded in Volume 3 of Defense Exhibits Rejected by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East), the incident erupted at 4:00 a.m. on July 29, 1937. Some 3,000 soldiers from the Tongzhou Peace Preservation Corps surrounded the Japanese garrison’s barracks, where approximately 110 soldiers were stationed, and proceeded to raid Japanese shops, inns, and private homes. Approximately 200 of the 380 Japanese residents of Tongzhou were slaughtered. The 120 who survived did so only because they fled to the barracks, seeking refuge, before they were surrounded.17
The Overseas Information Division director’s oral report follows.
The Chinese had intended to massacre every single Japanese resident, including women and children. Most of the women were abducted. After being tortured for 24 hours, they were dragged through the streets (some by the ropes with which their hands and feet had been bound, others by wires that had been forced through their noses or throats), and killed outside the East Gate. The corpses were dumped into a nearby pond. Some of the bodies had been coated with a virulent poison, which corroded the skin on their faces, rendering them unrecognizable.18
These acts were flagrant violations of international law relating to the conduct of war (hereafter referred to as “international law”). Four days after the incident, the aforementioned director officially condemned the Chinese troops for the abduction, rape, and slaughter of Japanese citizens. Defense attorneys submitted his statement to the Tokyo Trials, but it was rejected by William Webb, the presiding justice, without explanation. The Allies were unwilling to allow any mention of the Tongzhou Massacre in the courtroom.19
The rejection notwithstanding, on April 25, 1947, 10 years after the massacre, defense attorney Levine called Kayashima Takashi (a former lieutenant-general in the Japanese Army) to the witness stand.
According to Volume 5 of Reports of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Kayashima was concurrently commander of the Tianjin Infantry and the 2nd Infantry Regiment (also stationed in China). His unit was among those that rushed to Tongzhou to rescue the Japanese settlers. He arrived on the scene at 4:00 p.m. on July 30, the day after the massacre.
The scene inside the town was ghastly. Brutally murdered bodies of Japanese settlers were lying everywhere. Most of them had ropes tied around their necks. I had to force myself to look at the mutilated corpses of women and innocent children.
I no longer have the report I wrote at the time. I have relied on my memories for this statement. But I assure you that what I witnessed was so horrifying that I will never be able to forget it.
I went to a restaurant (I think it was called Asahiken) to investigate. There were seven or eight women there, ranging in age from 17 or 18 to 40. They had all been raped, and then shot to death as they lay naked on the floor. Four or five of them had been stabbed in the genitals with bayonets. … The living quarters had been ransacked, and all the furniture, bedding, and clothing stolen. The situation was virtually the same at the homes of the other Japanese victims.
The scene at the Kinsuiro Inn was gruesome. Since many of the Japanese had gathered there, sensing danger, there had been mass carnage. … The owner of Kinsuiro and the maids had been tied together, raped, and decapitated.20 [Italics supplied.]
When Lieutenant-General Kayashima’s testimony had ended, former Army Major Katsura Shizuo took the witness stand. Katsura was deputy commander of the 2nd Regiment’s infantry gun detachment, sent to Tongzhou as reinforcements. His detachment arrived there at 2:30 a.m. on July 31. His horrific eyewitness account of the tragedy follows.
When I walked through the gate to the Kinsuiro Inn, I was shocked at its transformation. It was in ruins. I was nauseated by the stench of the corpses. … I went into the combination service area and office. There I found a man and two women dead, lying on their sides or face down. I don’t know if the women had been raped, but it was clear that the victims had tried to fight off their attackers. The man’s eyes had been gouged out, and his torso was riddled with bullets.
I went to a cafe that I had visited a year before the tragedy. When I opened the door, nothing seemed to have been disturbed. At first I thought that the cafe had been spared, but when I investigated further, I saw the body of a naked woman in one of the booths. She had been strangled with a rope. Behind the cafe was a house where a Japanese family lived. There I saw a mother and child who had been slaughtered. The child’s fingers had been hacked off.
There was a Japanese-owned store near the South Gate. The body of a man, probably the owner, who had been dragged outside and killed, had been dumped on the road. His body had been cut open, exposing his ribs and his intestines, which had spilled out onto the ground.21 [Italics supplied.]
The last witness Levine called to the stand was Sakurai Fumio, a former Army major. The platoon Sakurai headed, attached to the 2nd Regiment, was also part of the reinforcements that entered the town on July 30. He had ample opportunity to observe the devastation that had been wrought.
When we passed through the East Gate of the garrison, the first thing we saw was the mutilated bodies of Japanese settlers of both sexes, lying on the ground just about every few yards. Every one of us was overcome with grief and anger. Since we detected no signs of the enemy, we concentrated on rescuing the survivors, until midnight. We went to every home, calling out repeatedly, “Are there any Japanese here?” During the course of our inspection, the survivors began to crawl out from their hiding places . from trash and garbage containers, from inside the moat, from behind walls. Among them were children whose noses had been pierced with wire, just like cattle. There were old women, now one-armed, the other arm having been chopped off. And there were pregnant women whose bellies had been stabbed with bayonets.
Inside a restaurant, a whole family had been slaughtered. The enemy had cut off their arms. Every woman over 14 or 15 had been raped. It was a pitiful sight.
When I entered another restaurant, Asahiken, I saw the corpses of seven or eight women lying on the floor, naked. They had been raped before they were killed. A broom protruded from the genitals of one of them, where it had been shoved. The mouth of another had been stuffed with dirt. The belly of yet another had been sliced open, vertically. It was truly a dreadful sight.
There was a pond near a Korean-owned shop, at the East Gate. In it I saw the corpses of a family of six. Their necks and hands had been bound with rope, and then pierced with No. 8 wire. They had then been tied together with the same wire, and obviously dragged for a distance before they died. The water in the pond was red from all the blood.22 [Italics supplied.]
The Japanese settlers were cruelly and brutally murdered. But the methods by which they were slaughtered have been used by the Chinese since ancient times.
Sima Qian (Ssu-ma Ch’ien) (c. 145 BC – c. 86 BC), in Chapter 1 of the “Book of Customs and Manners” of Shiji (Historical Records), writes that “Emperor Zhou (the last emperor of the Shang Dynasty) cut open Bi Gan’s chest. The emperor captured Ji Zi and, creating a new method of execution, burned him to death. Emperor Zhou also killed innocent people.”23
Similarly, in Chapter 9 of the “Book of Lu Hou”, he writes that “the Empress Dowager cut off Madame Qi’s arms and legs, put out her eyes, burned off her ears, forced her to drink a potion that made her deaf, caged her in a tiny room, and named her the ‘Human Pig.’”24
Apparently Lu Hou had married Emperor Gao Zu, the founder of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. -220 A.D.) when he was still a peasant known as Liu Bang. She was an extremely strong-willed woman. After Liu Bang’s death, Lu Hou declared her son Xiao Hui emperor, and became the empress dowager. When she transformed Madame Qi, whom the late Emperor had adored, into the “Human Pig,” even Xiao Hui was astonished, and agonized over her cruelty.
In Chapter 6 of “Book of the First Emperor,” Sima Qian writes that Emperor Zheng killed disobedient subordinates, and mutilated their corpses.25
Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government, as distinguished a chronicle as Historical Records, states that in 279, Wu King Sun Quan stripped the skin from his victims’ faces, and gouged out their eyes. The corpse of Hou Jing, the mastermind of the Hou Jing Rebellion, was disinterred and eaten by soldiers and civilians, who fought over it.26
According to Hallett Abend’s Tortured China, in the 1920’s, the flesh of law-abiding Chinese citizens was pierced with wire, which was then used to tie them together. Entire families were slaughtered, and the corpses of women whose arms and legs had been chopped off lay at the roadsides.27
In Journal of a Career Officer, Lieutenant-General Sasaki Toichi describes a uniquely Chinese means of intimidation, namely, gouging out the victim’s eyes, which Sasaki had the misfortune to experience personally.28 Agnes Smedley also mentions an instance in which that barbaric act was perpetrated in The Great Road.29 The Journal of Tanaka Seigen tells the story of Luo Yinong, a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee. Luo was captured by Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers, subjected to torture, during which both his eyes were gouged out, and later executed.30
Edgar Snow describes, in Red Star Over China, having encountered the bodies of some men killed by Chinese soldiers: “Their skin had been stripped from them, their eyes gouged out, and their ears and noses cut off.”31 Smedley also mentions having seen a victim’s severed head on display.32
Savage acts of this sort were committed frequently, even during Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. In China Wakes, coauthored by Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, there is an account of an incident arising from the confiscation of communiques issued by dissident Zheng Yi. The principals of a number of middle schools, deemed anti-revolutionary elements, were brutally murdered.
Afterwards, their flesh was fried and eaten. Human bodies were hung on meat hooks in government-operated restaurants.33
During the Tongzhou Massacre, Chinese soldiers pierced the noses of their enemies with wire, just as one would do to an ox. They pierced their hands with wire, and tied their bodies together. They slit their victims’ bellies vertically, exposing their intestines. They cut out their eyes. One can find accounts of combat techniques like these in Chinese records, since they have been used throughout history, from ancient times to the present.
The Tongzhou Massacre on July 29 was followed by a rash of similar incidents in which Japanese soldiers stationed in Tanggu and Tianjin were ambushed. As defense attorney Lazarus mentioned in his opening statement at the Tokyo Trials, every action taken by Japanese military personnel was defensive.34 The Japanese made a concerted effort to settle these incidents locally. But the Chinese persisted, and the incidents escalated, from Marco Polo Bridge, through Tongzhou, to Tianjin.

The Shanghai Incident
A peace conference at which these incidents were to be addressed was scheduled to be held in Shanghai on August 9. However, on that day, in Shanghai, Navy Sublieutenant Oyama Isao (posthumously promoted to lieutenant) and 1st Class Seaman Saito Yozo were murdered by Chinese Peace Preservation Corps soldiers. Needless to say, the negotiations never took place. In fact, the Chinese may very well have orchestrated the incident to avoid holding the conference.
For instance, in Travels in China, a translation of which appeared in the September 1938 issue of China, published by Toa Dobunkai, the author, Claude Farrere, writes that Oyama was lured into a cleverly set trap, and mowed down by Chinese soldiers wielding machine guns.35
The Japanese soldiers maintained a surprising degree of calmness. They followed the example set by the Roman police force . the best in the world. Not one of the Japanese laid a hand on either the automobile or the bodies. They summoned the Chinese mayor of Shanghai, and the British, French, and American police authorities, who arrived promptly.
The authorities began their investigation. A Chinese soldier had been killed, and his body was lying on the road about 100 paces away. The unanimous conclusion reached after the on-site inspection was as follows.
The unfortunate Chinese soldier had been shot in the back with an automatic pistol by one of his comrades. His body was then dragged to a location where it would create the impression that there had been a confrontation, setting the stage for the assassination of the Japanese.36
The Chinese soldier was shot not by Sublieutenant Oyama, but by another Chinese soldier, in the back. Every one of the investigators arrived at this conclusion . there were no objections. Farrere’s account is consistent with Japanese records of the incident. The investigation discredited the Chinese claim that Oyama was shot in self-defense, after he had shot a Chinese soldier.
The Current Situation in China, published in 1938 by the Toa Dobunkai, carried a report of the results of an investigation conducted by a Japanese naval landing party. Apparently Oyama sustained fatal wounds from bullets that entered the back of his head, and died instantly. After his death, the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps inflicted further injuries: “His head was split in two, half of his face had been obliterated, and his intestines were protruding.37 There was a hole in his heart the size of a fist.” Oyama had been the victim of an assassination.
Edouard Helsey, the China correspondent for a Paris newspaper, wrote an article entitled Witness to The Second Sino-Japanese War, which appeared in translation in the August 1, 1938 issue of International News Pamphlet.
An unfortunate incident occurred on August 9, in which a Japanese naval officer was murdered by Chinese sentinels from the Rainbow (Hong) Bridge Airfield. Perhaps the Japanese officer should have been more cautious, but there is no denying that this was a Chinese plot. It is clear that the Nanking government had decided to go to battle in Shanghai at least 15 days prior to this incident.
Their plan was not simply to split the Japanese forces in South China, but also to entice them into the Neutral Zone, which act would certainly cause international problems. It was a malicious trick, this engineering of incident upon incident, the misinterpretation of which would sway public opinion in the West.
Chiang Kai-shek himself concurred that that was his intention, and he seemed rather pleased with himself. When I met with him at the end of October (1937) in Nanking, I asked him the following question.
“That was a clever ploy, since Shanghai is a thorn in Japan’s side. Until it is extracted, the Japanese will be paralyzed, will they not?”
Chiang replied, through an interpreter: “You are right. I believe it was successful.” At that time, the Japanese government and military authorities were attempting to avoid a war. They viewed an attack on Shanghai as a real danger.38
One of the aims of the Chinese in perpetrating the Shanghai attack was, as Helsey indicates, to convince the rest of the world that Japan and China were at war by initiating hostilities in Shanghai.
Shanghai, with the French Settlement and the International Settlement at its center, was the perfect arena. If war should break out between China and Japan, the Western world would certainly hear about it. Residents of the foreign concessions and news correspondents would be able to view the battle from an ideal vantage point. That was part of Chiang’s plan.

Chiang’s German Military Advisors
One of the reasons behind Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to launch an attack in Shanghai lay in improved military preparedness in that city. Five years earlier, in 1932, Chiang had recruited a 60-member military advisory team headed by General Hans von Seeckt, who had been the guiding force in the remodeling of the German army, to Nanking. The Germans advised Chiang to construct a network of pillboxes throughout the unarmed sector of Shanghai. Chiang heeded their advice.39
On July 12, Chiang Kai-shek issued extensive mobilization orders. He ordered his Central Army, consisting of 10 divisions, to Shanghai. On August 11, approximately 12,000 regulars masquerading as Peace Preservation Corps personnel were dispatched to what had been designated as a demilitarized zone in a truce between Japan and China in 1932. Since the truce specified that no armaments would be permitted in Shanghai, Chiang’s orders constituted a grave violation.
Upon the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, approximately 22,000 Japanese residing on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River were evacuated to Shanghai. On August 11, Japan dispatched a naval landing party of 4,000 to Shanghai, to protect the lives and property of Japanese citizens. But by then, the Chinese force, shielded by pillboxes and creeks, had already swelled to 150,000. Therefore, the Japanese government decided to send two more divisions from Japan to Shanghai on August 13.40
On the night of August 14, five days after Sublieutenant Oyama was assassinated, as hostilities and tension heightened, Chinese Air Force planes bombed Shanghai. Several aircraft flew toward Shanghai at 10:00 a.m., and dropped bombs on the Japanese Consulate, Naval Landing Force Headquarters, Japanese warships, and on the streets of Shanghai. At about 4:00 p.m., a dozen aircraft bombed the moored warship Izumo, the French Settlement, and the International Settlement.41
An entry in The China Year Book 1938 reads “Chinese planes drop bombs in International Settlement.” Those bombs killed 1,741 persons and wounded 1,868. Most of the victims were Chinese. The Chinese Air Force had intentionally dropped bombs on its own people, setting a world record, however disgraceful.42
On the night of August 14, Japanese naval aircraft bombed airfields all over China. On August 15, Chiang Kai-shek established his GHQ, and issued nationwide mobilization orders. He divided China into four battle sectors, and installed himself as commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force. It was on that day that full-scale hostilities between Japan and China commenced.
The following account appears in a middle-school history textbook published by Kyoiku Shuppan: “Japan was attempting to make inroads into North China. In July 1937, there was an encounter between Japanese and Chinese soldiers in the outskirts of Beijing, initiated by the Japanese. … The Second Sino-Japanese War had begun.”43 This account notwithstanding, that encounter was not initiated by the Japanese, nor did they have any aggressive intentions.
Hallett Abend, who was in Shanghai at the time, dispatched a report to The New York Times, in which he wrote that the Japanese, wishing to avoid at all costs a recurrence of the Shanghai Incident,
had been exceedingly forbearing. They had made every effort to prevent the situation from worsening, but were coerced into war by the Chinese, who were determined to involve the foreign concessions in China in the turmoil.44
The account in the aforementioned textbook is refuted by Abend’s statement that Japan was coerced into war in Shanghai by Chinese who wished to draw foreign interests in China into the conflict. Abend’s analysis is identical to that of correspondent Helsey. It is very likely that Chiang Kai-shek intended to convince European and American residents of Shanghai that Japan and China were at war and, by forcing Japanese troops to enter Shanghai’s neutral zone, attract international attention and, possibly, intervention.
On August 13, Army General Matsui Iwane was dispatched to Shanghai as commander-in-chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, to protect Japanese lives and property from the full-scale warfare that had erupted between China and Japan. The Expeditionary Force began landing . the 3rd Division at Wusong, and the 11th Division at Chuanshazhen.
Chinese forces, already superior in numbers, were further augmented. The buildup occurred at a frenzied pace, with at least one division being added per day. By early September, nearly 40,000 Japanese soldiers had landed, but Chinese troops numbered 190,000 on the front lines alone. The rear echelons had swelled to 270,000 soldiers. By early October, 70,000 Japanese soldiers had landed, but they now faced Chinese forces 700,000 strong.45
Consequently, the 10th Army, commanded by Army Lieutenant-General Yanagawa Heisuke, was mobilized on October 12. It comprised the 18th and 114th divisions from Japan, the 6th Division from North China, and the Kunisaki Detachment of the 5th Division. The 10th Army landed in Hangzhou on November 5. Meanwhile, the 16th Division from North China (part of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force), landed at Baimaojiang on the upper reaches of the Yangtze.
Having landed at Hangzhou Bay, the 10th Army attacked Chinese troops from Shanghai from the rear. The Chinese soldiers immediately panicked and fled. Shanghai finally fell, seven days later, on November 12.
It had taken Japanese forces three months to quell the second Shanghai Incident. According to Volume 1 of Army Operations During the Second Sino-Japanese War, part of the Military History Series, approximately 20,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, and 60,000 wounded.
In the first Shanghai Incident (1932), 3,000 lives were lost. Japanese casualties six years later, in the second incident, were so severe as to defy comparison. This was a tremendous waste of lives, the worst for Japanese soldiers since the Russo-Japanese War.46 The German military advisory staff had advised the Chinese to erect pillboxes in Shanghai, which were the cause of innumerable Japanese casualties. As John Rabe wrote in The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe, it was the German military advisors who trained the Chinese soldiers who fought so fiercely in Shanghai. 47

Order To Attack Nanking Issued
The first Japanese troops mobilized to the Shanghai conflict were the members of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, followed quickly by the 10th Army. Since a unit that would coordinate the movements of these two armies was needed, the CCAA (Central China Area Army) was established to fulfill that role. General Matsui Iwane, commander-in-chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, was appointed commander-in chief of the CCAA.
Meanwhile, Chinese troops that had retreated from Shanghai were fleeing to the capital, Nanking. On November 22, the Central China Area Army sent a cable to Headquarters of the General Staff in Tokyo, which read, “Nanking must be attacked.” (A reading of General Matsui’s diary, War Journal, and Major-General Kawabe Torashiro Recalls the War with China suggests that some CCAA officers were motivated by the belief that they could defeat Chiang Kai-shek if they captured Nanking. They thought that they would have the upper hand if they acted before the routed Chinese forces had time to regroup.48)
On November 28, six days after the CCAA’s cable was transmitted, the Headquarters of the General Staff decided to attack Nanking. To communicate its decision, Tada Hayao, Subchief of the General Staff, flew to Shanghai from Japan. In War Journal, General Matsui writes, “On December 1, the Subchief of the General Staff arrived, bearing orders to attack Nanking.”49
Tada conveyed the gist of the order: “The commander-in-chief of the Central China Area Army shall attack Nanking, the capital of the enemy nation, with the cooperation of the Navy” (Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, Operation Order No. 8).50
At 7:00 p.m. on December 1, General Matsui issued an order to the CCAA (Central China Area Army Operation Order No. 25).51 The CCAA was to first seize Nanking, “in cooperation with Central China Navy warships.”
The main strength of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was next to “commence operations on or about December 5, attack eastern Nanking, concentrating its efforts on Danyang and Jurong Road. Some of its units were instructed to “attack the enemy from the rear, from the left bank of the Yangtze River.”
Similarly, the main strength of the 10th Army was to “commence operations on or about December 3,” advancing to Lishui, south of Nanking, and scattering any enemy soldiers they encountered. Part of the army was to advance to Nanking from the rear, from Wuhu. In other words, the two armies had been ordered to make a two-pronged advance. The Shanghai Expeditionary Force had been instructed to take the northern route, and the 10th Army, the southern route.
As soon as the order to attack Nanking was issued, the CCAA’s order of battle was revised. Lieutenant-General Prince Asaka Yasuhiko was appointed commander-in-chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. General Matsui remained commander-in-chief of the CCAA, and Lieutenant-General Yanagawa, commander-in-chief of the 10th Army.
The attack launched by the CCAA was sudden and swift. On December 7, the Army pressed on to an area 20 kilometers away from Nanking. On that same day, the order of battle for the capture of Nanking was issued, since the attack was imminent.52
According to that order, enemy troops were expected to react in one of two ways. If the commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps or any government officials “remained in Nanking,” the Japanese troops were to “urge them to open the gates and, once that had been done, to enter the city peacefully.” In that case, only designated units would enter Nanking and “sweep the city, dividing it into sectors.”
If the enemy soldiers “should refuse to leave their bases at the city walls,” Japanese troops were to “fire upon the walls and occupy them” and, subsequently, to “assign one infantry regiment from each division to sweep the city.”
Fields of operations for the two armies were then assigned.
5.
Fields of operations for both armies within the city shall be as follows:

Gonghe Gate (Tongji Gate), Gongyuan Road, Zhongzheng Street, Zhongzheng Road, Hanzhong Road.

6.
Gate assignments:
Expeditionary Force: Zhongshan Gate, Taiping Gate, Heping Gate
10th Army: Gonghe Gate, Zhonghua Gate, Shuixi Gate.

When Japanese troops entered Nanking, regiments were to position themselves at designated fields of operation, and sweep the enemy forces. With assigned fields of operations, Japanese soldiers were less likely to fire at each other in error. Furthermore, it would be easier to pinpoint responsibility for any wanton, unlawful acts, which were strictly forbidden.
The purpose of the invasion was to take the necessary military action to capture Nanking, not to engage in the random slaughter of its residents after the city fell.
What orders were issued to regiments that would not be entering Nanking? According to an order entitled “Action To Be Taken Upon Entering Nanking,”53 presumably issued on December 7, the main force of each division was ordered to “assemble at appropriate locations outside the city,” and was not to enter Nanking without permission. Moreover, a joint memorial service was scheduled for the war dead subsequent to the sweep.
The main purpose of the “Nanking Invasion Outline” was to prevent the commission of unlawful acts, but to further emphasize that purpose, additional orders entitled “Precautions To Be Taken When Attacking and Entering Nanking”54 were issued.
1. The entrance of the Imperial Army into the capital of a foreign nation is an enterprise of great magnitude, one that will go down in history. Since this event is destined to become known to the entire world, all units are instructed to set a standard for the future by comporting themselves honorably, and by refraining, at all costs, from looting, fighting among themselves, and committing unlawful acts. …
3.
Imperial Army personnel shall consult a map, to be provided separately, to ensure that they do not approach foreign concessions or foreign diplomatic missions. They shall also refrain from entering the zone designated, by diplomatic agreement, as neutral [the Safety Zone in Nanking], unless absolutely necessary. Sentries shall be posted to ensure that these

instructions are carried out. Furthermore, Imperial Army personnel are forbidden to enter certain areas outside the city walls, i.e., Zhongshan Tomb, where the remains of Sun Wen (Sun Yatsen) are interred, and the Ming Xiao Tomb, where the founder of the Ming Dynasty, Emperor Hong Wu, is buried.

4.
Units entering the city shall be selected with the utmost care by the relevant division commanders. Division commanders shall communicate precautions to be taken, and ensure that they are understood, taking special care to indicate the locations of foreign concessions within the city, so that absolutely no errors are made. Sentries shall be posted, if necessary.

Chief of Staff Nakayama Yasuto of the CCAA prepared maps on which he marked the locations of foreign concessions in red ink. However, at some point, some frontline units did in fact enter Nanking. At the Tokyo Trials, Nakayama testified as follows:
I was told later that they did so in the heat of the moment, in their excitement at having overcome resistance at the city walls. Furthermore, barracks or schools outside the city that might have accommodated the troops had been destroyed or burned by Chinese soldiers or civilians, leaving the Japanese soldiers with no housing. Also, there was a shortage of water outside the city. What water could be found was not potable.55
Frontline units entered the city spontaneously, propelled by their exhilaration at having finally breached the city walls. Even if they had been sent back, there was neither lodging (since all suitable structures had been burned to the ground by Chinese troops) nor water outside the city. It was midwinter, and bitter cold. We know from testimony given by Lieutenant-General Nakazawa Mitsuo, staff officer of the 16th Division, at the Tokyo Trials that “there were no houses that Japanese troops could use for shelter. Most of the units were forced to bivouac.”56
The impulsive entry of frontline soldiers into Nanking suggests that there was a marked disparity between conditions hypothesized when orders were drawn up and the events that actually occurred during the battle.
The penalties for looting or arson were extremely harsh.
Any soldier who engages in looting, or sets a fire, however
inadvertently, shall be severely punished.
The following order is probably the most pertinent one.
2. Soldiers are expected to adhere strictly to the military discipline and moral standards of their units and, respecting and revering the dignity of the Imperial Army, refrain from committing any act against Chinese military personnel or civilians that would sully its honor.
It is important to note that all Japanese military personnel were ordered “to adhere strictly to the military discipline and moral standards of their units” and to refrain from committing any act that would sully the honor of the Imperial Army. We can assume that the authority for military discipline was international law, a detailed treatment of which can be found in Chapter 5, “Points in Dispute (1).”
CHAPTER 2:

NANKING BEFORE
THE FALL

Chiang’s Scorched-Earth Strategy
On July 31, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek made public a speech by Wang Jingwei (originally Wang Zhaoming) entitled “The Final Juncture.” Chiang’s purpose in doing so was to convince the entire nation that both he and Wang were now in total agreement, and working toward the same goal. The following excerpts from that speech appear in Shanghai Sojourn by Matsumoto Shigeharu.
We are now approaching the final juncture, and we must make sacrifices, demonstrating firm resolve and courage. … We, your leaders, must sacrifice ourselves, as must all our fellow countrymen. … We must resolve to reduce every Chinese and every clod of earth to ashes, rather than render them unto the enemy. … We must leave nothing . absolutely nothing . for the enemy to claim.1
In his ardent oration, Wang Jingwei was advocating the exercise of the scorched-earth strategy. He was urging Chinese troops, when they retreated from an area, to burn everything in sight, until the town or city, regardless of its size, had been reduced to ashes. He was exhorting them to kill even Chinese, their own people, to prevent their falling into the hands of the Japanese. And this strategy, which destroyed human lives as well as property, was also embraced by Chiang Kai-shek.
Though we may, today, react with horror to such a strategy, it had been used in China for centuries. A description of the scorched-earth strategy dating back to the Jin Dynasty can be found in Jin Shu (History of the Jin Dynasty). During the Eastern Jin Dynasty (265-317), it was imperial policy to fortify (build strong walls around cities, which were vigilantly guarded), and burn (set fire to fields and allow them to burn until nothing remained).2 Another account, this one from the chronology in The History of Rebellion in China for 1798 reads: “The “fortify-and-burn” strategy begins to debilitate White Lotus Society troops.”3 (It was used to suppress an uprising of White Lotus Society soldiers.) There was nothing new about the sanguang or three-all strategy (kill all, plunder all, burn all) promulgated by Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek.

Nanking: Defend or Desert?
On November 11, two days after Shanghai fell, Chiang Kai-shek held a conference in Nanking to discuss the city’s defense. In attendance at this important meeting were Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, He Yingqin, Xu Yongchang, and Tang Shengzhi.
The opinions expressed by the participants are described in detail in the Memoirs of Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the 5th War Area, included in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1. Apparently, the first person asked to speak was Li himself, who favored withdrawing from the city.
I am opposed to defending Nanking, for strategic reasons. There is no means of escape from the city. It is possible for the enemy to surround Nanking from three directions and, in the north, the escape route is blocked by the Yangtze River. We cannot expect our troops, discouraged by defeat, to protect the city during a long siege.4
Historically, no fortress has ever withstood an attack. Moreover, recent, bitter defeats have diminished our soldiers’ morale, while morale within the enemy ranks has never been higher, since they sense that victory is near. Nanking will surely be conquered.5
Li objected to defending Nanking for two reasons . the city’s geographical situation, and the low morale of Chinese troops. He then offered two proposals.
If we declare Nanking an undefended city, the enemy would have no justification for arson, or for the murder of the city’s inhabitants. We could arrange a withdrawal of large forces to both banks of the Yangtze, thus preventing enemy troops from advancing either northward or westward. We must ensure that the enemy’s capture of Nanking, should that occur, has no major significance within the context of the war.6 [Italics supplied.]
The first proposal, declaring Nanking an undefended city, was a significant one. In the language of international law, the terms used are undefended places and open cities. According to the International Law Dictionary compiled by the International Law Society of Japan, “areas in which no resistance is made against an attempt to occupy them, even if a garrison is situated there, are termed ‘undefended areas.’ In such areas, firing is restricted to military targets.” 7
Thus, if Nanking were declared an “open city,” and no attempt were made to use it as a relay station for military transport, the city would come under the protection of international law . provided, that is, that Chinese troops in Nanking did not resist the invaders. The Japanese might have occupied the city without any bloodshed.
But we must also direct our attention to Li’s second proposal: everything possible should be done so that, in the event Japanese forces did capture Nanking, their victory would have absolutely no strategic merit. Li was simply restating Wang Jingwei’s version of the scorched-earth strategy. “We must resolve to reduce every Chinese and every clod of earth to ashes, rather than render them unto the enemy.” Since he submitted both proposals at the same time, Li Zongren’s intention was to burn Nanking to the ground so that it could not be used for military purposes, and then declare it an open city.
The next person consulted was General Bai Chongxi. Like Li Zongren, Bai replied that he was in favor of abandoning Nanking. Then Chiang, who had been growing increasingly irritated, spoke out.
Nanking is our capital. The father of our nation [Sun Yatsen] is buried here. We simply cannot retreat from the city without putting up any resistance. I am personally in favor of defending Nanking to the death.8
Sun Yatsen had died in Beijing. His remains had been temporarily installed at Xishan, on the outskirts of that city. The opportunistic Chiang had arranged for them to be transferred to Zhongshan Mausoleum, on the side of Zijinshan, outside Nanking. He had wanted to demonstrate to the entire world that he was Sun’s successor. And now, supposedly because Sun’s mausoleum was in Nanking, Chiang was determined to defend the city to the last man.
Chiang then questioned He Yingqin and Xu Yongchang. However, once Chiang had said that he would defend Nanking to the death, the two men could hardly speak candidly. Both He (Chief of Staff) and Xu (Chief of the Naval General Staff) said that they would act in accordance with the Chairman’s (Chiang’s) wishes.
Then, Chiang turned to General Alexander von Falkenhausen, leader of his second team of German military advisors. The first team was headed by General von Seekt, the man responsible for rebuilding the German Army, who had arrived in Nanking in 1932.
Von Falkenhausen, who assumed the position of chief advisor in 1934, was promoted to senior advisor to the Nationalist government the following year. (In 1938, when the entire German team departed, von Falkenhausen left Hankou for Germany. In 1940, he was appointed military commander of the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern France.
When asked, at the conference, by Chiang Kai-shek for his opinion, von Falkenhausen stated, as one might expect of a military advisor, that he was in agreement with Li’s proposal to abandon Nanking. He urged Chiang to avoid needless sacrifices.
Thus far, no one had come out in support of Chiang’s hard-line stance. Then Chiang questioned Tang Shengzhi. The latter jumped to his feet, and launched into a tirade.
The enemy is now pressing toward our capital, the site of the tomb where the father of our nation is laid to rest. To declare that we shall not suffer the loss of one or two generals in Nanking, because we are threatened by a powerful enemy, is an insult not only to the departed spirit of our president [Sun Yatsen], but also to our supreme commander [Chiang Kai-shek]. I propose that we defend Nanking to the death . that we fight the enemy to the bitter end.9
Chiang was ecstatic. He immediately promised to appoint Tang commander-in-chief of the Nanking Garrison (Nanking Defense Corps). Tang responded with a vow: “I shall devote myself, body and soul, to the defense of Nanking. 10 The city’s fate shall be my fate.” This animated, uncompromising outburst eclipsed the other, more rational argument, i.e., abandoning Nanking.
According to the Memoirs of Li Zongren, once installed as commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, Tang Shengzhi reiterated, this time publicly, his pledge to cast his lot with Nanking. Upon orders from Chiang Kai-shek, he pressed both soldiers and civilians into service in his frantic rush to fortify the city. 11

Chiang Kai-shek’s “Fortify-and-burn” Strategy
Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to expedite the construction of double (sometimes triple) pillbox emplacements outside the massive walls surrounding Nanking. This was the “fortification” aspect of his “fortify-and-burn” strategy. The following report from Nanking appeared in the December 1 issue of The New York Times, under the headline “Nanking Prepares To Resist Attack.”
Eight of Nanking’s city-wall gates were closed tonight in preparation for the Japanese attack. Soldiers built sandbag barricades and barbed-wire entanglements at the other four gates. A telephone communication system was set up to link defense positions commanding land and river approaches to the city.
Directed by army officers, a thousand Chinese civilians reinforced existing gun emplacements, concrete pillboxes and dugouts with a trench network extending thirty miles from the city in seven semicircular rings ending at the Yangtze River, which bounds Nanking on two sides.12
Actually, according to Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 3, triple emplacements were constructed, and the semicircular rings of trench networks numbered 27 in total. 13 What is of particular interest here is that 1,000 noncombatants were mobilized for this military operation.
Even boy soldiers were mobilized. They were spotted at an artillery school in Tangshan, an area famous for its hot springs, 20 kilometers east of Nanking. On December 7, 1937, correspondent Tillman Durdin sent the following special dispatch to The New York Times.
Between Tangshan and Nanking barricades were ready along the highway every mile or so, and nearer the capital there raged huge fires set by the Chinese in the course of clearing the countryside of buildings that might protect the invaders from gunfire. In one valley a whole village was ablaze. … Boy camp followers were numerous in the Tangshan area. These lads, 10 to 12 years old, are uniformed regulars serving as messengers, bearers and cooks, and sometimes in the very front lines they seem to enjoy the war as a game.14
The mobilization of boy soldiers does not constitute a violation of international law, as long as they are wearing uniforms. However, if boy soldiers were mobilized, we can assume that most of the young men in the city were drafted. Even without Durdin’s account, we know that Chiang Kai-shek, in his attempts to fortify Nanking, issued orders to “muster any and every able-bodied citizen.” 15
Then Chiang unleashed his scorched-earth strategy, with a vengeance. Zhenjiang (located east of Nanking), the former capital of Jiangsu Province, had a population of 200,000. As the Japanese approached, Chinese troops set fire to the city, which was soon enveloped in flames. The December 12 edition of The New York Times reported that Zhenjiang had been reduced to ruins. 16 Durdin described this desperate strategy in action in a special dispatch from Nanking on December 8.
The burning of obstructions within the defense zone by the Chinese continued. Palatial homes of Chinese officials in the Mausoleum Park district were among the places burned late yesterday.
The city was ringed by a dense pall of smoke, for the Chinese also continued to burn buildings and obstructions yesterday in towns in a ten-mile radius.
This correspondent, motoring to the front, found the entire valley outside Chungshan Gate, southeast of Mausoleum Park, ablaze. The village of Hsiaolingwei, along the main highway bordering the park, was a mass of smoking ruins, and inhabitants who had not evacuated days before were streaming toward Nanking carrying their few miserable belongings and occasionally pausing to take last sorrowing looks at their former homes.17
The burning was not restricted to the area to the east of Nanking. The Yangtze River flows to the west and north of the city. Japanese troops were advancing along its south bank toward Nanking from Shanghai. Since the Chinese military believed that hostilities would break out to the east and south of Nanking, they burned the densely populated Zhonghua Gate (South Gate) district, after forcibly evacuating its residents. 18
Xiaguan wharf in northern Nanking was also incinerated. On the night of December 9, flames rose from the eastern and northern sections of the city. 19
Villages located near principal roads leading to the front line, east of Nanking, were reduced to smoldering ruins. 20 As Durdin indicated in his December 9th dispatch from Nanking, this scorched-earth strategy, this burning of entire cities and towns to the ground, was a defensive tactic used by the Chinese military but, militarily, it was ineffective. 21 The only way in which it hampered Japanese troops was in forcing them to bivouac since, as the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (December 10 edition) reported, “not one building remained.”

Nanking’s Residents Flee
After Shanghai fell, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces lost battle after battle. Consequently, he opted to abandon Nanking and move his capital elsewhere, despite having declared that he would defend Nanking to the death.
According to The Current Situation in China (published by Toa Dobunkai), Chiang announced his decision on November 16, ordering government ministries and agencies to depart from Nanking within three days. Nationalist government agencies moved to three different locations. The five main branches (executive, legislative, control, judicial, and examination), moved to Chongqing. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Finance relocated to Hankou. The ministries of communications and industry moved to Changsha. 22
However, the relocation of the Nationalist government was not publicly announced until noon on November 20. 23 A week later, on November 27, Commander-in-Chief Tang Shengzhi issued a notice to foreign residents of Nanking, urging them to leave, and warning that he could not guarantee the safety of anyone in the city, not even foreigners.
Once they learned that even foreigners were in danger, middle-class and wealthy Chinese residents began a hasty exodus from Nanking. They did so not because a Japanese attack on the city was imminent, but because they knew that Chinese troops would soon be abandoning Nanking as well. They had not forgotten the words of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei: “We must resolve to reduce every Chinese and every clod of earth to ashes, rather than render them unto the enemy.”

A German Woman’s Last Days in Nanking
Lily Abegg was the China correspondent for the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung, and one of the many foreign residents who fled Nanking. She is presumed to have boarded a boat provided by the British Embassy on November 29, along with British citizens and a few Germans.
Safe in Hankou and ensconced in the Foreign Ministry, Abegg wrote an account entitled “Escape from Nanking: Our Last Days in China’s Capital,” and sent it off to Frankfurt. Her article, excerpts from which follow, appeared in the December 19 edition of the Frankfurter Zeitung.
The last sights I saw in Nanking were endless lines of evacuees, boarded-up houses and shops, and troops rushing in to defend the capital, the air-raid siren wailing all the while. Rickshaws and automobiles were piled high with packing crates, bundles, furniture, and humanity. Crowds of departing residents were on the move at all hours of the day and night. One by one, the shops closed down. Since the electricity in most of the houses had already been turned off, merchants were selling off their remaining stock by candlelight. It was impossible to find packing crates or brown paper anywhere . the shops were all sold out. Last week about 200,000 people left Nanking. One million souls once inhabited the city, but their numbers had dwindled to 350,000. Now there are at most 150,000 people remaining, but the waves of evacuees seem interminable.24
According to Abegg’s estimate, the population of Nanking was “at most 150,000.” This was, of course, only an estimate. Everyone was preoccupied with the evacuation, and no one knew the correct figures.
Incidentally, after the 1934 rezoning of every province and city, Nanking included, in addition to six districts within the city, three rural districts outside its walls: Yanziji to the north, Xiaoling to the southeast, and Shangxinhe to the southwest.
Consequently, Nanking’s population swelled to 973,000 (the population of the three districts outside the city was approximately 150,000). These figures are based on a survey taken by the Nanking city government in June 1936, and appear in Nanking, published by the Nanking Japanese Chamber of Commerce.25
There are conflicting views about the population figures. In 1936, the same year the Nanking city government survey was conducted, the Ministry of the Interior issued population statistics that were cited in The China Year Book 1938. The figure for Nanking was 1,019,000. 26
Thus, Chinese censuses and other population surveys tended to be inaccurate, and remain so. According to Ko Bunyu’s The Real China, someone asked Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, during his visit to Japan in 1983, what the population of China was. He replied, “Only God knows.”27 Even today, the People’s Republic of China is not in possession of accurate population statistics.

Abegg’s account continues:
The past three days have been chaotic ones. People who had been vacillating suddenly began frenzied preparations for evacuation. We received confirmation that government agencies had either completed their preparations for departure, or had already left Nanking, and that Chiang Kai-shek and his GHQ would be leaving shortly.28
Chiang remained in Nanking until December 7. Everyone knew that the Chinese forces would be defeated, even if he remained there. An article in the December 9 edition of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun reports that many residents of Nanking believed that Chinese troops would withdraw sooner or later. 29 The rumor spread that the military was going to set fire to Nanking, though city authorities denied it vociferously. Despite the denial, still more fearful residents left Nanking. No form of transportation was to be seen . even rickshaws had disappeared.
The exodus became a competition. Automobiles were very difficult to obtain. Government agencies were seizing trucks from one another. Automobiles were priced at several thousand dollars. Waves of evacuees thronged the wharf at Xiaguan. There was no other choice for them but to move forward, up the Yangtze River. The flood of humanity surging toward Xiaguan, hoping to board a ship, defies description.30
Nanking is situated on the south bank of the Yangtze River. If they were to avoid Japanese troops advancing from Shanghai, the evacuees had no choice but to proceed to the north bank. Therefore, they thronged to Xiaguan, on the banks of the Yangtze. From about November 20 to the beginning of December, there was an endless stream of evacuees extending from the center of Nanking, for three miles, to the Yangtze.
Eventually, preoccupation with the evacuation, which had eclipsed everything else, gave way, to some extent, to preparation for war. As civilians left Nanking, soldiers poured in. These were soldiers from other regions, and a varied and sundry lot they were. Soldiers from Guangxi in the south wore cotton uniforms and straw hats . some of them painted in the green-and-yellow camouflage pattern . just like automobiles . but they seemed well-disciplined. All of them carried rifles over their shoulders, not a common sight where local armies are concerned. Compared with the Guangxi soldiers, the Sichuan troops were a sorry sight. Their legs and feet were bare. Their uniforms were of poor quality, and in tatters. They looked as ragged as the most destitute coolie. A few of the soldiers at the vanguard carried rifles, but those following them carried only stout sticks and packs. 31 [Italics supplied.]
According to Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 3, by Unemoto Masami, most of the units defending Nanking were from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan.32 Abegg may have been misinformed. In any case, her account provides us with a good picture of the Nanking Defense Corps: a motley, uncontrolled collection of soldiers, most of them from other regions of China.
Wherever we went, we could see that order was giving way to chaos. A train carrying 2,000 wounded soldiers arrived at Nanking Station, but no one paid it any heed. There were no medical corpsmen with them. The soldiers were ignored for two days, and finally unloaded along with those who had died in the meantime, and lined up on the station platform. The corpses emitted a horrible stench, polluting the air. Evacuees fleeing the city simply stepped over the wounded soldiers, jostling them with their baggage. Members of the Relief Committee, all foreigners, asked government agencies to send ambulances. They were told that, yes, there were a few ambulances, but there was no gasoline, and no money to buy any. … The Chinese simply stood about, indifferent.33
Lily Abegg must have stopped at Nanking Station, which was adjacent to the Xiaguan wharf, before boarding her boat. The situation in Nanking two weeks before its fall was very sad indeed, the city’s train station filled with dead and wounded soldiers, and its government offices so preoccupied with relocation preparations that no money could be found to buy gasoline for ambulances.

The Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone
The inhabitants of Nanking fled the city in droves. Those who remained there were, as Professor Miner Searle Bates observed, “the poorest of the population.”34 Obviously, there was a need for a neutral zone where ordinary citizens could find refuge once war broke out in the city.
Foreign residents of Nanking proposed the establishment of a “Nanking Safety Zone.” They were inspired by the Jacquinot Zone, a safety zone established in November 1937 in Nanshi, southern Shanghai, at the urging of Father Jacquinot, a Jesuit priest. 35
As Archibald Steele wrote in the Chicago Daily News, Americans were the chief proponents of the Nanking Safety Zone, and were instrumental in its establishment. Among them, Bates stands out for his unstinting efforts. He was a professor at the University of Nanking, and well-known in the city for his missionary activities.
From the time of its establishment, George Fitch, secretary of the International Committee of the YMCA, headed the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. Lewis Smythe, also a professor at the University of Nanking, served as the Committee’s secretary.
Though the major roles on the Committee were assumed by Americans, John Rabe, a German businessman, was invited to serve as chairman, in light of the relationship between Japan and Germany. Other members were Rev. John Magee (chairman of the Nanking Committee of the International Red Cross), the Rev. W. Plumer Mills, and Charles Riggs, all Americans; and Eduard Sperling, a German. (Here, the designation “Rev.” has been applied to both missionaries and clergymen.)
Most of the 15 members of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone were missionaries, university professors, physicians, or businessmen. And most of them were Americans (seven), but the Committee’s membership also included four Englishmen, three Germans, and a Dane. 36
According to Rabe’s diary, the establishment of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone was formally announced on November 29, 1937. A headquarters was set up at No. 5 Ninghai Road. The Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, issued later, stated that the premises “had been kindly provided by the German Embassy.”37

The Nanking Safety Zone
A week earlier, on November 21, the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone issued a declaration describing the location of the Safety Zone and its boundaries. The eastern border would extend along Zhongshan North Road from Xinjiekou to the traffic circle on Shanxi Road. The northern border would extend from the traffic circle on Shanxi Road due west to Xikang Road (the west side of the new residential district). The western border would extend along Xikang Road from the northern border to the Hankou Road intersection (the southwest side of the new residential district). From there, the border would run due southeast to the intersection of Shanghai and Hanzhong roads. The southern border would extend along Hanzhong Road from the point at which it intersected with Shanghai Road to Xinjiekou, where the eastern border began. 38 Zhongshan Road, named after Sun Yatsen (sometimes called Sun Zhongshan), was Nanking’s principal thoroughfare. It was lined with diplomatic offices . the Japanese and American embassies, and the British Consulate. Thus, the diamond-shaped sector, measuring two miles long and one mile wide, was situated roughly in the center of Nanking. According to The China Year Book 1939, the Safety Zone occupied approximately 3.86 square kilometers, a relatively small area.
39
White flags imprinted with a red cross surrounded by a circle were posted at various points along the boundaries of the Safety Zone.40 Even when the flags were in place, it was not absolutely clear where the boundaries were. Unlike the Jacquinot Zone in southern Shanghai, there was no barbed wire around the Nanking Safety Zone. One could simply walk into it.

The Departure of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Official Evacuation Order
As Japanese troops drew nearer, Nanking fell into a state of utter confusion. According to an article in the December 2 evening edition of the Yomiuri Shinbun, there were daily “traitor hunts.” Individuals accused of conspiring with the enemy were shot and killed. Soon severed heads smeared with fresh blood were displayed on telephone poles and at street corners. Nanking had become “a city of death.” 41
The mayor of Nanking and the minister of health left the city on December 3. Scores of police officers followed suit, including Wang Gupan, who had been head of the National Police Agency since 1936.
On December 7, Chiang Kai-shek made his exit from Nanking. He had ordered “a futile defense of the capital, ” ignoring warnings from Bai Chongxi, Li Zongren, and his German military advisors. But now, six days prior to the fall of Nanking, Chiang, too, abandoned the city, forsaking his subordinates. Durdin castigated Chiang in The New York Times, stating that he was “responsible to a great degree” for what ensued, but that should be obvious to anyone. 42
On December 8, Tang Shengzhi (commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps) issued a proclamation. According to Durdin’s special dispatch, Tang “decreed that all noncombatants must concentrate in the internationally supervised safety zone.”43 No noncombatants were permitted to venture outside the Safety Zone without a special permit.
For all intents and purposes, Nanking was under martial law. The Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun carried a special dispatch, sent from Shanghai on December 8, describing Tang’s order.
On the morning of December 8, military authorities in Nanking issued an official evacuation order. Once signs reading “Safety Zone,” prepared by the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, had been posted, hordes of anxious evacuees poured in. … They numbered approximately 80,000. Thanks to the heroic efforts of the Committee, buildings, schools, and clubs in the area have been requisitioned. Administrative regulations have been established, which give priority to the poorest evacuees. To date, 65,000 persons have been housed. The Red Swastika Society [a Buddhist charitable group] and the Red Cross are making an herculean effort to distribute food to the evacuees. Since the morning of December 7, Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Garrison has further bolstered security in the city, fearing that residents will become violent amid the turmoil. Anyone who seems the least bit suspicious is gunned down. Chinese newspapers report that 100 persons have been shot dead so far.44
The evacuation order prompted an onrush of penniless souls who remained in the city, or who had evacuated its outskirts, into the Safety Zone. Anyone who looted, taking advantage of the upheaval in the city, was shot to death. The Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun reported that 100 people had been shot, but that figure may have been exaggerated.

Overcrowding in the Safety Zone
Nanking had became a city with two faces. It is described, in What War Means: Japanese Terror in China (Harold Timperley, ed.), as having been divided, almost overnight, into a Safety Zone “crowded with evacuees”45 and “a de facto no-man’s land,”46 until the end of January 1938. The December 8 edition of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun describes the situation in Nanking as follows.
Several hundred villages outside the walls of Nanking have been burned to the ground by retreating Chinese troops. Thick clouds of black smoke obscure the sky. Steady streams of residents have fled to the refugee area inside the city with only the clothing on their backs. Residents of unprotected areas within the city have also thronged the refugee area, which is now extremely crowded. Elsewhere in the city, mobs have already begun looting and vandalizing private homes. The police are punishing the perpetrators severely, and have already shot six of them to death. However, the situation has become virtually uncontrollable.47
In China, evacuations had always been accompanied by looting and vandalism. An encoded telegram transmitted by George Atcheson, a secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Nanking, on December 7 corroborates the Japanese newspaper account, reporting that six soldiers had been executed.48 In an article written for the Chicago Daily News, December 8 edition, Steele reported that the swift execution of ringleaders and the exhibition of their corpses discouraged others from emulating them.49

The Japanese Refuse To Recognize the Safety Zone
Nanking’s residents surged into the Safety Zone. There was nothing to stop them since, for the most part, the boundaries of the Safety Zone were public roads. Anyone could enter the Safety Zone simply by crossing one of those roads. There was no barbed-wire fence separating the Safety Zone from the rest of the city. It was just as easy for Chinese soldiers to infiltrate the Safety Zone, and seek “refuge” there. If it became a refuge for Chinese troops as well as for civilians, the Safety Zone’s neutrality would be compromised. Moreover, there were Chinese military installations inside the Safety Zone.
If the International Committee had been able to keep Chinese soldiers out of the Safety Zone, the Japanese probably would have recognized its neutrality. However, that was too much to expect of a group of private citizens. The Japanese military authorities were aware of that problem, and that is why they demurred.
The December 6 edition of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun describes the prevailing attitude toward the Nanking Safety Zone among Japanese military authorities: “We find it difficult to recognize the Nanking Safety Zone. We are concerned about the Committee’s lack of authority.50” Authority was, actually, the decisive difference between the Safety Zone in Nanking and the Jacquinot Zone in Shanghai.
The Jacquinot Zone was established as a safety zone in November 1937, when hostilities threatened Nanshi, the Chinese sector in southern Shanghai. Father Robert Jacquinot, a French Catholic priest, was the major force behind its establishment. Furthermore, the Jacquinot Zone was adjacent to the French Settlement, whose authorities, including French military units, made an effort to cooperate with the Japanese military. The Nanshi International Committee also accepted the fact that the Japanese military would have ultimate control over the Jacquinot Zone, and promised not to interfere.
Consequently, the Japanese were able to justify granting the International Committee for the Jacquinot Zone the authority to maintain neutrality there, should war break out. According to the November 16, 1937 edition of the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun and testimony given by diplomat Hidaka Shinrokuro, Commander-in-Chief Matsui made a contribution of 10,000 (the equivalent of $100,000 today) to the Nanshi International Committee.
When hostilities reached Nanshi, Chinese soldiers who sought refuge in the Safety Zone were disarmed by the International Committee. Japanese troops never entered the Safety Zone, and the situation ran its course very peacefully.
This account is based on Hidaka’s testimony at the Tokyo Trials. A counselor at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai, Hidaka acted as intermediary between the Japanese military and Father Jacquinot.51
The International Committee in Nanking was simply a group of private citizens, who did not, unfortunately, have the authority to prevent Chinese soldiers from infiltrating the Safety Zone, or to disarm them. Therefore, the Japanese military did no more than ensure that it would “respect” the neutrality of the Safety Zone as long as it contained no Chinese military installations.52 Even so, the concerns of the Japanese had not been allayed. On December 8, the director-general for press and public information at the Japanese Embassy in Shanghai issued a declaration stating that Japan would not recognize the Nanking Safety Zone. The following excerpts from that declaration were published in the Foreign Affairs Review, No. 794, on January 1, 1938.
Recent foreign communications from Nanking have described the activities of members of the so-called Nanking Safety Zone, and the influx of evacuees into same. However, in view of potential, insurmountable difficulties, the Japanese authorities regret that they cannot provide any guarantee whatsoever with regard to the establishment of the so-called safety zone, for obvious reasons. 53
“Insurmountable difficulties” referred to the inability of the International Committee to prevent Chinese soldiers from infiltrating the Safety Zone, and the fact that the boundaries of the Safety Zone were not clearly delineated. For those reasons, Japanese authorities made it clear that they could not provide any guarantee with respect to the Safety Zone, even if one were established. They also stated that they had made an announcement to that effect two days earlier, on December 6.
In view of Nanking’s geography and defenses, the city, in its entirety, constitutes a huge fortress. The establishment of a “Safety Zone” in such an area is an irrational concept. However, as we have stated in repeated declarations, the Imperial Japanese Army has absolutely no intention of deliberately subjecting the lives or property of foreign or Chinese citizens to the calamities of war.54
The city of Nanking was protected by walls, among the world’s most impenetrable, that formed an immense citadel. The idea of a demilitarized zone within a giant fortress was merely an illusion.
Nevertheless, the Japanese did state that they would not intentionally harm foreigners or Chinese civilians in the Safety Zone.
For reasons stated above, we cannot provide any guarantees whatsoever with respect to the “Safety Zone” in Nanking. All persons seeking refuge there should be aware that they are in danger. On this occasion, we would like to make it absolutely clear that we will not be held responsible if the aforementioned zone should be affected by hostilities.55
Once a fortress is surrounded, escape is virtually impossible. It was patently obvious that Chinese troops inside Nanking would seek refuge in the Safety Zone when they retreated. The Safety Zone would, consequently, not only become a haven for Chinese troops, but also a battle zone. On December 8, the Japanese foreign ministry asked the Norwegian diplomat who headed an association of consulate and embassy officials in Shanghai to warn foreign residents of Nanking to leave the city.56 The warning was communicated to the American Embassy in Nanking on that same day.

Wounded Soldiers Refused Entry into Nanking
On December 8, all of Nanking’s gates were closed in preparation for a Japanese invasion. Japanese troops were now very close to the city walls. The December 10 edition of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun carried the following report:
For several days, Chinese soldiers wounded at various battlefronts on the perimeter of Nanking have been pouring into the city. However, as of December 8, Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Garrison, realizing that the fall of Nanking is imminent, has ignored their pleas even though they stand outside every one of the city’s gates, begging to be allowed entry.57
Unable to enter Nanking, survivors of previous battles, wounded and otherwise, wandered pathetically about the gates, and eventually disappeared. As Durdin reported, strict orders had been issued prohibiting them from entering the city. 58
As they headed away from Nanking, Chinese soldiers sometimes encountered Japanese troops advancing toward Nanking, and hostilities were exchanged. According to Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 4, the 36th Infantry Regiment was advancing silently toward a now closed Nanking in the middle of the night on December 8. The soldiers were marching on the road that leads from Shangfangzhen to Guanghua Gate, on a moonless night. But the area around Nanking was illuminated by the scarlet flames of fires set by Chinese troops.
Japanese troops headed directly for Nanking. Some enemy soldiers fell in with them, mistakenly believing the soldiers of the 36th Regiment to be their allies. The 36th Regiment ended up “engaging in a chaotic, parallel pursuit,59” fighting hand-to-hand with the enemy all the while. It was past 5:00 a.m. on December 9 when Japanese troops finally reached Guanghua Gate, Nanking’s main gate.
CHAPTER 3:

ASSAULT ON THE GATES
OF NANKING

The Japanese Issue a Warning
At noon on December 9, Japanese aircraft dropped leaflets onto Nanking under orders from Commander-in-chief Matsui. They were addressed to Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, who had, on the previous day, ordered residents of the city to vacate their homes and proceed to the Safety Zone. He had also issued announcements to the effect that no one would be permitted to leave Nanking and that the city’s gates would be closed. The leaflets, an excerpt from which follows, counseled Tang to surrender.
The Japanese Army, one million strong, has already conquered Jiangnan. We have surrounded the city of Nanking … The Japanese Army shall show no mercy toward those who offer resistance, treating them with extreme severity, but shall harm neither innocent civilians nor Chinese military personnel who manifest no hostility. It is our earnest desire to preserve the East Asian culture. If your troops continue to fight, war in Nanking is inevitable. A culture that has endured for a millennium will be reduced to ashes, and a government that has lasted for a decade will vanish into thin air. This commander-in-chief issues a warning to your troops on behalf of the Japanese Army. Open the gates to Nanking in a peaceful manner, and take the aforementioned action.1
The “aforementioned action,” described elsewhere in the leaflet, involved delivering the response to the warning, by 12:00 noon on December 10, to the sentry line on Zhongshan Road or Jurong Road. Commander-in-chief Matsui added that if no response was forthcoming, the Japanese would have no choice but to attack Nanking.
An organization chart and a staff list 2 are appended to Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1. On the CCAA Headquarters staff list is a name that one normally would not expect to find there. The listing reads: “Saito Yoshie, Doctor of Law, advisor on international law.” Matsui must have consulted with Dr. Saito whenever the need arose. By having the leaflets dropped on Nanking, the commander-in-chief was acting in full accordance with international law.
The Hague Convention of 1907 Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 3 was signed at The Hague, Netherlands in October 1907. Article 26 of Regulations Annexed to the Convention (effective in Japan as of 1912) dictates the issuance of a warning before initiating hostilities.
The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities.
Commander-in-chief Matsui was in complete compliance with Article 26 and with the “Nanking Invasion Outline” issued on December 7, when he advised military authorities in Nanking to surrender.

Article 27 of The Hague Convention Regulations Strictly Observed
Article 27 of the aforementioned Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention, which concerns restrictions on bombardment, reads as follows.
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.
There was a distinct difference between the actions taken by the Chinese and Japanese forces vis a vis Article 27. Chinese troops, in their attempts to defend Nanking, set fire to nearly every city, town, and village on the outskirts of the city. They burned down some magnificent structures within the grounds of the Zhongshan Mausoleum, as well as the stately Ministry of Communications building. They incinerated nearly all of the Xiaguan district.
Conversely, Japanese troops observed the Regulations to the letter. In his article in the December 18 edition of The New York Times, Durdin wrote: “The Japanese even avoided bombing Chinese troop concentrations in built-up areas, apparently to preserve the buildings.”4
Before they attacked Zijinshan (Purple-and-Gold Mountain), Japanese military personnel had been ordered by Commander Matsui “not to destroy the Zhongshan Mausoleum,”5 as Shimada Katsumi, a company commander, later testified. Consequently, they refrained from using their field guns, accomplishing the attack using only machine guns and rifles. International law was strictly observed, but not without considerable sacrifice, since a great number of Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded during the assault.

The International Committee Proposes an Armistice
When the Japanese issued their final warning, a final attempt to stave off hostilities in Nanking was being made within the city. On December 9, the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone drew up an armistice proposal, which it submitted to Chiang Kai-shek. The proposal requested that the Japanese enter Nanking peacefully after Chinese troops had withdrawn from the city, also peacefully. Before those actions could take place, a temporary cease-fire, which the Committee proposed to both the Japanese and Chinese military, would be necessary.
As for the length of the proposed cease-fire, there is a discrepancy of one day between an account (dated January 20, 1938 and written by Georg Rosen, secretary at the German Embassy in Nanking in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, a collection of official documents from 1937 to 1939 prepared by the Embassy)6 and an article in the Chicago Daily News submitted by Steele.7 Nevertheless, the cease-fire was to last for a maximum of three days.
However, all of Nanking’s gates had been closed. The armistice proposal never reached the Japanese, but its content was identical to that of the leaflets they had air-dropped. It is likely that, if they had received it, the Japanese would have consented, but since they had not, its fate rested on Chiang Kai-shek’s decision.

The Committee’s proposal was telegraphed to Chiang from the American gunboat Panay and from the U.S. Embassy. However, as the International Committee had feared, Chiang rejected it.

Attack on Guanghua Gate
The deadline for the response to the final warning from the Japanese was 12:00 noon on December 10. Major-General Tsukada Osamu (CCAA chief of staff) and Major Nakayama Yasuto waited for an emissary from Tang Shengzhi bearing a flag of truce. As a precaution, they waited an additional hour after the deadline had passed, until
1:00 p.m. No emissary ever appeared.
The Japanese assumed that the Chinese had resolved to resist to the bitter end. According to an entry in the diary of Yamazaki Masao, staff officer of the 10th Army, they “realized that the enemy had no intention of surrendering,”8 and decided to launch a general offensive at 2:00 p.m. on December 10.
The general offensive was conducted in accordance with the “Nanking Invasion Outline” dated December
7. Japanese troops had been ordered to seize the gates by bombarding them if the enemy “should refuse to leave their bases at the city walls,”9 and, once they had passed through the gates, to sweep Nanking. They were never ordered to engage in random attacks on civilians.10
The gates were the first obstacles, and they were formidable ones. There were 19 of them in Nanking, including two railway gates. The gates facing south from the east became the arenas for the heavy fighting that ensued. The first gate reached by Japanese troops was Guanghua Gate, situated between Zhongshan Gate (East Gate) and Zhonghua Gate (South Gate).
At dawn on December 9, the 36th Infantry Regiment, attached to the 9th Division from Kanazawa, fought its way to Guanghua Gate after a forced march lasting several days and nights. According to The Battle of Nanking (published by Kaikosha) and the 36th Infantry Regiment’s “Report on Operations in Central China,” the wall in which Guanghua Gate was situated was approximately 13 meters high. In front of the wall was the outer moat, approximately 135 meters wide. Guanghua Gate was actually a double gate, with outer and inner archways, and iron doors. The two archways were about 20 meters apart.11
Anti-tank trenches and five rows of chevaux-de-frise blocked the road leading to the gate. The muzzles of machine guns protruding from loopholes on top of the walls were aimed directly at Japanese positions.
The attack on Guanghua Gate commenced at 2:00 p.m., after the deadline for surrender had passed. But the gate was so solidly built that they could make little headway. Soldiers made desperate charges against the wall, only to be killed, one after the other.
According to the recollections of Cheng Huanlang, a Chinese staff officer, found in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2, on the night of December 10, when the assault on Guanghua Gate began, “a battalion from Deng Longguang’s unit, sent as reinforcements to Guanghua Gate, arrived with some farmers, carrying some dozen severed enemy heads in bamboo vegetable baskets … proclaiming victory.”12 Even farmers had been enlisted for the defense of Guanghua Gate. This was clearly a violation of international law, which prohibits the mobilization of noncombatants.
Japanese troops began firing their mountain guns, and finally succeeded in demolishing part of the gate. Portions of the wall crumbled, the debris forming a steep hill. The 1st Battalion ascended that hill and, at last, broke through and seized the outer gate. By the time the Japanese flag had been raised amidst the rubble, night had fallen.
Guanghua Gate was defended by Chiang Kai-shek’s elite supervisory unit. The day after the gate had been partially destroyed, Chinese forces were doubled in size, to 1,000. Barricades of sandbags covered with barbed-wire entanglements had already been erected on the periphery of the gate. Furthermore, machine guns were aimed at the Japanese by Chinese soldiers protected by impregnable concrete pillboxes.
Outside the city, at Zijinshan (northeast of Guanghua Gate) and Yuhuatai (south of Zhonghua Gate), Japanese and Chinese troops were locked in a desperate struggle. The Nanking Defense Corps, aware that if Guanghua Gate fell to the Japanese, hostilities outside the city would, within a short time, be pointless, were motivated to fight even harder.
The Chinese brought in tanks, from which they fired on Japanese soldiers inside the outer gate, immobilizing them. Then the Nanking Defense Corps began strafing the Japanese from the top of the gate. Next came an incendiary attack: the Chinese threw lumber down on the Japanese, and poured petroleum on it, which they then ignited. The 1st Company was trapped inside the outer gate. The 88 Japanese soldiers there fell, one after another, till only eight remained. They were saved from total decimation by Japanese heavy artillery, the firing of which commenced on the morning of December 12. Gradually, the Japanese gained the upper hand. Finally, at 6:00 a.m. on December 13, the Sabae Regiment occupied Guanghua Gate.
It had taken the Japanese three full days to occupy the gate in one of the fiercest, bloodiest battles waged in Nanking, involving much hand-to-hand combat, with both sides hurling hand grenades at each other. Ouchi Yoshihide described the hostilities in his testimony at the Tokyo Trials.
On the morning of December 13, we occupied the wall of Guanghua Gate, but were not permitted to enter the city. The military police and a few small units entered Nanking. That day, the charred bodies of some unidentified men were found near the wall. They were still breathing, but just barely. When he saw them, Major Haga, the battalion commander, was furious. He ordered an immediate search for the perpetrators. I halted my battle preparations, and assembled my subordinates. I gave them instructions, and conducted an investigation, but discovered that none of them had been involved.
The medical officer who examined the bodies said that the crime had been committed at least 10 hours previously . before Japanese troops entered the city. He determined that the victims were Japanese soldiers who had been taken prisoner by the
Chinese and set fire to. That same night, I returned with my unit
to Tangshuizhen.13
Ouchi was a second lieutenant in the 9th Division, 9th Mountain Artillery Regiment. According to his testimony, the Chinese had taken Japanese soldiers prisoner during the peak of hostilities at Guanghua Gate, and burned them alive. However, the Chinese could not be accused of cruelty to prisoners of war (a violation of international law). This was war, and it was kill
Zho ghu or be killed.14 outside the city. The gate, which measures
20 meters high and 10 meters deep, fell at 1:00
a.m. on December 13. (Photo: Taku Yoshiro)

The Capture of Zhonghua Gate
Zhonghua Gate was 20 meters high and 10 meters deep. It was the most solidly built of all Nanking’s gates, with four iron archways. According to the Nanjing Tourist Map, there were 27 cave-like spaces within the gate called “soldiers’ hiding places,”15 which could accommodate 3,000 soldiers.
Stone steps formed a gradual stairway from the base of Zhonghua Gate to the top of the wall. Parallel to the stairway was a gently sloping ramp, also leading to the top of the wall, designed for transporting cannons. Across the top of the wall, right at the end of the stairway, stretched a vast plaza. At the highest point on the wall were rectangular holes (loopholes) set at specific intervals, through which Chinese soldiers could fire their guns at targets outside the city walls, where there was no shelter.

Outside the gate was the Qinhuai River, an artificial waterway excavated under orders from the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty, which served as an outer moat. Slightly downhill from Guanghua Gate, the Qinhuai converged with the Hucheng River. Near Zhonghua Gate, the Qinhuai was 30 meters wide and three meters deep.
The 6th Division from Kumamoto was entrusted with the assault on Zhonghua Gate. On the night of December 10, the Division’s first priority was attacking Yuhuatai, located south of the gate, on which it concentrated all its resources. It penetrated Yuhuatai at dawn on December 11. Not until 24
hours later, however, was the 6th Division able to reach the Qinhuai River, the moat outside Zhonghua Gate.

Before they could attack Zhonghua Gate, 6th Division soldiers first had to ford the outer moat. They built a temporary bridge, but the Chinese soldiers on top of the gate fired on it, and it soon collapsed. With the help of an artillery unit, the Japanese began bombarding Zhonghua Gate. First they demolished the southwest corner of the gate, and eventually succeeded in opening two breaches in the wall. At 4:45 p.m., they occupied the breaches and, subsequently, the top of the wall.
At 1:00 a.m. on December 13, they occupied the front of Zhonghua Gate.16 At 3:00 a.m., they removed the stone blocks that had been packed tightly into its archways. The bridge in front of the gate, however, had been demolished. On December 14, after another temporary bridge had been constructed, Major Yamazaki Masao crossed it on foot and entered Zhonghua Gate. Yamazaki described the situation at the gate, after another pitched battle, in his war diary.
December 14: Corpse upon enemy corpse near the gate . a pitiful sight. Our men and the moat in front of the gate, and behind it a wall and a tightly closed gate. The enemy can neither advance nor retreat, and will surely be annihilated.17

Japanese Soldier Tied to a Tree and Executed
The intense battle for Zhonghua Gate claimed the lives of countless Japanese and Chinese soldiers. At the Tokyo Trials, Osugi Hiroshi described his experiences in that battle.
I believe it was the evening of the 13th when we entered Nanking from the South Gate. The ground was littered with the dead, both my comrades and the enemy. Among the bodies I saw the corpse of a Japanese soldier who had been tied to a tree and shot several times. I assumed that he had been taken prisoner by the Chinese and then slaughtered. I cut the ropes and laid his body on the ground. Near the city walls, there were a large number of dead Chinese soldiers, but I saw no civilian corpses. … On December 13, I returned to Tangshuizhen, and then led my unit to Tushanzhen, south of Nanking, where we regrouped. At that time, I forbade my men to leave the area, in accordance with orders from my superior.18
Osugi was the head of an observation party from the 1st Battalion, attached to the 3rd Division, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment. He was also the officer who had been ordered to reconnoiter the battlefield subsequent to the attack on Nanshi in Shanghai (one month prior to hostilities at Nanking), to ensure that Japanese shells had not hit the French Settlement. He was ordered to do reconnaissance work again after the attack on Nanking. Osugi entered the city from the South Gate.
It was then that he saw the Japanese soldier who had been taken alive and brutally executed. But the Japanese could not claim that the massacre of a prisoner of war was in violation of international law. In the midst of a battle, it was impossible to accommodate prisoners.

Tang Shengzhi Decamps
At 8:00 p.m. on December 12, several hours before Zhonghua Gate (South Gate) and Guanghua Gate (Southeast Gate) fell, the commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps decamped. Despite having declared that he would defend Nanking to the death, Tang Shengzhi forsook his subordinates and escaped from Xiaguan to Pukou, on the other side of the Yangtze.
One wonders what Tang expected his men to do from then on. All the city’s gates were closed, with the exception of Yijiang Gate, where the supervisory unit was posted, under orders to shoot deserting soldiers.19 Having been abandoned by Tang Shengzhi, troops inside the city were trapped, with only three options available to them.
(1)
They could have fought to the last man, but this was not a viable option. Once Tang had decamped, it is unlikely that anyone would have obeyed orders to that effect. Furthermore, it was common practice for Chinese soldiers, in the face of defeat, to remove their uniforms and masquerade as civilians.

(2)
They could have fled Nanking before it fell. But since the gates were closed, there was no escape route available to them. Perhaps 40 or 50 soldiers could have escaped from the city walls, but not many more.

(3)
They could have escaped to the Safety Zone inside the city. This was the most realistic option, and it surely was contemplated before the decision was made to close the gates.

In fact, 90 minutes before Tang decamped (6:30 p.m. on December 12), Rabe mentions, in his diary, that he personally witnessed Chinese soldiers who had been fighting at Zhonghua and Guanghua gates running toward the center of Nanking, as if insane.20 But as they neared the Safety Zone, they gradually regained their composure, and slowed their pace. Though it was never mentioned, there was a tacit understanding among Chinese soldiers escape to the Safety Zone was an option available to them.
No one knows how many surviving Chinese soldiers remained in the city. However, with the exception of those who had been fighting in the Safety Zone from the outset, those who were shot down by their own supervisory unit, those who died in battle, and those few who escaped from the city walls, Chinese troops infiltrated the Safety Zone.21
Thus, the Safety Zone, intended as a refuge for evacuees, became a haven for thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of Chinese soldiers, primarily raw recruits . battle groups with no commander, no order, and no discipline. Soldiers who escaped to the Safety Zone were not acting spontaneously, but in accordance with an unspoken agreement, reached prior to the fall of Nanking.

Recruit Every Able-Bodied Man
Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1 contains a description of Tang Shengzhi’s defense of Nanking. Apparently most of the soldiers were recruited in Nanking, since units retreating from Shanghai to Nanking had suffered so many casualties. As Tang himself admitted, he had very few trained soldiers. Most of his men were raw recruits.22 According to the Nanking Defense Corps Battle Report, “At the time, the Nanking Defense Corps comprised only the 88th Division, the 36th Division, the supervisory unit, and a military police unit. All of them had come from Shanghai, after fighting the Japanese there, and new recruits were added in Nanking.” In this brief report, the term “new recruits” appears twice.23
As Durdin reported, Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Shengzhi rounded up every able-bodied man.24 Therefore, the Japanese were surprised “to find no young men anywhere” when they entered the city, as Makihara Nobuo wrote in his diary.25
The Chinese military provided the conscripts with little, if any, training. Raw recruits who had never held a rifle, who had no idea of their responsibilities as combatants, were sent off to the battlefield, where they were compelled to learn how to wage war. This phenomenon was not peculiar to the Nanking conflict. As both Durdin and Steele reported, this was a traditional military procedure practiced throughout all of China.26 When recruiters found men of draft age in a farming village, they would tie their hands together, and lead them away.27
Since there was no training, there was no discipline and, therefore, a very fine line between regular army personnel and outlaws.28 Unsurprisingly, losing battles resulted in uncontrollable chaos. As we will discuss later, regular army personnel even removed their uniforms on the battlefield.

Nanking Defense Corps Suffers Major Losses
The following account appears in the “Nanking Garrison Battle Report” reproduced in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
Most of the units in the Nanking Defense Corps suffered tremendous casualties in battle. There were few seasoned soldiers. Raw recruits were sent to the frontlines with no training. Officers and their men were not able to recognize each other, so when they were hit by shell fire hit, they dispersed immediately, and could not be controlled.29
The Nanking Defense Corps’ bitter experiences were partly due to Japanese aerial bombing and superior shell fire. But a far more significant factor was the quality of the Chinese soldiers, who had been placed in an unenviable position. Officers and their untrained recruits were meeting for the first time, so could not recognize each other. Once they were fired upon, they “dispersed immediately.” One could hardly expect the Chinese to conduct an organized resistance under these circumstances. It is not surprising that the Defense Corps sustained “tremendous casualties.”30 Most of the Defense Corps suffered “serious damage by battle.”31 The consequences were of a seriousness that is impossible to overestimate. According to The Battle of Nanking, the Chinese forces were 60,000-70,000 strong. Of their numbers, 30,000 are assumed to have died in battle,32 and this is certainly not an exaggeration.

Chinese Soldiers Strafed by Supervisory Unit at Yijiang Gate
Most of the Chinese soldiers in the crippled city are presumed to have removed their uniforms and infiltrated the Safety Zone. However, some of them headed north on Zhongshan North Road for Yijiang Gate (North Gate), which led to Xiaguan on the banks of the Yangtze. Yijiang Gate was the only open gate and, therefore, the only possible escape route.
On the night of December 12, multitudes of Chinese soldiers rushed to Yijiang Gate, which had been fortified with timbers and sandbags. The following is an excerpt from the memoirs of Staff Officer Cheng Kuilang in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2.
In front of the Ministry of the Navy on Zhongshan North Road, I saw units from the 36th Division standing on the road, having laid down their machine guns, and blocking traffic. They would not allow other units coming from the south to pass. … Zhongshan North Road was soon filled with vehicles and soldiers, which stormed Yijiang Gate. In the desperate competition to escape from the city, they lunged forward in waves, only to be pushed back. Some of them were trampled, and I could hear them yelling, ‘Grandfather! Grandmother!’ The sentries with the 36th division had placed machine guns on the parapets on the wall, and were shouting, ‘Don’t push! We’ll shoot if you push!’ But the pushing and shoving continued.33
According to the Nanking Defense Corps Battle Report, the responsibility of the 36th Division was to use force to prevent units from retreating. 34 This was a favorite tactic of the supervisory unit, and a Chinese specialty.
According to the Memoirs of Li Zongren, the supervisory shot at waves of fleeing Chinese soldiers from behind. Many of them were wounded or killed.35

False Reports Issued by American Journalists
The realities notwithstanding, Durdin wrote the following report, and sent it off to The New York Times.
The capture of the Hsiakwan [Yijiang] Gate by the Japanese was accompanied by the mass killing of the defenders, who were piled
up among the sandbags, forming a mound six feet high.36
Later, Steele, who had left Nanking, wrote a similar report, stating that when he left Nanking from Xiaguan, his car had to drive over a five-foot-high pile of corpses. Japanese Army trucks and cannons also rode over the bodies. There were corpses of civilians on the road, which was also scattered with Chinese military equipment and uniforms.37
Both journalists were implying that the Japanese were responsible for the five-foot-high (or six-foot-high) mound of corpses. Reading these articles, one would get the impression that the Japanese had slaughtered Chinese soldiers en masse when the former occupied Yijiang Gate.
However, the Japanese were not involved in any hostilities at Yijiang Gate. When they occupied the gate, it was Chinese soldiers who strafed their comrades, killing and wounding a great number of them.
In 1987, long after World War II had ended, Durdin finally conceded that there was no battle between the Chinese and Japanese at Yijiang Gate. According to Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References, Durdin recanted, admitting that there was a confrontation at Yijiang Gate between Chinese soldiers attempting to escape. Some of them were trampled to death, and that was the reason for the mound of corpses.38 Steele, too, eventually spoke the truth (in 1986), admitting that a great number of Chinese soldiers suffocated while attempting to escape through Yijiang Gate.39
Both accounts placed the blame for hostilities among Chinese soldiers on Japanese troops. They were malicious reports, with no basis in fact. What Steele described as the bodies of civilians were probably those of Chinese soldiers who had shed their uniforms in an attempt to pass for civilians. The reason for his having made that assumption shall be discussed later on in this book. It is impossible to deny categorically that some of the corpses were those of civilians, but most of Nanking’s noncombatants had already evacuated to the Safety Zone.

Main Strength of Chinese Military Escapes
Some Chinese soldiers were either shot and killed by members of the supervisory unit or trampled to death. Others made desperate attempts to escape by lowering themselves on ropes from the top of the city wall. Many of them fell to their deaths.
Even if they were fortunate enough to exit the city successfully through Yijiang Gate, there were no boats available to ferry them across the Yangtze. Some of the soldiers attempted to swim across the river. Others boarded makeshift rafts. Many of them drowned or were killed by machine-gun fire from a Japanese naval warship.
Thus, it would appear that the majority of Chinese troops were killed either inside or outside the city, but that was not the case.
When news of [Tang Shengzhi’s] flight became known, the Chinese soldiers attempted to leave the city. They were mowed down by machine-guns in the hands of their own comrades, but, when it became apparent that the fall of the city was inevitable, all Chinese troops who could fled from the scene.40
This account from The China Journal (January 1938 issue) describes the situation in Nanking on the day before the city fell. The main strength of the defending Chinese units escaped Nanking alive. Many Chinese soldiers in the city infiltrated the Safety Zone. Soldiers fighting outside the city simply fled.
The flight of Chinese troops from Nanking is substantiated by other records as well. Every issue of The China Weekly Review included a “day-to-day summary constituting a complete record of outstanding events in the war on all fronts.” The following descriptions of the movements of Chinese soldiers appeared in the January 29, 1938 issue.
December 21: Two Cantonese Divisions defending Nanking fought their way through Japanese lines into Anhwei [Anhui] province.
December 22: Japanese reports that some 20,000 Chinese troops still in Nanking denied by Chinese military authorities in Hankow.41
These accounts must have been based on reports emanating from Chinese military authorities in Hankou. The main strength of the Chinese military had moved to Anhui, which is adjacent to Nanking, one week after the fall of Nanking.
The move had also been confirmed by the Japanese military. The December 16 issue of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun carried the following report.
In defending Nanking, defeated enemy units have broken through Japanese lines and have travelled along two routes, over land (the eastern line of advancement) and up the Yangtze River. They are assembling at Bengbu in Anhui Province and at Anqing (Huaiqing). Subsequent to the fall of Nanking, the enemy has been accommodating soldiers who survived hostilities there, and is building a major defense position in front of the mountainous region bounded by Anhui, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, with concentration in Anqing. With these two lines of defense, the Chinese are preparing for another battle.42
This account is more specific than the one that appeared in The
China Weekly Review. No accurate figures are available, but it is
obvious that the majority of Chinese troops fled Nanking.
CHAPTER 4:

THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION
OF PRISONERS”

Japanese military personnel were never ordered or instructed to kill civilians. What is at issue, however, is Japanese military policy vis a vis enemy soldiers who had surrendered.
The prevailing view is that the Japanese military ordered the execution of prisoners of war. We will discuss the regulations of international law that apply to prisoners of war later on in this book. But first we shall describe Japanese military rules governing the handling of prisoners of war, and popular perceptions of those rules.
The Meaning of “Disposition of Prisoners”
A pedagogical example entitled “The Disposition of Prisoners of War” found in A Study of Combat Methods Used Against Chinese Troops, published by the Infantry School in 1933 (four years prior to the invasion of Nanking), reads as follows.
In keeping with our policy toward prisoners of war of all nationalities, it is not absolutely necessary to remand or incarcerate Chinese prisoners of war while waiting to see how the war situation develops. With the exception of special cases, prisoners of war may be released where they were captured, or after having been moved to another location.
Chinese census laws are not uniformly enforced, and there are many vagrants in the Chinese military, whose identity is difficult to ascertain. Therefore, if they were killed or released at another location, there would be no repercussions.1 [Italics supplied.]
There are two parts to this pedagogical example. The first part states that, except in special cases, “prisoners of war may be released” for reasons stated in the second part.
According to the rule governing the “disposition of prisoners of war,” as applied to Chinese prisoners, their captors were not required to wait until a battle ended but, except in special cases, could release the prisoners where they were captured or after having transported them to another location. “Special cases” were probably those in which prisoners did not obey orders issued by the Japanese military. In such cases, execution was permissible. In all other cases, prisoners were to be released. Therefore, the “Disposition of Prisoners of War” recommends, and explicitly so, that prisoners of war be released.
However, in his Proof of the Nanking Massacre, Hora Tomio bases his argument that killing all prisoners of war was an established policy of the CCAA on the same Infantry School pedagogical example.2
Fujiwara Akira, author of The Nanking Massacre: The New Version, also espouses the view that the Japanese had “no objection to killing Chinese soldiers, though they were reluctant to execute Russian and German soldiers.” He claims that it was Japanese military policy “to disregard international law” where China was concerned.3
However, these views are inconsistent with the wording and spirit of the pedagogical example, i.e., that “prisoners of war may be released.” Hora was probably aware of the inconsistency, which is why he cites only the second part of the example. There were, of course, exceptions, but one must be careful not to confuse principles and exceptions.
Then, what was the reason behind releasing prisoners of war? As stated in the example, Chinese census laws were not uniformly enforced, and many Chinese soldiers were, in fact, vagrants. Therefore, there would be no serious consequences if they were released on the battlefield. Furthermore, in special cases, if a prisoner defied orders from a Japanese soldier, for instance, the execution of that prisoner would not be in violation of international law. Article 8 of the Rules Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land reads: “Any act of insubordination justifies the adoption towards [prisoners of war] of such measures of severity as may be considered necessary.”4

Notice Issued by the Vice-Minister of War
Another document that addresses the treatment of prisoners of war is a notice issued by the Vice-Minister of War (Lieutenant-General Umezu Yoshijiro), entitled “Application of Battle Regulations” (Top Secret China Army Notice No. 198). The notice was sent by air to the chief of staff of the Army of Occupation in China. It was dated August 5, 1937, four months prior to the invasion of Nanking.
The instructions begin: “Problems concerning battle regulations in the current conflict are to be addressed in a separate document.” That document reads as follows.
1. At this time, the Empire is not engaged in a full-scale war against China. Therefore, it is not appropriate to act in accordance with specific items in the “Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and other treaties governing battle regulations,” in their entirety.5 [Italics supplied.]
Japan had not issued a declaration of war to Chiang Kai-shek’s government. For that reason, it was inappropriate for the Japanese military to act in accordance with specific items in the Convention, in their entirety. A superficial reading of this notice might suggest that the Vice-Minister of War was instructing the Occupation Army to disregard the Convention, and that is the conclusion reached by both Hora and Fujiwara.
However, that portion of the text was no more than a partial disclaimer. The Japanese military certainly intended to adhere to international law during the Second Sino-Japanese War. That was a foregone conclusion. The purport of the text cited above was that specific items in the Convention should not be applied in their entirety.
The next problem to be addressed is what “specific items” were not to be applied. The notice continues.
4. … At present, it is Imperial policy to avoid being drawn into a full-scale war in China. Therefore, a concerted effort must be made to avoid words and actions (e.g., looting, the use of the term “prisoners of war,” or official announcements by military personnel to the effect that battle regulations will be applied, and other unnecessary actions likely to antagonize foreign nations) give the impression that we have resolved to initiate a full-scale war in China.6 [Italics supplied.]
It being Japanese national policy to avoid full-scale war in China at all costs, the Vice-Minister of War instructed Japanese military personnel to avoid creating the impression that Japan intended to wage such a war. Therefore, they were to refrain from making any public mention of the application of battle regulations, or of prisoners of war.
Accordingly, it is doubtful that Hora’s interpretation, i.e., that “it was reasonable for Japanese military personnel in China to perceive the notice as instructing them not to recognize the existence of prisoners, and as giving them permission, or even license, to kill them,” is valid. Anyone arriving at such an interpretation and acting upon it by killing prisoners would have been committing a grave violation of international law. Moreover, the execution of prisoners would certainly “antagonize foreign nations,” and contravene the Vice-Minister’s instructions. All those involved would have been court-martialed. There is no basis for the conclusion reached by Hora and Fujiwara, i.e., that the Japanese military sanctioned the execution of prisoners of war.
It should be obvious by now that the notice from the Vice-Minister of War (Top Secret China Army Notice No. 198) was instructing Japanese military personnel to respect international law. The following portion, Section 4, which appears at the beginning of the notice, and which neither Hora nor Fujiwara cites, provides further substantiation.
4. Military personnel are to act in accordance with the aforementioned instructions with respect to the matter at hand. However, since it is the abiding desire of the Empire to minimize, to the extent possible, the ravages accompanying war, military personnel shall make every effort to comply with its objectives by adhering to the portion of the aforementioned “Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” entitled “Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges and Bombardments,” and to other treaties governing battle regulations.7 [Italics supplied.]
“Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges and Bombardments” appears in Article 23, Chapter 2, Section II of Rules Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land. Article 23 begins, “In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden … (c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion.”8
To lessen the casualties of war, the Vice-Minister of War issued instructions to the effect that every effort be made to adhere to this regulation, i.e., to refrain from killing enemy soldiers who had surrendered. Therefore, interpreting the Vice-Minister’s instructions as permission to execute prisoners of war is totally inconsistent with the spirit of his notice.

Notice Issued by 13th Division Headquarters
Another notice, entitled “Instructions Concerning Warfare,” addresses the treatment of prisoners of war. It was issued on October 19, 1937 (two months before the assault on Nanking) by the 13th Division Headquarters, Shanghai Expeditionary Force. Section 11 of that notice, entitled “Treatment of Prisoners of War,” reads as follows:
When a great many prisoners of war are captured, they are not to be shot to death, but disarmed, assembled in one location, guarded, and their presence reported to division headquarters. Furthermore, if there are officers among them, said officers are to be disarmed and transported to division headquarters. They are to be used for information-gathering and propaganda purposes. These instructions are to be strictly observed by all subordinate units. However, small numbers of prisoners of war are to be disposed of appropriately after interrogation.9
“Treatment of Prisoners of War” instructed Japanese military personnel not to shoot prisoners to death, when a great many of them were captured, but to submit a report of their capture to Division Headquarters. When a small number of prisoners were taken, they were to be “disposed of appropriately.” It would seem that the two phrases in this instruction contradict each other . that one is instructing that prisoners not be shot, but their presence reported, and the other, that they be executed.
Hata Ikuhiko, the author of The Nanking Incident, hypothesizes that “policy condoned the on-the-spot execution of small numbers of lower-ranking soldiers.”10 In other words, he assumes that the two phrases were in opposition, and that “disposed of appropriately” meant “executed.”
However, such actions contradict instructions from the Vice-Minister of War, in which he specified that Japanese military personnel shall make every effort to adhere to the regulations of international law, which prohibit the killing or wounding of “an enemy who … has surrendered at discretion.” Furthermore, it is impossible to believe that in October 1937, the 13th Division Headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force issued orders contradictory to the notice from the Vice-Minister of War (Top Secret China Army Order No. 198) issued in August of the same year. Any other interpretation would have been inconsistent with that order.
“Appropriate disposition” did not mean “execution.”
That being the case, what had Japanese military personnel been instructed to do? Were they to continue to observe small numbers of prisoners for an unspecified period of time? If so, they would have not been arriving at a disposition, but maintaining the status quo and, by doing so, placing themselves in danger.
Since the course of action to be taken was neither execution nor observation, the only remaining possibility is release. Therefore, the notice issued by 13th Division Headquarters entitled “Instructions Relating to Battle” was directing Japanese military personnel not to disarm and kill enemy soldiers who had surrendered, but to release them.
Such action was in keeping with the Vice-Minister of War’s notice instructing that the regulations of international law be observed. It is also consistent with the principle outlined in the pedagogical example from the Infantry School, namely, “prisoners of war … may be released.” Therefore, “Treatment of Prisoners of War” was based on previous notices, which stated that, in principle, “prisoners of war are to be released where they were captured.”
Then, why not write “release” instead of “appropriate disposition?” The reason is perfectly clear. By writing “release,” the authorities would have been ordering Japanese military personnel to free even the most malevolent prisoners. By using the term “appropriate disposition,” they were allowing for the execution of prisoners who did not obey orders.
When we paraphrase this regulation, we have, “When there are a small number of prisoners, release them after obtaining the necessary information through interrogation, e.g., their unit, the number of soldiers in that unit, and their operation plan. When there are a large number of prisoners, do not shoot them, but disarm them, report their capture to Division Headquarters, and then release them.” In other words, prisoners of war were to be released, regardless of their numbers.
This was a sound policy. It mattered little where a small number of prisoners went once they were released. But it was necessary for Division Headquarters to be aware of the existence of a large number of enemy soldiers, even if they had been disarmed. That is why there were two separate instructions relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, in accordance with their numbers.
CHAPTER 5:

POINTS IN DISPUTE (1):
“ALL PRISONERS OF WAR ARE TO BE KILLED
IN COMPLIANCE WITH A BRIGADE ORDER”

“All Prisoners of War Are To Be Killed in Compliance With a Brigade Order”
Kojima Noboru, the author of The Second Sino-Japanese War, discovered a battle report that includes an order stating unequivocally that “all prisoners of war are to be killed”. 1 Since a battle report is an official record, this was a shocking revelation.
The same battle report, prepared by the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, also appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1. It reads as follows.
8. The following order was received from the regimental
commander at 1400 hours [on December 13]:

A. To comply with brigade orders, all prisoners of war are to be
killed.
What is the advisability of rounding up the prisoners, a dozen at a
time, and then shooting them, one by one?

B. After weapons have been assembled, prisoners are to be
observed until instructions are forthcoming.

C. The main strength of the regiment is in the process of
sweeping the city, under brigade orders.
Your battalion’s assignment is as stated previously.

9. In accordance with the aforementioned order, the
procurement and collection of weapons and the provision of
lookouts was assigned to the 1st and 4th companies.

At 1530 hours, all company commanders were assembled to discuss the disposition of prisoners of war. They decided that the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Companies would divide the prisoners equally among them, and bring out in groups of 50 from the detention area. Prisoners were to be bayonetted by the 1st Company in the valley south of the bivouac, by the 3rd Company in the hollow southwest of the bivouac, and by the 4th Company near the valley southeast of the bivouac.
The companies were cautioned to post sentries along the perimeter of the detention area, lest the prisoners become aware of their fates when they were brought out. All companies completed preparations and commenced bayonetting by 1700 hours. Bayonetting ended at approximately 1930 hours, at which time a report was submitted to the Regiment.
The 1st Company altered the original plan, and attempted to confine the prisoners and burn them to death en masse. The attempt failed.
Some of the prisoners resigned themselves to their fates, bravely offering their heads before the sword, or calmly walking toward the bayonets. Others wept and begged for mercy. The company commander heard such entreaties when he patrolled the aforementioned areas.2 [Italics supplied.]
Kojima claims that the commander of the 66th Infantry Regiment issued the following order to the 1st Battalion: “All prisoners-of-war must be killed in compliance with brigade orders. Their execution is to be effected by rounding them up, a dozen at a time, and shooting them, one by one.”
According to the battle report, upon receipt of the aforementioned order, the commander of the 1st Battalion assembled the commanders of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th companies, with whom he consulted about the execution of the prisoners. The commanders agreed that the prisoners should be divided among the three companies, brought out in groups of 50, and bayonetted. The executions commenced sometime after 5:00 p.m. on December 13, and ended at 7:30 p.m.
The chain of command was as follows: The original order was issued by the 10th Army of the CCAA to the 114th Division, which relayed it to the 127th (left-flank) and 128th (right-flank) brigades. The 127th Brigade then passed the order on to the 66th Infantry Regiment which, in turn, relayed it to the 1st Battalion.
One often encounters entries like “The order was transmitted verbally and in writing once the recipients had been assembled” in battle reports. At that time, orders were communicated both orally and in writing.3 Verbal transmission was permitted when time was of the essence, but orders were always written down at some point.

Order from the 114th Division
We will consult Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1 for a closer examination of the battle report prepared by the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment. The order in question, 114th Division Order No. 62A, issued at 09:30 a.m. on December 13, reads as follows.
1.
The enemy is resisting stubbornly inside the city. …

2.
The Division shall continue its assault, with the intention of annihilating the enemy inside the city.

3.
Both flanks shall invade the city, and shall use bombardment and whatever other means necessary to annihilate the enemy.

If it is deemed necessary to do so to accomplish this objective, burn the city. Be especially careful to avoid being taken in by deceitful actions perpetrated by defeated enemy troops.4 [Italics supplied.]
The order issued by the 114th Division was transmitted to the 127th and 128th brigades. Unfortunately, the order received by the 127th Brigade has been lost. However, it is extremely unlikely that the Division issued different orders to the two brigades.

Order Issued by the 128th Brigade
According to Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1, the 128th Brigade issued “128th Infantry Brigade Order No. 66,” a right flank order.
1.
The enemy continues to resist stubbornly inside the city. …

2.
The right flank shall advance into the city, and sweep the areas southward of and including the line extending from Gonghe Gate, Gongyuan (Park) Road and Zhongzheng Road.

3.
Both frontline regiments shall concentrate their resources on gaining entrance into the city, and annihilating the enemy, using any and all means. If it is deemed necessary to do so to accomplish this objective, burn the city. Be especially careful to avoid being taken in by deceitful actions perpetrated by surviving enemy troops.5

This order was issued at noon on December 13, two-and-a-half hours after the 114th Division Order No. 62A (114th Division order), issued at 9:30 a.m.
Comparing the two, we note that the brigade order is a faithful rendering of the intent of the order issued by the superior entity, i.e., the division order. Therefore, we would like to provide an explication of the italicized portions of 114th Division Order No. 62A.
The gates of Nanking were occupied on December 13. Chinese troops fled in droves, but did not surrender. For both the invaders and the defenders, it was a desperate battle. A conflict ends when one side or the other surrenders. The sooner one side surrenders, the sooner it is over. But in this case, each side was determined to annihilate the other. Annihilation is a matter of killing the enemy to the last man, and annihilating an enemy that refuses to surrender is an act of war that does not violate the prohibitions specified by international law.
Next, we have: “If it is deemed necessary … burn the city.” This means that Japanese troops, when attacking enemy soldiers entrenched in the second floor of a building, were to burn that building if necessary.
According to the 114th Division Order No. 59A issued on December 12,6 “both flanks” referred to the 127th Brigade (left flank) and the 128th Brigade (right flank). Therefore, we may assume that the 127th Brigade order was issued at the same time as the 128th Brigade order, i.e., at about noon.
Two hours later, at 2:00 p.m. on December 13, the commander of the 127th Infantry Brigade (left flank) issued the order, “All prisoners are to be killed in compliance with brigade orders” to the 1st Battalion and the other battalions under his command.
However, the words “all prisoners are to be killed” appear nowhere in the aforementioned 128th Brigade order (128th Infantry Brigade Order No. 66). Thus, the execution order issued by the commander of the 66th Infantry Regiment was not relayed as a brigade order. In that case, why did the words “all prisoners are to be killed in compliance with brigade orders” appear in the battle report prepared by the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment?
According to the 1st Battalion’s battle report, the order instructing that “all prisoners are to be killed in compliance with brigade orders” was relayed to the 1st Battalion by the regimental commander. Was it issued by the commander of the 66th Regiment on his own initiative? If it had been, the execution order would have been recorded in the battle reports of the other battalions as well. The 66th regiment also comprised the 2nd and 3rd battalions. Fortunately, the 2nd Battalion’s war journal is extant. However, it contains no record of an execution order’s having been issued. In other words, there is no trace of an order to that effect issued by the regimental commander to his battalions. Therefore, we may assume that the regimental commander did not issue the order on his own initiative.
It is possible, however, that the execution order was relayed only to the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion’s battle report reads: “The main strength of the Regiment is in the process of sweeping the city … .” The 1st Battalion had not been ordered to participate in the sweep. Did the regimental commander issue the execution order, arbitrarily, to the 1st Battalion?
The answer is no. “Battle Instructions” from the headquarters of another division (the 13th Division), dated July 1937, reads in part, “When a great many prisoners of war are captured, they are not to be shot to death, but disarmed, assembled in one location, observed, and their presence reported to division headquarters.”7 As Deputy Platoon Commander Oyake Isaburo later attested, “Only officers ranking above regimental commander had the authority to issue orders relating to prisoners of war.”8 No regimental or battalion commander would have issued an execution order of his own volition.
Accordingly, no execution order was issued by the commanding division or brigade. Nor was one issued arbitrarily by a regimental commander (or battalion commander). What appears to be a phantom execution order is recorded in the 1st Battalion’s battle report.
Given the facts stated above, there is only one possibility. There must have been a problem at the 1st Battalion, which compiled this battle report. Therefore, we would like to submit the 1st Battalion’s battle report to further scrutiny. Before we do that, however, an investigation into the movements of the 1st Battalion is in order.

The 1st Battalion’s Battle Report
The 1st Battalion consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies, and other units. Most of the soldiers belonging to the 1st and 3rd companies had already entered Nanking. Since the 2nd Company was the color guard, it accompanied the regimental commander into the city. The remaining company, the 4th Company, must have been fighting near Zhonghua Gate.
According to entries in the 1st Battalion’s Battle Report for December 10-13, the 4th Company, 1st Battalion was assisting a light armored vehicle company attached to the 114th Division in its advance toward Zhonghua Gate (South Gate).
The Chinese were resisting the invasion doggedly, hurling hand grenades from the roofs of private homes. Waves of Japanese infantry soldiers charged continually through the hail of grenades, bursting into houses where the enemy was entrenched, and engaging in close combat. The light armored vehicles were very effective.
The terrified Chinese soldiers soon began to surrender, waving white flags. Many of them were shot in the back by their officers.9 After having recorded the progress of the battle, Company No. 4 wrote the following in the Battle Report for the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, which appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
By about 1900 hours (on December 12), the sound of hand grenades exploding had become intermittent … We took more than 1,500 prisoners and confiscated many weapons and a large amount of ammunition … When we took our first prisoners, our commander sent three of them as couriers, instructing them to tell their comrades that we would spare their lives if they ceased resisting and surrendered. This enterprise was very successful … We searched the prisoners and attended to the wounded.10
The account continues, reporting that 1,500 Chinese soldiers surrendered. A significant number of prisoners were taken near Zhonghua Gate by the 4th Company. This record is substantiated by a battalion order issued by Captain Shibuya, deputy commander of the 1st Battalion at 7:30 p.m. on December 12. The order read: “The 4th Company shall be entrusted with the observation of prisoners of war.”11
First Battalion Commander Ichikari was wounded on December 8, on the way to Nanking. Therefore, researcher Itakura Yoshiaki’s hypothesis that 1st Battalion Commander Ichikari executed the Chinese soldiers who had surrendered, at his own discretion, is not viable, since Ichikari had withdrawn from the battlefront.
Ara Kenichi’s Fortress: Soldiers’ Recollections of The Nanking Incident (Vols. 1 – 20), on the other hand, is a very reliable source. The author spent many years interviewing individuals who participated in the invasion of Nanking. This writer is greatly indebted to him, particularly for the material in this chapter. The book includes the recollections of Sergeant-Major Oyake Isaburo, deputy commander of the 1st Platoon. In 1938, after the fall of Nanking, Oyake went on to become an instructor at the Nanking Military Academy.
Oyake’s account reveals some surprising information. According to the battle report, when the 4th Company took its first prisoners, its commander dispatched three couriers to the Chinese soldiers who were still resisting the invaders. Oyake mentions that First Lieutenant Tezuka, commander of the 4th Company, had been wounded near Nanking on December 7, and was out of action. He had been replaced by 1st Platoon Deputy Commander Sergeant-Major Oyake.12 (There were three platoons in each company.) Oyake said that he did indeed assume command of the 4th Company, but never dispatched three couriers.
Sergeant-Major Oyake described his recollections of the hostilities at the time when Chinese soldiers were taken prisoner as follows.
On December 12, the 4th Company’s war potential had been reduced by half. However, we were ordered to advance to the right of Company No. 3, which was fighting on the front line. I led the 1st and 3rd platoons and about a dozen of my staff members (60 to 70 men in all) to assist the 3rd Company. Therefore, I was in charge of the 4th Company at the time. Since we were fighting on the front line, I had no idea where our company commander or the other platoons were.
I supervised my men from the footbridge in front of the barracks. Soon the Chinese began to retreat. When I noticed that some of them were waving white flags, I ordered my men to stop shooting, and beckoned to the Chinese. Then, suddenly, someone on top of the wall started shooting at me. There were five or six shots. The bullets landed near me.
Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to surrender. I interrogated them and escorted them behind the lines. During the interrogation, I was consulting with Tank Corps Commander Inoue about a possible Chinese counterattack, so I do not know exactly how many prisoners there were. I recall having been told later that there were 1,200 of them. Two or three hundred more had been captured by other units, so all together, there were 1,500 prisoners.
But it is hard to believe that we could have interrogated and disarmed 1,200 prisoners so quickly, so I cannot say with any certainty that there were 1,200.13
The battle report states that “By about 1900 hours, the sound of hand grenades exploding had become intermittent.”14 The battle must have been nearing an end, but did 1,500 soldiers surrender?
In any case, the Chinese prisoners were fed at 10:00 p.m. on December 12, even though Japanese troops had not eaten their fill. According to the 1st Battalion’s battle report, “For this meal, requisitioned rice was cooked by 20 prisoners assigned to that task … When the food was served, at about 2200 hours, the starving prisoners fought over it, and ate ravenously.”15
The meal was simply sustenance offered at the height of a battle, but it was enough to fill the prisoners’ stomachs. However, it would have been virtually impossible to disarm and feed 1,500 prisoners in less than three hours. The number of prisoners must have been considerably smaller.

Who Wrote the Battle Report?
Battle reports were written after an engagement had ended. When and how was the 1st Battalion’s report prepared?
Nishizawa Benkichi, commander of the 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, writes in Our Battles in China that on December 31, “instead of celebrating the New Year, the soldiers have been compiling the battle report, work on which began yesterday. We have been deluged with orders.”16
Japanese units in Nanking began preparing their battle reports on December 30. Preparation of the battle report in question, that of the 1st Battalion, must have begun on that same day.
Nishizawa continues, stating that even in January, “company members have been assigned to prepare a battle report covering all engagements since our arrival in China, and to see to organization, equipment, and training. The men are working night and day.”17
Approximately 20 days had elapsed since the most recent battle. Apparently, the personnel in charge of compiling the battle report were very busy. Then, who was entrusted with the preparation of the battle report? Let us consult Sergeant-Major Oyake’s account once again.
The battle report, as its name suggests, is a detailed description of all matters concerning battles. It was prepared by an adjutant or a clerk, and then submitted to the regiment after the battalion commander had approved it. Ultimate responsibility rested with the battalion commander.18
Thus, the battle report was drafted by the battalion’s adjutant, and then copied by a clerk. Did the 1st Battalion’s adjutant prepare the battle report? Since the battalion was in a combat zone, the adjutant might have been wounded and removed from the battlefront. Here are Deputy Platoon Commander Oyake’s comments on the subject.
I wrote the battle report for the 4th Company. There is no reference to the execution of prisoners in it, since no such action was taken.
Commander Ichikari had been wounded, and Adjutant Shibuya was the only logical person to replace him. Shibuya took up the reins of command, and was responsible for our military operations. But there was no time even to think about the battle report, and since Adjutant Oneta had not been in active service for very long, he didn’t know much about battle reports. I don’t think we produced a proper battle report, since this was a new experience for all of us.”19
It is true that Battalion Commander Ichikari had withdrawn from the battlefront, as Oyake mentioned. The order that read, “The 4th Company shall be entrusted with the observation of prisoners of war” was issued by Captain Shibuya.
Adjutant Shibuya was leading the 1st Battalion in battle. He was required to make instant judgements at every stage of the conflict, and had no time to think about the battle report. Oneta, the other adjutant, was inexperienced and unfamiliar with the preparation of battle reports. Therefore, anyone in a position to prepare the report was either preoccupied with the exigencies of warfare or incapable of preparing a proper report due to inexperience.
Nevertheless, for some reason, the 1st Battalion executed Chinese soldiers who had surrendered. But after the battle had ended, when it came time to justify the execution in the battle report, its writers used a nonexistent brigade order, namely “All prisoners are to be killed” as an excuse.
That is why the execution order did not appear in Division records or in the 2nd Battalion’s war journal . only in the 1st Battalion’s Battle Report.
In other words, as Ara Kenichi concluded through the process of elimination, the “execution order” was the creation of the writer of the 1st Battalion’s battle report.20 That is the only plausible explanation.
Further scrutiny of the report reveals two problems. The first questionable item is “What is the advisability of rounding up the prisoners, a dozen at a time, and then shooting them to death, one by one?” Soldiers fighting for their lives on the battlefield cannot act decisively when their commander is asking them to make decisions for him. Orders were always written in the imperative mode. A genuine execution order would have read “Shoot the prisoners of war, one by one.”
Furthermore, the prisoners were not shot one by one, as the “order” instructed, but bayonetted to death. It was winter. By the time the bayonetting commenced, night had fallen, and it was pitch dark. The Chinese prisoners were wearing heavy winter uniforms. Were the Japanese able to aim at the prisoners’ vital organs, through their uniforms, and bayonet them, again and again, in total darkness? And did the Chinese prisoners stand there docilely awaiting their deaths?
Most of the executions were performed by the 4th Company, which had captured the prisoners. Let us take another look at Deputy Platoon Commander Oyake’s testimony in Ara Kenichi’s Fortress: Soldiers’ Recollections of The Nanking Incident.
I don’t have a clear recollection of what happened to the prisoners
after that. But I do remember going to inspect the place where
they were confined, noticing that it was very noisy, and feeling
sorry for the soldiers who were guarding them.21
The treatment of prisoners-of-war, defined as soldiers who
surrender, having lost the will to fight, and who obey our orders
and instructions, is prescribed in the International Convention.
But among those considered prisoners of war are soldiers who have been defeated and lost the strength to fight when attacked. They surrender, but when they regain their strength, they form gangs where they are detained and foment rebellion. Or they feign surrender and wait for an opportunity to return to the battlefront. There have been instances in which prisoners under escort have ambushed their guards, seized their weapons, and escaped in great numbers. In most cases, it takes quite some time to confirm that they are genuine prisoners of war.22
A similar account appears in The Battle of Nanking published by Kaikosha. Shimada Katsumi, commander of the 2nd Machine-gun Company, 33rd Infantry Regiment, reports that many of the Chinese soldiers who had surrendered “discarded their rifles, but had hand grenades or pistols hidden in their clothing.”23
In other words, more than a few soldiers who surrendered because they had lost the will to fight did not obey orders from Japanese troops. Some of them were waiting for the right moment to return to the battlefront. Others seized opportunities to form gangs and rebel.
According to Deputy Platoon Commander Oyake’s testimony, the prisoners of war at the detention center were “very noisy.”24 It is likely that they later grew so restive and unmanageable that they could not be released, leaving their captors with no choice but to execute them.
CHAPTER 6:

POINTS IN DISPUTE (2): “TAKE NO PRISONERS”
The war journal of Lieutenant-General Nakajima Kesago, commander of the 16th Division, was made public about a dozen years ago. It was included in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1. The entry Nakajima made on December 13 reads as follows.
1.
Since our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners, we attempted to dispose of all of them. However, they continued to surrender in droves, first 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000. We could not begin to disarm such a large number of soldiers. They had completely lost the will to fight, and simply followed after us. They did not seem to present any threat, but if a riot had erupted, we would not have been able to control them. Therefore, I had additional units brought in by truck, and assigned them to guard and escort the Chinese.

On the evening of the 13th, we were required to make countless trips with the trucks. But since this event occurred immediately after a battle (which we had won), we were not able to act expeditiously. The Operations Section was unbelievably busy because we had to dispose of far more prisoners than we had anticipated.

2.
Later, I learned that Sasaki’s unit alone had processed approximately 15,000 individuals, that a company commander with the garrison at Taiping Gate had processed approximately 1,300, that there was a concentration of approximately 7,000 near Xianhe Gate, and that enemy soldiers were still surrendering.1

Readers were shocked by the first sentence in Nakajima’s entry, “Since our policy is to take no prisoners, we attempted to dispose of all of them.” In this chapter, we shall analyze this sentence, as well as the remainder of the entry, within the context of circumstances at the time.
During the assault on Nanking, division commander Nakajima was responsible for the area north of Zhongshan Gate (East Gate) extending to Taiping, Xuanwu, and Heping gates. The opposing force, the Nanking Defense Corps, had been so hastily augmented that its officers did not know their subordinates, and vice versa.
The moment Tang Shengzhi escaped, the Defense Corps began to collapse. The leaderless Chinese troops, now an unruly mob, attempted to flee Nanking, but the perimeter of the city was now under Japanese control. Having lost the will to fight, the Chinese began surrendering. On December 13, the day the gates were captured, thousands of Chinese soldiers surrendered to the 16th Division.
The Prevailing Perception: On-the-Spot Executions
In The Nanking Massacre: New Edition, Fujiwara Akira interprets the phrase “Our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” as “shoot prisoners to death.”2 In The Nanking Incident, Hata Ikuhiko perceives the phrase as meaning “Execute prisoners immediately.”3 A cursory reading does indeed give that impression.
But a more careful examination raises several doubts. First, let us assume that “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” means “shoot prisoners to death,” and that “dispose of” means “execute on the spot.”
(1)
If “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” meant that prisoners were to be executed immediately, orders to that effect would have been issued not only to the 16th Division, but also to all other divisions. However, there is no execution order in the official records of any other division.

(2)
Division Commander Nakajima might have issued an execution order, at his own discretion, to the 16th Division and only that division. In that case, one would expect to find the order in the records of the 16th Division, but no such order exists.

(3)
According to 16th Division records, attempts were made to “dispose of all of [the prisoners].” That would mean that they were summarily and indiscriminately shot to death. When the first 10 or 12 were executed, the sound of gunfire would certainly have been audible. Would “1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000” prisoners have surrendered after hearing the gunshots?

(4)
There would have been corpses everywhere. Having seen those corpses, would hordes of Chinese soldiers have submissively

followed their enemies?

(5)
Nakajima “had additional units brought in by truck, and assigned them to guard and escort the Chinese.” If policy had been to execute prisoners on the spot, was it not his duty to do so?

(6)
Nakajima would have been disobeying orders in taking the action described in (5). Was he so determined to disarm the prisoners that he was willing to suffer the punishment meted out to those who defied orders? And why would he go to the trouble of making himself “unbelievably busy” requisitioning trucks and ordering emergency reinforcements?

If the policy in force at that time had been to shoot prisoners of war to death on the spot, Division Commander Nakajima would surely have made every effort to implement that policy. But he would also have mentioned his frustration at not being able to shoot 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000 prisoners, because of their sheer numbers.
If we rewrite the sentence, following the sentence structure used in the journal entry, we have:
1. Since our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners, we attempted to dispose of all of them (by shooting them to death). However, they continued to surrender in droves, first 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000. We could not possibly shoot them all.
In other words, if we assume that “our policy is to take no prisoners” was an order to execute them, then it would have been logical for Nakajima to write that his men attempted to dispose of all of them by shooting them to death, but could not because there were so many of them. But that is not what he wrote. What he did write was: “We could not begin to disarm such a large number of soldiers.”
If we assume an execution order was indeed issued, this sentence no longer makes sense, which means that it is mistaken to conclude that Nakajima was attempting to execute the prisoners. However, if we assume that no execution order was issued, all of the aforementioned doubts disappear.

What “Take No Prisoners” Really Meant
In stating that “we could not begin to disarm such a large number of soldiers,” Nakajima was explaining that he was unable to act in accordance with policy, i.e., disarm the prisoners. In other words, the means for accomplishing the ultimate objective, i.e., “to take no prisoners,” was the disarming of the Chinese soldiers.
Then, what was meant by “take no prisoners?” There are three possibilities. The first possibility (and the prevailing interpretation) was that policy dictated the shooting to death of prisoners of war. If that had been the case, Division Commander Nakajima would have written: “Since our policy is to take no prisoners, we attempted to shoot all of them to death. However, they continued to surrender in droves, first 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000. We could not begin to shoot such a large number of soldiers.” However, Nakajima did not write “We could not shoot all of them to death.” Therefore, it was not Japanese military policy to execute prisoners on the spot.
In that case, was it policy to take prisoners? The answer is no, since the entry clearly states “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners.”
The only remaining possibility is that prisoners were to be released, because the only plausible actions to be taken vis a vis soldiers who surrendered on the battlefield were execution, incarceration, or release.
Therefore, “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” means “Our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners, but to release enemy soldiers who surrender, after having disarmed them.”
From the locution “We could not begin to disarm such a large number of soldiers,” we sense Nakajima’s frustration in not being able to implement policy, i.e., to take no prisoners, but to disarm and release them. Nakajima could not release such a large number of armed soldiers. Neither could he execute them, since he would have been disobeying orders, which stipulated that they be observed and their presence reported to the Operations Section. However, Nakajima lacked sufficient manpower to guard the prisoners, and was forced to dispatch trucks to transport personnel. That is why he was so busy on the evening of December 13, procuring personnel and trucks, and escorting the prisoners, something he had certainly not anticipated.
The gates of Nanking had fallen but, inside the city, Chinese troops had still not surrendered. The Japanese needed to maintain safety inside the city. Outside Nanking, near Zijinshan, fleeing Chinese soldiers were attacking Japanese units. Some of them were embroiled in the worst hostilities they had experienced since Shanghai. It is not surprising that the division commander and the Operations Section were “unbelievably busy.”

Shanghai Expeditionary Force Staff Officer’s Testimony
Interviews With Witnesses to the Nanking Incident, also written by Ara Kenichi, includes the testimony of Onishi Hajime, staff officer with the Nanking Special Agency, a section of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. Onishi explains that “take no prisoners” means “divest them of their weapons and release them.”4 His interpretation is consistent with several previously cited regulations relating to the treatment of prisoners of war.
It is consistent with the pedagogical example dating back to 1933, which states how prisoners of war are to be treated: “With the exception of special cases, prisoners of war may be released where they were captured, or after having been moved to another location.”5 It is also in keeping with the notice issued by the Vice-Minister of War in October 1937, which states that Japanese military personnel are to honor the “prohibitions” provided by the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention, and to refrain from attacking “an enemy who has … surrendered at discretion.” 6
“Battle Instructions” from 13th Division Headquarters directed that prisoners were not to be shot, but disarmed and released. It was the policy of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force to release enemy soldiers who had surrendered. Division Commander Nakajima’s policy of disarming and releasing prisoners, and Onishi’s testimony about releasing prisoners are completely consistent with Shanghai Expeditionary Force policy.

What “Process” Meant
The verb “process,” which appears near the end of the aforementioned journal entry, now acquires a meaning that differs from previous interpretations. Let us refer again to that portion of the text.
Later, I learned that Sasaki’s unit alone had processed approximately 15,000 individuals, a company commander with the garrison at Taiping Gate had processed approximately 1,300, that there was a concentration of approximately 7,000 near Xianhe Gate, and that enemy soldiers continued to surrender.7
There are three possible interpretations of “process.” The first is the “execute all enemy soldiers who surrender.” Let us suppose that 15,000 prisoners were executed between Zijinshan and northeastern Nanking, 1,300 at Taiping Gate, and 7,000-8,000 near Xianhe Gate (more accurately, near Xianhemenzhen). If that had been the case, a burial report or a statement from a witness would have been required. But there were no corpses and, therefore, no executions.
The second is “execute only rebellious prisoners.” Article 8 of the Rules Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land states: “Any act of insubordination justifies the adoption towards [prisoners of war] of such measures of severity as may be considered necessary.”8 Therefore, the execution of such prisoners would have been in keeping with international law. However, even if that had been the case, it is not likely that many prisoners were executed.
The third and last interpretation is “take no prisoners, but disarm and release enemy soldiers who surrender.” This interpretation is supported by the war journal of Major-General Iinuma Mamoru, Shanghai Expeditionary Force chief of staff, which contains two crucial entries, both dated December 14. The first is “From an aircraft, I observed two groups of approximately 1,000 prisoners of war being moved from east Nanking toward Xiaguan.”
The second reads: “Report received to the effect that four columns of prisoners of war, eight kilometers long, were observed from aircraft, as they were being escorted north of Nanking.”9
The second entry probably refers to several thousand members of the Nanking Defense Corps (which had sworn to defend Nanking to the death) who surrendered, “waving white flags,” in the vicinity of Xianhemenzhen.10 According to Sasaki Motokatsu’s account in Field Post Office Flag and Shanghai Expeditionary Force Sakakibara Kazue’s eyewitness account, on or about December 17, a large number of prisoners were escorted to the Central Prison in Nanking (No. 1 Penitentiary) and incarcerated there.11
If their captors had intended to execute them, they would have done so immediately. It was not necessary for the Japanese to move them into Nanking, and it was even dangerous, since the prisoners might have instigated a revolt. Also, when Major-General Iinuma received a report to the effect that the prisoners had been sighted, he would have ordered a halt to the convoy and had them executed.
The fact that he did not demonstrates that Japanese military policy was to disarm and release prisoners of war. It is likely that Chief of Staff Iinuma dispatched a plane to confirm that units under his command were adhering to policy by escorting the prisoners.
It is true, however, that on December 13, during the pitched battle at Zijinshan, quite a few enemy soldiers were killed subsequent to their surrender. On December 14, when hostilities had virtually ended, prisoners of war were transported and interned. A difference of one day was also the difference between life and death.
Thus, the word “process” had two meanings: (1) release prisoners of war after disarming them and (2) execute antagonistic prisoners. But when the Japanese transported soldiers who had surrendered, they really did intend to release them. Prior to the assault on Nanking, the policy was not to release prisoners immediately, and that policy was still in force. The gates had been occupied, but pitched battles were still being fought to the east and southeast of the city. The Japanese did not dare disarm and release soldiers who surrendered on the battlefield because of the risk of their rejoining their comrades. That is probably why prisoners were transported to the north, as Major-General Iinuma wrote in his journal.
CHAPTER 7:

POINTS IN DISPUTE (3):
“WE ARE TOLD TO KILL ALL PRISONERS;
ALL UNITS DESPERATELY SHORT OF FOOD”

Fifteen Thousand Chinese Soldiers Surrender at Mufushan
The Yamada Detachment, 65th Regiment, experienced the same phenomenon . the unanticipated surrender of a huge number of Chinese soldiers. The Yamada Detachment was, formally, the 103rd Brigade, 13th Division. Since it was commanded by Major-General Yamada Senji, it was listed as the “Yamada Detachment” in the Shanghai Expeditionary Force battle order. But being a detachment, it had only two subordinate units, the 65th Infantry Regiment from Aizu Wakamatsu and the 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment.
Major-General Yamada’s war journal can be found in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2. In it, he states that on December 12, his detachment was at Gaozizhen, about 12 kilometers north of Nanking. Gaozizhen was a remote village that had been “totally devastated” by Chinese troops.1 The detachment received an emergency order “to take part in the assault on Nanking” at 1:00 p.m. on December 12.2
The order stated that the Yamada Detachment was “to capture the forts at Wulongshan and Mufushan, and to facilitate the advance of the Sasaki Detachment.”3 Upon receiving these orders, the 65th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment
departed from Gaozizhen. This was a night march, since it was 5:00
p.m. and already dark.
On December 13, Yamada and his men passed through Xiaqijie, which had been so thoroughly burned by Chinese troops that no usable buildings remained.4 At 1:00 p.m., the 1st Battalion, 65th Regiment succeeded in capturing the fort at Wulongshan, on the banks of the Yangtze River.
The next objective was to seize the fort on Mufushan, a mountain that overlooks the Yangtze, three kilometers north of Nanking. The Mufushan fort was the last Chinese defense line.
There was surprisingly little resistance from Chinese troops. Some Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded, but the Chinese did not put up much of a fight. Soon they began to surrender, waving white flags. Yamada described the situation on the morning of December 14 in his journal.
Fearing that the fort might be captured by another division, we departed for Mufushan at 0400 hours. We reached the fort at dawn. A host of soldiers surrendered, so many that we were at a loss as to their disposition. 5
Every town and village in the area had been “burned by the enemy”
. another instance of the scorched-earth strategy.6 Brigade Commander Yamada found a school at the base of Mufushan, where he confined the prisoners after disarming them. It was a very large group: Yamada reports that there were 14,777 in all.7 According to 65th Regimental Commander Morozumi Gyosaku, whose journal also appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2, there were upwards of 15,300 prisoners. In any case, the prisoners outnumbered the 65th Regiment 10 to one. Yamada truly faced a dilemma, writing, “There are so many that it will be just as difficult to kill them as keep them alive.”8
According to Soldiers’ Accounts of the Great Nanking Massacre: War Journals of the Yamada Detachment, 13th Division, once the prisoners were confined, Morozumi noticed that they were “dressed in motley outfits,”9 and wondered if they really were soldiers. Further inspection revealed that some of the prisoners were noncombatants, residents of Nanking who had fled the city, and that some of the soldiers were actually women, old men, or boys.10 Innocent children only 12 or 13 years old had been sent to the front line, and women had volunteered to fight with the men.

Noncombatants Released
Noncombatants were weeded out and released. The remaining 8,000 prisoners were confined to barracks at the base of Mufushan, on the south side. Morozumi thought that the “barracks,” a row of 10 buildings resembling chicken coops, had been part of the Mufushan fortress.
According to the war journal of Miyamoto Shogo1, the Chinese soldiers were starving. While they were being escorted to the barracks, “some of them were eating whatever vegetation was to be found.” Another war journal reports that “many of the Chinese soldiers had had neither food nor water for a week.”11
Hirabayashi Sadaharu’s testimony in Suzuki Akira’s The Illusion of a Great Nanking Massacre describes a similar case.
We interned a great number of prisoners. On the second day, there was a fire. I don’t remember whether any of the prisoners escaped at that time. If they had wanted to escape, they could have done so easily, because the fence that enclosed them was made of bamboo. Our main problem was feeding them. It was all we could do to feed ourselves, and we simply couldn’t prepare proper meals for 10,000 people. Besides, the Chinese were leaderless. When we gave them water, they would fight over it. Some of them even ate the grass in the garden.12

“We Are Told To Kill All Prisoners; All Units Desperately Short of Food”
The events of December 15, the second day of internment, are described in Yamada Senji’s war journal.13 There are slight differences between the phrasing in the journal located by Suzuki Akira and the one that appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2, for reasons that have yet to be determined. The following citation is from
a
Not his real name; a pseudonym has been supplied out of respect for the writer’s wishes to remain anonymous.
the latter publication.
I dispatched Cavalry 2nd Lieutenant Honma to Nanking to receive
instructions regarding the disposition of the prisoners and other
matters.
We are told to kill all of them.
All units are desperately short of food.14
“We are told to kill all of them” gave rise to the belief that it was official military policy to execute prisoners. We must remember, though, that war journal entries were necessarily terse, and covered only the essentials. For that reason, they must be read with care. We shall proceed to explicate this entry.
First, Yamada dispatched 2nd Lieutenant Honma to Nanking to receive instructions regarding the disposition of the prisoners. He did so because brigades (regiments) were required to inform division headquarters when they were faced with a large number of prisoners. For instance, the notice discussed in Chapter 4 states that, “When a great many prisoners of war are captured, they are not to be shot to death, but disarmed, assembled in one location, guarded, and their presence reported to division headquarters.” That instruction emanated from the headquarters of the 13th Division, to which Major-General Yamada (Military Academy Class of 1905) was attached.
When Honma reached Nanking, Ogisu Ryuhei, commander of the 13th Division (Military Academy Class of 1904), instructed him to kill all the prisoners, as Yamada wrote in the second sentence of his entry.
There is a logical progression from the first to the second sentence. However, the third sentence, “All units are desperately short of food,” does not seem to follow. There is no connection between killing prisoners and the food supply. In fact, the food shortage would have been a perfect excuse for allowing the prisoners to starve to death. Deprived of nourishment, they would be too weak to resist, making it easier for the Japanese to comply with an execution order.
However, without ammunition, it is impossible to perform executions. If Yamada had written: “We are told to kill all of them. All units are desperately short of ammunition,” that would make better sense. But he wrote, “All units are desperately short of food.” Did Brigade Commander Yamada actually obey the order to kill all the prisoners? Or is it true that, as Regimental Commander Morozumi wrote, he “stubbornly refused to carry out the order, and instead, instructed his men to intern the prisoners?”15 Did he defy the order, falling back on the military regulation that states, “Enemy soldiers who surrender are not to be taken prisoner, but removed from the battle zone after they have been disarmed?”16 Whatever the case, the three-sentence entry in his war journal does not tell us how he felt when he was ordered to kill all of the prisoners.

Prisoners Commit Arson
Fortunately, the Japanese found rations in an underground depot at Mufushan, which were taken to the barracks. The prisoners were then instructed to cook their own meals, and preparations commenced.
On the third day of internment, December 16, a fire broke out in one of the barracks. It could not have been the result of carelessness, for the prisoners were aware that they would have to sleep out in the cold if their barracks were destroyed. Regimental Commander Morozumi concluded that the prisoners had set the fire, hoping to escape during the ensuing confusion.17
The arson incident is mentioned by four of the 19 individuals who contributed accounts to the “War Journal of the Yamada Detachment, 13th Division.” But the entries are inconsistent as to when the fire broke out. Three of the four soldiers wrote that it started at about noon on December 16. The fourth wrote, “In the evening, 20,000 prisoners started a fire.” Morozumi wrote that it was dark when the fire started. All agree as to the date of the conflagration (December 16). The accounts also vary as to the extent of damage caused by the fire. Some of them stated that it destroyed half, and others, one-third of the barracks.
According to Regimental Commander Morozumi’s account, half of the prisoners escaped during the commotion that resulted, while the fire was still raging. The Japanese fired their guns to prevent them from fleeing, but could not see their targets in the dark. Morozumi estimated that “if you moved away from the scene of the fire, you couldn’t see anything, so at least 4,000 prisoners must have escaped.”18 That leaves 4,000 prisoners remaining in the barracks.
If the Japanese had intended to execute the prisoners from the outset, they probably would have killed the remaining prisoners immediately, since the arson justified such action. However, they did not do so, which is proof that immediate execution was not official policy.
Brigade Commander Yamada’s Real Motive
After that incident, however, policy changed. The Japanese had encountered a worst-case scenario (the arson and the escapes), which taught them that they would have to perform executions. Nanking and areas in its vicinity had not yet been completely subdued.
In his war journal, Private 1st Class Odera Takashi described a volatile situation: On December 17, when his unit had advanced about 18 kilometers to the Shangyuan Gate, “every once in a while, rifle bullets would fly very close to our heads.”19 There was a real possibility that Chinese soldiers, once released, might engage in guerrilla warfare. Moreover, rather than surrendering to the Japanese, Chinese troops in Nanking were disguising themselves as civilians and waiting for a second chance to attack the Japanese. That behavior prompted the issuance of the division order instructing that all prisoners be killed.
The arson incident served to galvanize the position taken by division headquarters. Prisoners who resisted were invariably shot. That is why the brigade commander abandoned the idea of defying orders. As the situation worsened, he acquiesced to the method of last resort . execution.
In his journal, Regimental Commander Morozumi wrote: “We have no choice but to comply with orders. Major-General Yamada came to my unit, fighting back tears, to convince us.20 The brigade commander had gone to Morozumi to announce that he had agreed to shoot the prisoners to death. Armed with this information, we can offer the following interpretation of the third sentence in Yamada’s journal entry.
We are told to kill all of them. However, I cannot bring myself to do that, and would like to find some way to release them outside the battle zone. But since all units are desperately short of food, the regiment cannot incarcerate the prisoners until it is safe to release them. [Italics supplied.]
The text in italics had simply been omitted from the original entry. Yamada’s secret plan for the disposition of the prisoners was contrary to the order from division headquarters. There was never any agenda that prescribed “the systematic execution of prisoners of war,” as Fujiwara Akira claims. Ultimately, however, Brigade Commander Yamada’s plan to release the prisoners was thwarted.

Prisoners Executed After Arson Incident
On the evening the fire was set (December 16), some of the prisoners were shot to death. However, Regimental Commander Morozumi mentions nothing about executions taking place on the banks of the Yangtze River, even though several of his men wrote entries to that effect in their war journals. For instance, the “War Journal of Endo Takaaki” contains the following passage: “In the evening, one-third of the prisoners were taken to the riverbank, where they were shot by ‘I’.”21
By “I,” 2nd Lieutenant Endo2 meant the 1st Battalion. The order he refers to was probably a brigade order that mirrored a division order. A description of the fire and the subsequent executions appears in the “War Journal of Miyamoto Shogo” as well.
Subsequent to the afternoon meal, a fire broke out, resulting in a terrific commotion. The fire spread to 30 percent of the buildings. At 1500 hours, the battalion led approximately 3,000 prisoners to the banks of the Yangtze River and shot them . the method of last resort. A sight like that could never be seen, and never will be seen, anywhere but in a war zone.22
Second Lieutenant Miyamoto wrote about a “terrific commotion” after the fire broke out, and adds that the prisoners were executed . the “last resort.” This was military action taken against rebellious prisoners, which is condoned by international law. Miyamoto’s words
. “A sight like that could never be seen, and never will be seen, anywhere but in a war zone” . eloquently communicates this fact.
It is important to note here that even though Nanking fell on December 13, the Chinese had not surrendered formally. Instead, they mounted an obstinate resistance against the occupying Japanese forces. We have already covered this territory, but to cite another example, on December 17, the day after the arson incident, Nakano Masao3 was standing guard at the Wulongshan fort. He wrote in his journal about
2 See Note a. 3 See Note a.
deaths on the battlefield . events that occurred all too often.
While on sentry duty, two members of my platoon were wounded by hand grenades thrown by enemy stragglers. Every day we shoot and kill any number of these stragglers.23
On December 16, Private 1st Class Nakano, a member of the 1st Battalion, which was under Morozumi’s command, had been ordered to guard the Wulongshan fort. That day, a straggler threw a hand grenade at one of Nakano’s comrades on sentry duty, injuring him. Skirmishes like these were frequent occurrences. For the Japanese, the battle was not over.

Regimental Commander Morozumi’s Recollections
December 17, the day after the fire had been set, was the fourth day of internment for the prisoners. Though Regimental Commander Morozumi had been ordered to execute them, he issued the following instructions to 1st Battalion Commander Tayama.
On the 17th, assemble all remaining prisoners on the south bank of the Yangtze River, north of Mufushan. Wait until dark, and then transport them to the north bank and release them. Procure boats and oarsmen from nearby villages.24
Why did Morozumi ignore the order to kill the prisoners? According to his diary, he pondered it for a while, and then decided that “the unit chosen to carry out this order must have some discretionary authority. I will decide what to do on my own, and hope that all goes well.”25 He resolved to release the prisoners on an island in the middle of the Yangtze River. His plan was implemented on the night of December 17, the day of the ceremonial entry into Nanking.
The series of events that occurred when the boats were halfway across the river, events that could not possibly have been foreseen, is described in Morozumi’s diary.
Small boats carrying two or three hundred prisoners had reached midstream, when Chinese troops guarding the bank toward which the boats were heading opened fire. They must have thought that the Japanese had launched an attack from across the river. The terrified Chinese oarsmen veered left and right to avoid the bullets, but the boats were swept away. Meanwhile, when the prisoners who had been assembled on the north bank heard gunfire, they jumped to the conclusion that the Japanese had taken their comrades onto the river only to shoot them. The silence was broken, and utter chaos resulted. About 2,000 of the prisoners began running for their lives, every which way. There was nothing we could do to stop them but fire our guns. But we could not see them in the dark. Most of them escaped inland, but some jumped into the Yangtze. The next morning, I saw the bodies of prisoners whom we had shot, but there were only a few. That was the end of it. The outcome was terribly disappointing, but I have written the truth. The stories that have been circulated about what happened are full of hyperbole and propaganda.26
A map of the area shows an island called Baguazhou on the Yangtze opposite Mufushan, about 100 meters from the right bank of the river. Though small, it is larger than the city of Nanking. Since it was easily reached, many Chinese soldiers had escaped there from Nanking. Lieutenant Hashimoto Mochiyuki had already sighted them on the island from the battleship Hozu on December 13, according to The Battle of Nanking.27
But Regimental Commander Morozumi had no way of knowing this. His 1st Battalion made preparations to release the prisoners, following his instructions. The boats, packed with prisoners, set out for the island. As they approached Baguazhou, Chinese troops on the island spotted them and assumed, unsurprisingly, that the Japanese had launched a night attack. They fired at the boats. The prisoners waiting to be released on the banks of the Yangtze heard the shots. They thought that their comrades were being executed. Desperate, they began to run.28
According to Morozumi’s account, this incident took place at “about midnight.”29 The Japanese fired their machine guns, but since it was dark, and since no one had anticipated such a situation, there were Japanese casualties as well.

Were the Executions To Be Conducted in the Dark of Night?
Is it really justifiable to characterize this incident as a “night execution,” as some have done? Or was it a plan to release the prisoners under the cover of dark, as Morozumi wrote in his account?
The testimony of Sublieutenant Hirabayashi Sadaharu, the “walking encyclopedia” of the 65th Regiment (the Morozumi Regiment), appears in Suzuki Akira’s The Illusion of a Great Nanking Massacre. Hirabayashi heard that “the prisoners were being sent back to the Division at Zhenjiang by boat.”30
However, Hata Ikuhiko has expressed doubts about a plan involving the release of prisoners in the dark of night, for two reasons. He wonders why Morozumi’s unit didn’t move them during the day, if it really intended to release them. Furthermore, he does not believe that prisoners could have revolted with their hands were tied behind their backs.
In this writer’s opinion, there were two reasons for Morozumi’s decision to carry out his plan at night. First, he had received division orders to kill all the prisoners and, therefore, wanted to keep his plan as secret as possible. The island on which he intended to release the prisoners was very near Nanking. A Japanese Navy battleship was moored on the Yangtze, and an Army unit was stationed on its banks, both war-ready. If Morozumi had released the prisoners in daylight, the Japanese would have spotted them easily. The prisoners might have been killed. That is why he chose to release them at night, when there was less risk of detection.
Second, if the Japanese had intended to execute the prisoners at night, they would not have removed the ropes that bound their hands, to avoid the possibility of rebellion. If their hands had been tied, the prisoners could not have run properly, much less rebel. Surrounded, most of them would have been killed by machine-gun fire. There would have been virtually no chance of their escaping.
To release the prisoners safely (and secretly), Morozumi deliberately chose the dark of night. Since the prisoners’ bonds were probably removed just before they were released, they could have rebelled or escaped. Or, perhaps their hands were never tied since, given their numbers, it is unlikely that there would have been time for that between the issuance of the departure order and the actual departure. Whichever the case, it is clear that Morozumi intended to release the prisoners.
At that time, the Japanese executed enemy soldiers who violated international law on the banks of the Yangtze, in broad daylight. If Morozumi had intended to kill these prisoners, he could have done so during the day, to avoid overlooking any of them. After all, 4,000 of them had escaped on the previous day.
At nighttime, the Japanese could not have seen well enough to aim their rifles accurately. Nor could they have distinguished the prisoners from their comrades, whom they might have shot accidentally. It does not take an expert to realize the folly of nighttime executions, and Morozumi would never have jeopardized the safety of his own men to that extent.
In his war journal, Araumi Kiyoe, a member of the 1st Battalion Headquarters staff, wrote on December 17, “Some of the men in our battalion were killed or wounded.”31 Another war journal describes the writer’s sorrow when his comrade’s belly was pierced by a stray bullet.
If Morozumi had been planning, secretly, to execute the prisoners, he would have done so during the day. That way, he could have avoided losing some of his men, and could ascertain that every single prisoner had been killed. The clues that help solve the mystery are: Morozumi did not allow the prisoners to starve to death, his operation took place at night, and some Japanese were killed during its course.
Suzuki Akira, who discovered the “Diary of Yamada Senji,” views what happened as an accident,32 and he is correct. Even if Morozumi actually did plan to execute the prisoners, why would he be so foolish as to do so at night? Thus far, no one has provided a plausible response to this question.

Addendum
The events relating to the disposition of prisoners of war at Mufushan occurred in five stages.
(1)
On December 15, the day after the prisoners had been interned, the regiment received a division order to kill all the prisoners.

(2)
In defiance of that order, Brigade Commander Yamada devised a plan to free them.

(3)
Some of the prisoners started a fire, which created a distraction that allowed many of them to escape. Since this was a rebellious action, the prisoners had to be executed. Yamada could no longer justify defying orders.

Under the circumstances, Yamada regretfully opted for the method of last resort, i.e., execution. On December 16, the third day of internment, he ordered Regimental Commander Morozumi to shoot the prisoners. A group of prisoners adjudged to be particularly malicious was executed on the banks of the Yangtze.

(4)
On December 17, the fourth day of internment, Morozumi chose to ignore the brigade order and, instead, devised a plan whereby the prisoners would be secretly transported to an island near the opposite bank of the river at night and released. By doing so, he was acting in

accordance with Yamada’s original intention . to spare the prisoners’ lives.

(5)
The island was already populated by Chinese stragglers who had fled Nanking, though Morozumi did not know that. When boats carrying the prisoners reached the middle of the Yangtze, the stragglers on the island began shooting at them, believing that the Japanese were attacking them. This unanticipated turn of events ruined Morozumi’s plan.

(6)
When they heard gunshots, the prisoners on the banks of the Yangtze assumed that executions were taking place, and ran for their lives. The Japanese, having the right to shoot escapees, fired at them, but most of them got away, and some Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded.

When he heard what had transpired, Yamada, rather than reproving Morozumi, was relieved. According to Morozumi’s diary, the brigade commander “had read my mind.”33 Although Morozumi’s plan was partly unsuccessful, its outcome was close to what the brigade commander had originally intended. If Yamada’s policy had been to execute all prisoners, he would have rebuked Morozumi severely for disobeying his orders. But he did not.
Thus, Yamada and Morozumi both made a strenuous effort to remove Chinese soldiers who had surrendered from the battle zone. But their plans ended in failure, betraying their good intentions. Morozumi believed that his efforts had been in vain.
As he wrote, “That was the end of it. The outcome was terribly disappointing, but I have written the truth.”34 But even if he miscalculated, he did everything he could to wrest the prisoners from the jaws of death.

War Journals Written by Members of the Yamada Detachment, 13th Division
Only the few officers who were involved in the operation knew what had really happened, but none of them had the leisure to write detailed reports. They were preoccupied with other events unfolding before their very eyes, on the battlefield, which needed their attention. That is why the entries in the “Diary of Yamada Senji” (“We are told to kill all of them. All units are desperately short of food.”) are so terse.
Moreover, the rank-and-file had no way of acquiring an accurate grasp of the events that had taken place. Even if they had, battle fatigue prevented them from doing much more than scribbling a few lines in their diaries. That is why the “War Journals of Soldiers in the Yamada Detachment, 13th Division” describe only the final outcome, i.e., executions.
For instance, documents like “The War Journal of Meguro Fukuji” record only the executions.35 Moreover, Corporal Meguro4 was a member of the 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment, not of Morozumi’s unit (65th Infantry Regiment). His (and only his) diary contains a fatal misconception. He writes that on December 13 (actually December 14), 100,000 Chinese soldiers surrendered, and that on December 17 and 18 (actually only on the 17th) 13,000 were executed. He was mistaken about all the important facts.36 His diary lacks accuracy and reliability, but he cannot be blamed for that. Journal entries were written after the fact, when the soldiers had a spare moment. It is not surprising that their memories sometimes failed them.

War Journal of Endo Takaaki
We would now like to examine some of the war journals kept by officers. In the “War Journals of the Men of the Yamada Detachment, 13th Division” we find the journals of four officers. Only two of them contain accounts that mention the disposition of prisoners of war.
The first one is the “War Journal of Endo Takaaki.” In it he writes that on or about December 16, “It seems that orders were received from the Division regarding the disposition of prisoners.”37 Thus, 2nd Lieutenant Endo knew that the brigade commander, in issuing an order instructing that all prisoners were to be killed, had made a decision that was very painful for him (see (3) above).
But Endo could not have known about (4) and (5), since he did not accompany Tayama’s 1st Battalion. Therefore, he recorded only the tragic outcome of the regimental commander’s carefully laid plan to release the prisoners. The entry in 2nd Lieutenant Endo’s journal for December 17 follows.
Supplied nine soldiers for guard duty at the summit of Mufushan at
4 See Note a.
0700 hours. Selected soldiers to line the route of the entry into Nanking from “R” to represent “13D.” Depart with 10 soldiers from the platoon at 0800 hours, and enter Nanking from Heping Gate … Returned to barracks at 1730 hours, exhausted, as it was three miles from the barracks to the site of the ceremony. At night, provide five men for execution of more than 10,000 prisoners of war … .38 [Italics supplied.]
By “from ‘R’ to represent ‘13D’,” Endo meant that he selected soldiers from the regiment (Morozumi’s Regiment) to represent the 13th Division, and instructed them to participate in the victory ceremony.
The first part of this entry describes participation in the ceremonial entry. The second part refers to the fact that he dispatched soldiers for the executions. Viewing only this entry, one would get the impression that Morozumi’s original intent was to execute the prisoners. Endo’s entry for December 18 begins as follows.
Since executions not completed by 0100 hours, ordered to dispose of remaining prisoners of war. Proceeded to execution site. Cold wind blowing; blizzard commenced at about 0300 hours. Am chilled to my bones. It seemed as though daylight would never come. Completed at 0830 hours … From 1400 hours until 1930 hours, mobilize 25 men to dispose of more than 10,000 corpses.39
It would appear that 2nd Lieutenant Endo participated in the executions after they were underway. Since shots were fired from Baguazhou and the prisoners on the banks of the Yangtze began running for their lives at “about midnight,” Endo must have been ordered to appear about an hour later. Therefore, he was not privy to the information contained in (4) and (5) above.
Therefore, he describes only the final outcome (see (6) above) . the executions. Prisoners were shot to death, so executions did take place, but Endo had no idea about the preceding events. That is why he wrote simply “executions.”

War Journal of Miyamoto Shogo
Next we will examine the “War Journal of Miyamoto Shogo.” On December 16, 2nd Lieutenant Miyamoto took part in removing the prisoners to the banks of the Yangtze and “shooting them to death.” Then, on the night of December 17, he oversaw the escorting of prisoners. An excerpt from his entry for December 17 follows.
Today some of our men participated in the parade into Nanking, but most of them had been entrusted with the disposition of the prisoners of war. I marched to Nanking, departing at 0800 hours … By the time I got back it was evening. I immediately set out to take part in the disposition of the prisoners of war. There were more than 20,000 of them. There was a terrible mistake, and many of our men were killed or wounded.40 [Italics supplied.]
Miyamoto had taken part in the ceremonial entry into Nanking, as had 2nd Lieutenant Endo. But Miyamoto participated in the “disposition” of the prisoners of war immediately after he returned from the ceremony, while Endo did not.
However, doubts remain. In the entry for December 16, Miyamoto had written, “The battalion has decided upon the method of last resort … to shoot the prisoners to death.”41 But on December 17, he wrote neither “shooting” or “execution,” but “disposition.” Was this because the executions had ended in failure? If the intention had been to shoot the prisoners from the outset, then the executions could not have ended in failure, nor would any Japanese have been killed.
Thus, it was the 1st Battalion, Morozumi’s battalion, that shot some of the prisoners on December 16, after a fire had been set, and that removed the prisoners at night. Morozumi had instructed 1st Battalion Commander Tayama to release the prisoners. Therefore, Tayama was well aware of (4) and (5) above.
Miyamoto was not only a member of the 1st Battalion, but also an officer. Therefore, the battalion commander must have told him that the prisoners were being moved so that they could be released, not executed. It would have made more sense if he had written, “I immediately set out to take part in the shooting of the prisoners of war.”
Why didn’t 2nd Lieutenant Miyamoto write the truth? If he had, his entry would have read as follows: “I immediately set out to take part in the release of the prisoners of war. There were more than 20,000 of them. There was a terrible mistake, and many of our men were killed or wounded.” But by writing that, he would have been criticizing the operation and his superiors.
Neither Regimental Commander Morozumi nor 1st Battalion Commander Tayama was responsible for the debacle. No one could have foreseen the events that took place. And by writing “release,” “blunder,” and “many of our men were killed or wounded,” Miyamoto would have been intimating that the regimental commander and the 1st Battalion commander were to blame, which was not true. Therefore, to convey the idea that the prisoners were removed so that they could be “released,” and that ultimately, they were “shot,” he wrote “disposition.”
If the original intention had been to remove the prisoners to execute them, 2nd Lieutenant Miyamoto would have written “shot” or “executed” in his entry for December 17, as he had on the previous day. Instead, Miyamoto recorded a lawful act of war (execution), not a massacre. However, since no one counted the actual number of prisoners who were removed or shot, the accounts do not match.

Leaderless Chinese Soldiers Surrender
Rereading Suzuki Akira’s The Illusion of a Great Nanking Massacre, this writer noticed a passage in 2nd Lieutenant Hirabayashi’s testimony: “Besides, the Chinese were leaderless.”42 International law in time of war is applied only to combatants led by someone in a position of authority. The Chinese troops who surrendered at Mufushan were thus ineligible for prisoner-of-war status, but even so, the Japanese tried to protect them.
Our company supplied a great number of sentries. I was ordered to act as patrol officer, and was exhausted from having to be constantly vigilant. In the evening we provided meals to some of the prisoners. We didn’t have enough rations for ourselves, so we had a difficult time feeding the prisoners.43
This excerpt is from Miyamoto’s journal entry for December 15. It tells us that, though “all units are desperately short of food,” all possible was done to feed the Chinese prisoners, at the expense of the Japanese soldiers “who had been suffering from exhaustion for two days.” 44 We must remember that the Japanese did not treat the prisoners harshly, even though the latter were not protected by international law.
CHAPTER 8:

FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALLS OF
NANKING AFTER THE FALL OF THE CITY

During the invasion of Nanking, 16th Division Commander Nakajima Kesago was in charge of the gates north of Zhongshan Gate (East Gate): Taiping, Xuanwu, and Heping gates. That entire area was defended by Chiang Kai-shek’s crack training unit. Before, and even after Nanking fell, the 16th Division was engaged in heated combat with Chinese troops attempting to escape from the city.
The unit that Lieutenant-General Nakajima refers to as the “Sasaki Unit”1 in his war journal was the 30th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General Sasaki Toichi. However, Sasaki was, in fact, the commander of the 38th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment, both attached to the 30th Infantry Brigade. Sasaki’s memoirs have been published in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2. We shall refer to them as we examine hostilities subsequent to the capture of the gates.
Desperate Chinese Training Unit Attempts To Shoot Its Way to Freedom
Even when the Japanese captured and occupied Zhongshan Gate and other gates, the Chinese did not surrender. Counteroffensives perpetrated by Chinese troops desperate to escape from Nanking were vicious, especially in the vicinity of Zijinshan. In the “Journal of Major-General Sasaki Toichi,” the situation there is described as follows.
At about 0830 hours, I was awakened by a barrage of gunfire very close to me … enemy soldiers were approaching in great numbers, and from all directions. They were members of a training unit that had been at the summit of Zijinshan, and now they were launching an assault behind the battle line, attempting to cut through our unit.2
Sasaki was at detachment headquarters, located in Baying, north of Zijinshan. Five or six hundred soldiers from the training unit converged on Baying, shooting everything in sight with their Czech-made guns.3 The 16th Division, Sasaki’s detachment in particular, was forced into a pitched battle.
At about 9:00 a.m. on December 13, Sasaki’s unit fought a “formidable enemy force,”4 in compliance with orders from the 38th Regiment, for an hour. Most of the hostilities took place at Zijinshan, but the battle zone “extended over several kilometers,”5 from Tangshuizhen (two kilometers east of Nanking) in the east to Heping and Taiping gates in the west. During the intense, bloody battle, Chinese soldiers began to surrender.
Tang Shengzhi, commander of the Nanking Defense Corps, had sworn to defend the city to the death, but fled Nanking before the city fell. He did not order his troops to surrender to the Japanese. As Tillman Durdin wrote in a dispatch to the New York Times (December 18, 1937 edition), an alarming number of commanders deserted their men and “fled, causing panic among the rank and file.”6 The counterattacks outside Nanking (particularly near Zijinshan) were the abandoned soldiers’ last-ditch, desperate attempts to escape.

Major-General Sasaki’s Report
The vanquished stragglers were determined to escape at all costs, and that made them very dangerous. A typical example of their behavior was experienced by a combined cavalry unit at Xianhemenzhen (20 kilometers east of Nanking). The “Journal of Major-General Sasaki Toichi” describes a straggler attack that took place on the morning of December 13, resulting in a bitter struggle.
The combined cavalry units were there also, in the rear, near the sanitary troops. But it was dark, and when the enemy attacked, they were pushed into a village. It was a fiasco . they lost 200 men and 60 horses. The combined cavalry units and the heavy artillery units behind them begged me for reinforcements. But I simply could not attend to anyone capable of defending himself, because my unit was engaged in a desperate battle, spread out over what must have been several kilometers.7 [Italics supplied.]
According to History of the 3rd Cavalry Division, the first wave of the attack occurred at midnight on December 12. At Xianhemenzhen, a “disorderly mob”8 consisting of approximately 20,000 Chinese soldiers, mainly from the 159th Division, “blew their bugles and then charged like an avalanche.”9 A chaotic battle ensued,10 and continued until 9:00 a.m. on December 13.11
Among the more than 3,000 enemy dead was 159th Division Deputy Commander Cheng.12 The 3rd Cavalry Regiment sustained the “heaviest casualties since the Shanghai conflict.”13 Therefore, even on December 13, when Nanking’s gates were captured, battles were raging at Zijinshan . battles so fierce that the Japanese had to request reinforcements.

Chinese Troops Storm Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters
On the afternoon of December 13, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters at Tangshuizhen was ambushed by Chinese stragglers. The Japanese repelled them, but they attacked again at 5:00 p.m. Then, according to Major-General Iinuma’s war journal, “a free-for-all ensued.”14 The hostilities were so severe that when night fell, the entire 19th Regiment and one mountain gun battalion rushed to Tangshuizhen from Nanking.15 On the following day, the Japanese discovered that 12 of their comrades had been killed during the engagement. It is time to correct the common perception, i.e., that hostilities ended when the gates of Nanking were captured.

Testimony of the 38th Regiment’s Adjutant
Chinese soldiers invariably surrendered during these battles, as described in an account written by Captain Kodama Yoshio, adjutant of the 38th Regiment, which appears in Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 5.
When the regiment’s front line was one or two kilometers away from Nanking, engaged in close combat, the division’s adjutant told me, over the telephone, “Do not accommodate any Chinese soldiers who surrender. Dispose of them.” I couldn’t believe my ears … the whole unit was astonished and confused. But orders were orders, so I conveyed the instructions to all battalions. I received no subsequent reports from any of them. We were in the midst of a pitched battle, so you can imagine what it was like.16 [Italics supplied.]
Captain Kodama stated that these events took place on either December 12 or 13. Both he and the regimental commander were in the battle zone which, according to the 38th Regiment’s Battle Report, extended from Xingwei, a village on the north side of Zijinshan, to Shizijie, east of Heping Gate.
Since the houses in the area north of Zijinshan (near Xingwei and Shizijie) had already been burned by Chinese troops, few residents remained there. Furthermore, that same area “had regularly been used by the Chinese for maneuvers,” so they knew it very well. The 36th and 48th divisions and the supervisory unit did not surrender. Seeking an escape route, they launched a counterattack.17
The division adjutant responded by ordering his men, over the telephone, not to take prisoners. He was justified in doing so, since he had received repeated requests for reinforcements from a nearby unit under his command. Sasaki refused those requests, instead urging all his men capable of defending themselves to fight on. If the Japanese had accepted prisoners of war and disarmed them in the midst of hostilities, they would have been depleting their own war potential, and might have lost the battle.
The men of the 38th Regiment had the right to defend themselves and, in the throes of a pitched battle, had no obligation to accommodate prisoners of war. If they executed soldiers who surrendered, they were not necessarily violating international law. They were simply engaging in an act of war. Hata Ikuhiko was probably aware of that, and that is why he deleted the second (italicized) portion of the testimony cited above.18

Inaccurate Locution
Sasaki’s men finally fought their way to Heping Gate, where several thousand enemy soldiers surrendered to them. By then, it was about
2:00 p.m. on December 13, the same time when hordes of Chinese stragglers were ambushing Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters at Tangshuizhen. Another excerpt from Sasaki’s diary follows.
We reached Heping Gate. Later, several thousand prisoners of war surrendered to us. Our exasperated soldiers would have killed them all, had their officers allowed them to. Looking back over the carnage that has taken place over the past 10 days, and during which many of our comrades lost their lives, I too want to say, “Kill them all.”19
Sasaki should not have used the term “prisoners of war.” Prisoners of war do not need to surrender. As is indicated in The Battle of Nanking, Sasaki should have written: “We reached Heping Gate. Later, several thousand enemy soldiers surrendered to us.”
Why were there so many stragglers near Heping Gate? The most plausible answer to that question is found in the eyewitness account of Nishiura Setsuzo, commander of the 7th Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, 16th Division, in The Battle of Nanking.
[On December 14], I saw many corpses of Chinese soldiers lying in hollows when we were advancing south of Taiping Gate. Since they had been carefully lined up, I assumed that they were the bodies of Chinese military personnel who had died during the conflict at Zijinshan, and were later transported to the gate.20
The wounded had probably been brought from the site of the pitched battle at Zijinshan to Nanking, through Taiping Gate. Soldiers who died en route were buried carefully in the caverns inside the gate. We can, therefore, assume that Taiping Gate was open until immediately before Nanking fell, so that wounded soldiers could be transported into the city. By the time that Sasaki’s unit encountered stragglers at Heping Gate, at 2:00 p.m. on December 13, 12 hours had elapsed since the fall of Nanking. When the stragglers who had failed to escape were rushing from the north side of Zijinshan to Taiping Gate, in the hope of escaping into Nanking, they had a fateful encounter at Heping Gate with Sasaki’s unit, which was travelling south from that gate.

“Kill Them All”
When enemy soldiers surrendered, the soldiers in Sasaki’s unit apparently “killed them all.” Article 23 of the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention states, in part, that it is unlawful “to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion.”
Did Sasaki’s unit violate the Hague Convention? Any judgements must be made in view of the circumstances prevailing at the time, for which there were two possible scenarios:
(1)
The Japanese had subdued all of Zijinshan, and Chinese attacks had ceased. Chinese soldiers quietly came forward and surrendered.

(2)
Japanese troops were ambushed by the Chinese near Zijinshan, and forced into a pitched battle. During that battle, some Chinese soldiers surrendered. If the Japanese had treated them as prisoners of war and gone through the formalities, they would have been unable to assist their comrades, who were still fighting.

As stated previously, the prevailing circumstances were not as described in (1). A desperate, bloody battle was taking place at Zijinshan, as described in (2).
At 5:00 p.m. on December 13, three hours after several thousand Chinese soldiers had surrendered to Sasaki’s unit (Right-Flank Detachment, 16th Division), the Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters at Tangshuizhen was ambushed a second time. Another melee ensued.21 According to the Tangshuizhen Battle Report prepared by the 2nd Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, the Chinese used tanks in that encounter. At Shenhemenzhen, north of Tangshuizhen, the Chinese counterattack was so ferocious that the 2nd Battalion, Heavy Artillery (an independent unit), suffered its worst casualties since landing at Shanghai.
Chinese troops were attempting to flee from the east of Zijinshan to the west or southeast. On every battlefront except for Heping Gate, elite Chinese units were launching counterattacks. Put on the defense in the face of the violent attack, the 16th Division fought desperately. When the Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters was ambushed a second time, it was not the 16th Division that rushed to its aid from Nanking, but the 19th Regiment, 9th Division. The 16th Division could not spare a single man.

“Take No Prisoners Until So Ordered”
Had it not been for the skirmishes and bloody defensive battles, Major-General Sasaki’s 31st Infantry Brigade Order (issued on December 14 at 04:50 a.m.), i.e., “Take no prisoners until so ordered,”22 would never have been issued.
The situation in the vicinity of Zijinshan was described in the aforementioned order.
1. The enemy has been defeated on all fronts, but stragglers continue to resist.
“Resisting” seems a rather tame word to use to describe what the enemy was actually doing, i.e., launching savage counterattacks all around the base of Zijinshan.
The execution of enemy soldiers who surrendered on the battlefield was an act of war. If the Japanese had taken the time to disarm and free (or incarcerate) them, their war potential would have been diminished. That would have provided additional motivation to enemy soldiers attacking nearby, and might have caused a Japanese defeat. Even after the battles had ended, Japanese soldiers were ambushed by fleeing stragglers on many occasions.
Chinese troops never formally surrendered en masse. Some of them did surrender, but others went on the offensive. There was no orderly action on their part. As Tillman Durdin wrote for the January 9, 1938 edition of The New York Times: “Tang’s departure, unknown even to many members of his own staff, left the army leaderless and was the signal for complete collapse.”23 [Italics supplied.]
Leaderless troops have relinquished their obligations as combatants, and are not entitled to combatants’ rights. Even if they were taken prisoner, they lacked legal prisoner-of-war status. Killing them was not in violation of international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese transported this large group of prisoners in order to intern them.

Unrest Among the Prisoners
As stated in The Battle of Nanking, the majority of Chinese soldiers were completely without supervision. As long as the enemy possessed the will to resist, the Japanese had the legal right to crush that resistance.
Even when Chinese troops surrendered, the Japanese had difficulty determining their motives, which were, in many cases, suspect. Sergeant Shimizu Kazue of the 38th Regiment (16th Division) recorded one such incident in his war journal on December 14, which appears in Hata Ikuhiko’s The Nanking Incident.
As the sweep unit, we were assigned to the northern part of Nanking. We commenced our advance at 0800 hours … we climbed over the wall into the city. While we were opening the gate, Chinese stragglers were running wild. We captured and annihilated them. Some of the stragglers came to us make peace, but we bayonetted 92 of them since they were behaving restively … Countless stragglers were hiding in the city or running wild. I have never seen such a disgraceful sight. The spirited men of our company annihilated some stragglers who continued to resist, thus restoring order in the city.24 [Italics supplied.]
Hata’s reaction to this incident is that “it would be more appropriate to describe these as executions than acts of war.” One wonders what is at the basis of his conclusion. Normally, when soldiers who surrender on the battlefield are rebellious or defiant, the strictest measures are taken against them, i.e., execution. Executions performed under such circumstances are not in violation of international law. The italicized portions of Shimizu’s account prove that the actions taken by the 38th Regiment were not unlawful.

Chinese Soldiers Hurl Grenades After Surrendering
Japanese troops were plagued by acts of violence committed by Chinese soldiers who pretended to surrender and then attacked them by, for instance, throwing hand grenades. If they had refrained from attacking an “enemy who … has surrendered at discretion,” they would have been leaving themselves open to attack. Let us examine the testimony of 2nd Lieutenant Muguruma Masajiro, adjutant of the 1st Battalion (16th Division), which can be found in Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking: A Comprehensive Examination, Vol. 8.
With one platoon, I was entrusted with security at Zijinshan, north of Zhongshan Gate. The battle had been harsh, however, and only about 30 men remained in the platoon. At midnight, we captured several hundred stragglers who had emerged from the east side of the mountain and, not having noticed us, were heading toward Nanking.
But there weren’t many of us, and if the Chinese had become aware of that, we would have been in danger. So we took away their guns, and assembled them in a hollow. We tied only the soldiers on the perimeter with electric wire so that they could not escape.
Perhaps they underestimated us because of our small forces, because they began throwing hand grenades and rioting. They became uncontrollable, so we fired our light machine guns and rifles at them until we ran out of ammunition.25
In his Memories of My Youth, Muguruma mentions being shot with a dumdum (expanding) bullet.26 The Chinese were using dumdum bullets, which were expressly prohibited by the Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets,27 signed at The Hague in 1899. They also, on many occasions, concealed hand grenades in their clothing, which they held onto even after they had laid down their guns. Stragglers often fought back when captured.
Moreover, frontline combatants “did not have the leisure to carefully determine that each enemy soldier who raised his arms in surrender had lost the will to resist, or to accommodate him as a prisoner of war, in accordance with international law,”28 as stated in Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 5. It would have been different if only a few soldiers were left behind after an entire enemy force had been routed. But when Chinese troops, desperate to escape, counterattacked, “if we failed to kill the enemy, we were sealing our own fates.”

Transport and Medical Units Attacked
Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1 contains the Battle Report prepared by the 3rd Battalion, 68th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division. The report states that a second-line transport unit attached to the 68th Infantry Regiment and carrying ammunition, provisions, and fodder departed from Tianwangsi (approximately 50 kilometers southeast of Nanking) on December 11. The unit was scheduled to join the main strength of the regiment.
At 4:20 p.m. on December 14, as the party approached a mountainous area east of Tuqiaozhen (approximately 24 kilometers southeast of Nanking), “about 200 stragglers came out of a pine forest on the left side of the road, and attacked us.”29 This was an ambush.
The clever enemy had persuaded some Chinese farmers to put on the armbands that Japanese soldiers wore, and to approach us. Their main force hid in the forest, and when we made contact with the farmers, used that as their signal to attack the unit from a location 50 meters ahead of us. At that point, the head of the transport unit deployed members of the party who were carrying rifles to both sides of the road, and instructed them to attack.30
The transport unit was carrying a full load of weapons, ammunition, provisions, and fodder. Moreover, not being a combat unit, it was at a distinct disadvantage. The Chinese often attacked transport units, but this time they “persuaded farmers to don armbands with a picture of the rising sun on them,”31 and to approach the Japanese unit.
It is a violation of international law for civilians to engage in combat. Fortunately, the Japanese routed the Chinese after a battle that lasted approximately one hour. Still, the following warning was added to the Battle Report, “for future reference.”
Since large numbers of stragglers remain in territory we have occupied, we urge all units incapable of defending themselves to proceed with the utmost caution.32
Those who have claimed that stragglers presented no danger would be wise to revise their views.
Major Yamazaki Masao wrote in his war journal that at 3:00 p.m. on December 15, “more than a hundred”33 enemy soldiers attacked a party that included the Assistant G-4 (Ordnance Department, 3rd Division), the principal medical officer, and the principal veterinary officer. According to the war journal kept by Iinuma Mamoru, the party’s fate was unknown for a time,34 but later, word was received that it was safe. That safety had not been achieved, however, without the loss of several Japanese lives.
On December 16, Sasaki’s unit made a sweep of stragglers on the north side of Zijinshan. Not until then did the Battle of Nanking finally end.
CHAPTER 9:

THE SWEEP AFTER
THE FALL OF NANKING

The Nanking Safety Zone
The immense fortress that is the city of Nanking was constructed by Hong Wu (1368-1398), the first Ming emperor. Granite was used for the foundation, on top of which huge bricks were laid. Above some of the gates (Zhonghua Gate, for instance), the wall tops were paved with stones so that they could be used as roads for vehicles (see pp. 49, 50).
According to Nanking, edited by the Nanking Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the circumference of the city walls was 34.24 kilometers.1 Within those walls was the Nanking Safety Zone. As described in Chapter 2,2 the Safety Zone, roughly square in shape, was 3.2 kilometers long and 1.6 kilometers wide, with a total area of
3.86 square kilometers.

Nanking After the Fall
The city walls presented both advantages and disadvantages. They were useful for defense purposes, but once the city was surrounded by enemy troops and the gates captured, the defenders would be trapped inside. Such was the case when the Japanese invaded Nanking, since they attacked the gates from the east and the south. The only escape route available to Chinese troops was Yijiang Gate in the north of the city.
According to the testimonies of Captains Sekiguchi Kozo and Hashimoto Mochiyuki3 in Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 10, the road leading from Yijiang Gate to Xiaguan (located on the banks of the Yangtze) . the escape route used by Chinese troops . was “littered with blue-and-yellow uniforms” for a full kilometer.
During their flight, Chinese troops, who “had been careful to retain their rifles and machine guns,” crossed the Yangtze in rowboats and barges, on rafts and even doors, but not one of them was in uniform. Stragglers on the riverbank fired their rifles, but “none of them waved white flags, or raised their arms to show that they wished to surrender.” The Japanese pursued the fleeing enemy soldiers, and shot them, just as every army has done in every war throughout history. From these testimonies, we know that Chinese soldiers discarded their uniforms and attempted to escape through Yijiang Gate. What became of those whose attempts were unsuccessful?

Chinese Soldiers Infiltrate the Safety Zone Before Nanking’s Gates Are Breached
Tillman Durdin, an American journalist who departed from Nanking on December 15, wrote the following in a dispatch to The New York Times (January 9, 1938 edition).
Sunday evening [Chinese
troops] spread all over the
safety zone and thousands

Yijiang Gate after the fall of Nanking,began shedding their viewed from inside the city. (Source:uniforms. Civilian Reprints from Film Records of the Battle of
Nanking, Series 21)
clothes were stolen or
begged from passing
civilians, and when no
“civvies” could be found
the soldiers nevertheless
discarded army garb and
wore only their
underclothing.

Arms were discarded
along with uniforms, and
the streets became
covered with guns,
grenades, swords,
knapsacks, coats, shoes
and helmets.4 [Italics
supplied.]

Here, too, Chinese troops discarded their uniforms and masqueraded as civilians. In another article (December 18, 1937), Durdin wrote that he witnessed “the wholesale undressing of an army that was almost comic.”5 When they robbed civilians of their clothing, some Chinese soldiers even murdered their victims for their garments,6 as James Espy, vice-consul at the American Embassy in Nanking, inferred. Since these events took place on the night of Sunday, December 12, we know that Chinese troops had fled to the Safety Zone before Nanking fell.

Nanking: A Deserted City
The Japanese entered Nanking on the night of December 13. By then, Chinese troops had completed their flight into the Safety Zone. Sumiya Iwane was an artist assigned to the 3rd Fleet, Central China Expeditionary Force, on board the battleship Ataka. His description of Nanking on December 13 appears in Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 10.
At the time, I was on board the Ataka, the flagship of the 11th Squadron, on the Yangtze River. After Nanking fell, a newspaper reporter drove me to the city from Xiaguan. On the way, we passed corpse upon corpse lying near Xingzhong Gate [northwest of Nanking, directly north of Yijiang Gate].
The streets were deserted, and the houses had been damaged by fires. I got out of the car and found a bicycle. It was functional, though I had to ride slowly because there was something wrong with the pedals. I rode to the seat of the Nanking municipal government, the Headquarters of the General Staff, and the city assembly hall. At each of these places, I dismounted and went inside. But all was quiet, and there was no one in sight. … The Ono and Wakizaka units, Army units that had invaded the city, seemed to have located buildings with roofs intact to serve as billets. In any case, I saw no Japanese soldiers. Nanking was truly a deserted city. …
The next day, I explored more of the city on the bicycle, because I thought it strange that I hadn’t encountered any of its residents. I came upon a banner on the street that read “Refugee Zone: Do Not Enter.” The zone was packed with refugees. I don’t think I have ever seen such a crowded place.7
An eerie silence reigned in Nanking. Yasuyama Kodo, a colonel in the Army Medical Corps and the 3rd Fleet’s head physician, also described Nanking as a “deserted city”8 in his war journal entry for December 19. The headquarters of the 80th Division, the Ministry of Communications, and the Railway Ministry had been burned to the ground, another example of the scorched-earth strategy. There were no signs of life. Nanking had been abandoned. Most of its residents had congregated in the Safety Zone.

Armed Chinese Troops Hide Among Civilians
On December 13, there were no hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese within the city limits. But that did not mean that Nanking was a safe place immediately after it fell. As we can see from the accounts cited above, Chinese soldiers became “civilians” by casting off their uniforms, and disappeared into the Safety Zone.
The Safety Zone had been established to accommodate civilians (noncombatants). But in their midst were regular Chinese Army personnel dressed in civilian clothing. No matter what they were wearing, they were still soldiers. Some of them had discarded both their uniforms and their weapons, but certainly not all. Chinese military personnel had concealed an enormous quantity of weapons, as we shall demonstrate later. They could have planned and launched an attack at any time. Chicago Daily News correspondent Archibald Steele wrote that Chinese soldiers were still shooting from concealed points of vantage in the city.9
According to The Battle of Nanking, on December 14, a Japanese tank company was shot at by several dozen Chinese stragglers when some of its members alighted from their tanks on Zhongshan Road and entered a nearby auditorium. They rushed back to their tanks, barely escaping injury or death.10 Other Japanese soldiers were shot at by stragglers during their sweep of the city. Nanking was not yet a safe place.

Japanese Sweep Nanking in Accordance with Invasion Outline
If Chinese troops had not concealed themselves among civilians, the Japanese sweep of Nanking would have proceeded without difficulty. The sweep was begun in accordance with the “Nanking Invasion Outline,” issued on December 7.
As William Webb, the presiding justice at the Tokyo Trials, said, a sweep is conducted to “drive out or drive away the enemy.”11
International Prosecutor’s Office: Interrogations, Vol. 50: The Nanking Incident defines a sweep as a legitimate military action that involves “driving out” or “driving away” enemy soldiers.12
The “Nanking Invasion Outline” included two important instructions to be followed during the sweep of Nanking, one of which was:
3. … Each division shall designate one infantry regiment as its core unit, which shall sweep the city. With the exception of that unit, the main strength of the division shall assemble at an appropriate location outside the city.13
Even units that did enter Nanking were not permitted to move freely about the city, as substantiated by Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 8. According to that publication, when the 20th Infantry Regiment, 16th Division captured Zhongshan Gate and entered Nanking, 2nd Lieutenant Muguruma Masajiro’s 9th Infantry Regiment, 16th Division, was “forbidden to advance into the city.” He reported that “Japanese military control was strict, as it should be.” But, to his disadvantage, there were “no buildings to use for barracks” and, forced to bivouac, he slept poorly because it was so cold.14

Troops Not Participating in the Sweep Forbidden To Leave Their Barracks
Takeuchi Goro, a medical corpsman with the 9th Infantry Regiment, was billeted at the Nanking Military Academy until the end of 1937, when he moved to a barracks in Tangshuizhen. Takeuchi wrote that, like Muguruma’s unit, “we were not permitted to leave our barracks while we were in Nanking.”15
A 38th Infantry Regiment order issued on December 14 at 9:30 p.m. instructed the main strength of the regiment to “form village bivouac”16 at Xiaguan. Xiaguan, located outside Nanking, was in ruins, having been burned by Chinese troops.
In addition to soldiers’ accounts, there is other evidence that attests to the fact that the Japanese bivouacked or were forbidden to leave barracks, in the form of regimental orders and a division commander’s testimony.
On May 2, 1946, not long after World War II had ended, Fujita Susumu, commander of the 3rd Division, Shanghai Expeditionary Force, when interrogated by the International Prosecutor’s Office during the Tokyo Trials, was asked if all units were granted freedom of movement in Nanking after the ceremonial entry into the city on December 17. Fujita answered in the negative, and added that he had ordered his men to remain in their quarters when they were off-duty, and to refrain from approaching the Safety Zone. Moreover, his entire division had moved outside the city after the ceremony.17
Sergeant-Major Fujita Kiyoshi (later promoted to 1st Lieutenant), attached to the 2nd Light Armored Vehicle Company, an independent unit, testified that “on the 21st, my company moved to the Chinese training unit’s barracks at the Military Academy in Nanking … we were forbidden to leave our quarters unless we were on official business.”18 [Italics supplied.]
During an interview, 2nd Lieutenant Inukai Soichiro, head of the 9th Infantry Regiment’s Signal Section, told this writer that each day, someone from his unit was appointed bivouac orderly officer, and that non-commissioned officers and members of the rank-and-file were assigned to sentry and patrol duty. He added that it was against the rules for Japanese military personnel to leave their barracks, except when on official business.19 His testimony demonstrates that the aforementioned instruction, i.e., that “the main strength of the division shall assemble at an appropriate location outside the city,”20 was strictly enforced.

Designation of Operation Areas and Accountability
The other important instruction included in the “Nanking Invasion Outline” was as follows.
4. During the sweep of the city, operation areas shall be designated and strictly observed, thus ensuring that there is no fighting among Japanese military personnel, and that perpetrators of unlawful acts are held accountable.21
Japanese military authorities did not tolerate unlawful acts. Operation areas for the sweep were designated, and notice was given that crimes would not go unpunished. The operation areas were:
(1)
The area northeast of Nanking (north of Zhongshan East Road), including the fort at Shizishan: 33rd Regiment (the Noda Unit)

and the 38th Regiment (the Sukegawa Unit), 30th Infantry Brigade (under the command of the 16th Division)

(2)
The area west of Guanghua Gate extending to Hanxi Gate: 19th Infantry Regiment (the Hitomi Unit), 18th Infantry Brigade (under the command of the 9th Division)

(3)
The area east of Zhongshan Gate extending to Zhongshan East Road (south of Zhongshan East Road and east of Zhongzheng Road): 35th Infantry Regiment (the Fujii Unit), 6th Brigade (under the command of the 9th Division)

(4)
The northern part of the city (west of Zhongshan Road and north of Hanzhong Road): 7th Infantry Regiment (the Isa Unit), 6th Brigade (under the command of the 9th Division)22

No units were assigned to the area near Zhonghua Gate (South Gate) and the eastern sector of the city. No sweep was needed there, because Chinese troops had already retreated to the Safety Zone or left the city through Yijiang Gate (North Gate).
As Major Yamazaki Masao, staff officer with the 10th Army, recorded in his war journal, the eastern sector of Nanking was “a vast empty space.”23 Major Kisaki Hisashi, a 16th Division administrative staff officer, described the southern sector of the city as “residential,” and the northern and western sectors as “agricultural” in his journal.24 No sweep was scheduled for the eastern sector because it was impossible for Chinese soldiers to hide there.

The Sweep of Nanking
The testimony of First Lieutenant Tsuchiya Masaharu, commander of the 4th Company, 19th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division, describes the sweep as follows. (Tsuchiya was the officer whose unit commenced its sweep at Guanghua Gate (Southeast Gate) on December 13. His testimony appears in The Battle of Nanking.)
The walls had been destroyed by bombardment, but the homes inside were completely intact. Not even one roof tile had been displaced. However, an atmosphere of eerie silence and desolation pervaded the city, and even my stalwart subordinates hesitated for a moment. In the midst of this ineffable silence, one that I had never experienced before, I found myself, at some point, standing at the head of my company.
As we proceeded further into the city, I sensed that Nanking
was truly a “deserted city.” No enemy bullets flew at us. We saw no one . only endless, silent rows of houses.25
A captain, commander of the 3rd Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment, wrote that on December 13, “At night I heard nothing, not even dogs barking in the distance. Nanking was completely silent.”26 An entry in Battle Report No. 12 (dated December 14) prepared by the 38th Infantry Regiment, which swept the northeastern sector of the city, stated that “There are numerous refugees in Nanking, but they have all congregated in one area [the Safety Zone]. We saw very few civilians during our sweep.”27
It is no wonder that Japanese troops saw few civilians, since it would have been foolhardy for the latter to venture out into a battle zone. Moreover, according to International Committee Document No. 9, “we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zone.”28
However, in the northeastern sector of the city, to which the 30th Infantry Brigade (the Sasaki Brigade) had been assigned, the 33rd Infantry Regiment and the 38th Regiment apprehended and executed hostile enemy soldiers.

Sweep of the Safety Zone
However, as we have previously indicated, the Safety Zone presented the most serious problem, because it harbored both civilians and soldiers. The objective of the sweep was to ferret out Chinese soldiers hiding in the Safety Zone, and to intern soldiers who surrendered. It also involved executing restive soldiers in the Safety Zone, and confiscating their concealed ordnance.
The sweep of the Safety Zone, as stated earlier, was the responsibility of the 7th Infantry Regiment (6th Brigade, 9th Division). The sweep order issued by the 6th Infantry Brigade at 4:30 p.m. on December 13 instructed the 7th Infantry Regiment and other units to “comport themselves in accordance with the Nanking Sweep Outline during the sweep.”29
The first three items in the Nanking Sweep Outline read as follows.

1.
Sweep the enemy stragglers remaining in the city.

2.
During the sweep, precautions relating to entry into the city are to be strictly observed, except in areas where the enemy resists.

3.
When buildings are burned because of enemy resistance therein, special precautions are to be taken so as not to obstruct communications between units.

Power plants, the Electricity Bureau, post offices, telegraph offices, water sources, gas companies, warehouses, factories, and any other facilities suitable for military use are to be occupied expeditiously to prevent the enemy from destroying or burning same.
Since we assume that the majority of fleeing enemy soldiers have donned civilian clothing, apprehend any suspicious individuals, and detain them at an appropriate location.30 [Italics supplied.]
Precautions to be observed upon entering Nanking were as follows.
1.
In light of the fact that this operation, due to its magnitude, will come to the attention of the entire world, all units are instructed to set a standard for the future by comporting themselves honorably, and by refraining, at all costs, from looting, fighting among themselves, and committing unlawful acts.

2.
Japanese military personnel shall not approach foreign concessions or foreign diplomatic missions, and shall refrain from entering the neutral zone [the Safety Zone] unless absolutely necessary.31

Precautions Issued by Brigade Commander Akiyama
In accordance with the Nanking Sweep Outline, the following precautions were relayed to the 7th Infantry Regiment and other units by the commander of the Right-Flank Unit (Major-General Akiyama Yoshimitsu, commander of the 6th Infantry Brigade), at 4:30 p.m. on December 13.
2. Entry into any building in a foreign concession is strictly forbidden, unless said building is being used by the enemy.
This precaution was issued because there would be serious, lasting repercussions if the Japanese entered a foreign embassy, or a foreign residence.
3. Sweep units are to annihilate enemy stragglers. The sweep shall be conducted by units commanded by officers (including warrant officers). Anyone ranking non-commissioned officer or below is absolutely forbidden to act independently.
Only officers could serve as commanders of sweep units. The purpose of the sweep was to annihilate enemy soldiers, not to commit atrocities against civilians. Independent activity was, of course, strictly prohibited.
4. Assume that men aged 16 to 40 are stragglers or soldiers wearing civilian clothing. Apprehend and intern them. With that exception,
Chinese civilians who do not behave in a hostile manner, especially the elderly, women, and children are to be treated kindly, so as to earn their respect for the dignity of the Imperial Army. [Italics supplied.]
Since Chiang Kai-shek had conscripted all able-bodied men and sent them off to the battlefield, it was extremely likely that all men between the ages of 16 and 40 were stragglers. That is why they were to be arrested and confined.
On the other hand, “Chinese civilians who do not behave in a hostile manner, especially the elderly, children, women, and girls” were to be treated leniently. To earn their respect, Japanese military personnel were to comport themselves with dignity.
5.
Post sentries at public or private banks, but do not enter such
establishments.

6.
Refrain from entering private homes and looting them.
7.Anyone who commits arson or accidentally causes a conflagration
shall be severely punished, as per the warning issued by the Army
commander..

8. Military personnel are not to fight among themselves.
“Kanazawa” and “Toyama” [Japanese place names] have been
designated as passwords.

Even though Nanking had fallen, hostilities were still taking place over the entire Zijinshan area. The city was still a dangerous place. There was good reason to designate passwords in advance. Most of the members of the division hailed from Toyama, Ishikawa (in which Kanazawa is located), or Fukui prefectures.
9. If a fire is sighted, sweep units, as well as any other units in the vicinity, shall endeavor to extinguish it.32
Sweep units were also given instructions as to their attire. According to an infantry order (7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 106A), issued at 9:30 p.m. on December 13, military personnel were to wear their uniforms minus knapsacks.33 The soldiers normally carried knapsacks, which held their daily necessities, but also impeded their movement.

Sweep of the Safety Zone Commences on December 14
Infantry Operation Order No. 107A, reminded military personnel to “leave the city once the sweep had ended.”34 Headquarters did not want soldiers to be roving aimlessly around Nanking.
Furthermore, in Order No. 130A (a 9th Division operation order) issued at 7:00 a.m. on December 13, part of the 18th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General Ide Nobutoki, was designated as the left-flank unit. Part of the 6th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General Akiyama, was designated as the right-flank unit.
A 9th Division Sweep Unit Order, issued at 7:00 p.m. on December 14, prohibited the left-flank unit, which was not involved in the sweep, from leaving the area to which it was assigned.35 It also forbade any units other than the left- and right-flank units to enter Nanking.36 Therefore, not all Japanese military personnel proceeded into Nanking . not even the entire 9th Division entered the city.

Four Tanks Captured
The material cited above represents only a small portion of the operation order. Orders related to the sweep were also very detailed. Japanese military regulations were exceedingly strict, and that is why the behavior of Japanese soldiers was quite different from that of their Chinese counterparts. The 7th Regiment’s sweep of the Safety Zone commenced on December 14. Seventh Regiment Commander Isa wrote the following in his war journal: “We begin the sweep in the morning. There is a refugee zone in our assigned area.”37 On the night of December 13, the 7th Regiment entered the city from east of Zhongshan Gate, and bivouacked near Gugong Airfield.38 The men had not yet reached the Safety Zone.
The Regiment’s “Report on the Results of the Sweep of Nanking” (compiled between December 13 and December 24)39 reveals exactly how undisciplined the Chinese soldiery was.
This table lists only one-third of the items confiscated during the sweep conducted by the 7th Regiment.
Chinese soldiers who discarded their uniforms without any intention of surrendering were clearly in violation of international law. Furthermore, there was a huge cache of their weapons in the Safety Zone . also a violation of international law.
No hostilities took place in the Safety Zone. The incident described by Durdin in the December 18 edition of The New York Times, in which he writes that a group of 100 Chinese soldiers was bombarded by Japanese tanks, never took place.40

Chinese Military Personnel Found in Safety Zone Executed
Nevertheless, according to the “Report on the Results of the Sweep of Nanking,” the 7th Infantry Regiment bayonetted or shot 6,670 Chinese soldiers to death. We will provide an account of that incident from another source.
In his war journal, Private 1st Class Mizutani So, 1st Company, 7th Infantry Regiment, made the following entry.
Every young man has been rounded up, or at least the ones we were able to locate. … Each company has rounded up several hundred of them. The 1st Company had the least success, but still brought in close to 200. Individuals we assumed to be family members (wives and mothers) wept and begged us to release them.
We released all civilians, after ascertaining that they were indeed civilians, and shot 36 individuals.41 [Italics supplied.]
The 1st Company, 7th Regiment released several hundred persons after determining that they were civilians, and shot 36 soldiers in civilian clothing on the banks of the Yangtze. A similar entry in the war journal of Private 1st Class Inoie Matakazu, 2nd Company, 7th Infantry Regiment, dated December 16, appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
At 10:00 a.m. we set out on our sweep of enemy stragglers. We confiscated one trench mortar. We resumed our work in the afternoon. We apprehended 335 young men. We arrested every one of the refugees whom we suspected of being a soldier. … We removed those 335 stragglers to the banks of the Yangtze, where they were shot.42
The entry cited above is supported by another journal entry, also from Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking. It was written by Colonel Isa Kazuo, commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment: “On December 16, we moved to new quarters in private homes on Chibi Road. During the three-day sweep, we disposed of approximately 6,500 individuals in the most severe manner possible.”43
If the Japanese had shot someone in error, someone who had not been a soldier, his family members surely would have submitted a protest, which would have included the victim’s name. However, the International Committee made no such protests.
Furthermore, Chibi Road was located at the northern edge of the Safety Zone. The 7th Infantry Regiment moved its headquarters there to conduct sweeping operation around the noon of December 16.44 According to the Battle Report, “the sweep of the assigned area, the Safety Zone in particular, commenced on December 16.”45 It was completed on the following day, the day of the victory parade.46
We would like to digress a bit, and mention that the 7th Infantry Regiment had its headquarters on Chibi Road until it departed on December 26.47 Until 6:00 p.m. on December 24, when the unit received orders to “end the sweep now”48 (7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 117A), it had been assigned to sweep the Safety Zone. However, the sweep was, for the most part, completed in three days, by December 16.
The much-discussed sentence, “we disposed of approximately 6,500 individuals in the most severe manner possible,” probably means that 6,500 Chinese soldiers, out of all those who had been captured . regular army soldiers in civilian clothing . were executed because they were extremely hostile. Europeans and Americans in Nanking were critical of those executions. Were they in fact violations of international law? We shall address that issue in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 10:

REQUIREMENTS FOR
PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS

Japanese Spare Safety Zone
Document No. 1, dated December 14, prepared and submitted by the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone to the Japanese Embassy, opens with the following words of gratitude:
We come to thank you for the fine way your artillery spared the Safety Zone …1 [Italics supplied.]
The great majority of Nanking’s residents had taken refuge in the Safety Zone, as stated in Document No. 9, dated December 17: “On the 13th when your troops entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zone.”2 Moreover, as early as December 8, they were prohibited from venturing outside the Safety Zone. Nor was it likely that they would have attempted to leave, given that immediately after the fall of Nanking, all areas outside the Zone were potential battlefields. Testimonies provided by Japanese military personnel stating that they saw no residents on the city’s streets at that time are entirely credible. Therefore, it is extremely likely that anyone outside the Safety Zone was not a civilian, but a soldier. Any corpses sighted outside the Safety Zone must have been those of soldiers, not civilians.

Were Soldiers Who Had Shed Their Uniforms “Former Soldiers”?
If Chinese troops had laid down their weapons and surrendered to the Japanese, they would have been treated as prisoners of war, and the disputes that we shall proceed to describe would never have arisen. But rather than surrendering, Chinese soldiers shed their uniforms and transformed themselves into civilians by donning civilian clothing. Furthermore, as the Japanese discovered during the sweep, many of them were carrying concealed weapons (see Chapter 9).
To make matters worse, the International Committee described soldiers who had shed their uniforms as “former soldiers.”3 The term first appeared in Document No. 2 (dated December 15) of Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. Even when John Magee and Xu Chuanyin testified at the Tokyo Trials, after World War II had ended, they would not yield on this point: “We consider them as civilians before they gather themselves together in open resistance.”4
Was there any justification for perceiving soldiers who had removed their uniforms as former soldiers? Or for classifying former soldiers as civilians? When Europeans and Americans accused the Japanese military of having committed atrocities against civilians, they were relying on this sort of “logic.” In this chapter, we shall examine this issue, citing newspaper articles and other records written by Europeans and Americans. However, before we begin, we would like to discuss lawful and unlawful behavior, as prescribed by international law.

Regulations Governing Warfare
Normally, civilians are not charged with a crime unless they have broken the law. The same principle applies to military personnel. Only when they violate the rules of international law have they committed a crime. On this point, Adachi Sumio writes the following in Theory of Modern Regulations Governing War.
Uniformed units have the right to attack enemies, using whatever means are not clearly proscribed by regulations governing warfare. They also have the right to resist enemy attacks, and to crush enemy resistance, for as long as it continues.5 [Italics supplied.]
Article 23 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention states that it is unlawful “to kill or wound an enemy who … has surrendered at discretion.” An attack against an enemy soldier who surrenders, following officially recognized procedures, is in violation of international law. However, in Nanking, Chinese troops infiltrated the Safety Zone, and opted not to surrender, but to resist. Since it was not in violation of regulations governing warfare to attack enemy soldiers who had not surrendered, the Japanese had the right to attack Chinese troops, “and to crush enemy resistance, for as long as it continues.”

The Qualifications of Belligerents
Regulations governing the laws and customs of war on land were signed at The Hague in October 1907, and annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. They defined the laws, rights, and duties of combatants. One of the most pertinent regulations is Article 1, or the definition of belligerents.
Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1.
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2.
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

3.
To carry arms openly; and

4.
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.6

Unless they fulfill all four of these conditions, warring parties are not considered belligerents. If they do satisfy the conditions, they are qualified to be treated as prisoners of war, should the fortunes of war turn against them. However, if they do not satisfy them and are captured, the regulations of the Hague Convention do not apply to them. They lose the right to become prisoners of war.

Chinese Troops in the Safety Zone and International Law
Based on this information, we would now like to examine, in order, the regulations of the Hague Convention in light of the behavior exhibited by Chinese troops after the fall of Nanking.
(1)
As we have stated previously, before Nanking fell, Tang Shengzhi, the commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, who had sworn to defend the city to the death, fled to Hankou by train. As military historian Okumiya Masatake has stated, Tang did not move his command post to another location.7 When he escaped, all other officers ranking division commander and below escaped at the same time. Tillman Durdin indicated that “Tang’s departure, unknown even to many members of his own staff, left the army leaderless and was the signal for complete collapse.”8 Therefore, Chinese troops were an uncontrolled mob that did not fulfill Condition No. 1 of the

Qualifications of Belligerents: “To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.”

(2)
Leaderless Chinese troops discarded their uniforms and infiltrated the Safety Zone. However, the rules of the Hague Convention require that belligerents “have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance.” The Chinese also violated that rule.

(3)
Furthermore, regular army soldiers concealed a huge amount of weapons in the Safety Zone, thereby violating the regulation that requires them to “carry arms openly.”

(4)
In addition to violating the aforementioned three regulations, Chinese troops also violating the regulation stipulating that they “conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”

Thus, regular Chinese army soldiers failed to meet any of the qualifications of belligerents specified by international law. By doing so, they lost the right to prisoner-of-war status.

Requirements for Recognition as a Prisoner of War
Soldiers who did not fulfill the conditions for belligerents were not qualified to be treated as prisoners of war. Nor did the item in Article 4 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention, i.e., “They must be humanely treated,” apply to them. (Nor did the article of the Geneva Convention cited by Okumiya, which reads, “Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited” apply to Chinese military personnel in the Safety Zone.)
Soldiers who did not meet the qualifications of belligerents were in violation of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention. In Modern References: International Law, Tsutsui Jakusui writes the following subsequent to his exposition of the four conditions laid forth at the beginning of the aforementioned Regulations.
Those who are qualified to be treated as prisoners of war, should they be captured, are combatants who have engaged in warfare, and who have fulfilled these conditions. All others may be punished (in most cases, executed) in accordance with the law.9
Thus, international law sanctions the punishment, usually execution, of war criminals, i.e., soldiers who do not meet the qualifications of belligerents. We should note here that not only regular army soldiers, but also members of militias and volunteer soldiers were required to meet the qualifications of belligerents. All military personnel who did not fulfill them had no right to be treated as lawful prisoners of war, if captured.
Also noteworthy is the fact that “The Qualifications of Belligerents” was incorporated into the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, and is still in effect.
Civil Defense, a manual compiled in 1969 by the Swiss government, advises Swiss citizens about actions to be taken in the event of an enemy invasion. It includes the following precautions.
Regulations governing international law in time of war are to be strictly observed.
1. Warfare is the responsibility of the Army and only the Army, which has been organized, outfitted, and trained for that purpose. Military personnel may be distinguished by uniforms and badges denoting their ranks, and the fact that they are led by a commander in a position of responsibility.10 [Italics supplied.]
The Swiss government advised its people that military personnel must strictly observe international law, laying special emphasis on the italicized portions of the text cited above. This part of the document may be considered a paraphrase of the “Qualifications of Belligerents.” If not in the same order, there is an item that corresponds to each of the four items in that section of the Convention.
Chinese troops had no legal right to prisoner-of-war status. Nevertheless, the Japanese treated them as prisoners of war. During the segregation of soldiers from civilians, which took place from the end of 1937 to early 1938, they allowed Chinese military personnel to register as civilians. In light of these facts, we shall examine records kept by Europeans and Americans in the order in which they were written.

Smith’s Lecture (1)
“The Second Sino-Japanese War,” compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking, contains a lecture presented by a Mr. Smith, a correspondent for Reuters. Since this same lecture also appears in Rabe’s diary, under the title “Report of an Address by Mr. Smith (Reuters) in Hankow,” we would like to submit it to scrutiny. A summary of the address was prepared in Hankou on January 1, 1938. It is, therefore, likely that the actual address was delivered by Smith on or about December 20, 1937.
By the eve of 13 December [the night of December 12], Chinese troops and civilians had begun to loot. Mainly grocery stores were pillaged, but Chinese soldiers were also seen leaving private homes with food. It would be a mistake, however, to claim that Chinese troops were intent on systematic looting.
It is worth describing the scenes that took place outside Chinese clothing stores in South City. Hundreds of soldiers thronged before these shops. Ready-made civilian clothes of every sort sold like hotcakes. Soldiers spent their last cent on these clothes, changed into them out in the street, threw their uniforms away, and vanished as civilians. Several hundred of these civilians gathered later at the Military College and the International Club.11 [Italics supplied.]
On December 8, an order was issued instructing residents to go to the Safety Zone. Therefore, by the night of December 12, four days later, the most of them had already complied. Furthermore, the news had spread that the most intense warfare would be waged in the southern part of Nanking. And in fact, a bitter struggle did take place there. It is extremely unlikely that clothing stores were actually open and operating while rifle bullets and artillery shells flew overhead. Chinese troops probably broke into them to obtain civilian garb.
Smith reported that Chinese soldiers “threw their uniforms away, and vanished as civilians.” Can soldiers become “civilians” by simply changing into civilian clothing on the battlefield?
Next, Smith describes the situation on December 13, the day Nanking fell.
It was not until almost noon that Mr. McDaniel spotted the first Japanese patrols in South City. In groups of six to twelve men they cautiously and slowly felt their way forward along the main streets. Occasional shots could be heard. Here and there one saw dead civilians at the side of the road, who, or so the Japanese said, had been shot while trying to flee. At the sight of the Japanese, a sense of relief seemed to pass through the Chinese civilian population, and they came out ready to accept the Japanese if they would have behaved humanely.
In the so-called Safety Zone about a hundred Chinese had been
killed by stray bullets and grenades and several hundreds more
wounded.12 [Italics supplied.]
As Rabe’s diary, The Good Man of Nanking, first revealed, Chinese troops had positioned a small anti-aircraft gun on the southern edge of the Safety Zone.13 That gun was, as Captain Orikono Suetaro, 23rd Infantry Regiment, wrote in his war journal, at Qingliangshan.14 The Japanese were adjusting the angle of elevation of their gun barrels as they bombarded the fort at Qingliangshan. That is why some stray shells landed in the Safety Zone.
But as is clear from Document No. 9, “there had been very little destruction by stray shells … .”15 Therefore, only Smith claimed that “about a hundred Chinese had been killed by stray bullets and grenades and several hundreds more wounded,” and he was surely mistaken.
Smith did not say who had shot the Chinese. This omission is very important, because if the Japanese had shot civilians, they would have been in violation of international law. If Smith was certain that the Japanese were guilty, one would think he would have been more explicit. By using vague language, however, he was inviting his audience to assume that the Japanese were responsible.
But it was probably, as the Japanese explained to Smith, Chinese soldiers in civilian clothing who were shot by their comrades . by a supervisory unit, as they attempted to escape.
By then, most of Nanking’s noncombatants had congregated in the Safety Zone, so they could not have been in the battle zone in the southern part of the city. Therefore, civilians attempting to flee could not have been shot by the Japanese. Any corpses found were most likely those of soldiers who had divested themselves of their uniforms and changed into civilian clothing. During the course of their flight, between December 12 and early morning on December 13, they were shot by members of the supervisory unit.
The China Journal (January 1, 1938 issue) was more objective.
When news of [Tang Shengzhi’s] flight became known, the Chinese soldiers attempted to leave the city. They were mowed down by machine guns in the hands of their own comrades … .16
As Smith reported, “a sense of relief seemed to pass through the Chinese civilian population” that had taken refuge in the Safety Zone. Nanking’s residents welcomed the Japanese Army. They anticipated that the well-disciplined Japanese troops would restore order and peace, once they entered the city.

Fitch’s Account
George Fitch wrote an account similar in content to Smith’s lecture. Harold Timperley, the editor of What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China, included letters sent to him in Shanghai by both Fitch and Miner Searle Bates in the book. This work was published in great haste, and Timperley did not take the time to do any fact-checking. Fitch’s letter, an excerpt of which follows, appears in Chapter 1.
[The Japanese] were first reported in the Zone at eleven o’clock that morning, the 13th. I drove down with two of our committee members to meet them, just a small detachment at the southern entrance to the Zone. They showed no hostility, though a few moments later they killed twenty refugees who were frightened by their presence and ran from them.17 [Italics supplied.]
Fitch claims to have witnessed the shooting of refugees by Japanese military personnel at about noon on December 13, at the southern edge of the Safety Zone. But except for Fitch, no one . no Japanese, no American, no German . recorded an incident in which the Japanese “killed twenty refugees who were frightened by their presence and ran from them.” That is not surprising. At noon on December 13, the Japanese had not yet arrived on the scene (in the Safety Zone). Their sweep of the Safety Zone did not begin until the following day, December 14.
Fitch and his two colleagues from the International Committee could not have encountered Japanese military personnel “at the southern entrance to the Zone.” He claimed that he had seen them kill “twenty refugees who were frightened by their presence and ran from them.” But why would refugees flee at the sight of Japanese troops? Did Smith not report that “at the sight of the Japanese, a sense of relief seemed to pass through the Chinese civilian population?”
Approximately one year after Fitch’s account was published, Documents from the Nanking Safety Zone was issued. It contained a related account, an excerpt from Document No. 9, dated December 17.
In the afternoon of December 13, we found a captain with a group of Japanese soldiers resting on Han Chung Lu [Hanzhong Road]. We explained to him where the Zone was and marked it on his map. We politely called his attention to the three Red Cross Hospitals and told him about the disarmed soldiers.18 [Italics supplied.]
As readers will note, this is the same scene that Fitch described. Hanzhong Road is at the southern edge of the Safety Zone. But there are two discrepancies between Fitch’s account and Document No. 9.
The first is the time. Did the encounter take place at 11:00 a.m. or at noon on December 13? Whichever the case, this is not a serious discrepancy. The second is Fitch’s mention of 20 refugees’ being killed when they were frightened by the appearance of the Japanese and ran from them. This incident is not recorded in Document No. 9. Fitch’s record is a personal account. When one compares the two, it is easy to detect the inaccuracies in his description.

The Account in Rabe’s Diary
John Rabe was the chairman of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. Sometime on December 13, he and his party travelled north on Zhongshan Road. They passed the University of Nanking Hospital, and turned onto Zhongshan North Road. Then they headed for the Foreign Ministry, which was being used as a field hospital. The following is an excerpt from his entry for that day.
The dead and wounded lie side by side in the driveway leading up to the Foreign Ministry. The garden, like the rest of Chung Shan Lu [Zhongshan Road], is strewn with pieces of cast-off military equipment.19
The dead and wounded lying in front of the field hospital were probably Chinese soldiers, many of whom had shed their uniforms and thrown away their weapons on their way to the hospital at the Foreign Ministry. But Rabe described them only as “dead and wounded.” The use of language like this invites misunderstanding.
Rabe and his two companions from the Committee then left the Foreign Ministry and drove back to the main street.
We drive very cautiously down the main street. There’s a danger
you may drive over one of the hand grenades lying about and be blown sky-high. We turn onto Shanghai Lu, where several dead civilians are lying, and drive on toward the advancing Japanese. One Japanese detachment, with a German-speaking doctor, tells us that the Japanese general is not expected for two days yet. Since the Japanese are marching north, we race down side streets to get around them and are able to save three detachments of about 600 Chinese soldiers by disarming them. Some of them don’t want to obey the call to throw down their weapons, but then decide it’s a good idea when they see the Japanese advancing in the distance. We then quartered these men at the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Court.20
Again, Rabe does not state explicitly that the dead civilians were shot by the Japanese. But that seems to be what he wishes to imply. A rereading of this entry raises further doubts.
After Rabe and his companions had travelled approximately 100 meters from the Foreign Ministry, they turned onto Shanghai Road, where they encountered the advancing Japanese. As we have stated previously, Shanghai Road was part of the Safety Zone. It was also part of the sector that the 7th Infantry Regiment had been assigned to sweep (See p.117). However, the 7th Regiment did not enter the Safety Zone until the following day, December 14. On December 13, it was stationed on the west side of an airfield in Nanking, about two kilometers from the Zhongshan Gate.21
Rabe’s description places the medical officer he encountered on the front line. During and after hostilities, medical officers were always stationed at a field hospital behind the battle line. On December 13, there was a field hospital at the southern base of Zijinshan, so the medical officers would have been there. They could not have been on Shanghai Road.
A Japanese medical officer might have studied the German language and, thus, might have been able to converse with Rabe. That is why “a German-speaking doctor” was created, to render the story more believable. But even if a medical officer had been on Shanghai Road, the account is still suspect. A medical officer would not have been privy to information pertaining to the commander-in-chief’s scheduled arrival in Nanking. Major-General Iinuma Mamoru wrote in his war journal on December 14, “I was informed by the Central China Area Army chief of staff, by telephone, that he plans to hold the ceremonial parade on December 17 and, therefore, wishes the sweep to be completed by then.”22 On December 13, no one knew when the commander-in-chief would be arriving in Nanking. Rabe’s account was probably based on information obtained after the fact.
Rabe mentions that his party rushed to pass the Japanese unit, which was marching north, and then encountered and disarmed three Chinese units. If they really did pass the Japanese, why were Rabe and his companions, civilians, permitted to enter the dangerous sweep area outside the Safety Zone? At the time, they were on the perimeter of the Safety Zone, on Zhongshan North Road.
And if Chinese troops had seen the Japanese approaching, the Japanese would have seen them, too, and gone on the alert. It is unlikely that, under such circumstances, Rabe could have disarmed the Chinese, despite his claim. Could he have escorted 600 disarmed Chinese soldiers to the field hospital at the Foreign Ministry, or to the Supreme Court, and then retraced his steps?
Rabe wrote that as he was travelling south on Zhongshan North Road, the Japanese were advancing north on the same road. One would think that his party would have encountered the Japanese, who would have asked him to turn over the Chinese troops. It is difficult to imagine Rabe’s refusing that request and marching the Chinese to the Foreign Ministry.
Or did the Japanese make no demands of Rabe? That is also difficult to believe. But even if they did not, surely someone would have told an Army officer that Rabe, having introduced himself to the Japanese, escorted the Chinese soldiers to the Foreign Ministry. The incident would certainly have been mentioned in a battle report, but no such record exists. The many doubts raised by this part of his account make it impossible to believe that Rabe disarmed Chinese troops while Japanese military personnel watched.
Rabe continues with his description of the events of December 13.
It is not until we tour the city that we learn the extent of the destruction. We come across corpses every 100 to 200 yards. The bodies of civilians that I examined had bullet holes in their backs. These people had presumably been fleeing and were shot from behind.23
The 66th Infantry Regimental Order issued at 9:00 p.m. on December 13 can be found in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1. The order includes an unusual note stating that in southern Nanking, “there were signs that some foreigners in an automobile had been inspecting the area, and taking photographs.”24 The “foreigners” may very well have been Rabe’s party. Rabe mentions having seen the bodies of civilians who had been shot from behind. But like Smith, he does not say who shot them. Rabe deliberately used the passive voice, omitting the subject of the sentence . the perpetrators of the deed . so that at first glance, readers would assume that the Japanese had shot civilians in the back.
However, as previously stated, the 7th Infantry Regiment did not conduct its sweep of the Safety Zone until December 14. Any corpses of soldiers executed by that regiment on December 13 would have necessarily been outside the Safety Zone. Rabe must have exited the Safety Zone for his tour of the city. There were no civilians outside the Safety Zone, so he was mistaken to write “civilians.” If he did see corpses, they were those of Chinese soldiers who had posed as civilians.
If the Japanese had actually shot and killed civilians, one would assume that Rabe, as chairman of the International Committee, would have submitted a protest to the Japanese Embassy. Since he did submit protests in connection with other murders, why is it that he never mentioned this one?
On the other hand, when James Espy, vice-consul at the American Embassy, returned to Nanking on January 6, he was visited by the 14 Americans remaining in the city. They told him about the events that had transpired in Nanking. Their accounts were compiled into the top-secret “Espy Report,” which was sent to the American Embassy in Hankou.
It is logical that the Espy Report would include claims made by Rabe and Fitch, i.e., that there were many civilian corpses on Shanghai Road, and that 20 refugees were killed when they encountered and ran from Japanese military personnel. After all, Fitch and Rabe were both accompanied by two other members of the International Committee when they made their respective inspections. Then why does neither man’s account appear in the Espy Report?25
The only plausible explanation is that the “civilians” or “refugees” mentioned by Rabe, Smith, and Fitch were Chinese soldiers in civilian clothing who were shot in the back by the Chinese supervisory unit. That is why, even in his diary, in which he wrote his own impressions, Rabe did not mention having seen corpses of civilians who had been shot in the back by the Japanese military. Furthermore, he neither submitted a complaint to the Japanese Embassy, nor mentioned the incident in protests drafted by the International Committee in
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.

Steele’s Dispatch from the Oahu (December 15)
Steele wrote about the sweep conducted by the Japanese in an article that appeared in the December 15 edition of the Chicago Daily News. He described the systematic execution of 300 Chinese at the city wall near the riverbank as the last thing he saw as his party headed to Xiaguan to board a boat bound for Shanghai. Steele also claimed that thousands of residents had been executed, most of them innocent civilians.26
In Witness to the Nanking Incident, Okumiya Masatake cites the portion of Steele’s article that refers to the systematic execution of 300 Chinese.27 However, Okumiya wrote “Chinese soldiers,” not “Chinese.” His conviction that these were executions of prisoners of war, which were prohibited by international law, probably caused him to commit this error in transcription.
We still do not know, however, why Steele wrote that the Japanese executed 300 Chinese rather than 300 Chinese soldiers.

Smith’s Lecture (2)
Smith, like Steele, left Nanking on December 15. We have already examined excerpts from his lecture, but will now refer to its conclusion, since the material it contains is especially relevant.
On 15 December … When the wait for our departure lasted longer than expected, we used the time to undertake a short investigative walk. We saw how the Japanese had tied up some thousand Chinese out in an open field, and watched as small groups of them were led away to be shot. They were forced to kneel and were then shot in the back of the head. We had observed some 100 such executions, when the Japanese officer in charge noticed us and ordered us to leave at once. What happened to the rest of the Chinese, I cannot say.28 [Italics supplied.]
As we mentioned earlier, this lecture also appears in Nanking no shinjitsu, the Japanese translation of Der gute Deutsche von Nanking. However, auf einem freien Feld (in an open field) is mistranslated as “plaza,”29 leading the reader to believe that the events described took place within the city of Nanking, when in actuality they occurred outside the city, in Xiaguan. Furthermore, the translator omits the word “thousand.”30
In any case, the scene described in Steele’s article is the same one that Smith witnessed. And like Steele, Smith stated that “Chinese” had been executed. One wonders why he did not write that it was Chinese soldiers who were executed.

Durdin’s Dispatch from the Oahu (December 17)
Next, we shall examine an article by Durdin that appeared in the December 18 edition of The New York Times, under the headlines “All Captives Slain,” “Civilians Also Killed as the Japanese Spread Terror in Nanking,” and “Nanking Butchery Marked Its Fall.”
Through wholesale atrocities and vandalism at Nanking the Japanese Army has thrown away a rare opportunity to gain the respect and confidence of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign opinion there. …
The mass executions of war prisoners added to the horrors the Japanese brought to Nanking. After killing the Chinese soldiers who threw down their arms and surrendered, the Japanese combed the city for men in civilian garb who were suspected of being former soldiers. …
Just before boarding the ship for Shanghai, this writer watched the execution of two hundred men on the Bund.31 [Italics supplied.]
Before we address the problems presented by this excerpt, we must note some errors in the Japanese translation, as it appears in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References: Both “slaughter” and “atrocities” are rendered as “massacre.”32 Translations must be faithful renditions of the source language.
Durdin did not personally witness the “slaying of all captives.” He simply recorded rumors that he had heard. An entry in the diary of Dr. Robert Wilson written on December 24, which appears in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References, reads as follows.
And now they tell us that there are twenty thousand soldiers still in the Zone (where they get their figures no one knows) and that
they are going to hunt them out and shoot them all.33
Durdin based his article on rumors that were circulating at the time. But the source of the assertion that there were 20,000 Chinese soldiers inside the Safety Zone was, of course, the Japanese military.
For instance, “The military say there are still twenty thousand soldiers in the Zone”34 appears in Chapter 2 (written by Fitch) of What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China. The hypothesis that “at least 20,000 were killed in this way, though we have not been able to obtain detailed accounts”35 appears in the Espy Report (“The Situation in Nanking”. And based on that hypothesis, the prosecution, at the Tokyo Trials, asserted in the Prosecutor.s Summation (2) that “over 20,000 persons were executed out of hand by the Japanese.”36
The truth is that Chinese troops inside Nanking had shed their uniforms, thrown away or concealed their weapons, and infiltrated the Safety Zone. If they had laid down their arms and surrendered, it is likely that they would have been treated as lawful prisoners of war. Nevertheless, despite Durdin’s claim, no Chinese soldiers laid down their arms and surrendered.
Therefore, from the Japanese viewpoint, Chinese troops were still in a state of war, and might counterattack at any time. And in fact, they did attack Japanese military personnel after the fall of Nanking. (See Chapter 8.)
That is why the Japanese captured them, and executed those among them who were hostile. Those were the executions that Durdin saw on his way to Shanghai. He described them as “mass executions of war prisoners.” Why did he write “the execution of 200 men?” What prevented him from writing “the execution of 200 Chinese prisoners of war?”

Durdin’s Dispatch from Shanghai (December 22)
An article that Durdin dispatched from Shanghai on December 22 appeared in The New York Times, January 9, 1938 edition.
Civilians of both sexes and all ages were also shot by the Japanese. …
Tours of the city by foreigners during the period when the Japanese were
consolidating their control of the city revealed daily fresh civilian dead.
Often old men were to be seen face downward on the pavements,
apparently shot in the back at the whim of some Japanese soldier.
Wholesale looting was one of the major crimes of the Japanese
occupation.37 [Italics supplied.]
This article and those cited previously have two points in common. The first is that Durdin, Steele, and Smith all based their writings on reports from other foreigners, probably Fitch and Rabe. However, Rabe never wrote that civilians had been shot in the back by Japanese troops.
The second is that, despite the fact that Durdin, Smith, and Steele protested “mass executions of war prisoners,” they dared not write that the Japanese executed 200 (or 300) prisoners of war, or 200 soldiers, or 200 civilians.
All three used ambiguous language. Steele wrote that “300 Chinese” were executed; Smith, that “1,000 Chinese” were executed; and Durdin, that “200 men” were executed. Was their choice of words influenced by their knowledge that the executions were lawful?
Durdin and the other journalists could write only comments like, “Wholesale looting was one of the major crimes of the Japanese occupation.” If the Japanese had killed a great number of civilians (prisoners of war), they would have been guilty of violating international law. Why did the journalists not write that the major crime of the Japanese occupation of Nanking was the mass murder of civilians (prisoners of war)?
As we shall describe later in more detail, of all murders attributed to Japanese military personnel, only two cases were actually witnessed by foreigners. One involved lawful executions witnessed by Christian Kroger. The other was an incident described in testimony given by John Magee at the Tokyo Trials, and which involved the shooting of a Chinese male who fled in response to a challenge (when he was stopped for questioning). However, accounts such as “Civilians of both sexes and all ages were also shot by the Japanese” appear nowhere in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.

Abend’s Dispatch (December 19)
On December 15, Durdin, Steele, and other foreign correspondents left Nanking. Subsequent accusations were made by European and American residents of the city. An article written by Hallett Abend for The New York Times (December 19 edition), is of considerable interest.
Japanese authorities realize and ruefully admit that it is useless to
attempt to suppress the shocking facts, for an indictment on the conduct of Japanese soldiers will not be based upon tales of Chinese, who could be charged with prejudice and hysteria. On the contrary, it will be based upon diaries and careful notes of hourly outrages kept by responsible Americans and Germans who remained in the city throughout the ghastly events and are still there.38
Abend castigated the Japanese military for alleged atrocities, rapes, and murders. He predicted that charges would be brought against the Japanese military by foreign residents of Nanking, based on notes they had taken.

Report in The China Weekly Review (January 29, 1938)
As Abend predicted, foreign residents of Nanking did condemn the actions of the Japanese in that city. Their accusations appeared in the January 29, 1938 issue of The China Weekly Review, a Shanghai publication edited by an anti-Japanese, pro-Chiang American named John Powell. Reports from foreigners in Nanking were printed under the title “Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War.”
Dec. 23. . Collapse of discipline among section of Japanese forces and atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in Nanking revealed in dispatches published in New York Times from Nanking correspondent reprinted in Shanghai Evening Post. Outrages included “chaos of looting and raping which has made the Japanese entry into Nanking a national disgrace.”
Dec. 24. . Massacre of civilians, rape of Chinese women and systemetic [sic] destruction and looting of property in Nanking by Japanese troops confirmed by reliable foreign residents in the city. Eye-witness accounts of wholesale looting and murder.39 [Italics supplied.]
By “reliable foreign residents in the city,” the writer was probably referring to Rabe, Bates, and Fitch. But social position does not necessarily guarantee accurate statements. The three men certainly censured Japanese troops for their “atrocities” and “outrages,” specifically, looting, raping, and the murder of civilians. But these were not eyewitness accounts. As we have described in detail, these criticisms were all based on hearsay.40 Furthermore, there was not even one eyewitness account of the unlawful murder of “civilians.”
Since this is such an crucial issue, we shall reiterate that like Durdin and Steele, European and American residents of Nanking knew that Chinese troops who had discarded their uniforms and concealed weapons did not meet the legal qualifications of prisoners of war. Therefore, they were unable to claim that the Japanese had massacred prisoners of war. To find an excuse to charge the Japanese with violation of international law by executing Chinese troops, they represented the latter as former soldiers (civilians), and claimed that there had been a “massacre of civilians.”

British Consular Officer Castigates Japan (1)
In addition to the “massacre of civilians” argument, there was another overriding theme that pervaded foreign criticism of the behavior of Japanese military personnel in Nanking. The theme was atrocities, and its chief proponent was E. W. Jeffery, the British consul in Nanking. In a report dated January 28, 1938, Jeffrey denounced the Japanese as follows.
The atrocities committed during the first two weeks of the occupation of the city were of a nature and on a scale which are almost incredible.41
This report was sent by the American Embassy in Nanking to the
U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., by wire. It has been preserved on microfilm at the Department of State under the title “Records of the Department of State Regarding Political Relations between China and Japan, 1930-1944.”
The period singled out by the British consul was the two weeks subsequent to the Japanese occupation of Nanking (not two months, as claimed by the Chinese at the Tokyo Trials held subsequent to the end of World War II).
The target of that criticism was atrocities . not a “Nanking Massacre.” The editor of Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References was taking unconscionable liberties in entitling the Jeffery’s report “British Consul’s Report on the Nanking Massacre,”42 rather than “British Consul’s Report on Atrocities in Nanking.”

British Consular Officer Castigates Japan (2)
What did Jeffrey mean by “atrocities?” His report of January 29 contains the following passage.
Military lawlessness continues due to a lack of centralized control. Majority of cases are of ransacking.43
This report was written in late January. If the execution of regular army soldiers had been in violation of international law, that would have been cited as the most opprobrious unlawful act. But according to the Jeffery, the main Japanese violation of international law was “ransacking.” He added that “atrocities” had been committed in Nanking, without specifying what those atrocities were.
Similarly, the Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, issued in 1939, when Professor Bates was chairman of the Committee, criticized the sweep conducted by the Japanese in mid-December, citing “the general slaughter of mid-December.”44 However, it contained no mention of a massacre perpetrated by the Japanese military.

Defining “Atrocity”
The next topic we would like to address is the difference between “massacre” and “atrocity.” The highly respected Cobuild English Dictionary defines “atrocity” as “a very cruel, shocking action.”45
The torture of prisoners of war, looting, and rape, all of which are in violation of international law, would certainly be considered atrocities. The only atrocity cited by Vice-consul Jeffrey was ransacking.

Defining “Slaughter”
The same dictionary defines “slaughter” as the killing of people or animals in a way that is cruel, unjust, or unnecessary, and provides the following sentence to show how the word is used: “Thirty-four people were slaughtered while queuing up to cast their votes.”46
By “the general slaughter of mid-December, the Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee was referring to unjust executions of regular Chinese Army soldiers. If the executions were unjust, the report should have called them “unjust slaughter in violation of international law,” i.e., a massacre. But it made no explicit mention of a massacre.

Defining “Massacre”
“Massacre” is defined as “the killing of a large number of people at the same time in a violent and cruel way.”47 The following sample sentence is provided: “300 civilians are believed to have been massacred by the rebels … Troops indiscriminately massacred the defenceless population.”48
When defenseless civilians or prisoners of war are attacked and killed by an armed group, this is violence and brutality in the extreme, i.e., a massacre. But warfare is a serious of battles, where one must kill or be killed. In Nanking, Chinese troops did not surrender en masse. Both inside and outside the city, combatants were engaging in hostilities. No matter how violent or brutal the conflicts, they were, as Fujioka Nobukatsu writes in Reforming Modern and Contemporary History Education, acts of war.49

Report from 2nd Brigade, U.S. Marines
Another noteworthy report is one issued by the 2nd Brigade, U.S. Marines, on December 18, 1937, by the Office of the Brigade Intelligence Officer Headquarters, Second Marine Brigade. It appears in “Records of the Department of State Regarding Political Relations between China and Japan, 1930-1944. An excerpt follows.
Japanese units in Nanking are still engaged in mopping up operations, searching out small bands of snipers. Large numbers of Chinese soldiers who shed their uniforms in an effort to be spared, are summarily shot with characteristic ruthlessness.50
This part of the report was concerned with operations that took place between 8:00 a.m. on December 16, 1937 and 8:00 a.m. on December 18. It states that many Chinese soldiers were “summarily shot,” but does not accuse the Japanese of having violated international law.
If they had violated international law, then it might have been appropriate to write that the Chinese soldiers had been “massacred.” But that is not what was written. Regardless of the degree of brutality that characterizes a battle, as long as it does not violate international law, it is considered an act of war, not a massacre.
Furthermore, the facts have been subverted in this report, which implies that large numbers of Chinese troops shed their uniforms so that they would be spared by the Japanese when they conducted their sweep. But the truth was that large numbers of Chinese troops shed their uniforms, and infiltrated the Safety Zone with weapons concealed on their persons. That is why the Japanese were forced to conduct a sweep of the Safety Zone . to segregate civilians from soldiers.

Report from German Embassy in Nanking
Since this is such an important issue, we would like to cite another report prepared by a diplomat. To the best of this writer’s knowledge, there are only two records that accuse the Japanese military of violating international law. One is a report written by Secretary Georg Rosen of the German Embassy. The other is Bates’ memorandum, dated January 25, 1938. We shall address the latter later on in this book, but for now we shall examine “Events in Nanking” written by Rosen (dated January 20, 1938) and included in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking.
Between December 18 and 20, while we were on board the British warship Bee, moored very near Nanking, Sublieutenant Kondo spoke to British Major-General Holt. He told him that the Japanese needed to conduct a “sweep” of a large island in the Yangtze River downstream of Nanking, since there were 30,000 Chinese soldiers there. This “sweep” or “mopping up” operation is mentioned in official Japanese Army announcements. But it is, in effect, the murder of defenseless enemy soldiers, and goes against the highest principles of humanitarian warfare.51
Rosen used the expression “highest principles of humanitarian warfare.” Diplomats and foreign correspondents were very familiar with the letter of international law.
It is true that Article 23 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention prohibits the killing or wounding of “an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion.” Then, did the sweep scheduled by the Japanese of “a large island in the Yangtze River” constitute a violation of those rules?
Rosen described the sweep as the “murder of defenseless enemy soldiers.” Therefore, he was, however indirectly, claiming that the Japanese sweep violated the Regulations.
This writer does not know whether the sweep in question actually took place. But, as we have seen, the sweep of the city of Nanking had already been completed by mid-December. Rosen was aware of that sweep when he wrote his report on January 20. If he was convinced that it was in violation of international law, he could have mentioned that in his report, and criticized the Japanese for having murdered “defenseless enemy soldiers.” However, he did not. In other words, Rosen did not directly characterize the sweep of Nanking as being “in conflict with the highest principles of humanitarian warfare.”

Document No. 4
The International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone shared Secretary Rosen’s perspective. According to Document No. 4, dated December 15, the third day after the fall of Nanking, Chinese soldiers in the Safety Zone were “lawful prisoners of war.”52 But the Committee later retracted that statement, and it was never reiterated. The Committee realized that Chinese troops in the Safety Zone were not lawful prisoners of war.

China Today (January 1938)
Articles written by American correspondents at the time could hardly be termed unbiased reportage. Nevertheless, they were included in respected English-language magazines published in Shanghai. For instance, Peter Nielsen’s “The Nanking Atrocities” appeared in China Today, a magazine published in the United States. His article was based on a report written by Durdin and published in the December 18 edition of the New York Times. In it, Nielsen wrote of the “mass murder of peaceful civilians.”53 (Incidentally, the title of that article is mistranslated as “Nanking Massacre” in a collection of American sources translated into Japanese. Another translation error is the rendering of “mass execution of war prisoners” as “mass slaughter of war prisoners.”54)

The China Journal (January 1938)
At about the same time, an editorial appeared in the Shanghai publication The China Journal (January 1938 issue), in the “Events and Comments” column. It stated that compared with the slaughter perpetrated by the Japanese military in Nanking, the behavior exhibited by Chinese troops prior to the fall of the city was child’s play.55
Historically, the aforementioned articles or reports appertain to the initial phase of the “Nanking Massacre” argument.

Time Magazine (February 14, 1938)
Shortly thereafter, an article mentioning “Nanking atrocities” appeared in the February 14, 1938 issue of the popular American weekly, Time. Based on an article written by Steele, it begins: “With Japanese last week still forbidding foreign correspondents to go to captured Nanking …. the Chicago Daily News received last week one of the best eyewitness accounts thus far of the ‘Nanking atrocities’ from its Far East Ace Reporter A. T. Steele.”56 It concludes by reiterating Steele’s claim . i.e., that the “Japanese executed 20,000 at Nanking. However, Steele’s claim, as we have mentioned, was based not on an eyewitness account, but on a rumor. (The aforementioned collection of translated American sources renders “Nanking atrocities” as “Nanking massacre.”57)

North China Daily News (January 21, 1938)
The January 21, 1938 issue of North China Daily News, an established English-language newspaper published in Shanghai, also refers to a massacre, reporting that its victims numbered 10,000.58

China Forum (March 19, 1938)
The March 19, 1938 edition of China Forum, a weekly issued by the Chinese League of Nations Union in Hankou, carried an anonymous editorial asserting that 80,000 persons had been massacred.59 This was probably the last time during that era that the Japanese were accused, in the Chinese print media, of having perpetrated a massacre.

American Military Attache’s Account
Three months after Rosen had penned his “Events in Nanking,” Cabot Coville, a military attache at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, travelled to Nanking on an inspection tour. In April 1938, he was briefed by John Allison of the U.S. Embassy in Nanking, and also by Espy, Bates, Smythe, Rosen, and Jeffery.60
Coville kept records of these meetings. According to Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References, Allison told him that the Japanese Army had looted and raped for several weeks, as though he were the spokesman for the foreign community in Nanking.61
But no one indicated, as Rosen did, that the Japanese sweep was “in conflict with the highest principles of humanitarian warfare.” Even Rosen, whom Coville described as being openly anti-Japanese, did not claim that the execution of prisoners of war violated international law.
Prior to the fall of Nanking, leaderless Chinese troops shed their uniforms, concealed weapons on their persons, and infiltrated the Safety Zone. As long as they did not lay down their weapons and surrender, Chinese and Japanese were still at war. Therefore, the Japanese arrested enemy soldiers and executed those who resisted. These executions were witnessed by European and American correspondents.
But Chinese troops, having failed to meet their obligations as belligerents, were not eligible to be treated as prisoners of war. No one could rightfully accuse the Japanese of having conducted executions in violation of international law.
CHAPTER 11:

DOCUMENTS OF
THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)

Street Markets Open Three Days After Occupation
By December 8, most of Nanking’s residents had taken refuge in the Safety Zone, which Japanese troops were forbidden to enter. Japanese military policy was “kill no civilians, and refrain from entering the Safety Zone.”1 That is why public safety was restored so quickly.
On December 14, two days after Nanking fell, the Japanese commenced their sweep of the Safety Zone. The operation did not target civilians. At about 3:00 p.m., Colonel Tanida Isamu, accompanied by a squad of sentries attached to Headquarters, set out by automobile for a tour of Nanking. His recollections of what he saw that day are included in Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 4.
The streets of Nanking
were peaceful.
Residents were busily
cleaning up, and children
were playing in the
streets everywhere we
went. I saw Japanese
soldiers giving food to
some of them.2

On December 15, the third day of the occupation, in the Safety Zone, next to the Japanese Embassy, street vendors were selling groceries. Some barbers had also set up shop.3 Private1st Class Inoie Matakazu, 7th Infantry Regiment, who participated in the sweep of the Safety Zone, described these scenes in his diary.
The sweep ended on December 16, and the ceremonial entry took place on the following day. On December 18, according to Maeda Yuji’s Caught in the Current of War, war correspondents from Domei News Agency moved into the company’s former branch office inside the Safety Zone. They felt that it was safe to return, since the city was peaceful once more.4 Order had been restored to the point that on December 19, Private 1st Class Inoie had his hair cut by a barber he had spotted earlier, in the Safety Zone.5

Were 5,000 Persons Killed Each Day?
Nevertheless, in The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, Iris Chang writes that “Chinese women were raped in all locations and at all hours.”6 She also claims that 300,000 people were killed in Nanking.
The British consul wrote only that Japanese soldiers had committed unlawful acts (mainly looting) during the two weeks subsequent to the fall of Nanking. If 300,000 were indeed massacred over a period of two months, then 5,000 people would have been killed each day, at a rate of three or four per minute, for a period of 60 days.
For so many homicides, Headquarters would have had to issue a written plan, and a mobilization order. However, neither was issued and, in their absence, the killings might have lasted for one day, but certainly not for 60.
If 5,000 people were massacred each day, 20,000 would have died between December 13 and 17. On December 17, the day the ceremonial entry into Nanking took place, corpses would have been strewn about the city (including the Safety Zone) . 20,000 of them . since burials did not commence until February 1.7
The total area of the Safety Zone was only 3.86 square kilometers. If, in such a small space, 100,000, or 300,000, individuals were massacred, there would have been corpses everywhere. There is no mention of those corpses in Rabe’s diary, nor in Japanese records.
For instance, according to The Imperial Army Soldiers Who Recorded the Nanking Massacre: War Journals of the Members of the Yamada Detachment, 13th Brigade, five soldiers from the Yamada Detachment
participated in the ceremonial entry into Nanking.8 All of them recorded their impressions of the city, but no one mentioned piles of corpses.
Two days later, Corporal Horikoshi Fumioa of the Yamada Detachment entered Nanking under orders from the commander of his unit. While he was in Nanking on official business, he did not see large numbers of corpses on the streets. What he did see were street vendors, from whom he purchased “something that resembled flat bread, which the refugees were selling.”9
These journals contain no mention of massacred corpses, or of corpses of any sort, for that matter. Nor does Rabe’s diary. On December 15, the third day after the fall of Nanking, the city was safe enough for the refugees to engage in commerce.

The Safety Zone’s Population Increases
The population of the Safety Zone burgeoned. As stated in the Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, included in Rabe’s diary, and other sources, those remaining in Nanking were “the poorest of the population.”10 The problem of providing food for the refugees soon became an urgent one. The International Committee made a conscious effort to obtain up-to-date population statistics, and often mentioned them. The first reference appears in Document No. 9, dated December 17, which states that the 200,000 refugees were threatened with “starvation.”11
How did the International Committee arrive at the figure of 200,000? For many years this question remained unanswered, but Rabe’s diary has solved the mystery. Apparently, Wang Gupan, head of the National Police Agency, was the source: “There are still 200,000 residents remaining here in Nanking.”12 Wang provided this information on November 28, 1937. Nanking fell on December 13, but even on December 17, the city’s population was the same as it had been 20 days before. The International Committee was aware that
a
Not his real name; a pseudonym has been supplied out of respect for the writer’s wishes to remain anonymous.
the population of Nanking had not changed.
Document No. 10, dated December 18, states, “We 22 Westerners cannot feed 200,000 Chinese civilians … .”13 The Committee appealed to the Japanese military for help.
Document No. 20, dated December 21, mentions difficulties the Committee had experienced in supplying food and fuel to 200,000 civilians, and adds, “The present situation is automatically and rapidly leading to a serious famine.”14
It is clear from the aforementioned three documents that the population of Nanking did not change between the end of November and December 21. There had been no massacre and, therefore, no decline in the population.

The December 24th Census
Document No. 24, dated December 26 and addressed to the Japanese Embassy, contains the following sentence: “We are glad to report that cases are declining and conditions are much improved.”15
Two weeks after the fall of Nanking, the situation there had, for the most part, returned to normal, partly because of the International Committee’s protests to the Japanese military, and the subsequent, some might say draconian, punishment meted out by the latter.
There were two other contributing factors. One was a census, which was announced on December 22, and implemented on December 24. Residents of Nanking were asked to register in person16 at locations designated by the Japanese military. They were not permitted to send proxies. The purpose of the census, during which “civilian passports” were issued, was to separate civilians from soldiers.

Interrogations Held to Distinguish Soldiers from Civilians
Interrogations were held simultaneous to the census. In Document No. 4, the International Committee had reported that it was “unable to keep the disarmed soldiers separate from civilians.”17 That is why the Japanese initiated the interrogations under the watchful eyes of Nanking.s residents . to apprehend stragglers who had infiltrated the Safety Zone.
We know from the “Journal of Major-General Sasaki Toichi,” which appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1, that Sasaki, an officer of the 30th Infantry Brigade, was in charge of the interrogations.
Uchida Yoshinao, an interpreter attached to headquarters of the 16th Division, recorded his impressions of the interrogations, which were included in The Battle of Nanking.
The Chinese language has regional dialects. The Chinese troops that defended Nanking, from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan, spoke a southern dialect, which made it difficult to distinguish them from civilians by virtue of their speech. But it was easy to distinguish soldiers from civilians when we used physique as a gauge. Chinese from the Self-Government Committee assisted us with the segregation process. We did not apprehend any civilians. Many of the men were wearing army-issue underwear under civilian garments, so it was easy for us to tell that they were soldiers.18
There is no reason to suspect that Uchida’s recollections are inaccurate. The Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone contain many criticisms of the Japanese Army, some justified, and some groundless. But they include no accounts that accuse the Japanese of harassing civilians during the segregation process . none in which victims are named, at least.
As the “Journal of Major-General Sasaki Toichi” describes, the approximately 2,000 stragglers in the Safety Zone were apprehended and their weapons confiscated. Therefore, the claim made by the International Committee in Document No. 10, dated December 18, i.e., “But now we can safely assure you that there are no groups of disarmed Chinese soldiers in the Zone,”19 was incorrect.
The January 10, 1938 edition of the Yomiuri Shinbun reported that “the inspection of refugees began at the end of 1937. After seven days, the first stage of the inspection had been completed. Safe living quarters were provided for 1,600 stragglers and others. They can now walk around the city without fear.”20
Some Chinese soldiers who had found it difficult to survive in hiding voluntarily surrendered, and were permitted to register as civilians. The number of stragglers decreased, as did disturbances of the peace for which they had been responsible. Furthermore, the population increased when soldiers who had been in hiding turned themselves in.

Population of Nanking Reported at 200,000 on December 27
According to Document No. 26, on December 27, three days after the segregation process commenced, Nanking’s civilian population was 200,000.21 This was the last document to report that figure. Document No. 41 stated that on January 14, 1938, the total population was 250,000 . an increase of 50,000.22 The increase also proves that there had been no large-scale slaughter.
It is the events that occurred prior to January 14 that are at issue. The Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee cites events that took place in mid-December.23 Jeffery, the British consul refers to the “first two weeks after the occupation of the city”24 and only those two weeks.
Exactly what did happen during the two weeks after the fall of Nanking? Our investigation will focus on criticisms of the Japanese military by the International Committee, which were compiled and published in book form more than a year after Nanking fell. The 170-page book is entitled Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.

Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone is a compilation of written protests submitted by the International Committee, edited by Hsu Shuhsi. Born in 1894, Hsu returned to China after having earned a doctorate at Columbia University and, for a time, served as an advisor to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. When he edited the Documents, he was a professor at Yanjing University, which merged with Beijing University in 1952. The Documents open with a preface written by Hsu, dated May 9, 1939. Therefore, the book was probably published on the second anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War, in July 1939.
We would like to emphasize that the Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone were not official government documents. The International Committee was, according to Document No. 35, “a private organization for assistance to civilians.”25 Nevertheless, they are important because they bear the imprimatur of the Chinese government: “Prepared under the Auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Chunking,”26 and thus represent the official position of the Republic of China at the time.

Murders Reported in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
The following is a list of murders recorded in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.

There were eyewitnesses to only two of the above 25 cases (52 victims). Thus, more than 90% of the reports were based on hearsay. Were these 25 cases investigated before they were recorded? We would now like to examine two cases in detail.

Case No. 219
The much-discussed Case No. 219, the first one listed above, is representative of the murder cases recorded. We cite it in its entirety.
Mr. John Magee has an account of a family in South City of 13 in which 11 were killed, women raped and mutilated, on December 13-14 by Japanese soldiers. Two small children survived to tell the story. (Magee)27
The fact that Magee’s name appears at the end of the account indicates that he recorded information that was reported to him about the incident. However, Magee did not personally witness the murders.

Magee Provides Another Account of Case No. 219
Magee provided another account of this Case No. 219 to Georg Rosen of the German Embassy. Rosen asked the German Embassy in Shanghai to send Magee’s seven-page description of all cases, and four films the latter had made, to the Foreign Ministry in Germany. This occurred on February 10, 1938, about 10 days after Magee found the eight-year-old girl.
The following is the full text of Magee’s account of Case No. 219, which was later translated and included in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking.
On December 13, about thrity [sic] soldiers came to a Chinese house at #5 Hsing Lu Kao in the southeastern part of Nanking, and demanded entrance. The door was opened by the landlord, a Mohammedan named Ma [1]. They killed him immediately with a revolver and also Mr. Hsia [2], who knelt before them after Ma’s death, begging them not to kill anyone else. Mrs. Ma [3] asked them why they had killed her husband and they shot her dead.
Mrs. Hsia [4] was dragged out from under a table in the guest hall where she had tried to hide with her one-year-old baby [5].
After being stripped and raped by one or more men, she was bayonetted in the chest, and then had a bottle thrust into her vagina, the baby being killed with a bayonet.
Some soldiers then went to the next room where were Mrs. Hsia’s parents, aged 76 [6] and 74 [7], and her two daughters aged 16 [8] and 14 [9]. They were about to rape the girls when the grandmother tried to protect them. The soldiers killed her with a revolver. The grandfather grasped the body of his wife and was killed.
The two girls were then stripped, the older being raped by 2-3 men, and the younger by 3. The older girl was stabbed afterwards and a cane was rammed into her vagina. The younger girl was bayonetted also but was spared the horrible treatment that had been meted out to her sister and her mother. The soldiers then bayonetted another sister of between 7-8 [10], who was also in the room.
The last murders in the house were of Ma’s two children, aged 4 [11] and 2 years [12] respectively. The older was bayonetted and the younger split down through the head with a sword. After being wounded the 8-year old girl [13] crawled to the next room where lay the body of her mother. Here she staid [sic] for 14 days with her 4-year old sister [14] who had escaped unharmed. The two children lived on puffed rice and the rice crusts that form in the pan when the rice is cooked. It was from the older of these children that the photographer was able to get part of the story, and verify and correct certain details told him by a neighbor and a relative. The child said the soldiers came every day taking things from the house, but the two children were not discovered as they
Family Structure Chart basted on Magee’s Accounts hid under some old sheets.

All the people in the neighborhood fled to the Refugee Zone when such terrible things began to happen. After 14 days the old woman [15] shown in the picture returned to the neighborhood and found the two children. It was she who led the photographer to an open space where the bodies had been taken afterwards. Through questioning her and Mrs. Hsia’s brother
[16] and the little girl, a clear knowledge of the terrible tragdey [sic] was gained.28
This is Magee’s account of the incident, whose veracity he allegedly confirmed. The case involved the murder of not one family, but two. Twelve people were killed, and two sisters escaped with their lives. The two small children were the only survivors, and the only witnesses.

A Myriad of Questions
Magee’s account raises a myriad of questions.
(1)
The murders supposedly were committed on December 13, 1937. Fourteen days later, on December 27, the old woman returned to the neighborhood, and found the two children. One would think that the news of her discovery would have spread throughout the Safety Zone and that when the Americans and Europeans heard about the incident (and they certainly would have), they would have conducted an investigation.

However, according to Magee’s testimony at the Tokyo Trials, he did not begin his investigation until approximately six weeks after the murders were alleged to have been committed. Rabe did not mention the case in his diary until January 29. He wrote: “John Magee found two girls, aged eight and four, whose entire family of eleven had been murdered in the most gruesome fashion.”29 Note that Rabe mentions 11 victims, not 12.

(2)
The report written by Magee, which we cited earlier, and which appears in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, includes no mention of women having been raped and mutilated. Nevertheless, in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, which was published approximately one year later, Case No. 219 (Magee’s report) states that the women were “raped and mutilated.” What is the explanation for this discrepancy?

(3)
No given names are provided for the victims, the eight-year-old girl, the old woman (the neighbor), or Hsia’s brother. Perhaps the child didn’t know them. But when Magee testified about this case at the Tokyo Trials, he said that the child’s grandmother on her mother’s side had led him to the scene of the crime. Surely the grandmother would have known the given names of the victims. Magee verified neither the victims’ ages nor their full names. In the absence of this basic information, it is difficult to give credence to his account.

(4)
Magee claims that Japanese soldiers forced Ma, the head of the household, to open the door, then stormed into the house and shot him to death. Such behavior implies that the crime was premeditated. But for whatever reason, the two sisters, aged four and eight, were not killed. Normally, murderers are careful to kill all witnesses. Why were the children spared?

(5)
Though, as Magee wrote, “When this terrible thing began, neighboring residents had all fled to the Safety Zone,” the two little girls spent two weeks with 12 mutilated corpses. Why didn’t they run away?

(6)
The two girls apparently hid under old sheets after the incident. Apparently, nearly 30 Japanese soldiers went to the house every day to steal the residents’ possessions. Normally, one can sense the presence of another human being, yet they remained undiscovered for 14 days.

(7)
The eight-year-old girl, who had sustained a bayonet wound, did not die from shock. How did she manage to survive without medical attention for 14 days?

(8)
The incident is described as having occurred on December 13 in the “southeastern part of Nanking.” (An account written by Honda Katsuichi refers to Magee’s report, but mistranslates “southeastern” as “southwestern.”30 It was common knowledge that the southeastern sector of Nanking would become a battle zone even before the hostilities began.)

Furthermore, an evacuation order had been issued on December 8. According to the December 8th edition of the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun, residents of the areas of the city in which hostilities were expected to take place fled to the Safety Zone in droves.31 The areas near Guanghua Gate (Southeast Gate) and Zhonghua Gate (South Gate) had been deserted.
Therefore, several days before the crime was said to have been committed (December 13), almost all of Nanking’s residents had departed. Those two families, and only those two families, for some inexplicable reason, elected to remain in their home, within earshot of the Japanese Army’s deafening artillery fire. It is difficult to understand why they remained in a danger zone, knowing full well that a Japanese attack was imminent.
(9) The number of family members varies from account to account. Case No. 219 as described in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (Magee’s account) states that the household comprised 13 persons. However, Magee’s account in The Sino-Japanese Conflict mentions 14 people.
Moreover, the family relationships are not at all clear. Who were the parents of the two children alleged to be the only survivors of the incident, described only as an .8-year-old girl” and her younger sister (aged four)?
Magee abruptly introduces the “8-year-old girl,” writing that she “crawled into the next room, where her mother’s body lay.” Was her mother Hsia’s wife [4] or Ma’s wife [3]? If she was the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Hsia, then she must have been the sister of the girl of “between 7-8” [10]. If the two were twins, that would make the girl of “between 7-8. eight years old, but her age was never verified. The “8-year-old girl” did not know how old she was. Neither did the “old woman” nor Hsia’s brother. We can thus assume that the two girls were not twins. In that case, the girl aged “between 7-8. would have been seven years old but, again, that information remains unverified. It would make more sense to assume that the girl “between 7-8. was not the younger sister of the .8-year-old girl.. Therefore, the “8-year-old girl” could not have been the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Hsia.
Then, was she the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Ma? She had a four-year-old sister. The Mas had a four-year-old child, sex unknown. That would make the eight-year-old’s younger sister [14] and the Mas’ four-year-old child twins. Twins are easily identifiable, though, so someone would certainly have made a note to that effect, also stating their sex. But even that information was not recorded. Therefore, we may assume that the eight-year-old girl was the daughter of neither Mr. and Mrs. Ma nor Mr. and Mrs. Hsia.

The Eight-Year-Old Girl Changes Her Story
Kasahara Tokushi’s One Hundred Days in the Nanking Refugee Zone contains another account told to Magee by Xia Shuqin (the eight-year-old girl).
Japanese soldiers came to the Hsia home in the southeastern part of the city. They killed everyone in the house, 13 people, sparing only two children, an eight-year-old and a three-year-old (or four-year-old).32
Thirteen people were killed, according to this account. The girl’s surname is given as Hsia (Xia). However, in light of our analysis, Hsia was almost certainly not her name.
There are subtle but obvious differences between the “eight-year-old girl’s” account and those that appear in Case No. 219 in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, and in The Sino-Japanese Conflict.
(1)
The account of Case No. 219 in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone lists 11 victims, while that in The Sino-Japanese Conflict lists 12. To confuse matters further, Xia Shuqin, “the eight-year-old girl,” mentions 13.

(2)
In Magee’s account, the head of the household in question is a Muslim named Ma, while in the girl’s account, his name is Xia.

(3)
The girl’s younger sister survived, but in this account she is not four years old, but three or four years old.

Most people who have survived an event of this magnitude remember the details as vividly as if they had happened the previous day. In some cases they don’t remember anything, but then they have nothing to tell. If she had a story to communicate, Xia Shuqin should have told the truth, in which case there would have been no inconsistencies.

Xia Shuqin’s Story in Honda Katsuichi’s The Road to Nanking
Interestingly enough, Xia Shuqin’s story also appears in Honda Katsuichi’s The Road to Nanking. This version has the incident taking place at about 9:00 a.m. on December 13. Xia Shuqin was so frightened that she screamed, upon which the soldiers stabbed her three times with their bayonets. She fainted. When she regained consciousness, she went with her younger sister to the “air-raid shelter in the landlord.s inner garden.” The shelter was not a simple hole dug in the ground, but a structure consisting of “four sturdy desks, on top of which doors had been placed, and under which straw had been laid.” When she reached the shelter, she discovered the bodies of her mother and the baby. She was afraid to emerge from “under the desks” during the day, so she seldom ventured out. Even though “severely wounded,” she managed to fetch water from an earthen jar used by the entire household to store water for cooking by climbing onto a box.33
Italics have been used to designate portions of this account that differ from that provided by Magee.

Xia Shuqin’s Story in Magee’s Testament
When we viewed the film “Magee’s Testament” on the Internet, we noticed that Xia Shuqin appears after the film has ended. She speaks the following lines:
You ask about No. 5 Xinlukou? That.s where I used to live. Japanese soldiers ran after my father and then shot him in the back, killing him. They also killed a married couple and their children who lived in the house next door.
As readers will note, this account also differs from Magee’s description. Inconsistencies have been italicized.
Even more surprising is the fact that Xia Shuqin visited Japan, where she again told her story. According to the testimony she gives in The Great Nanking Massacre and the Atomic Bomb, compiled by the Association for the Commemoration of the War Dead, there were 15 people living in the household in question. Japanese soldiers first killed Xia Shuqin’s father when he opened the door to them. Then they killed her sexagenarian grandparents, her elder sisters (aged 13 and 15), and other household members . 13 victims in all. Only Xia Shuqin, who was eight at the time, and her four-year-old sister were spared. A week after the murders had been committed, people who had gone to pick up the bodies discovered the two girls.34

Xu Chuanyin Bears False Witness
Here we would like to add the testimony given by Xu Chuanyin at the Tokyo Trials with respect to another case reported by the same eight-year-old girl. Xu Chuanyin was one of the “Chinese co-workers”35 who extended unstinting cooperation to the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. His name
appears eight times in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
Xu claimed that he accompanied Magee to the scene of the crime. As a key witness, one would have expected to find his name in Magee’s report, but there is no mention of him.
Xu Chuanyin claimed that the bodies of two girls, aged 17 (actually, 16) and 14, were found lying in a pool of blood on a table and in a blood-drenched bed, respectively.36 According to his account in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, when Magee went to the scene, all the bodies had been removed. Xu was clearly lying.
Incidentally, at the Tokyo Trials, when questioned about a rape committed by Japanese military personnel, Xu again bore false witness. He testified that he had seen the incident with his own eyes.37 However, since no record of what he claimed he had witnessed appeared in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, we must assume that it did not take place.

Case No. 185
Next we shall address an incident described as Case No. 185 (see p.155). The excerpt below is from The Sino-Japanese Conflict, compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking.
On the morning of January 9, a few hours before our return to Nanking, Messrs. Kroger and Hatz (an Austrian) witnessed the following application of bushido very near the Embassy: In a partly frozen pond, located on the left side of Embassy Street between the building that houses the British Boxer Indemnity Commission and the so-called Bavarian Place, stood a Chinese man in civilian clothing in water up to his hips. Two Japanese soldiers lay in front of the pond with weapons aimed. When ordered by an officer standing behind them, the soldiers shot the Chinese until he fell down. The corpse is still in the water today, polluting it, as are the corpses filling the ponds and reservoirs in and around Nanking.38
On January 6, three employees of the American Embassy returned to Nanking. Three days later, on January 9, six diplomats, three employed by the German Embassy, and three by the British Embassy, also returned to the city. The incident witnessed by Kroger and Hatz occurred shortly before the German Embassy reopened. Their account was published in a report entitled “The Situation in Nanking.”
In Vol. 2 of his book, Atrocities in Nanking that Astonished Even Nazi Germany, Honda Katsuichi quotes from this same report, claiming that the incident it describes attests to the massacre of civilians.
One would expect the International Committee to have heard about the incident, given its seriousness; and to have issued a letter of protest and mentioned having done so in its records. Despite the fact that there is a fair amount of duplication, we cite the following portion of Case No. 185 from Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
On the morning of January 9, Mr. Kroeger and Mr. Hatz saw a Japanese officer and soldier executing a poor man in civilian clothes in a pond inside the Safety Zone on Shansi Road, just east of the Sino-British Boxer Indemnity Building. The man was standing in the pond up to his waist in water on which the ice was broken and was wobbling around when Mr. Kroeger and Hatz arrived. The officer gave an order and the soldier lay down behind a sandbag and fired a rifle at the man and hit him in one shoulder. He fired again and missed the man. The third shot killed him. (Kroeger, Hatz)39 [Italics supplied.]
When we compare these two accounts, we notice that, according to The Sino-Japanese Conflict, three Japanese soldiers participated in the execution, while in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, there were only two. This is not a glaring discrepancy.

Executions Recognized as Legal
However, there are two major differences. The account in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, published approximately 18 months subsequent to the incident, contains a very important note, which refers to the inquiry into the incident conducted by the International Committee.
Note: We have no right to protest about legitimate executions by the Japanese army, but this certainly was carried out in an inefficient and brutal way. Furthermore, it brings up a matter we have mentioned many times in private conversation with the Japanese Embassy men: this killing of people in ponds within the Zone has spoiled and thereby seriously curtailed the reserve water supply for the people in the Zone. This is very serious in this long dry spell and with the city water coming so slowly.40 [Italics supplied.]
This note does not appear in The Sino-Japanese Conflict. This omission is not inexcusable, but why did Honda Katsuichi, in referring to this incident as described in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, not mention it? Rabe, too, in the account of the incident he wrote in his diary, intentionally omitted the information contained in the note. Not having access to the note, his audience would assume that the incident as described in “The Situation in Nanking” (dated January 15) in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, involved the slaughter of a civilian.
But when the note is taken into consideration, it is obvious that the incident in question was a lawful execution. An investigation revealed that since the “man in civilian clothes” was a soldier who had disguised himself as a civilian, his execution was justified.
Why was the note appended? At the time, there was no central water supply (running water) in Nanking. Nor were there many wells. In Journal of a Career Officer,41 Sasaki Toichi tells us that Yangtze River water brought in by truck from Xiaguan was referred to as “first-class water.” Other water transported from outside the city was “third-class water.” A mixture of the two was “second-class water.” Nanking’s residents rinsed their rice and washed their vegetables at several dozen ponds in the city. They did their laundry and washed their chamber pots in those same ponds.
It was unsafe to drink untreated water, which elucidates a rather odd warning in the battle report issued by the 1st Company, 66th Infantry Regiment: “Do not drink unboiled water. Two soldiers from Unit X died instantly when they drank unboiled water near Nanking.”42
The German Embassy in Nanking was not criticizing the Japanese for conducting lawful executions, but urging them to refrain from polluting the city.s precious water supply.
CHAPTER 12:

DOCUMENTS OF
THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)

Rapes Committed During the Nanking Incident (1927)
Now we would like to examine the rape cases mentioned in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. But before we begin, we shall first look at the memoirs of John Powell (publisher of The China Weekly Review), entitled My Twenty-Five Years in China. Powell wrote that on the night after the Nanking Incident, he and all other foreign correspondents were summoned to a press conference held at the U.S. Consulate. He accompanied Manley O. Hudson, professor of international law at Harvard University, to the conference. There, he and his colleagues were introduced to an American missionary who had been in Nanking when terrorism was rampant.1
The American missionary presented a report mentioning several rapes that had occurred in Nanking. The journalists in attendance listened raptly as he spoke. A member of the consular staff distributed copies of the missionary’s statement, which had just been printed. Before the conference ended, Professor Hudson suggested that Powell ask the speaker whether he had actually witnessed a rape. The speaker replied no, he had not, but had heard about them from someone he trusted. A heated debate ensued, in the midst of which Professor Hudson told the gathering that he had been a member of a committee that investigated World War I atrocities. He explained that upon investigating those atrocities, the committee discovered that very few of them had actually been committed.2
The missionary was referring not to incidents that had taken place in Nanking in 1937 after the city fell, but to those that had occurred 10 years previously, in 1927. However, one does notice a common thread linking the Nanking Incident of 1927 to that of 1937 . namely, even when reports of rapes were investigated, very few were found to be based on fact.

Rapes Reported in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone contain records of cases numbered 1 through 444, including those that warranted investigation, e.g., murders and rapes. Cases 114-143, 155-164, and 204-209 (46 in all) were deleted, probably because they were deemed groundless. Of a total of 398 cases, 251 were rapes (or attempted rapes), if one includes .asking for girls.3 in this category. However, 190, or 75.7% of those case records were missing crucial information, e.g., the names of witnesses or of those who had reported incidents. Therefore, John Magee was lying when he testified, at the Tokyo Trials, that the records contained the names of the persons who had reported them.4
Sixty-one descriptions of rape or attempted rape cases included the names of the parties who had recorded them. Our examination will begin with these cases.
First, we have Case No. 167.
Five Japanese soldiers and one servant … took away two girls. Fortunately, while these two girls were just being dragged out, some Military Police came to our place for inspection and so they found the happening and captured these three soldiers and one servant.5
Eyewitnesses were mentioned in some of the cases, Case No. 107, for instance.
December 21, 3 p.m. Mr. Sperling was called to Mo Kan Lu No. 8. When he came … he found one soldier locked in a room with a young girl.6
However, since the Japanese soldier in question was not arrested by the military police, this incident may have taken place in a brothel.
Case No. 227 is similar to Case No. 107, and allegedly occurred on February 1. According to the record, Magee and Ernest Forster were summoned to a house, where they found two Japanese soldiers and a young girl in a locked bedroom. Magee and Foster handed the soldiers over to sentries.7
Case No. 192, an excerpt from which follows, seems even more improbable.
On the morning of [January] 17 … the [Japanese] soldiers came again with two trucks, two cars with two officers and got* some men and seven women from the Sericulture Building. Dr. Bates was there and observed the whole process and found it was completely voluntary on the part of the men and women going. One woman was young but went willingly.8 [Italics supplied.]
(Note: Hora mistranslates got* as “abducted.”9)
These people had probably been offered paid work, which they must have been happy to get. The record shows that the women acted of their own volition. The young woman who .went willingly. was probably a prostitute10 recruited by Wang Chengdian (aka Jimmy) of the Red Swastika Society, as stated in Rabe.s diary and in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking.
The account of Case No. 146 follows.
December 25 … two Japanese soldiers came to the Hankow Primary School Refugee Camp … and then raped a Miss Hwang of the staff. It was immediately reported to the Japanese Special Service Military Police. They sent Military Police to get the soldiers who had left, so they took the girl to their office and held her as witness.11
This case was, evidently, thoroughly investigated. When accusations were found to have been based on fact, Japanese military authorities made certain that the perpetrators were arrested. They never ignored crimes committed by Japanese soldiers.
Of 61 rapes or attempted rapes reported by someone who is named in the record, those reported to Japanese military authorities may be classified as follows.
(1)
One case (No. 167) in which a Japanese soldier was arrested.

(2)
One case (No. 227) in which Japanese soldiers were turned over to military police.

(3)
One case (No. 426) in which military police were contacted.

(4)
Two cases (Nos. 168 and 220) in which Japanese soldiers were brought before military authorities.

(5)
One case (No. 146) in which a victim was apprehended and interrogated by Japanese authorities.

(6)
One case of attempted rape (No. 216) in which both a Japanese soldier and the victim were brought before the authorities.

Only About a Dozen Rapes Reported to Japanese Military Authorities
A total of seven rapes or attempted rapes were reported to Japanese military authorities. It is possible that there may have been cases other than those enumerated above. Therefore, we would like to refer to testimony given by Tsukamoto Koji, head of the Judicial Department, at the Tokyo Trials.
The Judicial Department was an entity that administered military trials. Tsukamoto was assigned to Nanking as judge advocate of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces, from December 1937 to August 1938. When asked by prosecutor Sutton how many incidents had occurred during his assignment, Tsukamoto responded as follows: .I believe there were about 10 cases … Quite a few of them involved more than one person..12
He added that most of the crimes involved looting or rape,13 and that there were few incidences of personal injury or theft.14 Furthermore, very few crimes had resulted in someone.s death.15 There had been two or three cases of murder16 in Nanking, but the perpetrators were individual soldiers.
For purposes of comparison, we would like to cite some statistics concerning rapes committed by American soldiers in Japan, during the Occupation. During a 12-day period extending from August 30 to September 10, 1949, the Japanese government reported 1,326 rapes, in Kanagawa Prefecture alone, to the authorities at GHQ. This topic is discussed in detail in Gifts from the Vanquished by Masayo Duus.17

Perpetrators Severely Punished
Testimony from Tsukamoto Koji, head of the Judicial Department, and accounts in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone attest to the fact that Japanese military personnel committed very few crimes in Nanking.
According to .The Diary of Orita Mamoru. in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1, on December 16, two soldiers raped two women in the city. They were caught by 1st Lieutenant Yunoki, and interrogated at regimental headquarters.18 Also, in .Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, No. 8,. there is a reference to an incident in which Major Kisaki Hisashi, 16th Division deputy chief of staff, caught a soldier in the act of committing rape, apprehended him, and demanded that he be punished severely.19
More than 10 soldiers were charged with mutiny and .severely punished..20 The Japanese claim that soldiers were severely punished when they committed crimes was substantiated in an article that appeared in the February 9, 1938 edition of the Chicago Daily News.
In Chapter 1 of What War Means, Fitch wrote: .The victorious army must have its rewards . and those rewards are to plunder, murder, rape, at will … .. This statement is patently untrue.21 Soldiers who violated military regulations never went unpunished. Tsukamoto recalled that the punishments were so severe that .the Judicial Department of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces received complaints from many units to the effect that we were meting out cruel and unusual punishment for even petty infringements..22
Rapes committed by Japanese troops were indeed dealt with severely . seven of them, according to Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. Americans and Germans had been sending protests to the Japanese Embassy about looting and the abduction of women. Colonel Uemura Toshimichi, Shanghai Expeditionary Forces deputy chief of staff, expressed his indignation and anger in a diary entry dated January 21, describing the perpetrators as .unforgivable..23
At the 73rd Budget Committee Meeting of the Imperial Diet.s House of Peers held on February 16, 1938, Baron Okura Kimimochi remarked that .when even one or two persons stray from the path of righteousness, our disappointment is thousandfold..24 This was a sentiment shared by Commander-in-Chief Matsui Iwane.
On February 7, at a memorial service for the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces war dead, General Matsui condemned .the misconduct of our troops subsequent to the occupation of Nanking..25 Major-General Iinuma, Shanghai Expeditionary Forces chief of staff, who was present at the service, wrote in his war journal that Matsui .stated that there have been a number of abominable incidents within the past 50 days..26
However, according to Matsui.s own war journal, those abominable incidents were “rapes”27 (December 20) and .looting.28 (December 29), which .to my great regret, have sullied the reputation of the Imperial Army..29

Cases Devoid of Names
The Japanese military authorities were almost obsessively intent on maintaining discipline. However, accounts written by Europeans and Americans claimed that 20,000 women had been raped. Were the Japanese lying when they insisted that military regulations were strictly enforced? Let us return to our examination of the cases recorded in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
(1)
Case No. 1030
This was the first record of a rape, supposedly been committed at
noon on December 14, the day after Nanking fell. According to the
account, four girls were raped by Japanese soldiers in the house of a
Chinese on Chien Ying Hsiang.

(2)
Case No. 1231
On the night of the same day, December 14, the second rape was said
to have occurred at the same location, Chien Ying Hsiang. Again,
the victims were four Chinese women.

(3)
Case No. 1532
The third incident took place on the night of December 15. According
to the record, Japanese soldiers entered the house of a Chinese on
Hankou Road, raped one woman, and abducted three others. When
the husbands of two of them ran after the soldiers, they were shot.

However, records of these three cases are totally devoid of names
. the names of the victims (complainants), witnesses to the incidents, and of those who had reported them. In the absence of witnesses, they lack credibility.

Reports of Unsubstantiated Incidents Broadcast Throughout the World
Nevertheless, reports of unsubstantiated incidents, to which there had been no witnesses, appeared in The New York Times. On December 18, the sixth day after the fall of Nanking, the news that .many Chinese men reported to foreigners the abduction and rape of wives and daughters. was broadcast throughout the world.
The article was written by Tillman Durdin, who had departed from Nanking on December 15 and, therefore, was not in the city on the night of December 15, when the incident recorded as Case No. 15 was alleged to have taken place. He must have based his article on Cases No. 10 and 12, alleged to have occurred at noon and on the night of December 14, respectively.
Another record of unsubstantiated rapes appears in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone as Case No. 5.
On the night of December 14, there were many cases of Japanese soldiers entering Chinese houses and raping women or taking them away. This created a panic in the area and hundreds of women moved into the Ginling College campus yesterday. Consequently, three American men spent the night at Ginling College last night to protect the 3,000 women and children in the compound.33
There are three other accounts of similar cases.
One is a letter from Fitch addressed to Timperley, which was reprinted as Chapter 2 of What War Means, and which reads in part: .A rough estimate would be at least a thousand women raped last night and during the day..34
At the Tokyo Trials, McCallum gave the following testimony: .Rape: Rape: Rape: We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night and many by day..35
And in his diary entry of December 17, Rabe wrote: .Last night up to 1,000 women and girls are said to have been raped, about 100 girls at Ginling Girls College alone..36 [Italics supplied.]
According to Case No. 5, on the night of December 14, .there were many cases of Japanese soldiers entering Chinese houses and raping women or taking them away.. As we have established, the truth is that there were not .many,. but only two such cases (Cases No. 10 and 12). Furthermore, there were no witnesses to either of the alleged crimes. We can only assume that on the day after Nanking fell, rumors of rapes spread throughout the city, and gave rise to still more rumors.

A Missionary’s Account
Since Ginling [Jinling] Girls College was mentioned both in Rabe.s diary and in Case No. 5 (Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone), we would like to examine an account written by Professor Minnie Vautrin, who taught at the College.
When the Japanese occupied Nanking, Professor Vautrin (also a Christian missionary) established a camp for women and girls, the largest of its kind in the city, at Ginling Girls College. Her account, entitled “Sharing ‘the Abundant Life’ in a Refugee Camp,” appeared in the July-August 1938 issue of The Chinese Recorder (a monthly Protestant magazine that boasted a 70-year history).
From December 8 when the college gates were first opened to women and children refugees until January 16, there was little time to plan for other than the most pressing elemental needs of life . for food, clothing and shelter from the uncontrolled passions of men. The camp had originally planned to provided [sic] for a maximum of 2750 refugees and had put in readiness the college buildings for this number, but when the “Reign of Terror” came to the great walled capital, and no woman was safe from harm, the gates of the college were flung wide and the distraught and frenzied women and girls streamed in until every available space within the buildings was tightly filled and at night even verandahs and covered ways were packed closely, head to feet, and feet to head.37
According to an entry in Rabe.s diary dated December 26, Vautrin was a single woman who was so fastidious that she said she “would rather die on the spot.38 than allow a woman to fall prey to the lust of Japanese soldiers. However, the account in which she described her refugee camp (written in the summer of 1938), makes absolutely no mention of rape, which is further proof that no such incidents occurred. She must have eliminated any such references at a later date, when she realized that they were nothing more than propaganda.

Contradictory Accounts
Chapter 4 of What War Means consists of a letter written by Bates to Timperley, dated January 10. Part of that letter follows.
Incidentally, military police … took a woman from a University house and raped her thoroughly, after putting a bayonet against our man Riggs, when he happened along at the wrong time.39
This incident was included in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
as Case No. 187, from which the name of the person who recorded it is missing. We cite the account in its entirety.
On the night of January 9, a military police took a woman from Dr. Smythe’s house at No. 25 Hankow Road and another from another house. He met Mr. Riggs returning to his home at No. 23 Hankow Road and threatened him with a bayonet.40
Which account is correct? Bates. description was written on January 10, 1938. The one that appears in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, which was published in 1939, is probably the more accurate of the two, since someone must have edited it, and deleted unreliable information.
Case No. 148
To examine differences between accounts of the same incident, we shall refer to Case No. 148. In this incident, a 12-year-old girl was allegedly raped by seven Japanese soldiers on the night of December
25.41 The same case appears in What War Means. Chapter 2, entitled .Robbery, Murder and Rape,. which was written by George Fitch, secretary of the YMCA International Committee. According to his account, the victim was a 12-year-old girl, and the perpetrators were seven Japanese soldiers. But the rapes were said to have taken place on the nights of December 23 and 24. Fitch included neither the names of witnesses nor of the person who had recorded the incident.42 Thus, the date of the incident as recorded in the account in What War Means and that in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone differs by one or two days.

Cases Devoid of Dates
Next we shall cite cases that describe incidents without any mention of the dates on which they took place, i.e., Cases No. 283, 307, and 436.
Case No. 283
At No. 384 Tientsin Chieh, widow Chow, aged over 50 years, was raped by force. Now still detained and compelled to cook food. Reported February 1.43 [Italics supplied.]
Case No. 307
At the railway station at San Pai Lou an old woman over 60 has been recently raped over 10 times.44
Case No. 436
An old woman named Chen, over 60, at San Pai Lou, was visited by three Japanese soldiers. One was stationed outside while the other two raped the old woman by turn. One of the soldiers asked her to clean the penis by her mouth. Her grandson was stabbed twice for crying.45
Case No. 283 was supposedly reported on February 1, but there is no indication of the date on which it occurred. The same information is missing from the descriptions of Cases No. 307 and 436.
Some incidents were heavily publicized, despite the fact that accounts of them bore no names (of witnesses or informants) or dates. We have already mentioned Bates’ letter to Timperley, dated January 10, 1938, which was reproduced as Chapter 4 (“The Nightmare Continues”) of What War Means. In that letter, Bates makes the following accusation.
You can scarcely imagine the anguish and terror. Girls as low as eleven and women as old as fifty-three have been raped on University property alone. In other groups of refugees are women of seventy-two and seventy-six years of age who were raped mercilessly.46 [Italics supplied.]
Approximately 10 days after Bates wrote to Timperley, the North China Daily News (Janary 21 edition) reported that 8,000-20,000 Chinese women and girls ranging in age from 11 to 53 had been raped.47
The advanced ages of some of the alleged victims are puzzling. A search through Documents of the Safety Nanking Zone reveals no cases that mention rapes committed against victims aged 11, 72, or 76. The reports were groundless rumors, and were deleted from case records.
That leaves us with the case in which the victim is a 53-year-old woman. This was recorded by the International Committee as Case No. 138, and submitted as Exhibit 328 at the Tokyo Trials. This, despite the fact that the account had been expunged from Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, along with other spurious cases numbered 114-143.48 However, rumors were recorded, and given as much credence as facts. Rabe.s report to Hitler states that women who ranging from eight to 70 years old had been raped.

Another Case Deleted from Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
The following account appears in Chapter 2 of What War Means. This time the writer is not Bates, but Fitch.
Friday, Dec. 17. Robbery, murder, rape continue unabated … One poor woman was raped thirty-seven times. Another had her five months infant deliberately smothered by the brute to stop its crying while he raped her.49
A similar account can be found in an entry in Dr. Wilson.s diary, dated December 18. Wilson wrote that after a Japanese soldier raped a woman, he stabbed her young son with a bayonet, killing him.50 This is indeed a shocking account. However, the incident in question is nowhere to be found in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, which means that the report was judged baseless, and deleted from that publication.

Claim that 20,000 Women Were Raped Deleted
Thus, even cases that had been deleted from Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone generated rumors that spread like wildfire, and spawned the argument that 20,000 rapes had been committed. In Chapter 4 of What War Means, Bates claimed that .able German colleagues put the cases of rape at twenty thousand..51
As Bates testified at the Tokyo Trials, one of the .able German colleagues. was none other than Rabe. However, the charge that 20,000 rapes had taken place does not appear in the report sent by Rabe to Hitler. Were 20,000 rapes actually committed in Nanking?
The September 25, 1996 issue of Newsweek carried an article entitled “Born Under a Bad Sign.” According to that article, which reported statistics provided by the EU, 20,000 women were raped during the war in Bosnia. The tragic aftermath of the conflict was marked by the births of illegitimate children, many of whom were abandoned. The conflict in Rwanda produced the same phenomenon.52
But the absence of any mention of a rash of illegitimate births in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone discredits the argument that 20,000 rapes were committed in Nanking. And a look at both the 1938 and 1939 editions of an authoritative publication of the time, The China Year Book, reveals no record of 20,000 rapes. The North China Daily News, which carried an editorial arguing that 20,000 rapes had been committed, was published by the same company that produced The China Year Book . the North China Daily News and Herald Company.
Therefore, if the editorial in the North China Daily News stating that 20,000 rapes had been committed had been accurate, it is likely that the same information would have been printed in the The China Year Book. However, that argument is missing from both the 1938 or 1939 editions of the latter publication, which means that the publisher refused to give credence to a rumor. Therefore, Iris Chang.s claim in The Rape of Nanking that a minimum of 20,000 and a maximum of 80,000 women were raped is totally groundless. “Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking”
Japanese soldiers were, in principle, forbidden to leave their quarters except when they were engaged in official business. Given the strict discipline to which they were subjected, it is extremely unlikely that they could have found an opportunity to venture out to commit rapes. That being the case, why were there so many unsubstantiated cases?
Powell made a comment about the Nanking Incident of 1927, to the effect that the majority of news correspondents determined that reports of atrocities that they had wired to their various publications were not based on eyewitness accounts. Rumors of atrocities circulated in Nanking, taking on a life of their own to the point that they received newspaper coverage. Reactionaries took full advantage of the rumors, using them to encourage foreign military intervention.53 Might Powell’s words also apply to the Nanking Incident of 1937?
The answer is yes, according to an article that appeared in the January 4, 1938 edition of The New York Times, based on a January 3 dispatch from Shanghai. The headline was .Ex-Chinese Officers Among U.S. Refugees: Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking.. The article follows in its entirety.
American professors remaining in Nanking as foreign members of
the Refugee Welfare Committee were seriously embarrassed to discover that they had been harboring a deserted Chinese Army colonel and six of his subordinate officers. The professors had, in fact, made the colonel second in authority at the refugee camp.
The officers, who had doffed their uniforms during the Chinese retreat from Nanking, were discovered living in one of the college buildings. They confessed their identity after Japanese Army searchers found they had hidden six rifles, five revolvers, a dismounted machine gun and ammunition in the building.
The ex-Chinese officers in the presence of Americans and other foreigners confessed looting in Nanking and also that one night they dragged girls from the refugee camp into the darkness and the next day blamed Japanese soldiers for the attacks.
The ex-officers were arrested and will be punished under martial law and probably executed.54
The fact that the Nanking Safety Zone was a neutral zone notwithstanding, American professors (Bates, Smythe, etc.) harbored Chinese Army officers there. This was clearly a violation of neutrality. To make matters worse, the officers, who had shed their uniforms and were masquerading as civilians, looted and raped, for which crimes they blamed the Japanese. It is not surprising that the American professors were .seriously embarrassed,. especially since they had given their word, in Document No. 10 (dated December 18) that there was not one Chinese soldier in the Safety Zone.55
It is difficult to understand why an event of this magnitude was not recorded in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. Perhaps it was omitted because having included it would have weakened the case against the Japanese but, whatever the case, it was merely the tip of the iceberg.
On about January 22, 1938, Nakazawa Mitsuo, chief of staff of the 16th Division, prepared a report entitled .Noteworthy Events in Nanking,. which contains the following passage.
Yesterday we arrested the commander of a battalion attached to the 88th Division. Particularly worrisome is the fact that all foreign diplomatic entities are harboring Chinese officers of significantly high rank. The aforementioned 88th Division battalion commander admitted that a brigade commander and a battalion commander are hiding on American Embassy property.56

Lieutenant General Ma Foments Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Safety Zone
The January 25, 1938 edition of the China Press, published by Americans in Shanghai, carried a similar article stating that, as of December 28, the Japanese had apprehended 23 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers and 1,498 soldiers of the Chinese Army in foreign embassies or consulates, or buildings owned by them.
This roundup was a result of the census conducted by the Japanese on December 24 and thereafter. The aforementioned edition of the China Press then referred to a report issued the previous day by the Nanking Japanese Military Police.
Among them, it is claimed, was the commander of the Nanking peace preservation corps, Wang Hsing-lau, “who masqueraded as Chen Mi” and was in command of the fourth branch detachment of the international refugee zone, Lieutenant-General Ma Pou-shang, former adjutant of the 88th Division, and a high official of the Nanking Police, Mi Shin-shi.
General Ma, it is claimed, was active in instigating anti-Japanese disorders within the zone, which also sheltered Captain Hwan An and 17 men with a machine-gun and 17 rifles, while the report states that Wang Hsing-lau and three former subordinates were engaged in looting, intimidating and raping.57
Major-General Iinuma Mamoru, chief of staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces, wrote the following in his diary on January 1, 1938: “Foreign powers suspect Japanese troops of having entered their embassies or consulates, but a watchman bowed to me and said that Chinese troops were to blame.. On January 4, he wrote that “the commander of the Nanking Peace Preservation Corps and the deputy commander of the 88th Division. had been arrested, which corroborates the aforementioned article.58
Chinese troops in the Safety Zone did more than spread rumors of rapes committed by Japanese soldiers. To lend credence to the rumors, they themselves raped women or attempted to do so.
Some Chinese came forward to report that the rapes had been committed by Chinese soldiers. This explains a January entry in McCallum.s diary, which was also submitted to the Tokyo Trials.
Some of the Chinese are even ready to prove that the looting,
raping and burning was done by the Chinese and not the Japanese.59
However, this passage was omitted when the monitor read McCallum.s testimony at the tribunal.

Magee’s Testimony at the Tokyo Trials
Magee.s testimony at the Tokyo Trials is of considerable interest.
Oddly enough, when we would rush at these Japanese soldiers they would just enter a place and then go away. We often wondered why.60
However, Magee.s doubts are quickly resolved when we take into consideration the looting and rapes orchestrated by Wang Xinlao [Hsing-lau] and his cohorts, and substitute .Chinese soldiers. for .Japanese soldiers..
If Japanese soldiers had been the perpetrators, they would have received punishment to fit their crimes. Therefore, they would have fled before Europeans and Americans arrived on the scene, since they feared witnesses above all else. Or they would have waited until the foreigners had left a scene before committing a crime. However, that is not what happened, or so we are led to believe. They were accused of having committed their crimes in front of the foreigners . behavior that strains credulity. But let us, for a moment, assume that Chinese soldiers were responsible for the crimes.
Without European or American witnesses to their looting, arson, or rape, the Chinese soldiers could not have attained their goal (agitation). Furthermore, if Japanese military personnel had rushed to the scene, the Chinese would have been arrested. Since time was of the essence, they had to escape as soon as they had been spotted by foreign witnesses.
Therefore, when Magee rushed to the scene after he had been summoned, it was probably a Chinese soldier disguised as a Japanese soldier who fled immediately from the home he had invaded. It is difficult to understand why it never occurred to Magee or his fellow committee members that the perpetrators might have been Chinese, and not Japanese, soldiers.

Case No. 33
In connection with Case No. 33, Kroger reported the following: .On December 17 [the day of the Japanese ceremonial entry] Japanese soldiers … raped four women … They disappeared quickly when Hatz and myself appeared on the spot (Kroeger).”61
A careful reading reveals that Kroger did not claim to have witnessed the incident. When the soldiers saw him, they disappeared at once. Kroger.s report was based solely on an allegation made by a Chinese.
Then, why did Kroger and Hatz say that Japanese soldiers had committed the rapes? Probably because that was what they were told, and they believed their informant.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone and What War Means are rife with examples like these. According to Case No. 58 in the former publication, at about 6:00 p.m. on December 17, just when Rabe returned to his home, which displayed German swastika flags, two Japanese soldiers entered. One of them proceeded to remove his clothing and attempt to rape a young woman. When Rabe ordered the soldiers to leave, they obeyed.62
But if the soldiers in question were intent on rape, why were they not careful to ascertain that neither Rabe nor anyone else who might have apprehended them was in the house? Why would they appear .just when Mr. Rabe returned to his home,. as if they had been waiting for him? Even allowing for coincidences, the timing seems suspicious.
Case No. 77
Next we will examine Cases No. 77 and 75.
Case No. 77
On December 19 about 6 p.m. Dr. Bates, Mr. Fitch and Dr. Smythe were called to a University of Nanking house at 19 Hankow Road, where a University staff man was living, in order to escort out four Japanese soldiers who were raping the women there. We found them in the basement where the women had been hidden.63
Case No. 75
On the evening of December 19 about 4:45 p.m. Dr. Bates was called to the house at 16 Ping Tsang Hsiang where Japanese soldiers had a few days previously driven out refugees (viewed by Riggs, Smythe and Steele). They had just finished looting the place and started a fire on the third floor. Dr. Bates tried to put out the fire but it was too late and the whole house burned to the ground. (Bates)64
The second case cited describes an incident that allegedly took place at 16 Ping Tsang Hsiang [Ping Cang Xiang], which was located near 3 Pin Cang Xiang, the site of the headquarters of the International Committee, according to the speech Rabe delivered on his departure from Nanking. According to McCallum.s diary, which was submitted as evidence at the Tokyo Trials, the home of Lossing Buck at 3 Ping Cang Xiang, also housed Riggs, Smythe, Bates, Fitch, Mills, Sone, and Wilson.65
Why would Japanese soldiers choose to move into a house so close to one occupied by members of the International Committee? And why would they be foolish enough to sneak into a building on University of Nanking property? In any case, members of the Committee were summoned to both scenes. When they arrived, they allegedly found soldiers in the basement, who had just finished looting and set a fire.
There are about 10 instances in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone in which members of the International Committee, when summoned to the scene of an alleged crime, actually witnessed looting or a rape. These were probably contrived incidents, which the perpetrators had planned so that they would be witnessed by members of the foreign community. It is likely that they had agreed to divide the labor, designating a perpetrator, an informant, etc.

“They Believe Everything the Chinese Tell Them”
An account written by Chancellor Scharffenberg of the German Embassy and dated February 10, 1938 appears in Rabe.s diary. It contains the following passage: .And as for all these excesses, one hears only one side of it, after all..66
So many rape cases were fabricated that Uemura Toshimichi, deputy chief of staff, wrote in his war journal on January 25 that the Americans .were reporting crimes that had never been committed to the Japanese Embassy..67
On January 26, as distrust between the Japanese military and foreign residents of Nanking mounted, U.S. Consul Allison attempted to enter a home to investigate an incident, despite the efforts of a Japanese company commander to prevent him from doing so. The situation worsened when Allison was assaulted by a corporal.
The assault may have been provoked, but the soldier should not have attacked a diplomat. The Japanese apologized, but it was Allison.s officious behavior and his taking the law into his own hands that spurred the incident. According to the March 1938 issue of International Scholarship and Commentary, Japanese military authorities in Nanking .took the stance that Allison, in exhibiting insolent behavior to Japanese military personnel, exceeded the authority of his office, and provoked the unfortunate act committed by the Japanese soldier..68
CHAPTER 13:

FOOD SHORTAGE AND
UNBURIED CORPSES POSE THREATS

According to Document No. 9 of Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, prior to the fall of Nanking, “most of the trained, intelligent and active people [had] all moved further west.”1 Almost all of Nanking.s government bureaucrats and police officials had abandoned the city, leaving no one there to protect the residents or to maintain public safety and, more pertinently, no one with whom the Japanese could negotiate.
The social infrastructure had totally collapsed. According to the diary of staff officer Kisaki Hisashi of the 16th Division, .all radio, telegraph, and telephone equipment was useless, having been disconnected, and replacement parts destroyed..2 Therefore, when the Japanese entered Nanking, they were .at a loss as to where to begin,.3 according to Nakazawa Mitsuo, 16th Division chief of staff.
Nanking Self-Government Committee Established
The Japanese military first sought to restore public order and create an administrative entity. To that end, they established the Nanking Self-Government Committee and installed Tao Xishan, chairman of the Red Swastika Society, as its chairman.
On December 23, 10 days after the fall of Nanking, Tao articulated his aspirations as the Committee.s first chairman in a speech, which appeared in the February 1938 issue of International Scholarship and Commentary. He first stated that he had seen how the Japanese Army had restored order within 10 days after its entry into Nanking. Then he mentioned his goals for the future, his highest priority being the speedy recovery of Nanking. He cited the necessity for the refugees, the majority of whom were civilians, to be able to resume their work. Finally, he stressed the importance of restoring public safety, and of disciplining the few undesirable elements in the city in a peaceful manner.4
The Self-Government Committee held a lavish celebration on January 1, 1938 to commemorate its founding. Nevertheless, the Committee never amounted to any more than its name implied, since it consisted of and represented, as Rabe wrote, “the poorest of the population.”5 A passage from General Matsui.s war journal, dated February 7, reads: .The Committee’s unimposing membership can be explained by the absence of even the most basic resources or facilities..6 There was no financial or political base, and the Committee lacked the authority to collect taxes.
Obviously, the Committee was weak, in terms of both human and physical resources. It was bolstered by a special agency of the Japanese Army, the Nanking Special Agency. The Agency, however, made a concerted effort to stay in the background. It provided financial and other support, but the Committee was nominally responsible for executive functions, e.g., supplying food and fuel, and burying the dead.

The Nanking Pacification Unit
One of those involved in solving the city’s problems was Maruyama Susumu. According to Mission in Nanking: (Manchurian Railway Employee) Maruyama Susumu’s Recollections, edited by this writer, Maruyama was dispatched from the Manchurian Railway office in Shanghai to serve in the Nanking Special Agency’s Pacification Unit. This unit made a strenuous effort to aid the refugees, while taking pains not to wound the egos of Self-Government Committee members.7

For instance, with the aid of the head of the Nanking Special Agency, Maruyama succeeded in retrieving a large amount of coal from an open field in the city, and having it delivered to the Self-Government Committee, free of charge. The Committee then sold the coal to several charcoal manufacturers, who mixed the powdered coal with clay to form charcoal bricks, which they then sold on the open market.8
Maruyama used similar methods, on several occasions, to remove thousands of sacks of rice from warehouses under Japanese control in Xiaguan and Pukou, which he presented to the Self-Government Committee. The Committee then sold it at the market price to rice dealers who, in turn, sold it to retail customers. He also arranged to have 200 60-kilogram containers of peanut oil taken from a storehouse in Pukou and delivered to the Committee.9 The Committee was thus able to obtain some income to use for its projects from these sales activities, and to earn the trust of Nanking.s residents.

Sergeant Kanamaru’s Memorandum
Japanese soldiers would sometimes voluntarily transport flour from a mill storehouse to the University of Nanking. The following is an excerpt from the diary of Sergeant Kanamaru Yoshio of the Intendance Department, 16th Division, which appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
Military police and sentries from the Japanese Army were standing at the entrance, but when we explained why we were there, they opened the gate immediately. When we drove the truck onto the campus, and unloaded the flour, the Chinese caretaker thanked us with tears in his eyes. Moved by his response, I repeated the mission three more times, but this was something I did on my own. Someone who appeared to be a Jinling University [University of Nanking] professor extended his hands, palms joined, as if in prayer, and said, .I had thought that Japanese soldiers were horrible creatures. This is the first time I have seen them act with such kindness. Xiexie, xiexie [Thank you].10
The gifts of rice from the Japanese Army were also mentioned in International Committee documents.

Safety Zone Population Swells to 250,000
On January 14, 1938, Document No. 41 recorded the population of the Safety Zone as 250,000, for the first time. It also announced that the distribution of rice, flour, and coal would be handled by the Japanese Army through the Self-Government Committee.11
Document No. 43, dated January 17, included a note to the effect that .the Japanese authorities have assigned 1,000 bags of rice to the Tze Chih Wei Yuan Hwei [Self-Government Committee], delivery of which started this morning.”12
According to International Committee records, the population in the already overcrowded Safety Zone had increased by 50,000.13

The Population Increase and Food Shortages
The population increase was, unsurprisingly, accompanied by serious food (and temporary housing) shortages. The International Committee asked Japanese military authorities to increase rice rations to 1,000 bags per day in order to provide enough food for 250,000 people.14
Document No. 48, dated January 21, reports that Fitch and Smythe went to inspect the new rice shop operated by the Self-Government Committee. On January 18, Fitch had wired the following report (Document No. 46) to Boynton in Shanghai.
Food question more serious because no regular supply available [to] civilian population. Only twenty-two hundred bags rice [and] one thousand bags flour released for sale from large stocks on hand to two hundred fifty thousand people since December thirteenth.15
Fitch was expressing the International Committee.s dissatisfaction with the handling of the food problem. Since Nanking.s government officials had fled the city, there was no administrative organization to look after the welfare of the residents. Furthermore, the International Committee could not segregate soldiers from civilians, so the Japanese military was preoccupied with that process and the issuance of civilian passports from December 24 on. The Japanese had had no time to address the food problem.

Why the Population Increased
According to Document No. 54, the population of the Safety Zone on January 28, 1938 was estimated at 250,000.16 That same figure was mentioned in the Nanking International Relief Committee Report of 1939, which stated that .very nearly 250,000 people were packed into the Safety Zone..17
How had the Committee arrived at that figure? International Committee Document No. 35, dated January 14, addressed to Fukuda Tokuyasu of the Japanese Embassy, reads as follows.
We understand that you registered 160,000 people without including children under 10 years of age, and in some sections without including older women. Therefore there are probably 250,000 to 300,000 civilians in the city.18
The International Committee made its own estimate of the number of persons who had not been registered, arriving at the figure of 300,000 for the total population. Its members must have realized that they had inadvertently overestimated the number of residents, doubling the registered population because, in subsequent reports, the Committee always used the figure of 250,000. Therefore, the number of civilian passports issued by the Japanese military and the Self-Government Committee became the basis for subsequent population estimates.
Civilian passports were, as stated in Document No. 23 (December 22),19 issued to civilian residents of Nanking by the head of the Nanking Special Agency. In order to receive them, residents were required to appear in person at registration sites designated by the Japanese military. The aforementioned Maruyama was responsible for the behind-the-scenes administration of this process.
According to Maruyama.s memoirs, the Self-Government Committee .wrote each resident.s name and age with a brush on a piece of cotton cloth on which ‘Civilian’ had been stamped in ink.. After the Self-Government Committee and the Nanking Special Agency had granted their approval, residents were issued civilian passports. They were not permitted to send proxies. Therefore, the number of passports issued was as accurate a representation of the population as possible under the circumstances.20
Since Nanking.s residents were required to appear in person, Chinese soldiers hiding in the Safety Zone found themselves in a very precarious position. The city was surrounded by massive walls whose gates were guarded by Japanese troops. Anyone who approached those gates was interrogated. The soldiers could neither enter nor leave Nanking undetected.
In a report issued on January 21, 1938, the Nanking Special Agency stated that .at present, passage into and out of the city … is being permitted in a few cases, with special consideration given to those who have family either inside or outside the city or who have other valid reasons..21 Incidentally, the Japanese military .allowed unlimited free passage after February 25,.22 according to the second report issued by the Nanking Pacification Unit.
Consequently, Chinese soldiers hiding in the Safety Zone were unable to escape from Nanking. Several thousand of them were apprehended, along with the weapons they had concealed. Others, fearing the fate that was in store for them, came out of hiding and attempted to pass themselves off as civilians. According to the January 10, 1938 edition of the Yomiuri Shinbun, .Refugee registration, begun at the end of last year to ferret out stragglers, has, after seven days, been completed for the most part. Sixteen hundred stragglers and others have been provided with shelter and can now walk the streets of Nanking without fear..23
Moreover, one week subsequent to the fall of Nanking, residents returned to the Safety Zone from outside the city, after having passed through Japanese checkpoints located at every gate. An entry in the War Journal of General Matsui Iwane dated December 21, 1937 reports that .residents seem to be returning gradually..24 (According to War Damage in the Nanking Area, beginning in February and March, 1938, there was a significant influx of people from areas near Nanking where order had not yet been established.25)
Whatever the case, the census taken between December 24 and January 6 established that the population had increased by 50,000.

Population of Nanking Reaches 308,546 Nine Months After Occupation
According to Nanking, edited by Ichiki Yoshimichi and published in 1941, the city government conducted a census in August 1938 to obtain accurate population statistics. The aforementioned publication contains monthly statistics compiled by the Nanking Police Agency26 between August 1938 and December 1940.
In August 1938, nine months after the Japanese occupation, there were 162,586 males and 145,960 males in Nanking, for a total of 308,546 residents. International Committee records, which estimated the total population of Nanking when the city fell at 200,000-250,000, were accurate.
Therefore, there is no basis for Iris Chang.s claim, in The Rape of Nanking,27 that Nanking.s population was 600,000 when the city fell. The population did not reach 600,000 until June 1940, 30 months after the Japanese occupied the city.

Reviewing the Population Question
We would like to settle the controversy surrounding the population of the Safety Zone once and for all. An anonymous article at the end of Chapter 4 of What War Means contains the following passage, which refers to mid-January of 1938.
We have a big refugee problem on our hands now with this large

number of people . perhaps 150,000 or more in this Refugee Area, and perhaps 60,000 in our Refugee camps.28 [Italics supplied.]
Hora Tomio based his claim that the population was 150,000 inside the Safety Zone, and 60,000 outside on this article. And indeed, these figures do, at first, seem plausible. Fujiwara Akira wrote that .a great number of residents remained. outside the Safety Zone (inside and outside the city).29
However, the 1939 edition of the The China Year Book, in referring to the first relief work done by the International Committee in 1938, includes the following passage.
This responsibility was not a light one, as at the height of the emergency some 250,000 refugees were sheltered in the Zone; close upon 70,000 being housed in 25 matshed camps and the remainder finding shelter where they could30. [Italics supplied.]
The fact that 70,000 of the 250,000 refugees who had sought refuge in the Safety Zone were accommodated in matshed camps indicates that there were both refugee camps and refugee areas inside the Safety Zone. Residents of potential war zones outside the city had fled to the Safety Zone before hostilities commenced. Nanking.s residents, too, had been ordered to gather in the Safety Zone. As stated in Document No. 34 (dated January 7, 1938), the Safety Zone was safe, but .the present state of insecurity outside of the Zone”31 had caused overcrowding in the Safety Zone. Thus, the area outside the Safety Zone was, according to What War Means, .practically deserted.32 until the end of January 1938.

The Burial Problem
In Interviews With Witnesses to the Nanking Incident by Ara Kenichi, Onishi Hajime, head of the Special Agency, is quoted as saying that all Japanese soldiers who died during the attack on Nanking were cremated by their comrades subsequent to the fall of the city.33 Bodies of Chinese soldiers who died while retreating from the city, were left where they had fallen. Fleeing Chinese troops did not have the luxury of attending to their dead.
Then, when did the interment of Chinese soldiers begin? And where, how, and by whom were they buried? The International Committee first mentioned burials in Document No. 9, dated December 17, 1937. On the morning of December 14, the day after the fall of Nanking, the Red Swastika Society dispatched a truck to retrieve corpses in the Safety Zone. But the truck was stolen, and the laborers on it hauled away.34
Judging from Document No. 9, it would seem that burials commenced on December 14, but that was not the case. The city.s gates were closed, and no one was permitted to leave the city to bury the dead or for any other reason.

Red Swastika Society Truck Laden With Uniformed Chinese Soldiers
The information in Document No. 9 coincides with the following testimony provided by 1st Lieutenant Mori Hideo, commander of the 34th Company, 20th Infantry Regiment. On December 13, Mori noticed piles of enemy uniforms on Zhongshan Road, right across from the Safety Zone. He sensed that enemy troops had fled to the Safety Zone, but could not investigate further, since Japanese military personnel had been forbidden to enter the Safety Zone. Instead, he positioned a light machine gun on the road, aiming it at Xiaguan, and watched to see if any regular Chinese soldiers attempted to flee in that direction. His observations follow.
A truck approached from the direction of Xiaguan. It carried the Red Swastika Society flag, and was filled with uniformed enemy soldiers. As I stood there, astonished, the truck sped across our battle line and kept on going.35
This was a brazen act, since it was illegal for a privately owned truck to carry uniformed enemy soldiers. This incident explains why even Red Swastika Society trucks were later subjected to official inspections. The men described in Document No. 9 were not Red Swastika Society workers, but soldiers disguised as laborers.

Most Pressing Problem After Occupation: The Food Shortage
The Japanese sweep of Nanking continued until December 16, followed by the ceremonial entry on December 17. The census and the issuance of civilian passports began on December 24. During this time, the most pressing problem was the food shortage. As Fitch had written in his telegram to Boynton, “Food question more serious because no regular supply available [to] civilian population.”36
There was no time to even contemplate burying the dead.
The International Committee issued a series of documents relating to the food shortage after the fall of Nanking. Document No. 66, dated February 8, mentions that the Trucking Department of the Self-Government Committee was transporting 1,500 bags of wheat flour per day.37 Document No. 68, dated February 10, reports that Japanese military authorities had released a total of 5,200 bags of rice and 10,000 bags of wheat flour, and given the Self-Government Committee 2,000 gallons of gasoline.38
Document No. 68 also states that the Japanese gave the Self-Government Committee .9 old trucks..39 Document No. 49, dated January 22, refers to those trucks, commenting that it was difficult to use them to transport food and fuel because, besides being old, .no repair parts exist.”40 If the Red Swastika Society had possessed trucks, they, too, would have been mobilized for the transport of food.
According to The Second Sino-Japanese War: A Guide to Former Battle Sites, published by Rikugun Gahosha, transportation in Nanking prior to World War II consisted .mainly of rickshaws and horse-drawn carriages. Automobiles and buses were seldom used. Oddly enough, there were no trains in this capital city..41
Even today, automobiles are beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. At that time, no one owned an automobile. According to a statement made by Ernest Forster (who was affiliated with an Episcopalian missionary group based in the United States), found in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References, all means of transportation had been commandeered by the Japanese.42 What remained were trucks that lacked tires or were otherwise unusable.
Given the transportation situation, and the food problem, the solution of which was of the greatest urgency, it is extremely unlikely that burials commenced on January 18, 1938. In his diary entry dated January 22, Rabe writes, .My protests and pleas to the Japanese embassy finally to get this corpse buried, or give me permission to bury it, have thus far been fruitless..43

Census Ends; Problem of Unburied Corpses Addressed
Then, when did the burials begin? Nakazawa Mitsuo, 16th Division chief of staff, provides a hint in a report intended for his successor entitled .Noteworthy Events in Nanking,. written on January 22, 1938. Nakazawa refers to the effort to remove debris from the battlefield, mentioning that the task had been completed.
However, since the work had been done in haste, he worried that decomposing corpses might pose a health hazard in the summer.44
In other words, the dead had not been buried, but simply covered with earth.45 Therefore, as the temperature rose, burying the dead properly was even more urgent. However, Nakazawa assumed that as far as proper burials were concerned, .it would not be extremely difficult to inter the bodies, since they were located near a former battle zone..46
Thus, we know that on January 22, after the process of segregating civilians from soldiers had nearly reached its end on January 5, the burial problem was finally contemplated. Nakazawa had assumed that only bodies near the battlefield would be buried, and that that could be accomplished .without great difficulty..
.Noteworthy Events in Nanking. also contains a warning, motivated by an incident that had occurred 10 days earlier (on or about January 12). Approximately 100 Chinese stragglers had ambushed Japanese communications troops to the east of Jiangningzhen, causing the Japanese to be even more cautious. The warning was as follows: .Further door-to-door surveys are needed, to search for and confiscate weapons. Additionally, all comings and goings should be carefully monitored until we are satisfied that there is no longer cause for concern..47
It was impossible to enter or leave Nanking without passing through one of its gates. The frustration of the city’s residents is evident in International Committee Document No. 49, dated January
22: .Until persons are allowed to leave or enter Nanking, it is impracticable to do anything … ..48
Xu Chuanyin was telling the truth when he testified at the Tokyo Trials that the Japanese did not permit burials until approximately one month after they had occupied Nanking.49 But if he was implying that the Japanese were apathetic about interments, he was wrong. Nanking.s government organizations had collapsed, and the Japanese were forced to take the initiative.
Immediately after the fall of Nanking, the Japanese attended carefully to their own dead, after which they cremated some of the bodies of enemy soldiers, which were strewn about, and buried them.
The following passage is an entry from the diary of Staff Officer Kisaki Hisashi, dated December 26.
Accompanied the commander during his inspection. … The commander inspected the area near Taiping Gate. As the smoke
rose from enemy corpses being burned inside, he was told about the hostilities that took place when we occupied the city.50
Northeast of Taiping Gate, where the Japanese were burning the bodies of Chinese soldiers, was Zijinshan, where the fighting had been particularly brutal. By .enemy corpses,. Kisaki meant the corpses of enemy soldiers who had died in battle.
The Chinese did not cremate their dead at that time, but rather, buried them in the ground. When they saw the Japanese piling corpses on log pyres, pouring a small amount of gasoline on them, and then igniting it, they must have thought their compatriots were being burned alive. If rumors to that effect spread, they would explain the report sent by Rabe to Hitler, in which he told of complaints that Chinese were being burned alive.51 But there is no mention of the Japanese having burned anyone alive in the records of the time, or in the main text of Rabe.s diary.
Whatever the case, corpses soon rot, and if neglected for a month or two, can cause communicable diseases . even epidemics. That is why the Nanking Special Agency decided to have the city.s residents attend to the corpses before the hot weather arrived. According to Maruyama.s memoirs, orders emanating from Sakata Shigeki, head of the Special Agency and predecessor of Onishi Hajime, instructed that burials should commence.52
It was probably near the end of January when the Nanking Special Agency addressed the burial problem and began organizing a burial crew. On January 31, Rabe wrote in his diary, .The dead Chinese soldier who has been lying at my door for six weeks now has at last been buried..53 Later, in his report to Hitler, Rabe stated that .on February 2,.54 burials had finally begun.

Interments and the Nanking Special Agency
The Nanking Special Agency entrusted the Self-Government Committee with the burials, because one of the responsibilities of that entity was to improve the state of public health. One gets the impression that the International Committee, too, was anxious to have the dead interred. Document No. 33 stated that the Committee would .be glad to see the local Self-Government Association assume as speedily as possible all the usual functions of a local civic administration: policing, fire protection, sanitation, et cetera.”55
On April 16, 1938, the North China edition of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun carried an article that read, in part, .The Red Swastika Society, the Self-Government Committee, and our priests, who are affiliated with Nihonzan Myoho Temple, have joined together to bury the dead..56 One must be mindful, however, that the Self-Government Committee.s role in the interments, as in any other of its activities, was only nominal.
Interments commenced, supposedly as a voluntary activity of the Self-Government Committee, but they were funded by the Nanking Special Agency. The Agency stayed in the background, so that Chinese who cooperated with the Committee would not be labelled traitors. The fact that the Japanese military financed the interments was never made public.

Self-Government Committee Chairman Tao Xishan
Tao Xishan, the chairman of the Self-Government Committee decided to resign from that position according to a report prepared by Rosen.s report, dated March 16. On that occasion, Tao had said, “For 16 years, I have worked for the Red Swastika Society, a charitable organization.” Tao had been, concurrently, the Nanking representative of the Red Swastika Society and chairman of the Self-Government Committee.57 It is, therefore, not surprising that the Self-Government Committee recruited the Red Swastika Society to bury the dead.
Note: The Society’s insignia was a swastika. The Winter 1938 issue of the China Quarterly carried an essay by Zhu Youyu entitled “The Christian Church in War-time Service,” in which he mentions the .Swastika symbol, worn on the arm-bands of the workers or borne on the banners of the relief teams… [Italics supplied.]
Footage of the Red Swastika Society appears in “American Newsreels: January 1938,” broadcast as part of an NHK special series entitled A Century of Images: #11 . Japan. However, that footage had been faked. In it, a man appears wearing clothing that bears a large swastika printed on a white background, but his attire does not coincide with the description in Zhu Youyu’s report. Furthermore, the Red Swastika Society could not have been engaged in burials in January 1938.
Even assuming that the Red Swastika Society did begin interments on February 1, no preparations had been made, nor had a sufficient number of laborers been recruited. The aforementioned Mr. Maruyama took charge of the burials. In his memoirs, he wrote, .The head of the Nanking Special Agency told me that he would obtain the necessary funds somehow. I then set out to accomplish my mission, which was to ensure that the dead were buried.”58

The Search for Burial Sites
According to Maruyama, most of the corpses were outside the city. How many were there? In a report about the progress of relief work in Nanking, dated
February 14, Bates estimated On February 24, 1996, the NHK Broadcasting Co. aired a special program
that the Red Swastika Society
entitled A Century of Images: Japan, in might bury 200 bodies per day, which it rebroadcast “American Newsreels: but 30,000 bodies remained January 1938.” This photograph allegedly
shows the interments done by the Red
unburied.59 Rabe estimated
Swastika Society. However, since all that there were 50,000 or 60,000 foreign cameramen had left Nanking by dead, but Maruyama calculated December 15, 1937, this photograph could
not have been taken by an American
that, at most, there were .about
photographer. Furthermore, this scene was 20,000..60 Maruyama selected reportedly photographed in January 1938,the burial sites, at which he despite the fact that the Red Swastika
Society did not commence burials until
instructed the Red Swastika
February 1, 1938. The photograph shows
Society to inter the dead. the swastika symbol on the front ofuniformlike garb worn by the Society.s members, but in fact, the emblem appeared
There was absolutely no only on armbands and banners. This
public land. If the Red newsreel was faked. Swastika Society had arbitrarily selected burial sites, and interred the dead there, the landowners would, of course, been furious. Since long-time residents of Nanking knew who owned which land, rumors would have spread like wildfire if the Red Swastika Society had designated private property as a mass burial site. Affected landowners would have voiced strong objections to the Red Swastika Society. Therefore, I couldn.t allow the Society to select burial sites. Left with no other option, I made the selections myself. There were mass graveyards and temple cemeteries in every district, but not much space was available, so they were not suitable for mass burials.61
Since Maruyama was acting on behalf of the Nanking Special Agency, landowners were forced to acquiesce when their property was selected, and the Red Swastika Society could bury the dead there without fear of repercussions. Maruyama wrote that burials commenced in early February,62 as did Rabe.
Furthermore, according to the .Third Report of the Nanking Special Agency. for March 1938, included in Central China Pacification Operations, corpses .were interred at designated areas in Xiaguan and Shangxinhe outside the city..63

Interment Methods
There were no trucks to be had in Nanking. The Red Swastika Society recruited nearby farmers, who transported the corpses in large, two-wheeled carts. They then used hoes to dig two-meter-deep graves, lined the corpses up in the graves, and covered them with soil.
According to Maruyama, the number of bodies that could be buried in one day, using this method, was .at most 200, normally approximately 180..64 The work proceeded slowly at first, because there weren’t enough workers, and those recruited were unaccustomed to this sort of task. Rabe also mentions having heard that it was impossible to bury more than 200 bodies per day65 in a report he sent to Hitler. But how was Maruyama able to keep track of the work that was being done?

Workers’ Wages
The Red Swastika Society had been entrusted with burying the dead by the Nanking Special Agency (and the Self-Government Committee). The Society was paid 30 sen (1 yen = 100 sen) for each body buried (approximately $7.00 today), at a time when police officers in the Republic of China earned 3-5 per month. For those residents who remained in Nanking, .the poorest of the population,. the opportunity to earn this much money was an attractive proposition.
Later, other small organizations (Chongshantang, for instance) asked the Self-Government Committee for some of the burial work, but the latter had entrusted the entire task to the Red Swastika Society, and so refused all such applications. The Red Swastika Society may have subcontracted some of the work to them, but according to Maruyama, the Society was the sole contractor.
Because the Society was being paid 30 sen per body buried, Maruyama was kept informed of the progress of the work. Since he was required to submit a report to the Manchurian Railway office in Shanghai each month, he took notes on a
Scroll presented to Maruyama Susumu
daily basis. He sent
when he departed for Japan, by Wangmonthly reports to his Chengdian of the Self-Gavermentsuperiors at the Nanking Committe Special Agency and to Ito Takeo, director of the Manchurian Railway office in Shanghai.
The reports must have been relayed from Shanghai to the office of the president of the Manchurian Railway in Dairen (Dalian). Their recent discovery was mentioned in an article in the May 10, 1994 edition of the Asahi Shinbun, under the headline .Secret Reports from Nanking Special Agency Dispatched by the Shanghai Office of the Manchurian Railway..

When Were the Burials Completed?
Maruyama wrote that Onishi Hajime, the head of the Nanking Special Agency, scheduled a memorial service for civilians and soldiers who died during the hostilities, to be held on the vernal equinox in 1938 at Yijiang Gate. Maruyama instructed the Red Swastika Society, through the Self-Government Committee, to complete the burials by March 15. With the deadline looming, the Red Swastika Society recruited a large number of workers to complete the project. Maruyama reports that .the burials were completed on March 15..66 At the service, Kawano Sangyo, a priest affiliated with the Honganji sect of Buddhism (and subsequently a member of the House of Councillors), chanted the sutras.
That is why there were many more burials in March than there had been in February. It is likely that 500-600 bodies were buried per day in March,67 since in .The Situation in Nanking,. dated March 4, Rosen reported that the Red Swastika Society buried that number of bodies each day in mass graves.
Note: In .The Situation in Nanking,. Rosen wrote that the bodies of 30,000 persons, killed in mass executions when the terror was at its worst, still lay in a port town outside the city. However, his report was totally unfounded. The records of the Red Swastika Society, accurate or not, state that the Society buried 3,003 bodies in the Xiaguan area subsequent to March 4 . specifically, 1,772 near the coal harbor in Xiaguan on March 6, and 385 in an open field near the coal harbor in Xiaguan on April 27.
Since the burials were completed on March 15, it is unlikely that any bodies were interred on April 27. It is also unlikely that the Red Swastika Society buried 1,772 bodies on March 6, two days after Rosen wrote his report. Even if did, the total number of bodies buried at Xiaguan was 3,000.

The Dead Interred Only by Red Swastika Society
According to Japanese records, only the Red Swastika Society conducted burials. What did American references have to say on this matter? First, the International Committee reported the following in Document No. 33, dated January 7: .We would be glad to cooperate with other organizations in the relief work, as we are now doing with the Red Swastika and the Red Cross … .”68
A month later, Bates described that cooperation in detail in “Refugee Problems in China,” dated February 14. He even mentioned the soup kitchen where meals were served free of charge, the burials, and the free medical treatment. His report appears in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References. In it, he lists all the relief activities coordinated by the International Committee, organized in the Nanking Safety Zone. In cooperation with the local branch of the Chinese Red Cross Society, the Committee was able to operate a large soup kitchen. The Red Swastika Society also assisted in the relief effort by running two large soup kitchens and by burying the dead.69
According to Bates’ report, only the Red Swastika Society conducted burials. The Chinese Red Cross Society, a local organization, was involved only with a soup kitchen, not in the burials.
Chapter 22 of the 1939 edition of the The China Year Book carried an article about the refugee problem in China, which contains the following passage.
Throughout the emergency period, the International Safety Zone Committee had the co-operation of the Chinese Red Cross Society in conducting a large soup kitchen for the refugees; and the Red Swastika Society also rendered valuable assistance by maintaining two soup kitchens and by burying dead bodies. Coal for the soup kitchens was delivered by the Self-Government Committee, and was also purchased from private yards. As soon as the surrounding country began to settle down, the Safety Zone Committee directed its efforts toward persuading the peasants to return to their farms; assistance was rendered, where necessary, to enable them to take up their work again.70 [Italics supplied.]
This article corroborates Bates. report.
Bates listed all the relief efforts, but with regard to burials, he mentioned only the Red Swastika Society, as did the 1939 edition of the The China Year Book. Again, the Chinese Red Cross Society was not involved in burial work. “Burial Statistics by Month, Prepared by Burial Crew No. 1, Chinese Red Cross Society, Nanking Chapter” is included in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 2: Chinese References. But since the information it contains is inconsistent with the records of the time,71 it must have been fabricated.

Republic of China Reports “279,586 Compatriots Slaughtered”
Nevertheless, the Republic of China submitted records to the Tokyo Trials claiming that 279,586 Chinese citizens had been slaughtered.72
We have numbered those records for purposes of explanation.
1.
In the Xinhe district, 2,873 Chinese were killed (from testimony given by burial workers Cheng Shizheng and Chang Kaiyun).

2.
In the vicinity of the Army Arsenal and Huashenmiao (outside the South Gate), more than 7,000 were killed (from testimony given by burial workers Rui Fangyan and Zhang Hongru).

3.
At Caoxiexia, 57,418 were killed (from testimony given by Lu Su, who managed to escape).

4.
At Hanzhong Gate, more than 2,000 were killed (from testimony given by Wu Zhangde and Chen Yongqing, who escaped).

5.
At Linggu Temple, more than 3,000 were killed (from an inscription on a stone monument to the dead erected by traitor Gao Guanwu).

6.
Chongshantang buried 11,267 (112,266) bodies, working continuously for four months.

7.
The Red Swastika Society buried 43,071 bodies, working continuously for six months.

These records were compiled by Chen Guangyu, head prosecutor at the Nanking District Court. However, he does not explain how he obtained them, or on what references they are based. Nor do we know precisely when they were compiled, since the compilation date is listed only as “February 1946.” Moreover, the names of burial sites and of organizations mentioned in 1. to 6. above as having done the burial work are fictitious. They do not appear in any of the records of the period. The Red Swastika Society, which is mentioned in 7., did engage in burial work, but its work was done over 40 days, not “continuously for six months.”
No one seems to have bothered to check the arithmetic in these records. For instance, the total obtained when all the figures in this reference are added up amounts to 227,628 bodies, not to 279,586, as was testified.

Nanking International Relief Committee Report
The Nanking International Relief Committee Report, which probably appeared in the summer of 1939, contains the following reference to burials. (Bates chaired the Committee.)
For example, $2,540 was used to complete the necessary burial
enterprises undertaken by the Red Swastika Society, which covered over 40,000 bodies otherwise uncared for. During some 40 working days, this employed nearly 170 men. On this and a number of other work relief jobs, forty cents per day of actual work was taken as the standard wage.73 [Italics supplied.]
This report is an important, decisive reference, from which we can infer the following.
1.
All necessary burials were undertaken by the Red Swastika Society, which interred approximately 40,000 bodies. The burials were completed in about 40 working days.

2.
During that period, workers were paid $.40 per day. The Red Swastika Society also received remuneration from the Nanking Special Agency through the Self-Government Committee, which doubled the aforementioned wage. According to this record, at least, neither the Nanking Special Agency nor the Self-Government Committee was aware of this duplication.

3.
Since the International Committee paid $2,540 to cover daily wages of $.40 per worker, we can assume that a total of 6,350 laborers participated in the operation over 40 days. The mention of “170 men” in the above citation probably refers to the average number of laborers used each day. The Society found it difficult to recruit laborers in early February.

4.
If the project required 40 working days, then the burials done by the Red Swastika Society continued for two months (February and March). Rabe mentions that burials were not permitted between December 13, the day that Nanking fell, and the end of January. Therefore, the Red Swastika Society’s burial records for the months of December and January are total fabrications.

Burials Completed on or About March 20
Normally, when a project nears its end, only the finishing touches are required. Inspections are made to ensure that nothing has been overlooked, but not much actual work takes place. An examination of the burial records of the Red Swastika Society from that viewpoint reveals that 500-600 bodies were interred during early March, but only 112 on March 15. That number decreases to 100 on March 19. These figures suggest that the work was nearing an end, and that the burials themselves had been completed. On March 22, a memorial service may have been held for the war dead, both soldiers and civilians.
It is likely that burials were completed on March 15, as Maruyama’s memoirs suggest. In that case, the records for March 19 must have been added at a later date. If they are accurate, then burials may have been completed on March 19, and the memorial service held on March 22. Still, it is difficult to believe that work was not halted for even one day during that time, since Nanking’s roads normally froze when the temperature dropped. In his journal, Isa Kazuo wrote, “The rains started this morning, turning the ground into mud.” When the roads were muddied due to rain or snow, burials were impossible. What we do know about unfavorable weather at the time is that on February 4 it both rained and snowed. On February 23 there were torrential rains, which would have prevented burial work on the following day as well. However, there is no extant data that would allow us to determine weather conditions subsequent to February 23.

A Maximum of 15,000 Bodies Buried
Let us assume that there were three days in February on which burials could not take place, and that in March, work proceeded continuously. If we also assume that the burials were done over 40 days, from February 1 to March 15, we arrive at figures that, for the most part, coincide with information in the Nanking International Relief Committee Report. At first (in February), the work did not go smoothly but, estimating that 200 bodies were interred on each of 25 working days, then the total number of burials in February would be 5,000.
According to Rosen’s Report, in March, 500-600 bodies were buried per day. But since little burial work was done in the latter part of March, the figure of 550 bodies per working day is probably more accurate. Even that might be an overestimate, but if 550 bodies were buried per day, and the burials were completed on March 15, the total number of interments for March was 8,250. When we add the figures for February, that makes 13,250 burials in all.
If burials were completed on March 19, the total for March would have been 19 times 550, or 10,450. Together with the 5,000 bodies interred in February, that makes 15,450. Even allowing for possible omissions, the maximum number of bodies buried in Nanking was approximately 13,000-15,000.
Proof that the number of actual burials was inflated by 28,000-30,000 can be found in the second report issued by the Pacification Unit of the Nanking Special Agency. That report states that “as of the end of February, approximately 5,000 bodies have been buried.”74 However, the burial records of the Red Swastika Society, as submitted at the Tokyo Trials, assert that 30,382 bodies had been buried by the end of February.
In fact, as early as the end of February 1938, the Red Swastika Society had inflated its burial records by approximately 20,500. That is probably why it announced, from the end of February through the beginning of March that “there are still 30,000 bodies in Xiaguan.” Hearing that announcement, Rabe (and later Rosen) wrote that “there are still 30,000 to be dealt with, most of them in Hsiakwan [Xiaguan]. But as we have shown, the Red Swastika Society buried only about 3,000 corpses (if that many) in Xiaguan subsequent to March.

Discrepancies in Nanking Burial Records
How many of the dead were buried within the walls of Nanking? An examination of the Red Swastika Society’s burial records (see p.208) found in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 2: Chinese References, reveals three fundamental errors.
1.
No burials took place during December or January. Therefore, the figures for those two months must be disregarded. Furthermore, there is no mention of bodies having been interred in Nanking in March.

2.
The figures listed for the interments of males add up to 1,761, but the records show the total as 1,759.

3.
The subtotal for the number of children buried should be 56, but the number reads 26. According to the record, the bodies of 30 children were interred on February 22, but they are not added in the subtotal on the chart. Or was this information included later? In that case, 26 is the correct number.

Since the burial records submitted at the Tokyo Trials, found on p. 378, Vol. 1 of Source Material Relating to the Great Nanking Massacre during the Second Sino Japanese War also fail to mention those 30 bodies, this figure was clearly entered on a subsequent date. Therefore, we may conclude that 30 dead children were not buried on February 22. (The 26 bodies that were actually buried may have been those of boy soldiers, since the International Committee received no complaints from parents to the effect that their children had been murdered.)

A Maximum of 623 Bodies Buried in Nanking
On February 13, there were torrential rains. Since the roads would have been muddy the next day, it would have been impossible to bury 109 bodies on Mt. Gulinsi. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that 672 corpses were buried in northern Nanking on February 19. Furthermore, on that same day, outside the city in Xiaguan, 524 corpses were buried. Would the Society have hired extra workers, enough to bury 1,196 bodies in one day? Even if 180-200 bodies were indeed interred each day in northern Nanking, it would have been virtually impossible to bury more than 200.
Moreover, the last burials in the city (a total of 337 bodies) took place on February 27. The last days of a project, as we mentioned previously, are spent checking to ensure that everything has been done. These figures have obviously been embellished.
An investigation into the dates of burials completed prior to February 27 reveals an entry for February 22. The record states that corpses were interred in northern Nanking on February that day, and again on February 27. Why would the work crew, once it had buried
Burial Records within the Wall of Nanking

30 men and women on February 22, not have time to bury theremaining 170 bodies on the same day? The answer is, most likely, that there were no bodies to be buried. The operation was most likely completed with the burial of those 30 bodies in the northern Nanking on February 22. The 337 bodies allegedly buried on February 27 probably never existed.
Thus, the correct figures would be: 19 bodies buried on February 2, 49 on February 6, 151 on February 7, 20 on February 11, 154 on February 12, and 30 on February 22, for a total of 423. Even if we include the 200 burials recorded for February 19, the total rises only to
623.

Classification of the 600 Bodies Recovered in Nanking
Who were the approximately 600 persons laid to rest in Nanking, and how did they die? The following classification seems reasonable.
1.
Rioters and looters were shot to death by Chinese military police prior to the fall of Nanking to set an example (see p.36).

2.
Two thousand Chinese soldiers, most of whom were dead, or wounded and dying, were dumped on the platform at Nanking Station in Xiaguan (see p.32) prior to the fall of the city. According to Lily Abegg, they were eventually taken to a hospital, but some of them did not survive.

3.
Many Chinese soldiers were killed during the hostilities at Nanking’s gates prior to the fall of the city. For instance, a witness saw “corpse upon enemy corpse” in front of the gate (see p.51).

(4)
Prior to the fall of Nanking, at Yijiang (North) Gate, members of the Chinese supervisory unit shot at Chinese soldiers attempting to escape and, as a result, many were killed or wounded (see p.55).

(5)
Prior to the fall of Nanking, Chinese soldiers were killed when they sought to escape from the city walls. Others rushed to Yijiang Gate at the northern end of the city, and were trampled (see p.56).

(6)
Prior to the fall of Nanking, many wounded Chinese soldiers headed for the field hospital (located in the Foreign Ministry), but died before they could be treated (see p.133).

(7)
After the fall of Nanking, rebellious Chinese soldiers were (lawfully) executed by Japanese troops (see Chapter 10).

CHAPTER 14:

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF
THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

In the previous chapter, we discussed the burial work performed by the Red Swastika Society in Nanking. We demonstrated that the Society actually buried only about 15,000 bodies, despite its claims of having interred 43,000. Are we to believe that the 43,000 bodies listed in the Society’s records were casualties of war? Or were they victims of a massacre? We shall address that issue in this chapter but, before we do, we shall address some of the Chinese allegations of Japanese atrocities reported to Europeans and Americans in Nanking.
Chinese Allegations of Japanese Atrocities
Most of the Americans who remained in Nanking (Bates, Smythe, Wilson, Fitch, Riggs, and Sone) resided in the home of Professor Lossing Buck. Living at close quarters, the men discussed everything they had heard or seen with each other.
The most serious allegations made by Chinese residents are, fortunately, extant, having been recorded in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References. They have also been carefully compiled by Kasahara Tokushi into a book titled One Hundred Days in the Nanking Refugee Zone. We will cite some of the accounts therein.
1.
Fitch’s Criticism of the Japanese Military During the Sweep of Nanking Fitch claimed that when the Japanese saw huge piles of Chinese military uniforms on December 14 (the day after Nanking fell), they apprehended 1,300 persons in the vicinity and shot them to death. He also accused the Japanese of, two days later, abducting 1,000 persons from the Safety Zone and massacring them. The eyewitness report he wrote was carried in the March 16, 1938 edition of the South China Morning Post, a full three months after the incidents allegedly occurred.

2.
An 11-Year-Old Boy’s Account In a letter dated December 18, Dr. Robert Wilson, a physician associated with the University of Nanking Hospital, wrote that a group of 79 Chinese had been led away from the Safety Zone, and killed on a hill west of Xizang Road. His informant was an 11-year-old boy, who claimed that he had regained consciousness after the Japanese soldiers had departed, and returned to the Safety Zone. Dr. Wilson wrote;

He came to after they had left and found the other seventy-nine dead about him. His bullet wounds are not serious.1
This account strains credibility in several ways.
(1)
There was only one witness to this incident, the boy in question. Who was he? What was his name?

(2)
After such a traumatic experience, would an 11-year-old child, after regaining consciousness, have remained on the scene long enough to count 79 corpses? Wouldn’t one expect him to have fled the scene, terrified, at the earliest opportunity?

(3)
The burial records of the Red Swastika Society do not mention 79 corpses on a hill west of Xizang Road.

3. A 17-Year-Old Boy’s Account In another letter, this one dated January 3, Wilson recounts a story he heard from one of three boys who came to him that day for medical treatment. The boy, 17 years old, reported that on December 14, about 10,000 men and boys ranging in age from 15 to 30 were taken to the banks of the Yangtze near a barge. There, Japanese soldiers shot them with field and machine guns, and hurled hand grenades at them. Most of the dead were dumped into the river. The Japanese piled up the remaining corpses and burned them. The boy and two others had, miraculously, managed to escape. Six thousand of the victims were former soldiers and 4,000, civilians.
This account, too, raises questions.
(1)
Neither the given name nor surname of the boy is mentioned.

(2)
All of Nanking’s gates were guarded by Japanese soldiers on constant alert. How was the boy able to enter the city?

(3)
Why did the boy risk returning to a city where, as he stated, shootings were taking place?

(4)
Why did he remain silent until January 3? If he had confided in someone, news of his ordeal would have spread throughout the

Safety Zone. Why didn’t the other two boys come forward?

(5)
How was this boy, who was running for his life, able to ascertain that 6,000 former soldiers and 4,000 civilians had been killed?

(6)
How was he able to distinguish civilians from soldiers? And how could he possibly have counted the victims? With some many flaws in his story, why didn’t Dr. Wilson interrogate him further? If incidents like this one had actually occurred, they would have

been recorded by more than one person. But the 17-year-old boy’s account exists only in Dr. Wilson’s letter.

Bates’ Memorandum Deleted
Bates wrote a memorandum on January 25, 1938, the gist of which was his claim that the Japanese military had conducted unlawful executions. He sent the memorandum to Harold Timperley in Shanghai. It was reprinted as Chapter 3 of What War Means, edited by Timperley and published in July 1938.
In that memorandum, Bates criticized the way in which the Japanese segregated combatants from noncombatants, a process that commenced on December 24. He claimed that when the Japanese were registering the refugees and issuing civilian passports, they rounded up 3,000 Chinese men next to the University library. The Japanese assured the men that their lives would be spared if they admitted that they were soldiers. In front of Bates’ eyes, “between two and three hundred” men stepped forward. Later, they were taken away “in two groups.” But the Japanese broke their promise, and secretly executed the men outside Hanxi and Hanzhong gates. Or at least that is what eight men told Bates.
The first man to approach Bates told him that he had been forced to join the group of “between two and three hundred” after having been apprehended by the Japanese on the street. He had sustained bayonet wounds. Bates’ description follows.
Next morning, a man with five bayonet wounds came to the University Hospital … That evening, he said, somewhere to the west, about 130 Japanese soldiers had killed most of five hundred similar captives with bayonet thrusts. When he regained consciousness he found that the Japanese had gone, and managed to crawl away during the night. He was not familiar with this part of Nanking, and was vague as to places.2 [Italics supplied.]
There are problems in this account as well, which we shall list.
(1)
The group of “between two and three hundred” men has now ballooned to 500. Bates later wrote, “This confusion or complexity of reports was discouraging.”

(2)
Who was the “man” who reported the incident to Bates? No name is given.

(3)
According to Bates’ subsequent investigation, the incident took place on the banks of a canal outside Hanxi Gate.3 How did the man manage to pass through the gate, where Japanese sentries were posted?

(4)
The man claimed that he had barely escaped being executed by the fearsome Japanese. Why didn’t he attempt to distance himself from Nanking? Why did he return to a city in which, as he claimed, arrests and executions were taking place? The number of corpses mentioned is quite large. Were the bodies

ever discovered? If there were no bodies, there were no murders, and Bates’ account was nothing more than malicious propaganda. Further on in the same account, Bates writes that burial gangs did discover the corpses.
Burial gangs report three thousand bodies at the point, left in rows or piles after mass executions.4 [Italics supplied.]
Burials did not commence until February 1938, however, so no “burial gangs” were working on December 25. And how do we explain yet another increase in the body count, to 3,000? We shall now proceed to shed some light on these mysteries.
As previously stated, Bates’ memorandum was reprinted as Chapter 3 of What War Means, and was carried in the following four English-language publications as well.
1.
What War Means, edited by Timperley (March 23, 1938)

2.
The War Conduct of the Japanese, edited by Hsu Shuhsi (April 12, 1938)

3.
A Digest of Japanese War Conduct, edited by Hsu Shuhsi (January 28, 1939)

4.
The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39 (March 15, 1939)

5.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsu Shuhsi (May 9, 1939)

All but one of the aforementioned publications, including The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39, which was based on official sources, deleted the sentence that read “Burial gangs report three thousand bodies … left in rows or piles.” Therefore, it is safe to assume that those 3,000 bodies never existed, and that the story Bates heard from the “man” was untrue. The claim that the Japanese promised to spare the lives of Chinese soldiers who came forward, and then reneged, is totally without merit.

Bates Accuses Japanese Military of Violating International Law
Bates also recorded another hearsay account from two Chinese men.
Two other men from the University Library reported indirectly that they escaped from a large body of several hundred who were bayoneted along the canal wall to the north, near to San Chia Ho.
Finally, it should be remembered that this incident is only one of a series of similar acts that had been going on for two weeks, with changes on the main theme of mass murder of men accused rightfully or wrongfully of being ex-soldiers. This is not the place to discuss the dictum of international law that the lives of prisoners are to be preserved except under serious military necessity, nor the Japanese setting aside of that law for frankly stated vengeance upon persons accused of having killed in battle comrades of the troops now occupying Nanking. Other incidents involved larger numbers of men than did this one. Evidences from
burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.5 [Italics supplied.]
Bates, who never seemed to question what Chinese informants told him, accused the Japanese military of violating international law. As proof of that crime, he cited the 40,000 corpses that had been interred, insisting that they were not victims of war, but of a massacre. He also alleged that approximately 12,000 of the dead were not soldiers, but civilians.
On January 25, 1938, when Bates wrote his memorandum, burials had not yet commenced. How did he know about the 40,000 bodies buried by the Red Swastika Society? He reported that when he wrote the announcement of the publication of What War Means, he made a final check of the draft of that memorandum.6 By that time, all the burials had been completed. Records dated March 23 stated that nearly 40,000 bodies had been interred. We assume that Bates inserted the passage that stated that “close to forty thousand persons” had been buried during the final editing process.

Bates Again Claims 12,000 Civilians Massacred
In 1938, Bates wrote the preface to War Damage in the Nanking Area, a report of war casualties compiled by Smythe, representing the International Committee. The publication was completed in June of that year. At the end of the report were the results of surveys of one in every 50 households, conducted between March and April 1938. According to one of them, “Number and Cause of Deaths and Injuries, by Date,” between December 12, 1937 (the day prior to the fall of Nanking) and January 13, 1938, 2,400 persons, including those mentioned in cases with no dates, were killed as a result of “soldiers’ violence.”
For some reason, Bates multiplied the survey figures by five, and again insisted that the Japanese had massacred 12,000 persons. His argument was included in War Damage in the Nanking Area as a footnote to a passage that referred to the massacre of 12,000 civilians.
A careful estimate from the burials in the city and in areas adjacent to the wall, indicates 12,000 civilians killed by violence. The tens of thousands of unarmed or disarmed soldiers are not considered in these lists.7 [Italics supplied.]
However, as even Hora Tomio has conceded, there are no burial statistics for the number of soldiers versus the number of civilians interred. The claim that approximately 30% of the corpses, i.e., 12,000 were those of civilians was the product of Bates’ imagination.
Thus, there was no objective evidence that could be used as proof that 12,000 civilians were interred. The content reflected the personal, unsubstantiated views of Bates, who wrote the preface, and of the editor, Smythe. The argument that 12,000 civilians were massacred has taken on a life of its own, despite the fact that it is Bates’ opinion, and nothing more than that.

Moderate View Rooted in Bates’ Argument
Nevertheless, Bates was the first of the “moderates” (the term favored by those who write on this subject) to assert that tens of thousands of Chinese were massacred in Nanking. The positions taken by later moderates. Hata Ikuhiko, Okumiya Masatake, Itakura Yoshiaki, and contributors to The Battle of Nanking (Kaikosha) . may differ as far as the number of victims is concerned, but they are all variations on Bates’ theme. The moderates all agree with Bates on one point, i.e., that the Japanese perpetrated executions in violation of international law during their sweep of Nanking. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, this allegation was not made for the first time after World War
II. It was made by Bates immediately after the fall of Nanking, and continually thereafter.
The gist of Bates’ argument, which has played a key role in the controversy about Japanese military conduct in Nanking, is as follows.
(1)
The Japanese military executed Chinese soldiers in violation of international law.

(2)
The Japanese military killed 40,000 persons, 12,000 of whom were civilians and 30,000 soldiers, in violation of international law.

(3)
These mass murders took place over a period of two weeks, not two

months. (The claim was made that executions in violation of international law took place over a period of two weeks, from December 13 to December 26, not over two months. This two-week period was also cited by Jeffery, the British consul.)
Bates’ argument was, most likely, based on stories he had heard about the execution of 10,000 persons from the 17-year-old boy, and about the execution of 79 persons from the 11-year-old boy. Despite the fact that those accounts had been deemed groundless and expunged from official records, Bates wrote (on January 25, 1938) that “evidences from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.”
Was his claim accurate? If it had been, it would have been investigated and entered into the records of the time, where it would have remained. If it was not accurate, it would have been removed from official records (discredited). At this juncture, we would like to report the results of our search for the term “Nanking Massacre” in the English-language magazines and official records of the time.

The China Year Book 1938
Unlike Japanese publications, those issued in other nations do not include the day or month of publication, only the year. Hints can, however, be obtained from the dates that follow prefaces. For instance, the preface of the 1938 edition of the venerable English-language almanac, The China Year Book, first published in 1912, carries the date of February 2, 1938.
The China Year Book was issued by the North China Daily News and Herald Company, originally a newspaper company founded by a Briton in 1864. The company produced the North China Daily News and a weekly newspaper known as the North China Herald. The former boasted the largest circulation for an English-language daily in the Far East at the time.
The 1938 edition of the The China Year Book included a chronology for 1937, covering Chinese politics, economics, military affairs, and trade. At the beginning of Chapter 19, “Sino-Japanese Hostilities,” was a “Summary of Events.” Following the summary is a list of items relating to Nanking.
Aug. 13 Outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai.
Aug. 14 Chinese planes drop bombs in International
Settlement, causing 729 deaths and wounding 861
between Cathay and Palace Hotels in Nanking Road,
and killing 1,012 and wounding 1,007 at junction of
Avenue Edward VII and Boulevard de Montigny.
Aug. 23 Japanese troops force landing near Woosung.

Chinese plane drops bombs in International
Settlement: one (which did not explode) behind
Hamilton House, and another on Sincere Co.’s
Emporium, killing 215 and wounding 558 persons.
Sept. 20 Four air-raids, in which 80 Japanese planes took part,
on Nanking, which hereafter was bombed almost
daily.
Oct. 24 British soldier (Rifleman W. McGowan) killed … in …
Shanghai, by machine-gunning from Japanese plane.
Dec. 12 U.S. Panay sunk by Japanese aerial bombing above
Nanking. H.M.S. Ladybird badly damaged by Japanese
shell-fire of Wuhu.
Dec. 13 Nanking occupied by Japanese.8

The same edition of The China Year Book contains only a very brief passage about the Japanese occupation of Nanking, dated December
13: “Nanking occupied by Japanese 1937.”
Some might think that the North China Daily News and Herald Company did not know anything about the “Nanking Massacre” because its offices were located in Shanghai, but that was not the case. We have previously noted that an editorial in the January 21, 1938 edition of the North China Daily News claimed that 10,000 persons had been massacred in Nanking.
But the 1938 edition of the The China Year Book, whose preface is dated February 2, contains no reference to the claim made just eight days earlier in a newspaper issued by the same company. Furthermore, at the end of the same edition of the The China Year Book is an “Index to Past Issues.” Listed under “Nanking” we find “Nanking Outrages 1927.” Since these were infamous incidents in which the Japanese, British, and American consulates were attacked by Nationalist troops, they were included in the list of important events in Nanking. No mention was made of a Nanking Massacre.
The 1939 edition of the The China Year Book was no different. The one and only item listed under “Nanking” was the “Nanking Outrages” of 1927.9 Moreover, both the 1938 and 1939 editions begin with a chronology outlining the main events of past years. For instance, the entry for Sunday, January 2 is “Port Arthur captured by Japan 1905,” and for Tuesday, January 4, we have “Hankow British Concession entered by Communist mob 1927.” The entry for March 24 reads, “Nanking Outrages 1927,”10 but nowhere in the chronology is there a similar entry for 1937.
The entry for December 13, 1937 in the calendar is “Japanese triumphal entry into Nanking,”11 and for December 18 of the same year, “Japanese mills destroyed at Tsingtao [Qingdao]1937.”
Jeffery, the British consul, asserted that atrocities had been committed during the first two weeks after Nanking was occupied. However, his assertion appeared neither in the calendar nor anywhere else in the 1938 edition of the respected The China Year Book. It had, therefore, been repudiated.
If the Japanese had conducted executions in violation of international law in Nanking, they would have overshadowed the “Nanking Outrages” of 1927. A special entry referring to them would certainly have been included in the 1938 edition of The China Year Book. But there was no Nanking massacre and, therefore, no entry.

China at War
The first issue of China at War appeared in April 1938. The fact that an editorial entitled “China’s Spiritual Mobilization,” written by Soong Mei-ling, the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, appears at the beginning of that issue reveals that this was an English-language magazine designed to rally support for the Chinese war effort. Careful reading of a message conspicuously placed above the “Table of Contents” advertises that intent. The first half of the message follows.
Within this inaugural issue of “China at War” are selections from the daily bulletins of the China Information Committee, Hankow, whose main object has been to present a realistic and truthful picture of the many forces at work in the New China born in war brought by Japan.12 [Italics supplied]
The “bulletins” were short official announcements. Therefore, the selections in China at War were official records of the Republic of China.
Furthermore, when the first issue was published (April 1938), four months had elapsed since the fall of Nanking. An anonymous editorial in the March 19 issue of China Forum, issued by the Chinese League of Nations Union in Hankou, accused the Japanese of having massacred 80,000 persons. How, then, did the inaugural issue of China at War, which claimed to be providing the true facts, based on official records, describe the situation in Nanking after the Japanese occupation?
Nanking . after December 12, 1937 . became a hunting ground for the Japanese soldiers who combed the city looking for money, loot and women.13
Nanking fell not on December 12, but December 13. On that point, China at War was mistaken. It is the remainder of the sentence, however, to which we should turn our attention, regardless of its accuracy. Though it paints an extremely unflattering portrait of Japanese soldiers, it does not allude to unlawful executions (the Nanking Massacre). The only explanation for this “omission” is that the Japanese military did not execute Chinese soldiers in violation of international law. Also noteworthy is the fact that the China Information Committee in Hankou did not accuse the Japanese of executing prisoners of war unlawfully.

The War Conduct of the Japanese
At the beginning of The War Conduct of the Japanese is a statement to the effect that the publication was compiled under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs. The preface is dated April 12, 1938, and the editor was Hsu Shuhsi, a Yanjing University professor who had also served as a member of the commission appointed by the League of Nations to investigate the Manchurian Incident.
The memorandum Bates wrote in January 1938 also appears in The War Conduct of the Japanese, as one might expect. However, the passage in which Bates expresses his personal view (“Evidences from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.”) is absent.14 Bates’ argument, i.e., that 40,000 Chinese were massacred, remained uncorroborated and unaccepted.
Bates never reiterated his claim that the Japanese military violated international law. As previously stated, Cabot Coville, a military attache with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, visited Nanking in later April 1938. At that time he met with Bates, but the latter did not tell him that the Japanese had violated international law. Bates had retracted that particular charge.
Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War
Nor did Mao Zedong make any mention of a Nanking Massacre in his famous lecture entitled On Protracted War, delivered over a period of nine days, beginning on May 26, 1938 at an anti-Japanese symposium at Yan’an. Part of that lecture follows.
Prior to the Taierzhuang campaign [March 1938], the enemy demonstrated its lack of able commanders. During hostilities in Shanghai, Nanking, Cangzhou, Baoding, Nankou, Xinkou, and Linfen, the enemy won many battles, but took only a few prisoners and trophies. Five blunders . inadequate reinforcements, the lack of a main direction of attack, poor strategic coordination, the inability to use opportunities appropriately, and the failure to annihilate more than a few soldiers though having encircled many . demonstrated the incompetence of Japanese military leadership.15
When this lecture was presented, six months had elapsed since the fall of Nanking. Mao analyzed the errors made by the Japanese military as follows.
1.
The Japanese did not annihilate Chinese troops.

2.
Therefore, large numbers of Chinese soldiers survived the conflicts.

3.
Survivors regrouped and launched counterattacks against the Japanese.

4.
The Japanese, in failing to annihilate Chinese troops, afforded the latter an opportunity to retaliate.

In Mao’s opinion, the Japanese could have exterminated Chinese soldiers trapped within the city walls, but did not do so. Note that he did not accuse the Japanese military of violating international law . of perpetrating a massacre in Nanking.

The League of Nations Resolution
On May 27, 1938, two months after the inaugural issue of China at War came out, the Council of the League of Nations (the forerunner of the United Nations) adopted the following resolution, which was published in the 1939 edition of The China Year Book.
The Council having heard the statement by the Representative of
China on the situation in the Far East, and the need for national

defence in China, firstly, earnestly urges the Members of the League of Nations to do their utmost to give effect to the recommendations contained in the previous Resolutions of the Assembly and the Council in this matter.
It earnestly urges the Members to take serious and sympathetic consideration of the requests they may receive from the Chinese Government.
In conformity with the said Resolutions the Council expresses its sympathy with China in her heroic struggle for the maintenance of her independence and integrity, which are threatened by the Japanese invasion, and in the suffering which has thereby been inflicted on her people.
Secondly, the Council recalls that the use of toxic gases in war is condemned by International Law, and cannot fail to meet with the reprobation of the civilized world. It requests the Governments of the States which may be in a position to do so, to communicate to the League any information they may obtain on the subject.16
The resolution was adopted six months after the fall of Nanking. The “Representative of China” mentioned in the citation above was Gu Weijun. Gu, born in 1887, received a doctoral degree from Columbia University. Prior to his appointment as Representative, he served the Nationalist government as foreign minister, deputy prime minister, minister of finance, member of the Lytton Commission, and ambassador to France. Despite Gu’s having been a leading Chinese diplomat, and despite his broad range of activities, he makes no reference to a Nanking Massacre in this resolution. Nor is there any evidence that a protest relating to the “Nanking Massacre,” propaganda about which had circulated for three months after the city fell, was ever submitted to the League of Nations. Given the absence of any allusion to executions carried out in violation of international law, i.e., a massacre, we can assume that those allegations were unfounded.

The China Critic: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary Issue
July 8, 40 days subsequent to the adoption of the League of Nations resolution, marked the first anniversary of full-scale hostilities between Japan and China. All Shanghai-based English-language magazines published special issues commemorating that anniversary.
The China Critic was no exception. The bureau chief of this weekly which, from its inception in 1928, carried articles, editorials, and reproductions of official records, was Gui Zhongshu, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin. Gui had been the editor of an American daily newspaper called the China Press, published in Shanghai, since 1935.
The July 7 issue of The China Critic contained a noteworthy editorial, entitled “A Year of Undeclared War,” an excerpt from which follows.
Nanking fell on December 10. The immediate result was very damaging to China and a big celebration went on in Japan. The Japanese “Victory Parade” in Shanghai narrowly escaped another major incident. But soon China regained her composure again. The capital was removed to Hankow. Many competent observers even then were quite confident that China could not be conquered. Even after the fall of Nanking and the beginning of the Great Retreat, Nathaniel Peffer wrote that Japanese expectations were “illusory,” and events of subsequent months bore out that prediction.17
As an editorial, “A Year of Undeclared War” represented the official views of The China Critic. Like China at War, it was mistaken about the date of the fall of Nanking, but it did not mention a Nanking Massacre.

China Forum: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary Issue
China Forum was a weekly English-language magazine published in Hankou “under the auspices of the Chinese League of Nations Union.” Its role was to communicate official Chinese views to the rest of the world. As we mentioned previously, the March 1938 issue of China Forum included an unsigned editorial claiming that 80,000 Chinese had been massacred in Nanking.
The manner in which the July 9 issue of this magazine describes the occupation of Nanking is of considerable interest. The issue included an article entitled “One Year of Sino-Japanese War: Review Questions for Study Groups.” There were more than 10 of these review questions, each accompanied by a sample response. The 10th question is of special interest: “What was the attitude of China after the fall of Nanking?”
The sample response provided is as follows.
General Chiang Kai-shek said on December 16, 1937: “No matter how the present situation may change, we must not surrender but march onward. To capitulate would be to court sure national disaster.” Meantime, Tokyo announced its decision to “pursue extended hostilities.”18
Let us assume that the Japanese executed Chinese soldiers in violation of international law after the fall of Nanking. If that had been the case, Chiang Kai-shek would have broadcast accusations to that effect throughout the world. The sample response to the aforementioned question would have been, “After the fall of Nanking, a massacre commenced, perpetrated by the Japanese military. Chiang Kai-shek appealed to the entire world to condemn the Nanking Massacre.”
Instead, the response to that question was Chiang’s appeal to his compatriots for a war of resistance. He said nothing about a massacre in Nanking. The special issue of China Forum commemorating the first anniversary of the conflict between Japan and China also discredited the massacre argument, as well as the claim that 80,000 Chinese had been massacred, as stated in the March 19 issue.

Chiang’s Statements on the First Anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War
On July 7, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek delivered “The Generalissimo’s Statement to Friendly Nations” and “The Generalissimo’s Statement to the Japanese People.” A good part of each statement was devoted to a denunciation of “Japanese atrocities.” Below we cite portions of “The Generalissimo’s Statement to Friendly Nations” found in the 1939 edition of The China Year Book.
Facts as mentioned above are well known to the world and need no recitation. … In war areas and districts under Japanese occupation, besides incalculable losses of property and resources, innumerable able-bodied men and youths, women and children, and the enfeebled old, were all subjected to wholesale slaughter, raping and other wanton acts of barbarity. …
Take Canton, for instance. That city has been attacked from the air day and night during the last fortnight. Thousands of civilians have been killed. Their blood and flesh sputtered with the splinters of their houses where the infernal machines raged. Foreign officials and civilians who personally witnessed the appalling scenes have written reports and made motion pictures thereof illustrating the unprecedented cruelty committed by the barbarous Japanese in China. If such acts of extreme barbarity, committed under pretence of civilization, should be left unpunished, there would be no more equity and justice in this world. This is an ineffaceable blot on the history of mankind.19 [Italics supplied.]
Never mind that in the section entitled “Japanese Atrocities,” Chiang neglected to mention the scorched-earth strategy that he himself had implemented. When one reads through these statements looking for a reference to Japanese atrocities in Nanking, one notices that Chiang mentions nothing about a Nanking Massacre. The atrocities he describes allegedly occurred in Guangdong.
There had been no Nanking Massacre. Since the International Committee had expressed its gratitude to the Japanese for having restored peace in the Safety Zone (Document No. 34), even Chiang could not say, “Take Nanking, for instance.” He could not submit a protest to the League of Nations. Chiang was unable even to fabricate a Nanking Massacre in his “Statement to Friendly Nations” and “Statement to the Japanese People.”

The China Journal: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary Issue
The China Journal prided itself on publishing genuine historical records and essays written by distinguished writers and scholars. It was one of the best monthlies of the time. The magazine had started out in 1923 as The China Journal of Science and Art, and acquired its new name in 1927.
As we mentioned earlier, the “Events and Comments” column of the January 1938 issue of The China Journal carried an editorial that referred to “slaughter” committed by Japanese troops in Nanking. However, the same column in the following issue contained only the following reference.
It is a well known fact that the fall of Nanking and Hangchow [Hangzhou] was followed, even up to weeks afterward, and even
to date, with Japanese looting, raping, and wanton destruction.
The China Journal was the first magazine to revise (deny) the claim that there had been a massacre in Nanking.
The July issue also carried an editorial penned by Arthur Sowerby, former editor-in-chief, under the title of “One Year of Undeclared War in China. An excerpt follows.
The Japanese pushed on towards Nanking, reaching the outskirts of the capital on December 8. After a week of terrific fighting the Chinese forces evacuated Nanking on December 13. Terrible scenes followed as the Japanese forces, completely out of hand, committed unspeakable outrages upon the civilian population in the city and its suburbs.20
Sowerby wrote that looting and raping by Japanese soldiers ensued after the fall of Nanking. He must have obtained his information from erroneous articles in The New York Times and similar sources. Nevertheless, he did not allude to executions of soldiers or civilians in violation of international law, i.e., the Nanking Massacre, in his editorial. The July issue also rejected the accusation that there had been a massacre in Nanking. The publication’s editors saw absolutely no reason to change their point of view.

China Quarterly: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary Issue
China Quarterly, based in Shanghai, was an English-language monthly magazine first published in 1935. The Summer 1938 issue carried an anonymous editorial entitled “One Year of Sino-Japanese Conflict,” which described a “reign of terror” in Nanking.
After vigorously resisting Japanese attacks for a week, the Chinese defenders evacuated Nanking in the night of December 13. The Japanese entry into Nanking was followed by a reign of terror which lasted for many months. Prior to the Japanese advance on Nanking, the National Government was removed to Chungking, Szechwan [Sichuan] province, on November 20 and officially commenced functioning on December 1.21
Chinese troops deserted Nanking on December 12, not December 13. Bates condemned incidents that allegedly took place between December 13 and 26, 1937 . a period of approximately two weeks . not over several months, as the editorial states. Still, there was no further mention of the argument that Bates had broached six months earlier, i.e., that 40,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians had been massacred.
The writer of the editorial describing a “reign of terror” in Nanking could certainly have revived Bates’ argument, but he did not. By “reign of terror,” he might have been referring to rapes, rumors of which had circulated in the city.

The China Weekly Review: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary Issue
Among editorials of this sort, the only one that adopted a different stance appeared in The China Weekly Review, published in Shanghai. The publication’s first issue is thought to have appeared in 1917. Its editor-in-chief was John Powell, known for his anti-Japanese, pro-Chiang stance.
The January 29 issue of The China Weekly Review included the following text: “Massacre of civilians, rape of Chinese women and systemetic [sic] destruction and looting of property in Nanking by Japanese troops confirmed by reliable foreign residents in the city.”22 Then, in the June 11 issue, Peter South wrote an editorial entitled “Nanking and Taierchwang . Where Japan Lost the War.” South included Rabe’s viewpoint, i.e., that 20,000 women had been raped in Nanking. He also reprinted part of one of Durdin’s articles in a section subtitled “Horrors of Nanking,” which stated that the latter had “watched the execution of 200 men on the Bund.”
However, we would like to reiterate that the first appearance of the argument that 20,000 Chinese women had been raped was in the January 21, 1938 edition of the North China Daily News. Furthermore, that argument was not included in the 1938 edition of The China Year Book, issued by the same publisher, the North China Daily News and Herald Company. South was resurrecting an accusation that had already been repudiated in the publication’s June 11 issue.
Then, how should we interpret Durdin’s eyewitness account? An important hint is provided by the issue of China Today commemorating the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War. But before we refer to that, we shall examine another commemorative issue, published by The China Weekly Review.
The July 9 issue of that publication contains an unsigned editorial entitled “Review of the First Year of the War.” The only indication as to the identity of the author is “By a Chinese Contributor.” An excerpt from the editorial follows.
After the fall of Shanghai, the Japanese Army pushed on to Nanking, which fell on December 13. The wildest excesses imaginable of Japanese soldiery followed; civilians, young and old and of both sexes, were wantonly murdered; Chinese women, estimated to number as high as 20,000, were raped; 20,000 helpless captured Chinese soldiers were executed … .23
This was a reiteration of the claims brought forward by Rabe and Bates. The author might well have used his real name and mentioned that Rabe and Bates had made similar claims. But he could not do so in good conscience, because these were claims that had already been repudiated.
By publishing arguments that had already been repudiated, i.e., that 20,000 women had been raped and 20,000 Chinese massacred, The China Weekly Review failed to provide unbiased reportage.

China Today: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary Issue
China Today was a monthly magazine published by American Friends of the Chinese People, a New York-based organization. The first issue appeared in about 1933. Since the organization had labeled Japan as a military-fascist state, the magazine’s editorials were, unsurprisingly, slanted.
The January 1938 issue contained an article written by Peter Nielsen, based on Durdin’s eyewitness account of the executions of 200 soldiers, describing the “mass murder of peaceful civilians.”
Six months later, editor-in-chief Robert Norton wrote an editorial entitled “One Year of War,” part of which follows.
By the end of November, Shanghai was in Japanese hands, excepting for the International Settlement … The advance upon Nanking was rapid, and Japanese troops entered the city on December 13. Meanwhile, on December 12, the Panay had been sunk on orders of Colonel Hashimoto, a leader of the attempted Tokyo coup of February 26, 1936. …
In preparing for resistance to this offensive, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek held military meetings with many generals, including the commanders of the Eighth Route Army, culminating with the important session of the National Military Council at Wuchang, January 27-30. This meeting not only laid plans for positional defense on three lines, but also developed a plan of coordination of positional and guerilla warfare. Plans were made for organization immediately of three guerilla armies, each consisting of over 100,000 men.24
Ninety days subsequent to the fall of Nanking, Nationalist and Communist military leaders gathered in Wuchang. Even at that historic important meeting of minds, there was no discussion of Japanese executions of civilians and military personnel in violation of international law. The only topic addressed was the organization of guerrilla forces.
The July issue of China Today did not reprint Durdin’s and Nielsen’s accusations about a Nanking Massacre. If those accusations had been true, records substantiating them would remain. However, they were removed from the records. Durdin’s and Bates’ views had been rejected.

The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College
What was the Chinese Communist Party’s stance vis a vis the “Nanking Massacre.” Useful information on this subject is provided by The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College.
In 1931, the Red Army School was established in Ruijin, Jiangxi. Its name was changed to the Red Army Academy two years later. It was closed for some time, but was reestablished in June 1936. Lin Biao was installed as its president. On July 1, 1937, a month after the Xian Incident, the Academy was moved to Yan’an, where its name was changed, again, to the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political College (abbreviated to the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College). After the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out, branches of the Academy were established all over China. Their purpose was to nurture Communist Party leaders capable of resisting the Japanese.
In August 1938, The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College was published by the Dongyuan Company in Hankou. A description of the history and activities of the College, the book’s intention was to attract warriors who would fight for the communist cause. Nanking is mentioned in the following passage.
Beijing, Tianjin, Nanking, Shanghai may have fallen, but we can
still crush the enemy. Nankou, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, and
Linfen may have fallen, but we can still crush the enemy.
Beiping [Beijing], Nanking, and now Wuhan, the center of
resistance against the Japanese … these beautiful cities have been
trampled by thieves, and we will never again be able to frolic on
their mountains and fields.25
If there had been a massacre in Nanking, a great deal of space would have been devoted to it, as excellent pedagogical material for the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College. But as the citation above indicates, there was no mention of such an incident. The assumption that there had been a massacre was erroneous from the very beginning.

Guo Moruo’s Reflections on the War Against Japan
The golden age of Nationalist-Communist cooperation extended from the summer of 1937 to the end of 1938. The center of that activity was Hankou (Wuhan, after World War II). On April 1, 1938, the newly-established Nationalist Political Agency No. 3 began operating in Hankou. The responsibility of the Agency, whose slogan was “propaganda before strategy,”26 was, as one might surmise, the creation and dissemination of propaganda.
Within the Agency, departments were formed and staffed with several hundred persons engaged in propaganda-related activities: the editing and printing of documents, and the creation of cartoons, propaganda directed toward the enemy, and films. The Agency received funds amounting to 10,000 yuan for a week of heightened propaganda production.27 The head of the Agency was the renowned historian Guo Moruo, who served as deputy prime minister after World War II.
Guo supplied the preface for the Chinese edition of What War Means in June 1938. He was instrumental in the diffusion of propaganda relating to the Nanking Massacre. Then, according to Reflections on the War Against Japan, which he wrote in 1948, sometime around the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War (July 1938), he edited and published A Factual Account of Enemy Atrocities, mobilizing the entire Agency.
Still, during this massive propaganda campaign, the term “Nanking Massacre” did not appear in any of the English-language magazines commemorating the first anniversary of the war. Even in The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College, there is no mention of a massacre in Nanking.
But Guo did refer to a Nanking Massacre in Reflections on the War Against Japan, as follows.
When the end came for Wuhan Sanzhen, I heard no sound, no human voice, beneath the ink-black skies. Through the haze, I could see only the frigid mist rising from the Yangtze. … Then, suddenly, there was a bloody apparition before me. Transfixed, I stared at a city bathed in blood. I was looking at the aftermath of the Nanking Massacre. Who can be sure that we won’t see a repetition of that horror, tomorrow or the next day, in Wuhan Sanzhen?28
Reading this passage, one might think that the Guo Moruo had personally witnessed a massacre in Nanking, but what he wrote was fiction. Guo was not in Nanking when the city fell. In the same publication, he wrote: “The fall of Nanking … viewed from Guangzhou [Canton] seemed like an event that had taken place on another planet.”

General Xiang Ying’s Speech
In September, 1937, Xiang Ying, under orders from the Communist Party, entered into negotiations with Xiong Shihui, a proxy for He Yingqin, concerning a truce between the communist commando troops and Nationalist forces. The result was the consolidation of multiple units into the New 4th Army, with Ye Ting as commander, and Xiang Ying as deputy commander, two months prior to the fall of Nanking. On January 1, 1939, approximately one year later, Xiang Ying delivered a speech entitled “Lessons Learned During a Year of Combat,” in which he outlined 4th Army strategy from the time of its establishment until the end of 1938.
That speech can be found in Volume 9 of Chinese Communist Party History: Source Materials. Though Xiang alluded to Nanking many times, he never mentioned a massacre. What he remembered about Nanking in 1938 was the constant disturbances created by his men within the city.29 There had been no Nanking Massacre.

Bates Persists
Bates, possibly frustrated because his claim that 40,000 Chinese had been massacred had been continually rejected, he restated his argument on November 29, 1938, in the form of a letter addressed to Christians in the United States. To an audience that was not conversant with China, much less with the situation in Nanking, he submitted, once again, his claim that the Japanese had massacred more than 30,000 prisoners of war.30
Bates was convinced that 40,000 Chinese, both civilians and soldiers, had been massacred. The only new material in his letter was the assertion that prisoners of war had been massacred, probably a ploy to attract attention.

“The Christian Church in War-Time Service”
The Winter 1938 issue of the China Quarterly appeared in January 1939. In it was an editorial written by Zhu Youyu, entitled “The Christian Church in War-Time Service,” which reads, in part:
In many cities, as the tide of war engulfs them, international relief committees have been set up, largely with missionary personnel and utilizing mission property. A notable example was the International Relief Committee of Nanking, which cared for 250,000 men, women and children in the so-called Safety Zone and fed 50,000 destitute persons, through those dark weeks following the fall of the city, that have become historic in modern warfare for the barbarities, lack of military discipline and the terrorism that prevailed.31
The focus of Zhu’s editorial was the relief work done by the Christian church. In it he cites the International Relief Committee of Nanking.
If noncombatants had been killed in Nanking, those murders would have taken place in the Safety Zone, where almost all the refugees had congregated. However, the editorial makes no reference to the murder of 12,000 civilians in the Safety Zone. Nor does he state, as Bates had, that more than 30,000 prisoners of war had been taken from the Safety Zone and unlawfully executed. He alluded only to barbarities, lack of military discipline and terrorism.

Bates’ Argument Again Discredited
Not long after “The Christian Church in War-Time Service” appeared, A Digest of Japanese War Conduct, edited by Hsu Shuhsi, former advisor to the Foreign Ministry, was published. It included Bates’ memorandum asserting that 40,000 Chinese had been massacred. The preface is dated January 28, 1939.
That same memorandum also appeared in Chapter 1 (“Japanese War Conduct”) of The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39. The preface is dated March 15, 1939. The Chinese Year Book was an English-language almanac, which stated, in its inaugural (1935-36) edition, that it was “entirely under Chinese editorship and management.” Only the fourth edition of The Chinese Year Book (1938-39), was “prepared from Official Sources by the Council of International Affairs.” Hsu Shuhsi was the director of the Council. Furthermore, Bates’ memorandum also appeared in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsu. This was the fourth inclusion. The preface is dated May 9, 1939.
In other words, the accounts carried by the aforementioned three publications were based on “official sources,” and thus represented the official view of the Republic of China. Bates’ memorandum appeared several times in those official sources. But subsequent to its first appearance, his argument that 40,000 Chinese had been massacred was never reprinted. The memorandum was included in a total of four official Nationalist records, as follows.
1.
Hsu Shuhsi, Japanese War Conduct (preface dated April 12, 1938)

2.
Hsu Shuhsi, A Digest of Japanese War Conduct (preface dated January 28, 1939)

3.
The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39, edited by Hsu Shuhsi (preface dated March 15, 1939)

4.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsu Shuhsi (preface dated May 9, 1939)

All four publications had deleted (repudiated) Bates’ argument, i.e., “Evidences from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.”32

Edgar Snow Revives Bates’ Argument
Nevertheless, in The Battle for Asia, published in 1941, Edgar Snow wrote the following.
The sordid story of the Nanking massacres is now pretty familiar to the world. According to an estimate given to me by members of the Nanking International Relief Committee . which was, incidentally, headed by a German business man, Mr. John H.D. Rabe, who wore Hitler’s highest Nazi decoration . the Japanese murdered no less than 42,000 people in Nanking alone, a large percentage of them women and children.33
What Snow wrote, in actuality, reflected the estimate arrived at by International Committee members. It was Bates’ personal opinion, as well as that of the foreign residents of Nanking, which made it seem credible.
Still, the members of the International Committee never claimed that 30,000 civilians had been massacred. They believed that 12,000 civilians and 30,000 soldiers had been killed. Snow shamelessly transposed the figures, claiming that most of the 40,000 were women and children.
He thus revived an argument that had been refuted many times in official publications of the Republic of China, and presented it to a Western audience unfamiliar with the situation in China. Despite the fact that it had already been repudiated by The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, and other official sources, Snow insisted on resurrecting Bates’ argument.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, minus the offending portion of Bates’ memorandum, was published by Kelly & Walsh in Shanghai. The company was, therefore, aware that Bates’ argument had been removed from official sources.
Inexplicably, Kelly & Walsh also published Snow’s The Battle for Asia, thus aiding in the revival of an argument that had been thoroughly discredited. Kelly & Walsh acted as Bates’ accomplice in disseminating this malicious propaganda.

Lily Abegg’s The Renewal of China
We would now like to cite a portion of Lily Abegg’s The Renewal of China: Space as a Weapon that relates to the occupation of Nanking.
Abegg was a foreign correspondent who moved to Hankou not long before the fall of Nanking. According to Owen Lattimore’s Solution in Asia, at the time of the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War (July 1938), Abegg was in close contact with German military advisors.
Her voluminous book (481 pages), published in 1940, describes the situation in Nanking as follows.
Afterwards, exhausted Japanese soldiers wreaked havoc for several weeks, so much so that they ruined the reputation of the Japanese Army for years to come. Since until then, members of the Japanese Army had never committed such atrocities, their lack of discipline in Nanking was particularly appalling. The few foreigners who remained in Nanking were worried that there would be looting and robberies once Chinese troops had deserted the city, but they did not fear Japanese soldiers. Until then, the entry of Japanese military personnel into cities all over China had been welcomed, even by those who were politically ill-disposed toward Japan. They expected the Japanese to establish peace and order. The events that enfolded in Nanking were so sudden and so horrible that it took years to erase the terrible memories. The reputation of the Japanese military was finally restored when Guangdong and Hankou were taken. There, Japanese behavior was faultless.34
Abegg had left Nanking two weeks prior to the fall of Nanking. Therefore, her description was probably based on accounts provided by Bates and Fitch, which appeared in What War Means. Those two men were the source of the propaganda describing rapes and looting in Nanking. Their influence must have been powerful, since even Abegg believed them. Even so, Abegg did not reiterate Bates’ claim that 40,000 Chinese had been massacred. That argument had been dismissed many times as groundless and fallacious in statements made by Chiang Kai-shek, by English-language magazines and almanacs published in Shanghai, and by “official sources,” such as the Council of International Affairs in Chongqing.

Preface to 1939 Edition of The China Year Book
We shall close this chapter with a citation from the preface of the 1939 edition of The China Year Book, dated May 8, 1939.
It has been the constant aim of the Editor, ever since the publication of the first issue of the China Year Book, to make its contents impartially factual, and to avoid including material which could in any way be considered partial, on controversial issues.
For that reason, except for a brief commentary on the actual progress of hostilities, the Sino-Japanese conflict has been dealt with entirely on the basis of official documents or speeches. Inclusion of more than a limited number of these official pronouncements is out of the question, but in the selection of them every effort has been made to preserve a balance between the parties involved, whether belligerents or neutrals. It is hoped that no document, speech or statement essential to an understanding of the issues raised by the present hostilities has been omitted.35
Here, the editorial policy of The China Year Book since its founding in 1912 is restated. The commitment of its editors to providing information based on official documents and speeches, without omission, especially where the “Nanking Massacre” is concerned, is just as relevant today as it was some 60 years ago.
How was the situation in Nanking after the occupation reviewed and documented by individuals? How was it described in speeches and statements emanating from Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong? And how was the situation after the fall of Nanking described in English-language magazines of the time?
To ignore official records of the situation in Nanking after it was occupied by the Japanese . as documented by individuals, and as described in speeches and statements made by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, and printed in English-language magazines and newspapers, i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary resources, in historiographic terms . is to violate the standards of historical research. The indiscriminate use of dubious sources, some of whose authors are unnamed, and others whose veracity has otherwise been compromised, to describe the events of the past is propaganda at its very worst.
The “Nanking Massacre” gained credence as a result of “evidence” far removed from primary or secondary sources. There is not one single source that proves the claim that Chinese citizens were massacred in Nanking, or that states the number of victims. As long as that continues to be the case, the Nanking Massacre will remain a global fantasy . nothing more.
We invite those who would say otherwise to demonstrate irrefutable proof that the Japanese violated international law subsequent to the fall of Nanking.
CHAPTER 15:

AN OVERVIEW OF
THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

When and why did the outcry over the “Nanking Massacre,” supposedly perpetrated during the four months subsequent to the fall of that city, begin? As we stated in the previous chapter, the words “Nanking Massacre” are nowhere to be found in English-language magazines commemorating the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War (with the exception of one anonymous article), or in official documents.
In this chapter, we shall examine the way in which the term “Nanking Massacre” has alternately come to the fore and receded into obscurity during the period extending from December 1937 to the present, which we have divided into six phases.
Phase 1: December 1937 to March 1938
Burial records show that approximately 40,000 bodies were interred in Nanking. Did those 40,000 individuals die in battle, or were they massacred? The massacre argument was put forth by Europeans and Americans residing in Nanking, University of Nanking Professor Miner Searle Bates in particular.
In a letter to Harold Timperley, Bates wrote: “Evidences from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.” This sentence appears in Chapter 3 of What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China (1938), which Timperley edited.
This was the first time that the argument that Japanese military personnel had massacred 40,000 soldiers and civilians in violation of international law was broached. However, there was no solid evidence substantiating the massacre of 12,000 civilians.
Bates’ argument may have been rooted in a perception shared by Western residents of Nanking, i.e., that Japanese troops had unlawfully executed large numbers of Chinese soldiers and civilians during their sweep of the city and their subsequent segregation of combatants from noncombatants. That perception was based on an account that Bates had heard from a Chinese who claimed that he alone had escaped with his life. Bates did not claim to have seen 40,000 corpses. The conclusion he reached, namely that 40,000 persons had been massacred, was his extrapolation of reports he heard from various Chinese individuals.
Phase 2: April 1938 to 1940
A memorandum written by Bates asserting that 40,000 Chinese had been massacred was reproduced in The War Conduct of the Japanese, published in April 1938. The War Conduct of the Japanese, written in English and issued by the Council of International Affairs in Hankou, was a propaganda magazine intended for worldwide distribution. However, Bates’ reference to the massacre of 40,000 unarmed soldiers and civilians, cited above, had been deleted in its entirety and, therefore, discredited.
This was the first time that an official publication had denied that the “Nanking Massacre,” which allegedly occurred over a four-month period beginning on the day the city fell, had taken place. The Council of International Affairs viewed the 40,000 dead not as victims of a massacre, but of war.
There was no mention of a “Nanking Massacre” in a resolution issued by the League of Nations a month later, on May 27, nor in a lecture entitled “On Protracted War” delivered by Mao Zedong over a period of nine days, commencing on May 26. Nor was it mentioned in Chiang Kai-shek’s statements to friendly nations and to the Japanese people sent on July 7, or in special issues of English-language magazines commemorating the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War published in Shanghai.
The “Nanking Massacre” remained unacknowledged. Furthermore, the claim that it had occurred had been dismissed by numerous official statements and records.
In November 1938, Bates felt compelled to inform American readers, who were largely unfamiliar with the situation in China, that the Japanese had executed 30,000 prisoners of war in Nanking. Even so, his most vociferous argument, i.e., that 40,000 Chinese had been massacred, had yet to gain acceptance.
For instance, Bates’ memorandum was included in The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39, published in 1939 but, again, his reference to the massacre of 40,000 Chinese was omitted. It is important to note that that issue was compiled from official source material provided by the Council of International Affairs in Chongqing. Bates’ claim that 30,000 prisoners of war and 12,000 civilians had been massacred had, once again, been repudiated in official records emanating from the Republic of China.
Nor was The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39 the only publication to disregard Bates’ assertions. As we mentioned earlier, though Bates’ memo was included in The War Conduct of the Japanese (1938), the reference to the massacre of 40,000 Chinese was deleted. The same reference was omitted in A Digest of Japanese War Conduct (1939), issued in Chongqing by the Council of International Affairs. Nor did it appear in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, also published by the Council. In The Renewal of China: Space as a Weapon, Lily Abegg makes absolutely no mention of a “Nanking Massacre.”
Therefore, prior to World War II, the accusation that Japanese military personnel violated international law had already been repudiated in official records, statements, and speeches.
During Phase 2, two Germans (John Rabe and Georg Rosen), a Briton (E.W. Jeffery), and four Americans (James Espy, Miner Searle Bates, Tillman Durdin, and Archibald Steele) all retracted their claims that the Japanese had violated international law. No one accused the Japanese of having perpetrated unlawful executions. Those who argue that there was a massacre in Nanking have continually overlooked these facts.
Phase 3: 1941 to 1945
In The Battle for Asia, written by Edgar Snow and published in 1941, the author resurrected Bates’ argument, despite the fact that it had been discredited, and presented it to a poorly informed audience. Snow reversed the alleged combatant-to-noncombatant ratio, claiming that the majority of victims were women and children.
American journalist Agnes Smedley, in her Battle Hymn of China (1943),1 increased Bates figure fivefold, declaring that Japanese military personnel had slaughtered 200,000 Chinese.
Phase 4: 1940 to 1949
The first Japanese reference to the “Nanking Massacre” was a feature article in the December 8, 1945 edition of the Asahi Shinbun.
The article was entitled “History of the Pacific War: The Downfall of Deceitful, Militarist Japan, Supplied by Allied Headquarters.” It described Nanking after its occupation by the Japanese as follows:
We have positive proof that Japanese troops perpetrated unspeakable atrocities, slaughtering 20,000 men, women, and children, from witnesses who described the worst massacre in modern history. [Italics supplied.]
This article, and its claim that the massacre had claimed 20,000 victims, shocked Japanese readers.
“History of the Pacific War” was carried by most of Japan’s national newspapers in 10 installments, the last one appearing on December 17. It was later published in paperback form, under the title History of the Pacific War Compiled by the Civil Information and Education Division, Allied Headquarters. The content was identical to that of the article serialized in Japan’s dailies.
Bates’ Testimony at the Tokyo Trials
The Tokyo Trials or the IMTFE (International Military Tribunal for the Far East) opened on May 3, 1946. The prosecution began submitting evidence relating to the Nanking Incident on July 25. After several witnesses had testified, among them Robert Wilson, a physician at the University of Nanking Hospital, and Xu Chuanyin, Bates took the stand.
He testified that “the bodies of many civilians who had been shot to death were lying about on the streets in my neighborhood for many days after the entry of the Japanese Army.”2
This is the same man who, on December 15, 1937, three days after the fall of Nanking, had told a Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun correspondent, “I am pleased that the orderly entry of the Japanese Army has brought peace to Nanking so quickly.”
While on the witness stand, Bates expatiated upon the “conclusion” he had reached, i.e., that after Nanking fell, Japanese troops had killed 30,000 Chinese soldiers and 12,000 civilians, including women and children. This conclusion had already been omitted from (repudiated by) official documents of the Republic of China.
Normally, when a writer provides material to be used in a book, he receives a copy of the work, once it has been published.
Therefore, we may assume that Bates was aware that his claim that the Japanese had massacred 40,000 Chinese had been deleted from numerous publications. We may also assume that since he did not protest, he did not object to the deletions. Nevertheless, he revived that same argument at the Tokyo Trials.

Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan
The number of victims reported by witnesses varied considerably, especially among those from the Republic of China. Count No. 45 of the indictment charged that Japanese military personnel had murdered and slaughtered tens of thousands of civilians and disarmed soldiers of the Republic of China.3
In his opening statement, Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan said that “the occupation of Nanking was characterized by the … organized and ruthless extermination of tens of thousands of prisoners of war, civilians, women and children.”4
Keenan’s position coincided with the charges in Count No. 45, as far as the number of victims (tens of thousands) was concerned. That figure would accommodate Bates’ argument (42,000 victims) and Count No. 45, both of which Keenan had embraced. By not being specific, was he making a concession to the Republic of China, one of the Allied Powers? Or was he leaning toward Espy’s testimony (the “Espy Report”),5 which stated that 20,000 had been killed, and which was based on what the latter had heard from Americans who remained in Nanking (Bates et al.)? It is likely that the answer to both questions is yes.

Nanking District Court Report on Crimes Committed by the Enemy
The “Nanking District Court Prosecutor’s Report on the Investigation of Crimes Committed by the Enemy” was submitted to the Tokyo Trials in February 1946. It was an undated official document, whose content is absurdly inconsistent.
While asserting that “a massacre that exceeded all other massacres in history in terms of its scale” had taken place in Nanking, the report conceded not only that “a very small number of individuals” had notified Chinese authorities of Japanese atrocities, but also that those who were questioned about the atrocities “had been rendered speechless, like cicadas in winter.” It also stated that “some individuals had actually denied that there had been a massacre.”6
The report described the victims of the massacre as follows: “There are now 300,000 confirmed victims, and possibly 200,000 more.”7
The next sentence reads: “It has been confirmed that 340,000 persons have been killed.” As if this were not enough to confuse the reader, the report later states that “279,586 of our fellow countrymen were slaughtered.”
Never mind that the Red Swastika Society, with the assistance with personnel from the Japanese Army’s Nanking Special Agency and the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, had interred approximately 40,000 bodies in Nanking. The “Nanking District Court Prosecutor’s Report on the Investigation of Crimes Committed by the Enemy” completely disregarded this authenticated figure and, instead, submitted falsified burial records (see p.203).

The Prosecution’s Concluding Arguments and the Judgements
These inconsistencies were, of course, reflected in the prosecution’s summations and the ensuing judgments. On February 18, 1948, the prosecution’s general summation included the following comment about what was referred to as the “Rape of Nanking”:
The approximate number of those who were killed within and near the city of Nanking over a period of six weeks is anywhere between 260,000 and 300,000. All of them were brutally murdered without benefit of trial.8
At this point, it is appropriate to recall the question raised by E.W. Jeffery, the British consul, which concerned the first two weeks of the occupation of Nanking. The summation simply mirrored the Republic of China’s allegation.
The “Matsui Summation” was presented by the prosecution a week later, on February 25. It included the following statement: “Tens of thousands of Chinese men, women, children, unarmed soldiers and policemen were killed by Japanese soldiers.”9 This was consistent with Bates’ position, since the number of victims had been reduced by one-fourth.
Nine months later, on November 11, 1948, the blanket judgment on the “Nanking Atrocities Incident” was read in the courtroom.
More than 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war were killed
within and near Nanking during the first six weeks of the occupation of the Japanese Army.10
However, on the following day, when the judgment against Commander Matsui was read, the wording was different.
More than 100,000 were killed … during those six to seven weeks.11
The number of victims mentioned varied, and wildly so, with each judgment. Neither Chief Prosecutor Keenan nor the Republic of China seemed to care how many victims there had been. All they wanted to do was to prove, in their fashion, that atrocities had been committed in Nanking, and to have those who had been responsible for them executed.
For further details on how the “Nanking Massacre” was invented at the Tokyo Trials, we refer readers to Fuji Nobuo’s How the “Great Nanking Massacre” Was Manufactured.

Defense Attorney Jodai Takuzen Describes the Courtroom Drama
In his later years, Jodai Takuzen, the attorney who defended General Matsui, shared his recollections of the Tokyo Trials with Ara Kenichi. They can be found in an article written by the latter entitled “Soldiers’ Recollections of The Nanking Incident, No. 22.”)
The tone for the entire proceedings was set soon after they began, when defense attorney Kiyose submitted a motion concerning jurisdiction.
The court rejected the motion, but we were never told why. Proceedings conducted under such circumstances do not deserve to be called “trials.” What I learned about criminal law was certainly not applied in that courtroom.
Every summer the controversy about the Nanking Incident resurfaces, and those who believe it occurred, as well as those who do not, voice their opinions. My heart sinks every time this happens. General Matsui was sentenced to death and executed. But who really believes that there was a massacre in Nanking? I don’t think anyone does. Certainly no one who knows how the Tokyo Trials were conducted would claim that there was a massacre. I am saddened by these annual polemics.
Not only the Nanking Incident, but all cases addressed at the
Tokyo Trials were handled in a way that bore no resemblance to what I was taught about the practice of criminal law. Those who are engaged in the dispute today are doing so because they believe that the drama that unfolded in that courtroom reflects the facts. …
The defense believed that some soldiers did commit immoral acts when the Japanese Army occupied Nanking. Such acts are one of the evils of war, and are inevitable. They must have occurred in Shanghai, as well as in Nanking, and in every war that has ever been fought in the history of mankind. …
I was skeptical about the many testimonies I heard in the courtroom. I don’t know how people reading the records today would react to them, but at the time, in the courtroom, no one granted the testimonies any credence. We all knew that they had been fabricated.12
By way of explanation, we would like to add that when he said, “What I learned about criminal law was certainly not applied in that courtroom,” Jodai was referring to the fact that by applying the law ex post facto, the court violated a fundamental legal principle, i.e., that the law is not to be applied retroactively, as Kiyose Ichiro indicated in his motion concerning jurisdiction. The Tokyo Trials: The World Passes Judgment, edited by Sato Kazuo, states that the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was a “showcase trial open to the public,”13 to use the words of William Webb, the presiding justice, and a trial in which there was never any attempt to respect international law.
And, as defense attorney Logan indicated, the Court also violated the procedural principle “commonly recognized by English-speaking nationals”, i.e., “the court calls witnesses and conducts direct questioning and cross-examination.”14 Witnesses did not testify . they signed affidavits. Defendants were tried on the basis of those affidavits.
Jodai stated, with respect to the many testimonies presented, that “no one gave them any credence.” That was a reasonable conclusion, given the testimonies we have examined so far. Nevertheless, from the outset of the proceedings, questioning the veracity of those testimonies was taboo. Though “we all knew that they had been fabricated,” the defense was not permitted to raise objections.

Japanese Military Personnel Executed Without Sufficient Evidence of Their Guilt
Many Japanese military personnel were held responsible for the Nanking Massacre and executed, without adequate verification or incontrovertible proof.
In April 1947, 6th Division Commander Tani Hisao was executed at Yuhuatai in Nanking. In January 1948, Captain Tanaka Gunkichi, 2nd Lieutenants Noda Tsuyoshi and Mukai Toshiaki, among others, were executed, also at Yuhuatai.
On December 23, 1948, General Matsui Iwane, who had commanded the Central China Area Army, was executed in Tokyo. These executions took place before the Chinese Communist Party came into power.
Phase 5: 1949 to 1978
The following year marked the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, on October 1, 1949. The Chinese Communist Party had wrested Nanking away from the Nationalist Party in April. One of the first projects the Communist Party undertook after its return to Nanking was the creation of a memorial park and Martyrs’ Tomb at Yuhuatai.
After 1927, when the Nationalists designated Nanking as their capital, many revolutionaries who opposed the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) were executed at Yuhuatai, situated south of Zhonghua Gate (South Gate). That is why the Communist Party selected Yuhuatai as the site of a memorial park to honor its dead.
At the center of the park, near the entrance, stands the Martyrs’ Tomb, on top of which are nine giant human figures carved from stone. According to Maruyama Susumu’s The Truth about the Nanking Incident, the following inscription is engraved on the tomb:
The Guomindang Government captured 300,000 Chinese Communist Party activists, brought them to Nanking and slaughtered all of them at this execution site in Yuhuatai. This memorial park was created to comfort the souls of these heroes.15 [Italics supplied.]
Chen Shunchen, in Journey Through China’s History, writes about a stone monument in front of the Martyrs’ Tomb on which Mao Zedong personally inscribed “Long Live the Martyrs Who Died for the Revolution.”16

No Monument to “300,000 Chinese Slaughtered by the Japanese”
According to the inscription on the stone monument, the Nationalists killed 300,000 Communist Party members. As we mentioned previously, Nanking became the Nationalist capital in 1927, and executions of revolutionaries began that same year. The Japanese occupied Nanking in 1937. The Republic of China began executing Japanese military personnel in 1947.
Both Communist Party members and Japanese military personnel were executed at Yuhuatai. The executions of the Japanese must have been fresh in the minds of the Chinese, since they had taken place only a few years before the park was opened. If a massacre did indeed occur in Nanking, it would have been appropriate to honor its victims as well. Mao Zedong did not, however, inscribe “The Japanese military slaughtered 300,000 Chinese in Nanking” on the Martyrs’ Tomb.
There are several possible explanations. If Mao was convinced that a massacre had taken place in Nanking, he might have decided that the Yuhuatai Martyrs’ Tomb was not an appropriate place to honor the memory of the victims, since it was intended to commemorate revolutionary heroes, not to censure Japanese soldiers. But if that had been the case, he would have looked for another site to honor the massacre victims. There he would have written the inscription: “The Japanese military slaughtered 300,000 Chinese in Nanking.” If he thought there had been a massacre, he certainly would have constructed a memorial for its victims. But he did not. That means that Mao Zedong did not believe that there had been a massacre in Nanking. Without proof that 300,000 Chinese had been slaughtered, neither Mao nor anyone else would have written such a thing.
Earlier we mentioned that Mao presented a lecture entitled “On Protracted War” over a period of nine days, beginning in May 1938 and ending in June. In that lecture, he stated that the Japanese committed a strategic blunder in not killing everyone in Nanking after they had surrounded the city. That error permitted Chinese troops to regroup and counterattack.
Mao Zedong rejected the argument that the Japanese had murdered 300,000 Chinese before World War II began. Even after the war ended, he did not alter his position.

No References to “Nanking Massacre” in History Textbooks Published in China and Hong Kong
There is no reference to a massacre in Nanking in the entries for 1937 in the “Chronology of Chinese and Foreign History” in the Handbook for Middle-School History Teachers, published in 1958 by the Shanghai Educational Publishing Company. The only entry that mentions the Japanese is: “Japanese troops occupy Shanghai; Nationalist Government moves to Chongqing.” On the other hand, one of the entries for 1927 reads: “Chiang Kai-shek establishes an anti-revolutionary government in Nanking … and slaughters many Communist Party members and revolutionaries.”
Similarly, the main text of Chinese History: A New Edition (a textbook first published in Hong Kong in 1972 by the Lingji Publishing Company), revised in 1975, contains the following account for 1937: “On December 13, Nanking fell. In the north, fierce battles raged, claiming many victims, and often resulting in defeat.”17
The entry in the book’s chronology for 1937 reads simply, “The Nationalist Government moves its capital to Chongqing; attempt to defend Nanking unsuccessful.”
It is, of course, impossible to make sweeping judgements about all textbooks issued up until 1975 on the basis of these two. However, the People’s Republic of China being a proletarian dictatorship, textbook compilers were not permitted to do any editing. If the national consensus were that a “Nanking Massacre” had occurred, an account of it would surely have appeared in government-approved textbooks. At that time, Hong Kong was a British Crown Colony. Since the United Kingdom is a democratic nation, textbook compilers in Hong Kong had the freedom to edit. Therefore, if they had determined that there had been a “Nanking Massacre,” they would have described it in the Colony’s textbooks.
However, there is no mention of the Nanking Massacre in textbooks used in 1975, which means that it was acknowledged neither by the citizens of the People’s Republic of China or Hong Kong.
Phase 6: 1978 to the Present
In the People’s Republic of China, the claim that there had been a massacre in Nanking gained no momentum until Deng Xiaoping came into power. By July 1977, Deng had been restored to high-ranking posts he had previously held (vice-chairman of the Communist Party’s Central Committee and chief of staff of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army)). In December 1978, he became the “Red Emperor.18”
Less than a year later, in July 1979, an account of the “Nanking Massacre” appeared in the first printing of The History of China, a textbook designed for elementary- and middle-school students attending school in the full-day, 10-year program.19 In 1985, the Memorial Hall to Compatriots Slaughtered by Japanese Troops During the Nanking Massacre was built. The hall’s facade bears the inscription “Victims: 300000.”
CHAPTER 16:

THE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA
The “Nanking Massacre” is the generic naming incidents that Japanese forces committed (massacre, rape, plunder, and arson) over the six week period following the capture of the city of Nanking on December 13, 1937. There are still different interpretations on the scale of the incidents among the researchers, and they haven’t reached any definitive conclusions yet. One perspective that has not been considered is that the “Nanking Massacre” be considered as war propaganda.
Based upon recent research and a top-secret document of the Chinese Nationalist Party which I recently found, it would be fair to say that the “Nanking Massacre” may be considered war propaganda. This paper presents clear evidence that the root of the “Nanking Massacre” lay in the Nationalist Party’s propaganda campaign, and verifies the actual scale of the Nanking Incident.
First, this will paper look at when and how accounts of the “Nanking Massacre” were spread throughout the world. Second, it will scrutinize two kinds of documents which contributed to that spread and are considered the evidence for the massacre. Third, it will examine the situation before the “Nanking Massacre”: how the Nationalist and Communist Parties looked at it, and the reasons why they had to resort to propaganda. Fourth, the paper will make use of recent research and a top-secret document which was recently found, and verifies the validity of the two kinds of documents. Fifth, it will examine the shrewd methods of propaganda in detail, and why they were successful. Finally, it will conclude that the “Nanking Massacre” was the result of this propaganda, and explains the aftermath effect.
Before entering into the main discussion, I would like to present a brief overview of at which point and how the “Nanking Massacre” was reported. American newspapers first reported on the “Nanking Massacre.” It was on December 15 (Dec. 16 in Japan), 1937, three days after the fall of Nanking, that the Chicago Daily News published the “Nanking Massacre Story” by Archibald Steele, a special correspondent. Then, in July, 1938 . seven months after the fall of Nanking and the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War . when Harold Timperley edited the accusations of the Americans living in Nanking against the Japanese forces into a book What War Means: Japanese Terror in China. These two were the principal sources that spread the account of the “Nanking Massacre” throughout the world, before the start of World War II.
It should be noted that no country . including Nationalist China where the alleged massacre occurred . ever publicly criticized Japan It was only after World War II that the Tokyo Tribunals first took up the issue of the “Nanking Massacre” and assigned guilt to Japan before the world.
In 1946, Joseph Keenan, the chief prosecutor at the Tokyo International Military Tribunal, insisted that there had been a massacre of tens of thousands of people. Miner Bates, Professor of the University of Nanking, who contributed of articles to What War Means, asserted there had been a massacre of 40,000. Nationalist China, which had never criticized Japan for this issue before World War II, claimed that 300,000 had been killed.
Most Japanese did not accept the story of the “Nanking Massacre,” which was condemned at the Tokyo Tribunals. As evidence of this, it was not presented in any Japanese history textbook under government authorization for a great while. Neither had it been discussed in any Chinese national textbook.
It was not until the 1980’s that the “Nanking Massacre” was covered in all Japanese and Chinese history textbooks. A history textbook for junior high schools published in Japan in 1999 says, “The Japanese forces encountered fierce resistance in various places, killed, it is claimed, 200,000 civilians after the occupation of Nanking. They were criticized [for this] by other countries.”1 Chinese History, a textbook published in China 1997 says, “When the Japanese forces occupied Nanking, they conducted an enormous, bloody massacre of the Nanking civilians, and committed outrageous crimes. … For the six weeks after the occupation of Nanking, the Japanese forces slaughtered 300,000 unarmed Chinese civilians and soldiers who had abandoned their weapons.”2
The Roots of the “Nanking Massacre”
As stated before, American newspapers first reported the “Nanking Massacre” to the world . the Chicago Daily News and the New York Times . and the book, What War Means. The media reports and the book have been considered the evidence of the “Nanking Massacre”; it is these accounts that give credence to the “Nanking Massacre” up until the present day.
They were widely accepted because: First, these were real-time news reports. The Chicago Daily News story was published on December 15 and the New York Times story was published on December 17. The special correspondents who sent the reports stayed in Nanking until December 15, and this gave the readers the impression that the correspondents were there actually witnessing the massacre.
Second, What War Means was considered to be a contemporary record written from a neutral position. Harold Timperley, the editor, was an Australian and a special correspondent in China for the British newspaper Manchester Guardian. Those who contributed articles that were the highlights of the book were Americans living in Nanking, and were accepted as third party of eye-witness accounts.
Third, What War Means was published seven months after the fall of Nanking and attracted a wide readership, which viewed it as a legitimate contemporary record.Certainly there was not even a hint of anything in it to suggest that the accounts were merely propaganda.
Due to recent research, the basis of these sources is beginning to crumble. For example, Suzuki Akira found that although editor Timperley was certainly a journalist, he was also an “advisor” to the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party. He assumed that the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party in the capital of Hankou had “devoted all their energy”3 to the completion of What War Means. Suzuki’s position is based on this statement in Jindai Laihua Waiguoren Ming Zidian (The Modern Who’s Who of Foreign Visitors to China), which describes Timperley as follows:
After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, he was sent to Europe and America by the Nationalist Party, and was engaged in propaganda maneuvers. Thereafter he took a position as an advisor to the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party.4
As will be discussed later, Professor Kitamura Minoru found that in Zeng Xubai’s (the oldest member of the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party), autobiography, Zeng Xubai Zichuan, he disclosed propaganda operations of the department, and recalled that they were related to Timperley. Unfortunately, however, his autobiography did not mention anything about the editing and publication of What War Means.
All contributors to What War Means were anonymous; but they have, except for one article, all been subsequently identified as Professor Minor Bates of the University of Nanking, and George Fitch,. Moreover, Bates has turned out to have been an “advisor” to the Chinese Nationalist Government.5 Also, (how about ‘George Fitch’s wife’(?)) Mrs. Fitch was found out to have been a “close friend” of Madame Chiang Kai-shek.6 Therefore, we cannot trust the neutrality of the articles in the book.
For example, Chinese forces established anti-aircraft emplacements in the civilian refugee Safety Zone that was in Nanking and left them there, ignoring repeated complaints from the International Safety Zone Committee. But Fitch, siding with the Nationalists, wrote:
Gen. Tang,… charged with the defense of the city, cooperated splendidly on the whole in the very difficult task of clearing the Zone of the military and anti-aircraft.…7
Can we not say that this statement was contrary to fact, rather than a witnesses’ true record?
The basis for accepting What War Means as unbiased evidence for the “Nanking Massacre” has begun to be undermined. But there is still a lack of decisive evidence to assert it was just propaganda.

Propaganda Has Priority over Tactics
Mainland China was not unified as it is today. Internal conflicts had continued for one and a half centuries since the end of the 18th century. Military factions existed in various places, and the country was torn by internal conflicts. The Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, expanded their power most in 1930’s.
The Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, was attacked militarily by the National Party and managed to limp away to Yan’an for safety. They could barely maintain the status quo. After an incident in December 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was held hostage by Chang Shueliang., the Nationalist and Communist Party came to an agreement. In September of 1937 they entered the era of the so-called second cooperation between the Nationalist government and the Communist government. Even though it was called “cooperation,” the Nationalist Party received the generous support of the U.S. and Germany and thus possessed the more powerful military force compared with the Communists. Therefore, the Nationalist Party took leadership.
When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937, it was Nationalist forces which actually fought against the Japanese forces. After the war, General He Yingching of the Nationalist Party expressed his dissatisfaction that the Communist Party took the lead and fought only “twice” out of 40,000 battles.8 But in terms of conducting propaganda, the Nationalist Party combined with the Communist Party produced a powerful campaign.
Shortly after the war, Communist Party member Guo Moruo wrote his memoirs, which were later published in Japanese as Konichisen Kaisoroku (Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Warfare). According to Guo, the Communists established the First Office to oversee Party affairs in the forces, the Second Office to oversee civilian organizations, and the Third Office to oversee propaganda under the directorship of chief-of-staff Chen Cheng with Chow En-lai, representing the 8th Rte Army (stationed in Hankou) as deputy director in the political department. It was the Third Office that was responsible for propaganda for military forces, international propaganda, and anti-enemy propaganda, which began operations with Guo as the head on April 1, 1938.
Guo recalled that he “felt much better” when he saw the slogan, “Propaganda has priority over tactics, and politics has priority over military affairs.” He described himself as the person in charge of propaganda warfare. But the work of the Third Office . which was also a “group of people opposing Japanese culture” . was not to publicize real facts, but rather to propagate “exaggerated” facts,9 namely “exaggerated propaganda.”10 His greatest achievement was the publication of Dikou Baoxing Zhen Lu (True Records of the Invader’s Atrocities) in 1938. Guo boasted that its publication “from information gathering, editing, printing, and stocking, to publishing, was all done by the people at the Third Office.”11 The existence of this particular document has yet to be confirmed, but this document is likely to have actually been called Rikou Baoxing Zhen Lu (True Records of Japanese Invader’s Atrocities), which does exist.
The Nationalist Party’s documents describe almost the same organizational structure and the same elements of propaganda as described by Guo’s Memoirs, but mentioned Dong Xianguang and Zeng Xubai as the persons in charge. In November 1937, the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party was established. Therein, the International Information Division was organized to be in charge of overseas propaganda. According to Zeng’s Autobiography, Dong Xianguang (vice-director of the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party) oversaw the overseas propaganda, while Zeng (a professor of Ginling College in Nanking) assumed the position as head of the International Information Division.
Nationalist Party and Communist Party documents were not exactly identical, and it appears as if the Communist Party conducted their own separate propaganda campaign. The fact that Guo was the head of the Third Office of the Political Department of the Nationalist Party, however, tells everything: people belonging to the Communist Party were included in the Nationalist Party’s organizations. The Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party “closely cooperated with”12 the Third Office of the Political Department of the Nationalist Party, and promoted propaganda. For this reason, Guo recalled that he “saw” Zeng, the head of the International Information Division “all the time.”13 After the fall of Nanking, the International Information Division, “together with”14 the Third Office, invited foreign special correspondents to the International Information Division in Hankou every Monday.
The Top-Secret Document: Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu Guoji Xuanchuan Chu Gongzuo Gaiyao (An Overview of Propaganda Operations of the International Information Division of the Central Information Department)
Propaganda had priority over tactics. The greatest exaggerated propaganda success was the publication of Timperly’s What War Means. Given that no one was able to detect that this book was a work of propaganda for more than half a century following its publication in July 1938, one can easily understand how shrewd and successful the effort was. But now it is revealed to be merely a “propaganda book.” What indicates this without any doubt is the document
Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu Guoji Xuanchuan Chu Gongzuo Gaiyao: zi 1938-nian zhi 1941-nian 4-yue (An Overview of Propaganda Operations of the International Information Division of the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party: from 1938 to April 1941). This document, which was kept at the Party History Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party in Taipei, is a booklet of approximately 100 pages (along with a hand-written mimeographed copy). The cover page was stamped “Top Secret”.
According to this document, the International Information Division of the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department was divided into five sections and three offices: the Editing Section, the External Affairs Section, the Anti-Enemy Propaganda Section, the Photographic Section, the General Affairs Section, the Office of Broadcasting, the Office of Documents and the Clerks’ Office. This top-secret document detailed the “Anti-Enemy Propaganda Section.” One chapter is called, “An Outlook on Activities of the Anti-Enemy Propaganda Section”:
The Anti-Enemy Propaganda Section began operations on December 1, 1937. At that time, our forces retreated from Nanking and Shanghai, and were conducting the warfare bravely. It was time that we should do our best to expand our activities, and cooperate effectively with the forward military actions. Time flies like an arrow, and three years have passed. We submit the situation of the development for consideration.
Our activities can be divided into two types: propaganda and research. What follows here is the analysis:15
In other words, this top-secret document records activities from December, 1937 (two weeks before the fall of Nanking) to March, 1941 (nine months before the outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan). In the sub-section headed “Books,” of the section “Editing and Producing Books for Anti-Enemy Propaganda,” one of their activities is recorded:
1. Books The anti-propaganda books that this section edited and printed were in two kinds as follows:
A Wairen Mudu zhi Rijun Baoxing (Japanese Atrocities Witnessed by Foreigners).
This book was written by Harold Timperley …, a prominent British journalist. The contents were on rape, arson, and plunder; namely wicked conduct after the enemy entered into Nanking on December 13, 1937. The book also equally described the detailed situation of deterioration of military discipline and degradation of human nature. The book was published both in Chinese and English. It was also published in Japanese. The title of this Japanese version was changed to, What Is War? The book started with the introduction by Aoyama Kazuo, an anti-war Japanese writer, and contained many photos of violence. This book was widely sold in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and various places in the world. Prince Kanyin, the Chief of Staff of the enemy’s headquarters, distributed this book to all the generals of the Japanese forces in an attempt to persuade them to admit the Imperial Army’s conduct of national disgrace in China, and admonish it for those activities 16
From this document, it is clear that Timperley’s What War Means was edited and printed as a “propaganda book” by the International Information Division, rather than just merely translated by the Division. Therefore, What War Means, which first brought the accusation of a “Nanking Massacre” to the world, was not written based on a neutral third person’s point of view, but actually a work of biased propaganda. We can say that this with absolute certainty.

The Realities of the Shrewd Propaganda 1: Delegated Propaganda
Timperley’s What War Means was not identified as propaganda for more than half a century. That is how shrewd was the method in which the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department edited and produced it.
Zeng, details the story in his Memoirs. China, which was militarily inferior to Japan, propagated the accounts of their heroic warriors and the enemy’s atrocity as a national policy. In doing so, the Chinese Nationalist Party did not appear in the forefront; rather, they preferred an indirect method of propaganda, which was to ask their “international friends”17 (so-called third persons) to speak on their behalf. This was their method of “delegated propaganda.”18 Zeng contacted Timperley in Shanghai and asked him to fly to Hankou, where he consulted with him for many hours in a “closed room”. Zeng recounts:
What was just good in timing was that two foreigners were staying in Nanking, and watching the course of this tragedy. One of them was Timperley, a special correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in England, and the other was Professor Lewis S.C. Smythe from the U.S.
Conveniently, Timperley was one of the three important members who were attending the “resistance committee” in Shanghai as we were promoting anti-Japanese international propaganda. He is an Australian. So as soon as he came to Shanghai, we contacted him immediately. Then we asked him to fly from Hong Kong to Hankou to consult with him on everything. When he came, we talked with him in a closed room for many hours, and decided the early plan for the overseas propaganda network of the International Information Division.
In the current international propaganda, we talked to each other: We Chinese ourselves should never go to the fore, but find our international friends who can understand the real situation of our resistance and our policy; and that we should ask them to speak on our behalf. Timperley was an ideal person for this. For the first step, we decided to pay money to Timperley asking him and Smythe (whom he introduced us to) to write two books on the “Nanking Massacre” as the witnessed records, and to print and publish them.
After that, Timperley wrote Rijun Baoxing Qizhen (Records of Japanese Atrocities), and Smythe wrote Real Records of War Damage in Nanking. They sold well and spread widely. Thus they attained the propaganda purpose. At the same time, we consulted with Timperley again. We asked him to become a secret person who would be in charge of our International Information Division and living in the U.S. It was registered there as the Trans Pacific News, and published his manuscripts in the U.S. At the same time, Earl Leaf became responsible for the clerical work in New York, Henry Evans was in charge of that of Chicago, and Malcolm Rosholt was in charge of that of San Francisco. They were all experienced American journalists, and we completed the whole U.S. propaganda network. Our propaganda was focused on the U.S., but simultaneously they were compelled to represent the openings for England and Hong Kong, and a contingency station for the enemy’s policy in Shanghai. 19
Zeng recounts that Timperley executed everything as decided, and the International Information Division of the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department achieved their propaganda goal. But what did he secretly discuss with Timperley for so many hours? Zeng did not specify, but it must have concerned the editing and production of What War Means. These closed-room discussions indicate how careful members of the Information Division, including Zeng, were in keeping secrets.
Timperley was no exception. Two months after the fall of Nanking, an exchange of opinions began between Timperley in Shanghai and Miner Bates of the University of Nanking, a contributor of articles, over editing of What War Means. On March 14, 1938, Timperley told Bates:
50% (instead of the whole) of the profits derived from the sale of the book will be given to the Shanghai International Red Cross Committee and the balance will be used to meet the cost of production and of translation into various languages. I find that the whole thing is costing a great deal more than I have bargained for; especially in the way of photographs, which will run me into something like Mex. $1,000. Gollancz [the English publisher] asked for 200 photographs, though of course he will not use anything like that number in the book. I have had four typists and two other assistants at work on the preparation of the manuscript for the past fortnight and there have been numerous other expenses. It has been suggested to me that the manuscript ought to be translated into Japanese and perhaps into Hindustani, among other languages.20
From this letter, it seems as if Timperley had been editing the book but is having a hard time paying the various costs. It also seems as if he had been translating the manuscript into several languages, colleting photographs and editing by himself with the help of his “assistants.” We see no obvious sign of his connections with the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department.
Timperley’s letter was carefully camouflaged. to achieve the purpose of producing a propaganda book. First, as the top-secret document of the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department and Zeng’s Memoir make clear, it was the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department that decided to “pay money to Timperley … to write two books on the ‘Nanking Massacre’…” One of those books was What War Means. They then printed and published it. Any financial burden on him was out of the question. Despite the fact that he did not have to worry about the costs of production, translation, or photography, to say nothing of “four typists” and “two assistants,” he referred to the finances to make the pretense that he had edited the book (and that he had had nothing to do with the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department).
Second, Victor Gollancz in England did not print even a single photograph, when they published What War Means, even though Timperley said Gollancz asked him to send them 200 photos for inclusion in the book. In contrast, the Chinese edition, published simultaneously with the English edition, had approximately 30 photos in it. Therefore, the one who really asked him to send them photos had to have been the Central Information Department. To give an impression that he had nothing to do with them, he needed to write as if the British publisher had made the request.
Third, Timperley wrote that Gollancz suggested that “the manuscript ought to be translated into Japanese and perhaps into Hindustani.” Nothing is so absurd as to suggest publishing books in foreign countries where no distribution channel existed. The one who actually suggested he translate the book into Japanese was the Central Information Department, which had abundant funds. After they published the English, Chinese, and Japanese versions, they also published a French version in Paris next year.
Fourth, Timperley said, “I am thinking of using Gollancz for the publisher,” but in London, New York City, Hong Kong and Shanghai, where What War Means was published, the International Information Division’s overseas offices had also been established.
Thus, Timperley paid careful attention such that his connection to the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department would not be discovered. Also he did so to make What War Means receive wide acceptance, even if his correspondence should be made public in the future. This was the extent to which the editing of What War Means was carefully disguised.

The Realities of the Shrewd Propaganda 2: Concealing Lies in a Fact
In order for propaganda not to be detected, it is necessary to impress the intended audience that the grounds for the argument are based on doubtless facts. In this respect, What War Means was fully developed. In the introduction, Timperley wrote as follows:
Perhaps this book would not have come to be written had it not been for the fact that telegrams reporting [sic.] the outrages committed against Chinese civilians by the Japanese troops which occupied Nanking in December of last year. I make this personal explanation in order to show that the idea of producing this book was entirely my own. It is by no means the purpose of this book to stir up animosity against the Japanese people. The aim of this book is to give the world as accurately as possible the facts about the Japanese Army.s treatment of the Chinese civilian population in the 1937.38 hostilities so that war may be recognized for the detestable business it really is and thus be stripped of the false glamour with which militarist megalomaniacs seek to invest it.21
Timperley tried to send a telegram to the Manchester Guardian. He emphasized that the Japanese authority in Shanghai seized it, which motivated him to edit this book. Based on the introduction of the book, the reader must have developed some antagonism against the country that seized his telegram, thus setting up a negative image of Japan. At the same time, the reader must have felt that he can trust What War Means.. This is because of what Timperley said and how he included a “fact.” The readers are weak in facts.
This presentation of this fact was the beginning of their shrewd propaganda because there was a trick. Timperley’s telegram told of “the massacre of 300,000 people in the Yangtze Delta,” as it had been cleared before. However, he did not quote the contents of his telegram in the introduction of his book. He mentioned the Japanese “seizure” of his telegram in his letter to Bates on February 4, 1938, but he did not touch upon the contents. To begin with, “the massacre of 300,000 people in the Yangtze Delta” was a phrase best suited for accusing the Japanese forces, but he did not quote his telegram in the introduction. There was space enough to do so, so why did he not do so?
Timperley’s aim was to allow the Japanese to seize his telegram so that he can report the fact that his telegram had been seized. For this purpose, the contents had to be such that the Japanese forces would be forced to seize it, thus the words, “the massacre of 300,000 people in the Yangtze Delta.” But he himself knew that this was a false statement. In Chapter 6 of What War Means, he wrote:
According to a careful estimate made by a foreign observer who had visited these regions on several occasions, both before and after the Japanese occupation, at least 300,000 Chinese civilians have lost their lives as a result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in the Yangtze Delta. 22
It would have been impossible that the general civilians were at the battlefield, so it was strange to say “300,000 Chinese civilians.” At any rate, Timperley recognized it as “a result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities,” and not as a “massacre.”
Here is another example. In publishing What War Means, Bates suggested to Timperley the following, twice . first on March 3 and then again on March 21:
For purpose of impressing a distant public with the brutality of warfare waged as this one has been waged, it seems much more effective to have a base wider than that of one city. But if similar stories come over a period of months from Shanghai, Sungkiang, Soochow, Wushi, Huchow, Hangchow, the total effect is far more massive and convincing.23
In other words, Bates suggested to Timperley to write about the actions of Japanese forces in the places other than Nanking such as Shanghai. But Timperley, who sent a telegram addressing the situation and in which he proclaimed “the massacre of 300,000 people in the Yangtze Delta,” answered:
In your letter you ask why I have done nothing about Shanghai, Sungkiang, and Kashing. I think you will find that Chapter VII fills the gap. When we looked into the matter we found that there was very little authentic evidence of Japanese outrages against the civilian population around Shanghai.24
Contrary to his claim of a “massacre of 300,000 people in the Yangtze Delta,” he admitted that “there was very little authentic evidence of Japanese outrages against the civilian population” in Shanghai, Sungkiang and Kashing.
If he switched “a result of the … hostilities” with “Japanese outrages against the civilian population,” and with no authentic evidence to support this send a telegram, inevitably the Japanese would have to seize it, which they did since it was “grossly exaggerated”25 and untrue. He fully estimated the necessity that the exaggerated contents would certainly cause its seizure. Timperley could have sent the telegram from the French settlement in Shanghai, where it would not have been seized; but he deliberately tried to send it from the Japanese telegraph office in Shanghai. This was also a part of his scheme to make them seize his telegram.
Since What War Means has been revealed as propaganda, the introduction sounds hollow. The top-secret document of the Central Information Department indicated that the International Information Division edited and printed What War Means. His statements, “I make this personal explanation in order to show that the idea of producing this book was entirely my own,” and “it is by no means the purpose of this book to stir up animosity against the Japanese people” were deliberately written to conceal his real intention．
The reason the readers still did not notice his “lies” was that, as stated before, by establishing and presenting a “fact” that the readers liked he made them relieved, and the readers were attracted by the presentation of this “fact.” By doing so, what was disadvantageous for Timperley, namely the fact that the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department “edited and produced” the book, had completely disappeared because of the fact that Japanese had seized his telegram.

The Realities of the Shrewd Propaganda 3: Exaggerated Facts
In the first four chapters of What War Means, the articles described the city after the fall and were contributed by Americans living in Nanking.. The description was tricky in that the “facts” were exaggerated and disguised qualitatively and quantitatively to an extent that they would not to be recognizable as lies. The fact that the contributors were anonymous diminished their moral integrity, which contributed to the further exaggeration of actual events .
However, if the contributors were entirely anonymous, the credibility of the book could be called into question. Timperley therefore described the contributors as follows:
Further details given in the following vivid account by a foreign resident of Nareanking who has spent almost the whole of his life in China. His letter has been left exactly as it was received by his friends in Shanghai except that references of a largely personal nature have been deleted.26
And he introduced another as:
This brief but illuminating description of events immediately after the Japanese entry of Nanking is taken from a letter dated December 15, written to a friend in Shanghai by one of the most respected members of Nanking’s foreign community who is noted for his fair mindedness.27
These details appeal to readers. First, the contributors were regarded as neutral third-persons in decent social positions who lived in Nanking. Second, they did not contribute articles specifically for What War Means, but their letters to their friends happened to be used as the manuscripts for it. This was the first step to subconsciously reassure the readers.
Approximately twenty years ago, the anonymous contributors were identified by Itakura Yoshiaki. The accuracy of his verification was endorsed by Bates’ statement, “In Timperley’s volume, Chapters I & II came from George Fitch; except pp.18.20 from me, also III, IVa and Appendix F.”28 So for the next step, in order to verify the contents of the two contributors’ manuscripts, the letters to their friends, the following is excerpted from Bates’ “letter to his friend in Shanghai” in the first half of Chapter I:
But in two days the whole outlook has been ruined by frequent murder, wholesale and semi-regular looting, and uncontrolled disturbance of private homes including offences against the security of women. Foreigners who have traveled over the city report many civilians bodies lying in the streets. A considerable percentage of the dead civilians were the victims of shooting or bayoneting in the afternoon and evening or the thirteenth, which was the time of Japanese entry into the city. Any person who ran in fear or excitement, and any one who was caught in the streets or alleys after dusk by rowing patrols was likely to be killed on the spot. It proceeded in the safety zone as well as elsewhere, and many cases are plainly witnessed by foreigners and by reputable Chinese.29
The article by Fitch who wrote the latter half of Chapter I had similar contents with expressions such as “a story of such crime and horror as to be almost unbelievable”30; “the story of depredations”31; “Complete anarchy has reigned for ten days . it has been a hell on earth.”32 Probably the readers can guess from what he said. I excerpt only the part which is worth attention:
Every day we call at the Japanese Embassy and present our protests, our appeals, our lists of authenticated reports of violence and crime. We are met with suave Japanese courtesy, but actually the officials there are powerless. The victorious army must have its rewards . and those rewards are to plunder, murder, rape, at will, to commit acts of unbelievable brutality and savagery on the very people they have come to protect and befriend, as they have so loudly proclaimed to the world. In all modern history surely there is no page that will stand so black as that of the rape of Nanking.33
Based on these descriptions, I would not be the only person who would believe that that the Japanese indulged in atrocities such as murder, rape, plunder and arson when they occupied Nanking. Also, I would probably not be the only one that thought that something dreadful was happened in Nanking based on Fitch’s expression, “a hell I had never before envisaged.”34 Moreover, when read that “many cases were plainly witnessed by foreigners and by reputable Chinese,” or “the foreigners who looked around Nanking,” called “at the Japanese Embassy and are present our … reports, ” we really feel the credibility of the expression “a hell I had never before envisaged.”
Since they wrote their manuscripts anonymously, the characteristic of chapters one through four was that no one could call them to account. How the manuscripts were to be perceived depended on the European and American readers. For example, the London Times published their book review, “The evidence … here put forward is clearly genuine and reliable.”35
Was each of their descriptions a fact? I would like to look into each description, whether they are so, but space limitations make this impossible. Therefore, this paper will focus on the “daily reports of the serious injuries to civilians”36 that the International Committee submitted to the Japanese Embassy (and included in the appendix of What War Means) to verify whether Bates’ and Fitch’s descriptions were true.
The International Committee (consisting of the Europeans and Americans in Nanking) gathered and submitted documents called “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians” to the Japanese Embassy. These were appeals as well as accounts from the Nanking residents of things that they saw and heard.
The reports were compiled by Professor Smythe in a “complete or almost complete” set by the beginning of February 1938. The main parts (41% of all the cases) were published in the Appendix of What War Means. Almost all (except for very doubtful cases) were published in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. Timperley also summarizes it, “The following section of cases … completes the story of the first two months of the Japanese Army’s occupation of Nanking.”37 Bates and Fitch were among the powerful members of the International Committee. What they saw and heard were certainly written up in the Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians.
To sum up the Daily Reports: 27 cases of murder, 175 cases of rape, 131 cases of plunder, and 5 cases of arson. There was only one case an actual, witnessed murder, which was a “legitimate execution.” The other cases of murder were simply rumors, and no one even knew who witnessed them. Similarly, almost all the cases for rape, looting, and arson were based on hearsay. Just in case, this paper examines the statistics other than the Daily Reports.
According to research in which all the data from the diaries and records of the Europeans and Americans who remained in Nanking, Chinese Related Documents, and all Japanese officers’ and soldiers’ records were entered into a computer and analyzed,38 the incidents in Nanking break down as follows: 94 cases of murder, 243 cases of rape, 201 cases of looting, and 34 cases of arson. Out of all these, there was only one case of a witnessed “murder,” and it was actually an incidence of legal execution.39 Of the numbers given above, 17 cases of rape, 26 cases of looting, and one case of arson had witnesses. Therefore, the remainder was based on hearsay.
It should be clear that the total number of incidents in the Daily Reports, which Fitch indicated as “our lists of authenticated reports,” was a far cry from Fitch’s description of “a hell on earth” where Japanese forces looted, murdered, and raped, “at will,” and Bates’ charge of “frequent murder” being carried out in the Safety Zone. The facts simply do not jibe with their assertions that many cases were plainly witnessed by foreigners and by reputable Chinese.
It is surprising that most of the reports were based on hearsay. Of course, this is because nearly the entire civilian population took refuge in the Safety Zone of Nanking, and everything outside the Zone was practically deserted. Moreover, in order to make a charge of murder, a corpse was needed as evidence; without a corpse, no one could make a charge. One can therefore infer that the claims of incidents of murder were reflected by reality. But when rape was claimed, on the other hand, no actual evidence was necessary, so that there were more claims of rape than that of murder. Let us look at Fitch’s accounts of rape:
That morning the cases of rape began to be reported. Over a hundred women that we knew of were taken away by soldiers, …
there must have been many times that number who were raped in their homes.40 Friday, Dec. 17. Robbery, murder, rape continue unabated. A rough estimate would be at least a thousand women raped last night.41
The Fitch accounts were like this. His description, “there must have been many times that number who were raped in their homes” was his guess, which was far and away different than “our lists of authenticated reports” as Fitch himself had claimed. In addition, when Fitch wrote “a thousand women were raped,” it sounds as if it was a fact. But as John Rabe, the chairman of the International Committee, wrote in his diary on December 17, “Last night up to a thousand women and girls are said to have been raped.”42 Rabe wrote of it as hearsay. This was the result of typing all the reports brought to the International Committee one after the other and leaving them unverified, for as the committee pointed out, “There is no time or space here to go into the cases that are pouring in faster than we can type them out.”43
Bates said, “Understanding with embassies that any acts of brutalities will be adequately witnessed and promptly reported.”44 In acts of rape, looting, and arson, which were to have been witnessed, there was no way to verify whether they were committed by either Japanese or Chinese. For the Europeans and Americans in Nanking, nothing was so difficult as to distinguish whether one was Japanese or Chinese. These westerners could hardly be trusted to verify unlawful acts.
This paper does not intend to claim that there were no incidents of bad conduct on the part of individual Japanese solders. Armed forces are inseparably bound up with disgraceful incidents. Even in present day, peaceful Okinawa, serious incidents such as the rape of an innocent girl by American soldiers, for which then President Bill Clinton apologized, has taken place. But the Japanese forces in Nanking had to respond to roll-call several times every day, and they were certainly not allowed to engage in any conduct which was not appropriate. Moreover, nothing was more dangerous than wandering at night alone in the Safety Zone where Chinese soldiers lurked. In addition, the Japanese Army imposed strict penalties on soldiers who exhibited bad behavior . which were so strict that units complained to their commanders.
Since these were the actual conditions under which Japanese forces were operating, there simply could not have been many disgraceful incidents. In fact, the Daily Reports actually indicate this to be the case. It is possible that liaisons with prostitutes were counted as “rapes,” and Japanese requisitioning of goods for the occupation was perceived as “looting.”45 In the middle of January, 1938, Japanese forces organized a firefighting unit46 to cope with incidents of Chinese arson. Nothing is so inconsistent as to assert that the same Japanese force which organized a unit specifically intended to fight fires allowed arson. Moreover, if the Japanese were committing arson, this would have been like slitting one’s own wrists since this would mean burning their own lodgings down. Yes, it was true that there were a few disgraceful incidents. But the exaggeration of the facts was nothing more than a propaganda ploy.

The Realities of Propaganda 4: No Explanation of the Situations
A certain amount of explanation of each incidence would be indispensable to prevent a misperception of events by a third person, but by intentionally omitting those explanations, the misunderstanding persisted and so the propaganda worked. In describing corpses and mop-up operations by the Japanese military, the contributors omitted vital explanations of the situation.
Let us consider their descriptions of corpses. As stated before, Bates wrote, “foreigners who have traveled over the city report many civilians’ bodies lying in the streets.” Fitch also wrote, “at the gate more cars jammed and were burned … [it was] a terrible holocaust,… and the dead lay feet deep.” 47 War, by its nature, leads to death and corpses.
The corpses in Nanking before and after the fall of the city are categorized as follows:
1.
those of Chinese soldiers who died in battle;

2.
those left on the platforms of the Nanking station before the fall of the city;

3.
those of soldiers who had been wounded and subsequently left at the field hospital (of the Diplomatic Division) in the northern part of the city;

4.
those of soldiers who were shot at the North Gate and the South Gate by a “supervising unit” peculiar to Chinese forces which preventing desertion;

5.
those of soldiers who rushed into a narrow path at the North

Gate trying to escape and were crushed to death;

6.
those of soldiers who were trying to escape to the outside over the city wall by the North Gate;

7.
those of soldiers who tried to escape from the North Gate to the shore of the Yangtze River, but were drowned in the river;

8.
those of soldiers who were killed trying to resist Japanese forces;

9.
those of soldiers who had removed their military uniforms and had hidden in the Safety Zone, but were found and executed by Japanese forces.

Bates and Fitch must have fully known the circumstances surrounding the corpses found in Nanking. Certainly there were a large number of corpses at Yijiang Gate (North Gate), which had become the only escape route for the defeated Chinese. But as Durdin and Steele confessed fifty years later, the corpses were not the result of attacks by Japanese forces. Rather, the corpses at Yijiang Gate were those of soldiers either crushed by their comrades in the stampede to escape or were the victims of a supervising unit responsible for preventing deserters from fleeing by shooting the offenders.48
It is similar to the situation with mop-up operations. Even if the outcome of a battle is clear, mop-up operations continue until there is no more enemy soldiers in the area. The city wall of Nanking was 34 kilometers in total circumference. Zhonghua Gate, the strongest of all, was 118 meters in width from the East to the West, 128 meters in depth from the North to the South, and 20 meters in height. It fell early . at dawn on December 13, but no Chinese soldier raised his hands and surrendered inside the walled city.
On the contrary, they began to take off their military uniforms, disguising themselves as civilians and hid in the civilian Safety Zone. This was witnessed and fully acknowledged by the Europeans and Americans in Nanking . including Bates and Fitch. The International Committee, which could not prevent it, did not fulfill their obligation for neutrality. The “unarmed” and “neutral” Safety Zone was a failure. Moreover, John Rabe, the chairman of the International Committee, hid Chinese officers and cooperated with their concealment.49 This was a serious violation of the neutrality agreement.
At any rate, those in the Safety Zone knew that Chinese soldiers were hiding amongst them. Certainly everybody knew that the Japanese would prosecute them if they found the Chinese. If they resisted, they could have been hurt, or even executed; such was the situatioon. Instead, Bates and Fitch put the situation out differently:
(On December 14) four hundred men … were marched off in batches of fifty between lines of riflemen and machine gunners. The explanation given to observers left no doubt as their fate.50 (On December 15) The men were lined up and roped together in groups of about a hundred by soldiers with bayonets fixed;… by the light of our headlights we watched them marched away to their doom.51
These descriptions stress only the Japanese forces’ “atrocity,” but masked the following important points:
First, mop-up operations are conducted at every battlefield, in every war, by every military, to ensure security. Mop-up operations also protected the lives of civilians. Had the remaining Chinese soldiers who discarded their uniforms attacked from the Safety Zone, which existed only for civilians, the lives of those civilians would have been in danger. As Steele said, “There were some Chinese soldiers who were still hiding and attacking in the city, and the Japanese soldiers were mopping them up.”52 The actual situation was not different from any other battle.
Second, they wrote, “we watched them marched away to their doom,” but in fact, they did not watch their executions. The Japanese forces did not execute all the regular Chinese soldiers they caught, but only some of them. They used others as coolies. As of the end of February 1938, the total number of coolies (in man-days) Japanese forces used reached approximately 10,000 people.53
Third, the execution of the Chinese soldiers by the Japanese forces was legitimate under the International Law Relating to War Conduct. Bates, Fitch, and other Europeans and Americans discussed this. They stood up for and argued the case of the disarmed Chinese soldiers on both the principles of humanity and the acknowledgment the laws of war, in unified opposition to the Japanese forces for their exposure and executions of Chinese from the Security Zone. This was the new appeal of the International Committee, and the general points of their position are as follows.
On December 15, two days after the fall of the gates, the International Committee maintained that, “The Committee fully recognizes that identified soldiers are lawful prisoners of war.”55 This indicates that they understood the situation as being the same as executing prisoners of war, which was against the International Law Relating to War Conduct. But this interpretation was wrong. (The recognition of the law on war will be discussed later.)
Since it was not the execution of prisoners of war, but rather that of unlawful combatants, the International Committee was compelled to admit that the executions were legitimate; so after their last assertion on December 15, they never again claimed it was unlawful.
People usually continue to complain about things they consider to be unlawful, but often do stop once legality has been established. It is telling that Europeans and Americans in Nanking stopped criticizing the executions. For example, E.W. Jeffrey, a British consul, reported on January 29, 1938. “Military lawlessness continues due to a lack of centralized control. Majority of cases are of ransacking.”56 This was his complaint.
Even the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department (which surely would have immediately disseminated reports of any illegal activities that may have occurred), responded only with the publication of What War Means. They addressed the issue generally in an internal document thusly: “After the fall of Nanking, the Japanese forces [committed] rape, arson, and looting . that is, acts of brutal cruelty.” In conducting the exaggerated propaganda campaign related to Japanese forces’ unlawful actions in Nanking, what was mentioned first was “rape,” but the critical word “massacre” was not mentioned.
It was the same with the United States. Despite the fact that an American newspaper published a story on the “Nanking Massacre,” the U.S. State Department criticized Japan only on the Panay Incident and the incident where Consul John Allison was beaten. They never criticized the Nanking executions as unlawful.
Bates and Fitch therefore had to avoid stating publicly the executions were unlawful. Instead, they described the situation to make the readers imagine illegal killings. There lay the trick of “adverse propaganda,” which omits explaining the real situation and allowing readers to take it from there..
Fitch wrote, “by the light of our headlights we watched them marched away to their doom”; but Japanese forces publicly executed them at the shore of the Yangtze River in the daytime. They never did so during night when it was dangerous. Japanese forces were prohibited from going out at night, in fact. Fitch’s writing, however, gave the impression of Japanese forces committing nefarious acts hidden by the cover of darkness.

Lawful Prisoners of War, or Unlawful Combatants?
Bates and Fitch described the situation two days after the fall of Nanking as “frequent murder,” and “a hell on earth.” Who were the targets of “murder?” As will be discussed later, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone showed that these incidents were only the five cases of looting and rape where no one knew who the witnesses were. The object of their description was nothing more than the executions carried out by the Japanese forces.
Certainly, Japanese forces prosecuted, and executed, Chinese soldiers in their mop-up operations during this period but can it be called murder? That is, was it lawful or unlawful killing? It is necessary to look at the incidents in detail. The Hague Regulations of 1907 listed four qualifications that had to be met by combatants. For the first time, a belligerent could become a lawful prisoner of war protected by law . so long as he observed the regulations and they were recognized by his captors. We must contrast that with the Chinese soldiers who did not express their will to surrender during the mopping-up operations which continued for three days even after the fall of the city gates. The qualifying conditions cited in the Hague Regulations are highlighted in bold-face below:
1.
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

The Chinese forces lacked commanders because their commander, General Tang Shengzhi, and his subordinates had fled.

2.
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

They had already taken off their military uniforms.
3. To carry arms openly;
Japanese forces found secretly hidden weapons amongst Chinese soldiers which, until March 1938, amounted to fifty truckloads worth. They obviously possessed hidden weapons.
4. To conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Violation of the first three regulations indicated that Chinese soldiers didn’t adhere to the fourth requirement of The Hague Regulations; namely, they failed “to conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of the war.”
How fatal it was to violate the rule governing the qualification of combatants! Regarding this problem, a concrete example from the present would serve to provide some context.
In January, 2002, when the soldiers of al-Qaeda and the Taliban were interned at the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba, the U.S. government announced their position on the treatment of these soldiers. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “One of the most important aspects of the Geneva Convention is the distinction between lawful combatants and unlawful combatants.”57 He continued:
It is a terribly dangerous thing from the standpoint of our military and the military of other countries if we blur the distinction between lawful combatants and unlawful combatants. An unlawful combatant is a person who tries to look like a civilian and puts in jeopardy civilians. And a lawful combatant is one that functions as I described, in a uniform, in an organized operation, showing their weapons. The reason they are provided a higher standard of care is because they are lawful combatants, and the idea we should blur that distinction out of some unknown idea that that.s a good thing to do is just fundamentally flawed. We want not to blur that distinction.58
Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, had the same view. Rumsfeld, who conferred with the Secretary of State on this matter ten times, emphasized, “He has said basically what I have said.”59
A central purpose of the Geneva Convention was to protect innocent civilians by distinguishing very clearly between combatants and non-combatants. This is why the convention requires soldiers to wear uniforms that distinguish them from the civilian population. The Taliban did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols, or uniforms. To the contrary, far from seeking to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan, they sought to blend in with civilian non-combatants, hiding in mosques and populated areas.60
We must recall that at the time of the fall of Nanking, the Chinese soldiers were in a situation similar to the one just described. The Chinese soldiers took off their military uniforms, and escaped into the Safety Zone where almost all the civilians had taken refuge. Once the battle broke out, the uniformless combatants were completely indistinguishable from civilians. Any counterattack on those uniformless combatants would endanger civilians. Therefore, in order to avoid such a situation, combatants had an obligation to clearly distinguish themselves from civilians.
Those who observed the law were protected by it, and those who did not were not protected; combatants who were wearing military uniforms and observing the Hague Regulations were under its protection and thereby earned the status of prisoner-of-war. Giving prisoner-of-war status to combatants who had taken off their uniforms and violated the Regulations, however, meant fundamentally undermining the “incentive system”61 of the Regulations.
The soldiers who took off their uniforms became unlawful combatants, and technically speaking, they did “not have any rights under the Geneva Convention.”62 This was Mr. Rumsfeld’s answer to the question, “Mr. Secretary, can you explain why combatants who are on the enemy side and were captured … in some cases, combat … in wartime should not be considered prisoners of war? ”63
We must remember that though the Chinese soldiers who took off their uniforms and hid themselves in the civilians’ Safety Zone were nothing but unlawful combatants, the Japanese soldiers still treated them as prisoners-of-war. At any rate, the Japanese forces’ execution of some Chinese soldiers was nothing but the execution of unlawful combatants. Not only they did not possess any rights under the Hague Regulations of 1907, but any executions were legal according to the International Law Relating to War Conduct as there are no war regulations negating the legality of the execution of unlawful combatants.
The Chinese Nationalist Party Did Not Recognize the “Nanking Massacre”
There were no unlawful murders in Nanking, there were only legal executions. Since Bates and Fitch were writing anonymously, they deliberately described the lawful executions as unlawful murders. Since the Central Information Department decided to exaggerate and spread accounts, making the claim “after the fall of Nanking, the Japanese forces [committed] rape, arson, and looting . that is, acts of brutal cruelty,” those murders Bates and Fitch described were at odds from the real situation in Nanking as recognized by the Central Information Department. Nonetheless, if they spread word of it, they would be able to receive enormous benefits for its propaganda value. The Central Information Department, pleased by being provided with such a convenient source of propaganda, readily adopted it.
Since anonymity did not come with any journalistic responsibility for accuracy, it also allowed Bates to embellish. He added the following:
Evidence from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.64
This was completed on January 25, 1938, and was added to “Memorandum” which made up Chapter III of What War Means. The addition of this sentence . which did not appear in the original “Memorandum” . was a “major revision.”65 Since Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, which he as chairman edited, reported that the Red Swastika Society buried approximately 40,000 corpses that had been left in Nanking, and completed all the necessary burial enterprises,66 it is fair to assume that this sentence was inserted at the beginning of April of 1938 when he checked his final manuscript. In other words, after they found out the number of burials in Nanking.
This was the root of the “Nanking Massacre” wherein the Japanese forces killed 12,000 civilians and 30,000 prisoners of war. Running away was all the defeated Chinese forces could do, they did not have time to bury their fellow soldiers’ corpses at all. But Bates insisted that the corpses left in Nanking were those of soldiers massacred by Japanese forces; this view completely ignored the real situation in Nanking.
For the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department, whose goal was the propagation of anti-Japanese propaganda, this was a problem that they could not ignore. It is clear from this simple fact that, as stated before, they published the English and Chinese versions of What War Means simultaneously. The Central Information Department allowed Bates to insert the sentence of the massacre of 40,000 into the English version for Europeans and Americans who were far away from China . people who did not know much about the real situation of Nanking. However, they did not publish this sentence in the Chinese version as it could be easily have been read by the Japanese and Chinese who knew the actual situation well. If it had been published, his lie would have been detected, and their propaganda would have failed.
They treated Bates’ sentence of the massacre of 40,000 differently for the English version and the Chinese one. To reiterate from the top-secret document, the Central Information Department acknowledged, “After the enemy invaded in Nanking on December 13, 1937, rape, arson, plunder, namely wicked conduct.” They did not admit that the Japanese forces massacred people in Nanking. This paper asserts that the view of the Central Information Department was firm on this.
The National Military Council chaired by Chiang Kai-shek was an important organization of the government, and the Council of International Affairs can be considered to be one organ, or an affiliated organ, of the Chinese Nationalist government. The Council of International Affairs edited the following four books under its auspices:
1.
The War Conduct of Japanese, edited by Hsu Shuhsi and prepared
under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs in
Hankou, April 12, 1938.
(Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh,1939)

2.
A Digest of Japanese War Conduct, edited by Hsu Shuhsi and
prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs
in Chongqing, January 28, 1939.
(Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh, 1939)

3.
“The War Conduct of the Japanese, “ in The Chinese Year Book
1938.39, edited by Hsu Shuhsi and prepared from official sources
by the Council of International Affairs in Chongqing, March 15,
1939.

4.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsu Shuhsi and
prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs
in Chongqing, May 9, 1939.
(Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong : Kelly & Walsh, 1939)

When Bates’ “Memorandum” was included in the above publications, the Council of International Affairs deleted the sentence that Bates had added to What War Means, claiming a massacre of 40,000 people.
If a massacre had occurred in Nanking, it would have been natural for the Nationalist Party to take every possible opportunity to repeat it over and over again; but they did not. The Chinese Nationalist Party had a plan for “disclosing the enemy’s atrocities after the fall of the capital.”67 But even if they conducted exaggerated propaganda, they did not recognize any “massacre” in Nanking. Even if one tries to find the expression “Nanking Massacre” one can find it nowhere in Chiang Kai-Shek’s Generalissimo’s Message to the Japanese People,68 (the production of which Guo Moruo joined in69) which was printed70 by the Central Information Department on July 7, 1938, commemorating the first anniversary of the Sino-Japanese war.
The Source of the Newspaper Articles Was Bates
The first half of Chapter I of Timperley’s What War Means was contributed by Bates. According to Timperley, the chapter included Bates’ “letter to his friend in Shanghai” dated on December 15, 1937. This letter was sent not only to his friend in Shanghai but also handed to the special correspondents who were about to leave Nanking for Shanghai on December 15. He wrote about this in his letter announcing the publication of What War Means in April, 1938.
The book (What War Means) uses a statement (will be called, a “report” from now on) which I prepared on the 15th of December to be utilized by the various correspondents leaving Nanking on that date.71
On December 15, two days after the fall of the city, Bates prepared a “report” to be used by the special correspondents leaving Nanking. On that day, there were five special correspondents leaving Nanking. Among them were Steele of the Chicago Daily News and Tilman Durdin of the New York Times. They boarded the Oaff, a U.S. Navy gunboat, and left Nanking where they lost their means of communication with the international settlement in Shanghai. As soon as the Oaff left Nanking, Steele sent the following article, which was published in the Chicago Daily News on December 15 (U.S. time). In the article, he said,
The story of Nanking.s fall is a story of indescribable panic and confusion among the entrapped Chinese defenders, followed by a reign of terror by the conquering army which cost thousands of lives, many of them innocent ones. It was like killing sheep. This account is based on the observations of myself and other
foreigners remaining in Nanking through the siege.72
Following this, Durdin reported in The New York Times dated on December 18:
Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians, the eviction of Chinese from their homes, mass executions of war prisoners, and the impressing of able-bodied men turned Nanking into a city of terror.73
I will now compare their articles with Bates’ “report” in the first half of Chapter I of What War Means. (B stands for Bates, S for Steele, and D for Durdin.)
B: “At Nanking the Japanese Army has lost much of its reputation, and has thrown away a remarkable opportunity to gain the respect of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign opinion.”
S: “Japanese brutality at Nanking is costing them a golden opportunity to win the sympathy of the Chinese population.…”
D: “Through wholesale atrocities and vandalism at Nanking the Japanese Army has thrown away a rare opportunity to gain the support and confidence of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign opinion there.”
B: “Any local people freely expressed their relief when the entry of Japanese troops apparently brought an end to the strains of war conditions….”
S: “Nanking experienced a distant sense of release when the Japanese entered….”
D: “A tremendous sense of relief … pervaded the Chinese populace when the Japanese took over control within the walls.”
B: “The whole outlook has been ruined by frequent murder, wholesale and semiregular looting, and uncontrolled disturbance of private homes including offices against the security of women.”
S: “They were quickly disillusioned.”
D: “Two days of Japanese occupation changed the whole outlook. Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians … mass executions of war prisoners….”
B: “Any persons who ran in fear or excitement … was likely to be killed on the spot.”
D: “Any persons who ran because of fear or excitement was likely to be killed on the spot as was any one caught by roving patrols in streets or alley after dusk.”
B: “Foreigners who have traveled over the city report many civilian bodies lying the streets.”
S: “Streets throughout the city were littered with the bodies of civilians and abandoned Chinese equipment and uniforms.… This account is based on the observations of myself and other foreigners.”
D: “Foreigners who traveled widely through the city Wednesday found civilians dead on every street.… Many slayings were witnessed by foreigners.… Nanking’s streets were littered with dead.”
While these three men ostensibly acted separately, their descriptions are strikingly similar. Steele’s and Durdin’s articles were completely under the influence of Bates’ “report.”
Articles that condemned the Japanese army appeared 37 times only in American newspapers from December 15 through February of the following year. They can all be found in Nankinjiken Shiryoshu (Collected Materials on the Nanking Incident). The articles, the source of which turned out to be Bates’ “report,” appeared in as many as ten different newspapers. Since his “report” was published in What War Means, it can be understood and dismissed as a kind of propaganda. Just in case, however, let us verify whether or not the article was accurate.
Assuming Bates completed his writing by 6 o’clock on the morning of December 15, it means that the articles described the situations on December 13, when the city gates fell, December 14, the next day, and before dawn of December 15. To make the descriptions of Nanking at that time easy to understand, the paper recreates the situation from December 12, before the fall, to December 15 based on the records “seen by foreigners.”
Nanking on December 12
As of December 12, where were the civilians? Five days before the fall, General Tang Shengzhi, the commander of the Nanking Defense Corps, made a proclamation that all the civilians in the city must “concentrate” in the Safety Zone. Document No. 9 (dated December 17) of the International Committee (consisting of sixteen Europeans and Americans in Nanking) said, “On the 13th when your troops entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in the Zone.”74 Almost all the Chinese soldiers, on the other hand, were stationed near the city wall for the battle. This was the distribution of the population on December 12.
At 8pm on December 12, Tang, who had publicly announced his intent to defend Nanking to the death, abandoned his subordinates and fled. The Chinese forces then flew into a panic. Chaos was created by soldiers who were trying to escape from the front and as a supervising unit shot at them. The supervising unit in turn began to flee. The soldiers who tried to escape from the city wall and who tried to flee from the North Gate stampeded into a narrow defile and were crushed to death. The remaining soldiers finally threw away their weapons, took off their military uniforms, and infiltrated the Safety Zone disguised as civilians. Some soldiers tried to deprive the civilians of their clothes because they did not have any civilian clothes of their own.
Nanking from December 13 to 15
Confusion and panic continued from the night of December 12 to December 13. The New York Times and Japanese Army records made reference to Chinese military uniforms and weapons being scattered. In other words, from the 12th to 13th, more and more Chinese soldiers began to discard their military uniforms and enter the Safety Zone where civilians sought refuge, and hid themselves. The 3.86-square-kilometer Safety Zone was filled with a mix of civilians and soldiers.
Outside of the Safety Zone, the city was “practically deserted,”75 as Timperley described. He seemed to have based his information on descriptions by Bates, Professor Lewis Smythe, and Secretary-General Paul Scharfenberg of the German Embassy in Nanking. Therefore, if a massacre of civilians took place, either it happened in the Safety Zone, where in fact all the civilians took refuge, or the civilians were taken away and killed elsewhere. If the civilians were taken away and massacred, the local civilians and European and American civilians surely must have seen and heard about it.
If there were people outside the Safety Zone, they were Chinese soldiers. As Steele admitted, “The Japanese army did not obtain the whole city instantly. From the place they entered, they advanced orderly, and hunted down Chinese soldiers from one block to the other.… It took several days to complete the occupation,”76 The fall of the gates on December 13 did not mean the instantaneous fall and occupation of Nanking. The battle between the Japanese and Chinese forces continued for several days even after Japanese entry into the city.77 When the Japanese army entered the city, the Safety Zone was actually in the middle of a sort of a battle.
Only the 7th Infantry Regiment entered the Safety Zone. Other officers and soldiers were denied entry.
For three days, on December 14, 15, and 16, the 7th Infantry Regiment had specific orders to undertake mop-up operations (typical with any battle) to eliminate remaining enemies and secure Nanking. They also prosecuted regular Chinese soldiers. They executed only those who had given indications of resistance, and conscripted others as coolies.
This was the situation of Nanking on December 12 before the fall, and from the 13th to the 15th. Did the Japanese army massacre civilians and prisoners of war? In other words, did the Europeans and Americans in Nanking see and hear the incidents reported by Bates, Steele, and Durdin? It must be questioned. As stated before, Documents of Nanking Safety Zone, the Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians, and Tomisawa Shigenobu’s Nankin Jiken no Subete . Deta Besu ni yoru Zenjiken Ristoappu (The Whole Nanking Incident . Listing All the Incidents Using a Database), no murders were witnessed. Dated on December 14, Document No. 1 of the International Committee says, “We come to thank you for the fine way your artillery spared the Safety Zone…. “78 If murder, looting, and rape had frequently happened, and Bates’ testament that, “surely there is no page that will stand so black as that of the rape of Nanking,” had been true, such words of gratitude from the committee would not have been made to the Japanese army.
There were no murders after the fall of the city. The evidence for this is found in Documents of Nanking Safety Zone in the Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians. There were only five incidents that the Chinese made appeals on from December 13 to 14, and which Bates’ ”report” mentioned as problems. They were all the incidents on December 14. Out of the five, three cases were rape, and two cases were the theft of gloves, fountain pens, and clocks.79 Moreover, they were incidents without witnesses and credibility because no one knew who had witnessed them.
While Bates wrote of “frequent murder” in his “report” to the U.S., did he complain only of the Japanese Army’s plunder of gloves to the Japanese Embassy? While the Europeans and Americans in Nanking were supposedly observing thousands of innocent civilians being slaughtered like sheep, instead of making a complaint to the Japanese Embassy about that, why did they instead complain about these five incidents? It is strange in that if “frequent murder” had been true, why did the International Committee feel the need to record only the theft of gloves? Since there were other serious incidents which should have been recorded, didn’t the Committee record them?
Bates’ Real Intention Is An Enigma
Bates, who had insisted that the executions had been unlawful, did not mention them when he used his own name. For example, When Cabot Coville, a military attache who came from the American Embassy in Tokyo to Nanking in April, 1938, to confer with Bates and gather detailed information,, Bates never referred to the contents of his articles which were in What War Means and his assertion which was added to it.80 This was because Professor Lewis Smythe, Consul John Allison, Vice-Consul James Espy, the British Consul E. W. Jeffrey, Secretary George Rosen and others were present and knew the actual situation. Even Bates, who insisted that, “in America and England we are accustomed to free statement of facts and opinion,”81 could not state what was not true, and tell them lies.
Even so, why did Bates release a groundless “report”? So far the reason has not been fully explored or understood. What is known is that he was at the time an “advisor” to the Nationalist Chinese Government before the fall of Nanking, and that he was later twice decorated by the Chinese government. It was in 1938 when he inserted the bit about the “Japanese army’s killing of prisoners of war and civilians” (which he did not mention to Coville), into What War Means, and in 1946, when he testified to the massacre of 40,000 people at the Tokyo Tribunal as a witness.82
Theodore White, who was hired as an “advisor” by the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department and later became a prominent journalist, seems to hint at Bates’ motive in his memoir, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure. When White assumed his office in Chongqing in April, 1939, he did not fully understand his job. His lack of understanding was not due to his irresponsibility; no one could explain his job.
I did not understand the job. No one could explain it to me. I
thought of myself in the stiff Socialist rhetoric of my youth as a “fighter against Fascism.” But in reality, I was employed to manipulate American public opinion. The support of America against the Japanese was the government.s one hope for survival; to sway the American press was critical. It was considered necessary to lie to it, to deceive it, to do anything to persuade America that the future of China and the United States ran together against Japan.83
Conclusion
The Chinese Nationalist Party, which had released disinformation to the U.S. but never to the Chinese mainland, and the Communist Party, knew the “Nanking Massacre” was, above all, just war propaganda.84 While American newspapers first reported on the “Nanking Massacre,” the U.S. government only addressed problems such as the accidental bombing of the Panay in Nanking and the incident of the beating of Consul John Allison; they never touched upon any “Nanking Massacre.” So didn’t the U.S. government know about it?
When the war ended, the war propaganda should have been stopped. The Tokyo Tribunals, which relied solely on war propaganda, conducted anything but a fair “trail” .85 It assumed the “Nanking Massacre” was true and executed General Matsui Iwane, the Supreme Commander in Nanking, as a scapegoat.86 The facts that the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department sealed away never to be detected as propaganda were all the more hidden away.
In summary, the Sino-Japanese war broke out in July, 1937, and the Nationalist Party cooperated with the Communist Party in September 1937 to fight against Japan. The Nationalist Party received support from the U.S. and Germany, so it was important to promote anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese sentiment in the U.S. and Europe. It was also necessary to overcome Chinese military inferiority. So in November they established the Central Information Department to promote propaganda warfare . delegated propaganda, exaggerated propaganda, adverse propaganda, and so on. The quintessential example of the department was What War Means They paid money to Harold Timperley, their international friend, to edit it. Then they edited and published it.
On the other hand, Miner Bates, an advisor to the Chinese Nationalist Government, wrote anonymous articles for What War Means, and added the infamous line about a massacre of 40,000 people. It was published in American newspapers, and spread throughout the world. He also testified to this at the Tokyo Tribunal. Moreover, he was decorated twice by the Chinese Government: when he wrote a part of the book in 1938, and when he testified at the Tokyo Tribunal in 1946.
What War Means was highly regarded as important evidence for the “Nanking Massacre,” but it turns out to be a merely war propaganda. That the book was written from a neutral third party is completely untrue. On the contrary, the Nationalist Party promoted the existence of a “Nanking Massacre” using the book.
As stated before, the real facts of the “Nanking Massacre” were doubly sealed and became insubstantial. This was the beginning of the second tragedy for Japan. War propaganda was conveyed to the postwar world as the facts of the situation. The “Nanking Massacre” has been eating at the Japanese heart. At the same time, it has been preventing the normal development Japanese-Chinese relations. Ironically, since this fiction has come to be accepted by the post-War Japanese as factual history, the Beijing government has decided that they could use it for their own diplomatic purposes.
In May 1988 the late Professor Muramatsu Takeshi urged the Chinese in Beijing, “You mention the ‘Nanking Massacre’ and say 300,000 people were killed. But there were only 200,000 people in Nanking at that time. How could they kill 300,000 people? Establish the International Committee (for the research).”87 Sun Ping Hua, the president of the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Association answered, “There is no such need. The number of 300,000 has already been decided.” War propaganda made up by the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department, together with the Communist Party, was introduced to the present Chinese Communist Party. The “Nanking Massacre” became a politically determined fact.
But thanks to the result of the recent research and the newly discovered top secret documents, the veil of the “Nanking Massacre” has finally been removed, and the real facts are exposed to the public eye. Unless the world recognizes, and copes with it, we cannot say that the war ended in peace. War threatens the lives of people, but war propaganda threatens their very hearts. Therefore, we must eradicate it.
(This chapter first appeared in the 29th International Congress of Military History: War, Military and Media from Gutenberg to Today, issued in
Bucharest by Military Publishing in 2004.)
CHAPTER 17:
NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO
THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS
NO MASSACRE IN NANKING

1. On December 13, 1937, approximately 67 years ago, the city of Nanking fell. Japanese newspapers of that era carried photographs showing Japanese soldiers standing atop one of the city gates, raising their voices in cheers of “Banzai!” Other photographs showed people carrying lanterns and parading through the streets of Japan’s towns and cities to celebrate the victory.
But in the U.S., the coverage was entirely different. The top headline of the December 15 edition of the Chicago Daily News read “Nanking Massacre Story.” The text of the article reads, in part, as follows.
The story of Nanking’s fall is a story of indescribable panic and confusion among the entrapped Chinese defenders, followed by a reign of terror by the conquering army which cost thousands of lives, many of them innocent ones. (…) This account is based on the observations of myself and other foreigners in Nanking throughout the siege.1
The New York Times, in its December 18 edition, ran a similar story under the title of “Nanking Butchery Marked Its Fall.” Excerpts follow.
Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians … turned Nanking into a city of terror. (…) Any person who ran because of fear or excitement was likely to be killed on the spot (…) Many slayings were witnessed by foreigners.2
Reading these articles, one would certainly be led to believe that the moment Japanese troops breached the city walls, they had stormed the city and proceeded “to plunder, murder, rape, at will” any citizens who crossed their paths. The two news stories marked the first time that the world ever heard of the “Nanking Massacre.”
Both were scoops, the former wired by Archibald Steele, and the latter by Tillman Durdin. Steele and Durdin, the foreign witnesses described in the articles, were American correspondents who were in Nanking when the city fell, but left soon after (December 15).
The news seemed to spread like wildfire. Nearly 200 Japanese journalists and photographers were scouring Nanking for news, and word of the massacre stories reached some of them, including Maeda Yuji, a graduate of Tokyo University who had majored in French literature. Maeda was employed by the news agency Domei Tsushin, which assigned him cover the movements of Japanese troops involved in the Battle of Nanking. Years later (in 1982), Maeda authored a book entitled Caught up in the Current of War, which includes the following passage.
Cables emanating from foreign news agencies described numerous instances of looting, rape and arson in the Safety Zone, after the city was occupied. (…) My colleagues and I stared at each other, dumbfounded. Not one photographer – not one cinematographer (and they had all made the rounds of the city) had heard about any violent crime in Nanking once order was restored. (…) If any unlawful acts had been committed, not just people from my agency, but the 100 other journalists assigned to Nanking from Japan’s news media would have heard about them.3
Another journalist, Yamamoto Osamu, was in Nanking when the hostilities took place, representing the Osaka Asahi Shinbun. About the alleged atrocities, he wrote: “I neither saw nor heard anything about them. (…) We reporters used to get together every night … but nobody from any of the Asahi papers mentioned anything of the sort.” When Yamamoto returned to Japan in the summer of 1938, someone struck up a conversation with him at a Kobe hotel. “He told me he’d heard that Japanese soldiers had committed violent acts in Nanking. I couldn’t believe my ears. My interlocutor reported that he had read about them in a foreign newspaper.”4
Who was telling the truth?
Since the two American correspondents departed from Nanking on December 15, we must assume that their reports were based on foreigners’ “observation” and “witnesses” between the 13th and the 15th. Let us now have a look at “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civlians,” 5 compiled in February 1938 by Lewis Smythe, professor at the University of Nanking, then edited as Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone by Hsu Shuhsi and published in 1939: “The following section of cases … completes the story of the first two months of the Japanese Army’s occupation of Nanking.”
During the three-day period in question, the following cases are mentioned: one rape and two instances of looting for a total of three cases on December 13, a murder, four rapes and three thefts (of gloves, a fountain pen and a clock) on December 14, and four murders, five rapes, and five cases of looting on December 15. But it was never made clear who had witnessed these crimes. The murders committed prior to the two foreigners’ departure from Nanking were few, and were not substantiated. No one had witnessed the murder of a civilian during the three days that followed the fall of Nanking.6 What did the reporters mean by “observations of myself and other foreigners” and “many slayings were witnessed by foreigners?”
2. What actually was the situation in Nanking at about the time of the city’s fall, when the two American correspondents (Steele and Durdin) and other foreigners claimed that they witnessed a massacre? Five days before the city fell, the commander in chief of the Nanking Defense Corps ordered all civilians to evacuate to the Safety Zone. International Committee Document No. 9 bears witness to the fact that, for all intents and purposes, every civilian in Nanking took refuge in the Safety Zone.
But during the Battle of Nanking, events that the Japanese could not have anticipated occurred. Commander-in-Chief Tang Shengzhi ignored Japanese warnings to surrender, swearing to fight to the death, if necessary, to defend Nanking. But at 8:00 p.m. on December 12 (shortly before the fall of Nanking), Tang fled from the battlefield, without surrendering, even though the hostilities were still in full force.
Tang’s men were trapped inside the city, surrounded by huge walls and gates. They had two options: escape from the city or infiltrate the “neutral” Safety Zone, which was intended only for civilians. Since the city was about to fall, most of the soldiers poured into the Safety Zone, where the mixture of combatants and civilians caused chaos. (Foreigners had also taken refuge there.)
The Japanese breached Nanking’s gates in the wee hours of December 13. Chinese troops never surrendered; in fact, the hostilities continued outside the city’s walls. Fleeing Chinese troops launched fierce assaults on Japanese soldiers, killing or wounding many of them.
Between December 14 and 16, Japanese troops embarked on a mission “to solidify the occupation by sweeping Nanking and its outskirts to rid those areas of any remaining enemy soldiers.” The restoration of public order hinges on such sweeps, which were then, and continue to be, essential battlefield operations.
The Japanese faced their most daunting challenge in the Safety Zone. Chinese troops, having discarded their uniforms, were posing as civilians. To make matters worse, there were Chinese military facilities inside the Safety Zone. Although those facilities should have been vacant, they were occupied by some enemy soldiers, who had hidden weapons inside them and were using them to launch a counterattack. Any such assault within the Safety Zone would cause hostilities to recommence. There would be civilian casualties, and Japanese soldiers would be in danger as well. Japanese military authorities ordered the 7th Regiment (and that unit only) to sweep the Safety Zone. Its men exposed and captured Chinese soldiers, and executed any who resisted on the banks of the Yangtze River. However, the Japanese used most of the soldiers they ferreted out as coolies (a total of 10,000 men as of February 28, 1938.)7
Then what are we to make of the “[w]holesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians” witnessed by the two American journalists and by no one else? We can assume only that the reports they wrote were informed by (1) the panic that ensued with the fall of Nanking, (2) the presence of corpses, and (3) executions that took place on the banks of the Yangtze River.
For instance, Durdin wrote, “The capture of the Hsiakwan [Yijiang] Gate by the Japanese was accompanied by the mass killing of the defenders, who were piled up among the sandbags, forming a mound six feet high.”8 In his mind, the corpses were the result of “mass killing.” But as he recalled 50 years later, they were the bodies of Chinese soldiers who had flocked to Yijiang Gate, the sole escape route inside the city walls, where they had the misfortune to be trampled to death, or shot and killed by a Chinese supervisory unit.
Right before he left Nanking, Steele wrote about executions of Chinese: “The last thing we saw as we left the city was a band of 300 Chinese being methodically executed before the wall near the waterfront.”9 But note that when he was asked, 50 years later, whether he had seen Chinese being massacred, he replied that he had seen a large number of soldiers being shot in a systematic and orderly manner.10 Since Steele mentioned soldiers, it was clear that he had perceived the execution of soldiers as a massacre.
Furthermore, one would have expected Durdin, too, when asked (50 years later) for his impressions of the three days he spent in Nanking, to describe the traumatic experience of witnessing (or being told of) the murders of women and children. Instead, he replied that the Safety Zone, though packed with refugees, was peaceful, and food seemed abundant.11
In other words, neither journalist ever witnessed “wholesale looting, the violation of women, or the murder of civilians.” We can make this statement with confidence because the information we presented in 1. (i.e., that there no murders of civilians), is supported by “daily reports of serious injuries to civilians” compiled by Dr. Smythe on behalf of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone) and the recollections of reporters assigned to Japanese units. The Americans apparently seemed to base their opinions that a massacre had taken place on the corpses lying in the street and executions conducted by the Japanese military.
3. Japan’s Army authorities dispatched a team to Nanking to determine whether there was any truth to the “Nanking Massacre” stories carried by American newspapers. Ishii Itaro, head of the Foreign Ministry’s East Asia Bureau, read the “daily reports of serious injuries to civilians” from the International Committee delivered to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking. The report he subsequently submitted to the government listed acts of rape, arson and looting committed by Japanese military personnel inside the walls of Nanking;12 however, are we to attribute the fact that they contained not one instance of the word “massacre” to mere coincidence?
The reports checked by Ishii, which covered a two-month period, listed a total of 26 murders, 175 rapes, 131 robberies, and five cases of arson. Most of the reports were based on rumors, and contained no witnesses’ names.13 The only murder observed by a named witness turned out to be a lawful execution.14
In those reports, every incident reported by a resident of Nanking or a foreign resident there was recorded. The information was accepted as fact by foreign residents of Nanking. It is small wonder that Ishii Itaro and other Japanese investigators reached the conclusion that the “wholesale looting, the violation of women, or the murder of civilians” supposedly witnessed by foreigners had never been committed.
How did Americans react to the stories they read in the newspapers? After Steele’s and Durdin’s articles appeared in their respective newspapers, other American newspapers carried similar coverage. However, the only protest raised by the U.S. government concerned the bombing (in error) of the Panay, and the assault against
U.S.
Consul John Allison. At the February 1938 conference of the League of Nations, a representative of the Republic of China broached the topic of the “Nanking Massacre” (as described in U.S. newspapers). However, the League was not asked to send an investigative team similar to the Lytton Commission to Nanking.

What about the Chinese Nationalist Party, which claimed that a multitude of compatriots had been massacred? If the Nanking Massacre story had been true, the Party would certainly have unleashed anti-Japanese invective for days on end . invective far more vitriolic than what we hear today. But nowhere in China at War, issued in April, 1938 by the Ministry of Information, do we find any mention of a “Nanking Massacre,” though the book does contain references to the city itself.15 Nor does the famous address entitled “On Protracted War” delivered by Communist Party head Mao Zedong over nine days in late May 1938 contain even one reference to a massacre in Nanking. Mao did address Japanese strategic errors, however, and in citing one of them (failing to take advantage of opportunities to annhilate more enemy soldiers in Nanking), he essentially discredits the massacre theory.16

U.S.
newspapers may have publicized the massacre argument, but no other nation disseminated similar accusations. Nor did any other nation scorn Japan for having perpetrated a massacre in Nanking.

But looking back, we realize that the Japanese Foreign Ministry was seriously remiss in not immediately reacting to accusations published in American newspapers by setting the story straight. An international investigative team should have been formed, and the results of its work published for all the world to see.
Harold Timperley took full advantage of this unfortunate lapse on the part of the Japanese. He published, in London and New York, What War Means: Japanese Terror in China in July 1938, the first anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War (and seven months after the massacre stories appeared in U.S. newspapers). The book was supposedly written from the perspective of a disinterested party who wished to impress upon the public the cruelty of war, with the Sino-Japanese War as a backdrop. The first four chapters of the eight-chapter book consist of letters written by foreign residents of Nanking to a friend.
[I]n two days the whole outlook has been ruined by frequent murder, wholesale and semiregular looting, and uncontrolled disturbance of private homes including offences against the security of women. (…) Complete anarchy has reigned for ten days
- it has been a hell on earth … close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed.17
The Chinese translation of What War Means (entitled Japanese Atrocities as Witnessed by Foreigners) was also published in July 1938. Not long afterwards a French-language edition was issued. Japanese government officials were not, however, accustomed to protesting or even objecting in situations like this. They simply pretended that What War Means didn’t exist, never dreaming that their failure to set a wrong right would haunt them long after Japan’s defeat.
4. On December 8, 1945 (six months prior to the commencement of the Tokyo Trials), Japan’s newspapers carried a two-page article entitled “History of the Pacific War: The Downfall of Deceitful, Militarist Japan, Supplied by Allied Headquarters.” An excerpt follows:
A nightmare in Nanking (… ) We have positive proof that Japanese troops perpetrated unspeakable atrocities, slaughtering 20,000 men, women, and children, from witnesses who described the worst massacre in modern history. During a four-week period, Nanking transmuted into a city of blood. Hacked-off pieces of flesh littered the streets.18
But exactly who were the witnesses? Where was the “positive proof” that 20,000 persons had been slaughtered? Allied Headquarters never conducted an investigation of the events that were said to have transpired in Nanking.
The Tokyo Trials began on May 3, 1946, and in July the court took up the matter of the “Nanking Massacre.” At no time during the proceedings were the articles published in American newspapers about the “massacre” or What War Means submitted to the court, either in part or in their entirety, despite their potential evidentiary value. Nor were the contributors, both named and nameless, called as witnesses.
Five Chinese and three Americans took the witness stand. Their testimony should have been weighed carefully, and a determination made as to whether it was eyewitness testimony or corroborative testimony. However, only Rev. John Magee was asked, under cross-examination, how many murders he had personally witnessed. He replied that he’d seen only one (involving one victim), but according to a diary entry he had made at the time, which mentioned that particular case, Magee wrote that “The actual killing we did not see as it took place.”19
The testimony that most heavily affected the outcome of the Tokyo Trials was that given by Rev. Miner Bates, who claimed that “as a result of our investigations and observations and checking of burials, that twelve thousand civilians, men, women and children were killed inside the walls within our own sure knowledge.”20 Also, citing the figure of 30,000, Bates insinuated that prisoners of war had been massacred: “Large parties of Chinese soldiers laid down their arms, surrendered, immediately outside the walls of the city and there, within the first seventy-two hours, were cut down by machine gun fire.”21 However, not once did Bates publicly accuse Japanese military personnel of having executed prisoners of war.
In February 1947, subsequent to his testimony at the Tokyo Trials, Bates made the following statement.
[A] low and incomplete figure for civilian deaths … inflicted by the Japanese in the first few weeks of their occupation of Nanking, was 12,000; and for deaths of unarmed men in military clothing, 35,000. Of these murders, over 90 per cent occurred in the first ten days, most of all in the first three days.22
Bates’ allegation that the slaughter occurred “most of all in the first three days” is important, because we have already demonstrated that it is untrue. Since foreign residents’ estimates of the population of Nanking (200,000 immediately before its fall,23 200,000 10 days later,24 and 250,000 a month later25), they obviously didn’t think that there had been a decrease. In fact, it is impossible to imagine that there were even several dozen murders, judging from an examination of the contents of the aforementioned “daily reports of serious injuries to civilians” over a period of two months.
The only possible explanation for Bates’ massacre accusations is executions of enemy soldiers by Japanese troops during the 72-hour sweep of Nanking. It is important to remember that those executed were not “unarmed men in military clothing,” but unlawful combatants who had cast off their uniforms. So the executions were not unlawful.
Nevertheless, Bates’ testimony wielded tremendous influence on the Tokyo Trials. On November 11, 1948, the Tribunal’s verdict was read: “More than 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war were killed within and near Nanking during the first six weeks of the occupation of the Japanese Army.”26
5. The verdict handed down at the Tokyo Trials stated that Japanese military personnel had killed at least 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war. Today the “Nanking Massacre” is mentioned in the same breath as the Nazi Holocaust, but we find reactions to that verdict, or rather, the lack of any at the time, puzzling. For years none of the world’s nations (including the Republic of China) spoke out about a massacre in Nanking. There was not a single reference to a “Nanking Massacre” in the textbooks of Japan, China, or any other nation, for that matter. After that, it seemed as though the verdict rendered at the Tokyo Trials had been accepted, but only nominally so.
Then, 25 years after the Tokyo Trials, when diplomatic relations between Japan and China were normalized, the climate shifted, and the “Nanking Massacre” allegations resurfaced. A new movement took shape . one whose adherents were convinced that justice had been served at the Tokyo Trials as far as Nanking was concerned, and sought to focus the world’s attention on the “Nanking Massacre.”
The turning point in public opinion came when Travels in China, written by Honda Katsuichi, was serialized in the Asahi Shinbun in 1971. The articles consist of testimony provided by Chinese nationals who claimed that they had been harmed in some way by Japanese soldiers during the Sino-Japanese War. The following year, the articles were compiled into a book, which became a bestseller.
Another ten years elapsed, and then the spotlight focused on “Nanking,” one of the chapters of Travels in China. Someone unearthed the articles that had appeared in U.S. newspapers in late 1937, as well as What War Means. All of these were translated into Japanese and widely disseminated. What War Means was held in high esteem because it was revealed that the man whose (anonymous) allegations it contained had testified at the Tokyo Trials. That man was none other than Professor Miner Bates.
In his testimony Bates had never uttered a word about What War Means. Since he was a contributor to the book, why did he neither mention What War Means nor submit it as evidence at the Tokyo Trials? In any case, the book penned by someone who was both a Christian missionary and a professor at the University of Nanking received great acclaim.
In 1982, an article printed in Japanese newspapers stated that Japan’s Ministry of Education had ordered publishers to tone down language used in a high-school history textbook, replacing the word invasion in “the invasion into China by the Japanese Army” with advance. The Ministry had never issued instructions to that effect, but the appearance of the article resulted in protests from China. Consequently, new approval standards requiring textbooks to be more sensitive toward Japan’s neighbors were introduced, and soon the “Nanking Massacre” found its way into the textbooks of both Japan and China.
In 1985, the Museum of the Nanjing Massacre was established in China. Fifty years after the fall of Nanking, most of the people involved in the occupation of that city were no longer alive. However, Fukuda Tokuyasu, a junior diplomat attached to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking at the time (and later minister of posts and telecommunications), was entrusted with the processing of complaints addressed to the Embassy. About the “massacre” allegations, he remarked:
It is true that not all Japanese soldiers behaved well. But there was no massacre -not of 1,000 individuals, let alone 200,000 or 300,000. (…) The supposed venue was a public place. The consequences of a massacre would have been disastrous. Furthermore, there would have been a multitude of witnesses. These accusations are outright lies. They are propaganda, pure and simple.27
Fukuda Tokuyasu was in Nanking right after the city fell, and he interacted with Europeans and Americans residing there. He swore that the “Nanking Massacre” allegations were built on lies and propaganda, but he was unable to supply evidence to support his convictions. In recent years, Fukuda’s claims, especially “propaganda” have at long last acquired credibility. First of all, What War Means was “edited and published”28 by the Nationalist Party’s Ministry of Information as a “propaganda material”29. Second, its editor, Harold Timperley, was an “advisor”30 to that same ministry. Furthermore, we now know the names of the anonymous contributors. One was George Fitch, whose wife was a “close friend”31 of Mme.
Chiang Kai-shek. The other was Miner Bates, who served as an “advisor”32 to the Nationalist government.
As for the source of the American newspaper articles that first broadcast the “Nanking Massacre” story to the world, again the evidence points to Professor Bates: “The book uses a statement which I prepared on the 15 of December to be utilized by the various correspondents leaving Nanking on that date.”33 The statement became the second half of the first chapter of What War Means. The foreign witnesses to the “Nanking Massacre” mentioned in the U.S. newspaper articles certainly included Bates, whom the Nationalist government decorated twice.34 He received the first award in 1938 (the same year in which he submitted his anonymous contribution to What War Means claiming that 40,000 persons had been massacred in Nanking), and the second in 1946 (the year when he reiterated this claim on the witness stand at the Tokyo Trials).
6. Now that there is a distinct possibility that the “Nanking Massacre” was Nationalist propaganda, we recall an article written by Tillman Durdin. As mentioned earlier, Durdin was the New York Times correspondent who disseminated stories about the “Nanking Massacre.” We discovered only recently that he was also a good friend and “old colleague” of Hollington Tong, the Nationalist vice-minister of information.
Durdin wired the article in question to the New York Times on December 22, 1938. It reads, in part:
[T]he Chinese command, fully realizing the practical certainty that the Chinese Army would be completely surrounded in the walled city of Nanking … chose voluntarily to place themselves in just such a situation, apparently with the intention of making the capture of the city as costly as possible.
What was the Chinese plan to make the Japanese conquest of Nanking “costly?” It is certainly within the realm of possibility that Nanking Defense Corps commanders were anticipating that Chinese troops remaining in Nanking might enter the Safety Zone before the city fell, creating panic and havoc; and that after the city fell, the Japanese might search the Safety Zone for Chinese troops, whom they would then capture and execute. Such a scenario would be perfect fodder for the Nationalist propaganda machine.
Coincidentally, a “top-secret” propagandist document from the second Nationalist-Communist coalition’s Ministry of Information has surfaced. Issued in 1941 and entitled Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department, Ministry of Information, the document describes propaganda strategy implemented during the three-year period commencing on December 1, 1937 (prior to the fall of Nanking).
Let us first examine the outline of operations issued by the Counterintelligence Division (one branch of the five-division, three-section ministry). It states that the Counterintelligence Division circulated a secret report describing What War Means as a book compiled and published by the Ministry of Information for propaganda purposes, and includes a synopsis of What War Means:
The book recounts rapes, arsons and lootings, i.e., heinous crimes perpetrated by enemy troops subsequent to their invasion of Nanking on December 13, 1937. It also describes in detail violations of military rules and basic standards of human decency.35 [Italics supplied.]
What War Means is crammed with accounts of murders, rapes, arsons and lootings. Consequently, one would expect the Ministry of Information to have made at least some mention of those crimes at the very beginning of the synopsis. However, the words “murders” and “massacre” are nowhere to be found.
Let us also explore another outline of operations, this one issued by the Foreign Affairs Division. The staff of this division of the International Information Department obviously believed that its propaganda would be more effective if disseminated by foreign journalists. Between December 1, 1937 and October 24, 1938 the department held 300 combination press conferences and tea parties.36
However, there is no mention of press conferences held to announce the “Nanking Massacre,” neither when American newspapers reported a massacre in Nanking in mid-December 1937, nor when What War Means came out in July 1938. If there actually had been a massacre in Nanking, it would certainly have behooved the Nationalist Ministry of Information to react to the news that Chinese citizens had been killed in an unlawful manner by presenting the facts to the entire world, and immediately so.
Furthermore, operations outlines issued by other divisions of the Ministry of Information (all of which we have examined) contain no confidential reports describing the use of mass murders in Nanking for propaganda purposes. What are we to make of the fact that absolutely no reference to the “Nanking Massacre” appears in these primary sources . confidential reports emanating from the Nationalist Ministry of Information?
We have established the following facts: (1) there is no mention of unlawful killings in the “daily reports of serious injuries to civilians,” and (2) Bates’ claim that the Japanese murdered 40,000 Chinese was deleted from the Chinese translation of What War Means, as well as from four printings of the English-language version of the book.37 When we combine these facts with other suspicious “evidence” and inconsistencies, we can arrive at only one logical conclusion: the Nationalist Ministry of Information perceived the “Nanking Massacre” not as historical fact, but as propaganda material.
We, too, wonder whether some civilians were caught up among Chinese soldiers exposed subsequent to the hostilities in Nanking, and whether perhaps some unlawful executions might possibly have taken place. But this is mere speculation.
Ultimately, we realize that the “Nanking Massacre,” originally a Nationalist propaganda tool, was resurrected to help justify the Tokyo Trials. We must insist that those who argue that there was a massacre in Nanking produce even one contemporary Nationalist Party document that offers unequivocal and unambiguous proof of the “Nanking Massacre.”
(This chapter first appeared in Sankei Shimbun from January 3 to 8, 2005 )
SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER:
REREADING RABE’S DIARY
Six months have elapsed since the publication of the Japanese translation of John Rabe’s diary, The Truth About Nanking (subsequently translated into English under the title The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe). Since Rabe served as chairman of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, the book has generated a great deal of interest and controversy. It has already been evaluated by six critics, but it is our opinion that those evaluations have not been sufficiently exhaustive.
The book, advertised as a diary, actually comprises two distinct sections. One is the diary Rabe kept while in Nanking, entries from which he compiled the two-volume The Bombing of Nanking in October 1942 (four-and-a-half years after he had returned to Berlin). Did Rabe edit his original entries during that period, making additions to some entries and deleting material from others? This is the first question that comes to mind.
The other section consists of written reports addressed to Adolf Hitler. Are the diary entries consistent with his reports to Hitler? This is the next question we must address.
Investigative Focus
For our investigation, we will focus on Rabe’s diary entry for January 9, in which he describes the one and only execution to which there were witnesses.
Kroger and Hatz arrive at our Zone headquarters at 11 o’clock and report that there’s been a “small” execution that they were forced to witness. A Japanese officer and two soldiers drove a Chinese civilian out into one of the ponds on Shansi Road. When the man was standing hip-deep in the water, one of the soldiers made himself comfortable behind a nearby sandbag barricade and kept firing until his victim sank into the pond.1
Accounts similar to this one appear in other books, namely:
(1)
Harold Timperley, The Japanese Terror in China, “Case No. 185,” 1938, 1969, p. 159ff.

(2)
Hsu Shuhsi (ed.), Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, “Case No. 185,” 1939, p. 78. (This book is a compilation, effected by the editor, of documents issued by the International Committee in protest of Japanese atrocities, and signed by Rabe, issued by the Council of International Affairs in Chongqing.)

(3)
Translation of (1) in Hora Tomio, (ed.), Source Material Relating to the Great Nanking Massacre during the Second Sino Japanese War, Vol. 2: English-Language Sources

Though accounts of Case No. 185, supposedly witnessed by Kroger and Hatz, appear in all three books, they are not consistent with Rabe’s account. The results of an investigation conducted by the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, i.e., that what Rabe described simply as “executions” were, in fact, lawful executions performed by the Japanese military are cited in the notes to (1), (2), and (3). Rabe did not, however, mention that crucial report in his diary. By omitting any reference to it, he was implying that lawful executions were unlawful massacres.
We will now cite all existing accounts that contain references to Case No. 185 for purposes of comparison. English-language records used as propaganda by the Republic of China, accounts written by American residents of Nanking, and The Sino-Japanese Conflict, a collection of official documents from 1937 to 1939, prepared by the German Embassy in Nanking (on microfilm) are extant and available for analysis.
Rabe’s diary consists of (1) factual accounts, (2) accounts in which he embellishes the facts, (3) accounts that omit crucial facts, and (4) accounts based on stories he heard from Chinese informants and accepted as fact. All of the passages cited below belong to one of these four categories.
Discrepancies Between Rabe’s Diary and Official Documents
Rabe writes about grenades landing in the Safety Zone, causing deaths.
The first grenades land in the refugee Zone in front of and behind the Foo Chong [Hempel’s] Hotel. A total of twelve dead and about twelve wounded. … Another grenade was fired into our Zone (at the middle school) and killed 13 people.2
Strangely enough, he does not say whether the victims were soldiers or civilians. In one of the documents included in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, which bears his signature, Rabe wrote, “ … we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zone in which there had been very little destruction by stray shells … .”3 He could not have written these words if civilians had been killed. He omitted an important fact, i.e., that the dead were Chinese soldiers.
Robert Wilson wrote, in a letter dated December 14, 1937, that in the firing of guns the Japanese Army had apparently made special efforts to keep the Safety Zone intact.4 We find in the document a similar expression of gratitude to the Japanese Army from Rabe, the committee chairman. Hata Ikuhiko claims that no such letter exists but, as Watanabe Shoichi has already indicated, it does. It appears at the beginning of Document No.
1: “We come to thank you for the fine way your artillery spared the Safety Zone.”5 The words in italics were intentionally omitted from the Japanese translation of Rabe’s book, which may explain why Hata reached the conclusion he did.
Inconsistencies in Rabe’s Overdramatized Diary
The entry in Rabe’s diary for December 13, the day after Nanking fell, provides much food for thought.
We drive very cautiously
down the main street.
There’s a danger you
may drive over one of

the hand grenades lying about and be blown sky-high. We turn onto Shanghai Lu, where several dead civilians are lying, and drive on toward the advancing Japanese. One Japanese detachment, with a German-speaking doctor, tells us that the Japanese general is not expected for two days yet.6 [Italics supplied.]
If the Red Swastika Society’s records are accurate, there were 20 bodies on Shanghai Road. Were they indeed the corpses of civilians, as Rabe described them?
It was standard procedure for Chinese soldiers, in the face of defeat, to shed their uniforms, change into civilian clothes, and flee, while the Chinese supervisory unit fired at them from behind (also standard procedure). A Chinese officer standing near Rabe (who was urging Chinese troops to lay down their arms) was firing his carbine. The corpses may have been those of Chinese soldiers shot by that officer as they attempted to escape.
On December 8, Tang Shengzhi issued an evacuation order, directing all civilians to concentrate in the Safety Zone, and forbidding them to leave it. There are references to this order in Japanese and American records, but none in Rabe’s diary.
International Committee Document No. 9, which bears Rabe’s signature, reads as follows: “In other words, on the 13th, when your troops entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zone … .”7 Thus, civilians could not have been in the battle zone at the intersection of Zhongshan and Shanghai roads. The bodies seen by Rabe were those of soldiers, not civilians, his diary entry notwithstanding.
If Japanese troops had shot civilians, the “Espy Report,” which contained complaints from 14 American residents of Nanking submitted to the American Embassy, would have mentioned such incidents.8 Since it does not, we must assume that the Japanese military personnel did not shoot civilians.
Rabe’s Blatant Prevarications
Rabe did not, of course, state specifically that Japanese soldiers shot civilians. But he attempted to sway the reader by using the passive voice, and omitting the subjects of sentences. Note the report that he sent to Hitler, which differs subtly from what he wrote in his diary.
According to a Japanese soldier on outpost duty who came by on a bicycle, the supreme commander would be arriving within three days. Here and there were the dead bodies of Chinese civilians. Upon examining several of them, I found that they had been shot point-blank in the back, perhaps when they were trying to flee.9 [Italics supplied.]
The italicized portions of this excerpt differ from the diary entry cited above. The discrepancy in the number of days (two versus three) is not serious, but the other inconsistencies are. Rabe exaggerated and bent the truth to create what is, essentially, propaganda. Rabe did not “present the facts in an unbiased manner,”10 as critic Fukuda Kazuya claims.
False Reports to Hitler
Here are further excerpts from Rabe’s report to Hitler.
Suspected of once having been soldiers, thousands of individuals were killed with machine guns or hand grenades.11
Gasoline was poured over them, and they were burned alive.12
Females ranging in age from eight to over 70 were raped and killed … beer bottles or bamboo sticks had been shoved into their genitals. I saw these victims with my own eyes.13
Perhaps half of the resident population has died from this pestilence.14 [Italics supplied.]
In his diary entry for December 24, Rabe writes that he “wanted to see these atrocities with my own eyes, so that I can speak as an eyewitness later.” Those who have reviewed his book have praised it as “better than a primary reference, since Rabe saw the atrocities with his own eyes,”15 without taking the trouble to verify the information it contains. One would expect him to have submitted a factual report to Hitler, but the portions cited above are nowhere to be found in Rabe’s diary or in any other record and are, therefore, fiction.
Chinese Military Exploited Safety Zone
The Nanking Safety Zone became a refuge for the 200,000 residents who remained in the city. The use of the Safety Zone as a haven was approved by Chiang Kai-shek. However, Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, did not order Chinese military personnel to withdraw from the Safety Zone. Even police officers armed themselves with rifles in violation of regulations. Chinese troops were ensconced in the Safety Zone, fully armed, well before Nanking fell. The prevailing view, i.e., that Chinese soldiers infiltrated the Safety Zone immediately before the occupation, is incorrect.
Rabe urged Tang to remove military personnel and facilities from the Safety Zone. But Tang claimed that that was out of the question. He had new trenches dug at three locations in the Safety Zone, and anti-aircraft batteries installed. On two occasions, Chinese military personnel removed all the red-cross flags from the Safety Zone. They even insisted on reducing the size of the area occupied by the Safety Zone.
Safety Zone Not a Neutral Zone
At 6:30 p.m. on December 12, several hours prior to the fall of Nanking, Rabe saw Chinese soldiers making a frantic beeline from Zhonghua and Guanghua gates to the Safety Zone. Their flight was not a desperate emergency measure, but a premeditated action or, at the very least, the result of a tacit understanding. As they neared the Safety Zone, they gradually regained their composure, and their racing slowed to a casual stroll.
From their behavior, we arrive at the conclusion that aside from soldiers who were shot by members of the supervisory unit at the South Gate or the North Gate (Yijiang Gate), the few who escaped from the city walls, and those who had been fighting from the encampment within the Safety Zone from the outset, Chinese troops (tens of thousands of them) had escaped to the Safety Zone, knowingly and willfully. The neutral zone intended for civilian evacuees became a refuge for soldiers.
As P.R. Shields, manager of the China Industrial Foreign Trade Association (and a member of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone), later admitted, establishing the Safety Zone was a mistake, since it was abused.16 The Japanese treated the Safety Zone with respect, though they had the authority to refuse to recognize its neutrality. The Safety Zone proved to be the source of all the “Nanking problems.”
Neutral Zone Committee Chairman Aided Deserting Enemy Troops
At 8:00 p.m. on December 12, about the same time when Tang Shengzhi decamped, Colonels Long and Zhou paid another visit to Rabe, asking him to give them shelter.
Rabe agreed, apparently without any pangs of conscience. Only two days earlier, Rabe had lamented the presence of severely wounded soldiers in the Safety Zone as “contrary to our agreement.”17 Wasn’t the presence of perfectly healthy high-ranking officers even more “contrary to our agreement?” If Rabe was able to justify harboring Chinese military personnel, he must have lost his reasoning powers.
Furthermore, Rabe sheltered Colonel Luo Fuxiang (Wang Hanwan) after Nanking fell, a fact that he did not enter in his diary until 71 days later, on February 22, 1938. Most diaries are faithful records of the events of the day, but Rabe’s diary does not belong in that category. He made his entries selectively and after the fact, to serve his own purposes. His garden, dubbed the “Siemens Camp,” sheltered 650 evacuees, among whom may have been a great number of soldiers, including Wang Hanwan.
When Rabe returned to Germany, he took Wang Hanwan on board ship with him, claiming that the latter was his servant, and helped Wang escape to Hong Kong. Rabe viewed himself as a hero for having abetted the infiltration into the Safety Zone and subsequent escape of high-ranking Chinese officers. But for someone who was committee chairman of a neutral zone, this was extremely irrational behavior.
What Happened During the Illegal 64-Day Sojourn?
On February 15, 1938, Rabe wrote the following entry in his diary: “Lung [Long] and Chow [Zhou] left my house yesterday evening … .”18 The Chinese officers had stayed, illegally, in his home for 64 days. Kasahara Tokushi characterizes Japanese attempts to ferret out Chinese soldiers as one of “total envelopment and annihilation,”19 but this accusation is patently untrue.
Colonel Long claimed that he and Zhou had been left behind to care for the wounded, under orders from Tang Shengzhi.20 If their duty was to tend to the wounded, why did they not go directly to the diplomatic office set up by the Red Cross Hospital, instead of to Rabe’s home? What did they have in mind?
An article in the January 4, 1938 issue of The New York Times provides a useful hint. Having heard about it from Ara Kenichi, this writer searched for the article in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol.
1: American References, but to no avail. An examination of the newspaper’s archives on microfilm finally produced the article, entitled “Ex-Chinese Officers Among U.S. Refugees: Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking,” which follows in its entirety.
American professors remaining at Ginling College in Nanking as foreign members of the Refugee Welfare Committee were seriously embarrassed to discover that they had been harboring a deserted Chinese Army colonel and six of his subordinate officers. The professors had, in fact, made the colonel second in authority at the refugee camp.
The officers, who had doffed their uniforms during the Chinese retreat from Nanking, were discovered living in one of the college buildings. They confessed their identity after Japanese Army searchers found that they had hidden six rifles, five revolvers, a dismounted machine gun and ammunition in the building.
The ex-Chinese officers in the presence of Americans and other foreigners confessed looting in Nanking and also that one night they dragged girls from the refugee camp into the darkness and the next day blamed Japanese soldiers for the attacks.
The ex-officers were arrested and will be punished under martial law and probably executed. [Italics supplied.]
The removal of uniforms and the concealment of weapons and ammunition are both violations of international law in time of war. The International Committee had repeatedly assured the Japanese that “we know there are no groups of disarmed soldiers in the Zone”21 (Document No. 10), but that was not true.
There is no reference to Chinese soldiers’ looting or raping in Rabe’s diary or in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, which he signed. Rabe visited the Japanese Embassy nearly every day to file a protest, but he made no protest against the article in The New York Times. The facts were accepted, ignored, and forgotten.
Chinese Military’s Covert Anti-Japanese Activities
The January 25, 1938 edition of China Press, an English-language newspaper published by an American press in Shanghai, contains an article entitled “The Second Sino-Japanese War,” an official document compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking. It contains information similar to the content of the aforementioned article in The New York Times, i.e., the disclosure that as of December 28, 1,575 Chinese soldiers (including 23 officers) had entered the Safety Zone with machine guns and rifles hidden on their persons. Among them was Wang Xinlao, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Peace Preservation Corps. Under an alias, Chen Mi, he took charge of the International Committee’s Fourth Branch Detachment and, with three subordinates, proceeded to engage in “looting, agitation, and rape.”22
Major-General Iinuma Mamoru, in an entry in his diary dated January 4, wrote that he had arrested one Ma Pou-shang, the deputy commander of the 88th Division.23 Lieutenant-General Ma had been “instigating anti-Japanese disturbances”24 in the Safety Zone. The refugees in the Safety Zone must have been aware of these incidents that took place behind the scenes. Some of them even said that the looting, arson, and rape were the work of Chinese soldiers.
James McCallum wrote the following in his diary on January 9, 1938: “Some of the Chinese are even ready to prove that the looting, raping and burning was done by the Chinese and not the Japanese.”25
His entry was submitted as evidence to the IMTFE, but was not read aloud.
Colonels Long and Zhou may have been ordered to remain in the Safety Zone for the purpose of instigating disturbances. If that was so, Rabe’s and Tang Shengzhi’s homes, both located in the Safety Zone, would have made ideal headquarters for such activity.
But an official announcement was issued, proclaiming that the Safety Zone would cease to exist on February 8. Without the protection of the Safety Zone, Nanking would become a dangerous place for the Chinese officers to be. They could not afford to linger. Six days later, both Long and Zhou disappeared from Rabe’s home in the dark of night.
What were the true identities of Colonels Long and Zhou? Rabe wrote in his diary that Luo’s real name was Wang Hanwan, but he did not pass that information along in his report to Hitler, even though he had harbored the officers for 64 days. Rabe may have been worried about the repercussions from having revealed a name that turned out to be an alias.
A Spate of Fires Set in Rabe’s Neighborhood
Reading Rabe’s diary, one is perplexed at the sheer number of fires set and rapes committed in his neighborhood. For instance, on December 19, he records conflagrations to the north and south of his home. He writes about another fire on December 20, and another that consumes three nearby houses on January 3, and yet another on January 5. He reports still another on January 9, again in his neighborhood. On December 27, he visits a “Japanese-Chinese store,” which is probably not yet open for business, and lo, someone has set fire to it!
His diary entries, however, contain absolutely no conclusive evidence that incriminates Japanese soldiers as the arsonists. Even so, he writes, on December 21, “There can no longer be any doubt that the Japanese are burning the city … .”26 The acts of arson, which Rabe must have thought were intended to target him, had had a chilling effect.
Fabricated Rapes
According to Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 8, the city of Nanking was “off-limits”27 to Japanese soldiers. Nevertheless, Rabe wrote that many of them went to his house intent on rape. He had recruited a security team, which he equipped with police whistles, but Japanese soldiers continued to attempt to trespass on his property: “As I write this, the fists of Japanese soldiers are hammering at the back gate to the garden … When I suddenly show up with my flashlight, they beat a hasty retreat.”28
Throughout history, criminals have feared witnesses. Rapists have traditionally favored deserted, dark places. Why would Japanese soldiers go to Rabe’s house when he was there?
Rabe reports that, on one occasion, he returned home to find that a “Japanese soldier” had entered his property, looking for someone to rape. But Rabe arrives “just in time” to save the day. The timing of these intrusions seems very strange indeed. Perhaps someone familiar with his comings and goings . the Chinese officers he harbored, for instance . orchestrated them.
In Xiaotaoyuan, the area in which Rabe’s house was located, there were plenty of places for Chinese soldiers to hide: the spacious Hujia vegetable garden, the University of Nanking Agricultural School field, and the refugee camp at the Nanking Language School. Moreover, Europeans and Americans have trouble distinguishing between Chinese and Japanese. Chinese soldiers could disguise themselves as Japanese soldiers without fear of being detected.
Taken in by Baseless Rumors
Rapes that seemed timed so that Rabe would discover them heightened his illusion to the point that he believed every rumor he heard.
Last night up to 1,000 women and girls are said to have been raped, about 100 girls at Ginling Girls College alone. You hear of nothing but rape.29
This entry was written on December 17, the day of the Japanese Army’s ceremonial entry into Nanking. Since Rabe had recorded the rumor that 1,000 girls and women had been raped, perhaps the rapes of “100 girls at Ginling Girls College alone” were part of that same rumor. Nakamura Akira surmised that that must be the case, while Hata Ikuhiko has rejected the “rumor” theory.
Actually, Professor Minnie Vautrin, who established the largest refugee camp for women at Ginling Girls College, the very same institution where the rapes allegedly took place, penned her recollections of the camp in an essay entitled “Sharing ‘the Abundant Life’ in a Refugee Camp,” which was published in July-August 1938 issue of The Chinese Recorder. Space limitations prevent us from reproducing the entire essay, but nowhere in it does she write that “about 100 girls were raped at Jinling Girls College alone,” which she surely would have done if they had been.
These rumors were probably spread by Chinese officers hiding in the college. As Chancellor Scharffenberg remarked, “When there is a case involving violence, only one side is heard,”30 meaning the Chinese side.
Chinese soldiers who infiltrated the Safety Zone spread rumors that Japanese military personnel were committing rape, arson, and murder. They then proceeded to lend credibility to those rumors by committing those crimes themselves. The foreigners in Nanking accepted these rumors as fact. Rabe perpetuated these rumors in his diary, a more accurate title for which might be Rumors from Nanking.
Discredited Account of Japanese Violations of International Law
Document No. 4 issued by the International Committee, and dated December 15, alleged that Chinese soldiers were “lawful prisoners of war.”31 But that was the first and last time that that allegation was made, and not because the International Committee was “indifferent” to international law, as Hata claims. The realization that the Chinese soldiers were not lawful prisoners of war as defined by international law forced those who wished to use the law as a weapon against the Japanese to abandon their claims.
Even when Chinese soldiers were, as Steele wrote, executed without benefit of trial, no one could accuse the Japanese of violating international law. When such accusations were made, they were disregarded, as was Bates’ claim, made in the fall of 1938, that the Japanese had massacred 30,000 prisoners of war.32
Why did the Chinese soldiers fail to meet the criteria for prisoners of war, as defined by international law? Rabe is silent on this matter, but he and his colleagues twisted the facts by asserting that the Japanese executed “former soldiers,”33 to imply that they had massacred civilians. Still, they were forced to withdraw those accusations.
No More Than 15,000 Interred
We will now put Rabe’s diary aside, and examine the five burial records from 1938.
The only organization entrusted with burials was the Red Swastika Society. When the Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee was issued (in summer, 1939), Bates was still chairman. It states that all necessary burials were performed by the Red Swastika Society. A total of $2,540 was expended to inter more than 40,000 bodies which had been left lying about.34
Chongshantang was not involved in the burials, which were completed by the Red Swastika Society. Furthermore, the Relief Committee report adds that they were completed in approximately “40 working days.” However, when interviewed by this writer, Maruyama Susumu, an employee of the Manchurian Railway and a member of the Nanking Special Agency, which supervised the interments, said that the burials commenced in early February and ended on or about March 15.
One would expect to find references to the burials, with dates, in Rabe’s diary, and he does make a casual reference to their having begun on February 1. This date, quite surprisingly, matches the information obtained from Maruyama.35
As mentioned previously, the burials took place over approximately 40 working days. They were completed on March 15, or March 19, at the latest. Thus, we know that the Red Swastika Society falsified its records.
How many bodies were interred? Since Rabe writes that it was impossible to bury more than 200 per day36 and Maruyama reported that “normally, 180 bodies37 were buried each day,” we can assume that 5,000 bodies were buried in February, over a period of 25 days. And from Rosen’s report stating that the Red Swastika Society was interring 500-600 bodies per day38, we can deduce that 10,450 bodies were buried in March at the rate of 550 per day, over a 19-day period. Therefore, the total number of interments could have been no more than 15,000.
Therefore, we must conclude that:
(1)
The Red Swastika Society, by stating that it buried approximately 40,000 bodies, more than doubled the actual figure.

(2)
Rabe’s contention that he and the other foreigners in Nanking believed that “50,000-60,000” were killed was a gross exaggeration. Where there is no body, there is no murder.

(3)
Hata’s theory that 40,000 Chinese were massacred is baseless.

Then, were the 15,000 dead (according to our estimate) the victims of a massacre? We will address this question at a later date, due to space constraints. We will close by stating that Bates’ argument that 40,000 Chinese were massacred was deleted from official records of the Republic of China any number of times and thus, discredited.
(This chapter is a modification of and expansion on an article that appeared in the April 1998 issue of Seiron.)
AFTERWORD
Just as aspects of certain events, even seemingly minor aspects, can raise doubts and questions that linger in our minds, the Nanking Massacre has been haunting me for years. Some of the particularly nagging doubts and questions concern (1) the population of Nanking before and after its capture, (2) the absence of any reference on the part of the Nationalist government to a massacre in Nanking, (3) editorials in English-language magazines published by Europeans and Americans in Shanghai and (4) burials.
Seven years ago, I analyzed each of these difficult questions, one by one. The result of my efforts is “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei kensho [An exhaustive examination of the “Nanking Massacre”]. I began with the verification of the most elementary facts, even widely accepted theories. For instance, I did not accept any item of information as fact until it had been proven so, all the time being careful to avoid “precipitancy and prejudice.” So that I would not overlook even one contemporary record, during my journey to “knowledge of the more complex,” I took pains to “make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general” in my journey to “knowledge of the more complex.” Without even being aware of it at first, I was following the four Cartesian precepts outlined in A Discourse on Method.
My mission in writing “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei kensho [An exhaustive examination of the “Nanking Massacre”] was, while avoiding precipitancy and prejudice, to verify the facts through the conduct of a meticulous, exhaustive examination of contemporary records. My intensive research into the “Nanking Massacre” brought me to the conclusion that the evidence supporting the massacre claim is unreliable at best.
Five years later, however, I was made aware of the existence of records that I had not examined. In January 2003, I visited the Museum of Chinese Nationalist Party History in Taipei, where I unearthed a top-secret document dated 1941 and entitled Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department, Ministry of Information. Readers are referred to Chapters 16 and 17 for my analysis of that document. The top-secret document in question demonstrated beyond a doubt that there was absolutely no historical perception of a massacre in Nanking, not within the Nationalist Party nor the Communist Party during the Second Nationalist-Communist United Front (established in 1937). The time has come for a complete reexamination of the “Nanking Massacre,” with a focus on this top-secret document. I hope to publish the results of that reexamination in Japan in the near future.
Now that the Internet has become such a popular forum, one sees unauthenticated photographs that purportedly bear witness to a massacre in Nanking posted on countless Web sites. Therefore, we have conducted the first comprehensive study of the 143 photographs offered as evidence of the “Nanking Massacre.” After scouring approximately 30,000 photographs in photojournalistic magazines published (before and after the Japanese capture of Nanking) in Japan and the U.S., we have discovered that every single one of these “evidentiary photographs” published in 1937-8 is a fake, the product of splicing, staging or false captioning. See Nankin jiken “shoko shashin” wo kensho suru [Analyzing “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre], issued in February 2005, for the results of our research. We expect to post an English translation on the Internet (http://www2.asia-u.ac.jp/~jh2cqxyz) in the near future.
In closing, I would like to acknowledge the many people who urged me to have this book translated into English seven years ago, when it first came out in Japanese under the title “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei kensho [An exhaustive examination of the “Nanking Massacre”]. Special thanks are due to Ito Takashi, professor emeritus at University of Tokyo; Kobori Keiichiro, ex-professor emeritus at University of Tokyo; Tonooka Akio, ex-professpr at Tokyo Gakugei University; Watanabe Shoichi, professor emeritus at Sophia University; Odamura Shiro, ex-chancellor at Takushoku University; Nagoshi Futaranosuke, ex-professor at Takachiho University; Dr. Komuro Naoki, Sato Kazuo, professor emeritus at Aoyama Gakuin University; Takubo Tadae, professor at Kyorin University; Nishio Kanji, professor emeritus at University of Electro-Communications; Suginoo Yoshio, ex-professor at National Defence Academy; Ko Bunyu, visiting professor at Takushoku University; Nakagaki Hideo, ex-professor at National Defense Academy; Kitamura Yoshikazu, professor at Aichi University of Education; Sugihara Seishiro, professor at Musashino University; Hasegawa Michiko, professor at Saitama University; Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, professor at Tsukuba University; Nakanishi Terumasa, professor at Kyoto University; Matsumoto Michihiro, ex-professor at Honolulu University; the Messrs. Nakajima Shinzaburo, Hara Takizo, Kondo Yasushi, Saisu Shigekazu, Masuda Toshio, Moteki Hiromichi and Ms. Mayumi Atsuko.
The author would also like to express his gratitude to Takemoto Tadao, professor emeritus at Tsukuba University; Fujioka Nobukatsu, formerly professor at University of Tokyo and currently professor at Takushoku University; and the Messrs. Takahana Yutaka, Iwata Yoshiyasu and Yuhara Masataka for their unceasing support and encouragement during the long road to publication.
Higashinakano Shudo Tokyo August 1, 2005
NOTES

Works frequently cited have been identified by the following abbreviations:
BN Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai [Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee], Nankin senshi [The Battle of Nanking] (Tokyo: Kaikosha, 1993).
EABN Unemoto Masami, “Shogen ni yoru Nankin senshi” [Eyewitness accounts of the Battle of Nanking], Parts 1-10 in Kaiko (April 1984-March 1985).
SMBN Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai [Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee], Nankin senshi shiryoshu [Source material relating to the Battle of Nanking] (Tokyo: Kaikosha, 1993).
PREFACE
1. James Bacque, Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans After World War II (Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1990), p. 87.
2.
Ibid., p. 87.

3.
Yamamoto Akihiro, “Amerika ni okeru ‘Nankin’ kenkyu no doko: James Bacque [no] Other Losses wo meguru rongi to hikaku shite” [Comparison of “Nanking” research trends in the U.S. and the debate over James Bacque’s Other Losses] in Higashinakano Shudo, ed., Nankin “gyakusatsu” kenkyu no saizensen 2003 [The front line of research on the “Nanking Massacre” 2003] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2003), p. 143-174.

4.
George F. Will, “Breaking a Sinister Silence,” Washington Post (19 February 1998), p. A17.

5.
Tomisawa Shigenobu, Nankin jiken no kakushin [The core of the Nanking Incident] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2004).

6.
See Chapter 17, Note 17.

7.
H.J. Timperley, ed., What War Means: Japanese Terror in China (New York: Modern Age Books, 1938), p. 161.

8.
Higashinakano Shudo, Kobayashi Susumu and Fukunaga Shinjiro, Nankin Jiken: “Shoko Shashin” wo kensho suru. [Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2005), p. 128.

9.
Higuchi Kiichiro, Rikugun chujo Higuchi Kiichiro kaisoroku [Memoirs of Maj.-Gen. Higuchi Kiichiro] (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1999), p. 352; David Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind (New York:

Free Press, 1995), p. 112.

10.
Maeda Toru, Ruuzuberuto hiroku gekan [Roosevelt’s Secret Records, vol. 2] (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2000), p. 118.

11.
Higashinakano Shudo, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2)” [Nanking Special Agency Report No. 2] in Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2004 [The front line of research on the Nanking Massacre 2004] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2004), p. 84.

CHAPTER 1: THE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING
1.
See Kasahara Tokushi, “Hakken sareta Nankin gyakusatsu no shogen” [Testimony about Nanking Massacre unearthed] in Sekai (September 1997), p. 153.

2.
See “China unter der Kuomintang 1928-1937” in Grosser Atlas zur Weltgeschichte: Von der Entstehung der Welt bis zur Gegenwart (Koln: Lingen Verlag, 1988), p. 123.

3.
Hallett Abend, Tortured China (New York: Ives Washburn, 1930), pp. 64,

220.

4.
Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], ed., Nihon gaiko nenpyo narabi ni shuyo bunsho [Almanac of Japanese foreign relations and principal diplomatic documents] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1965), vol. 1, p. 197.

5.
The established interpretation to the effect that they need not announce maneuvers planned for this area (as long as live ammunition was not used) notwithstanding, Japanese troops had the courtesy to notify Chinese authorities in advance of their schedule. See Hata Ikuhiko, Rokokyo jiken no kenkyu [Study of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1996), p. 52; and “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no kaisetsu to bunseki: Genba butai ga akashita kichona shogen” [Analysis of Jin Zhenzhong’s recollections: Valuable testimony revealed by a battalion commander on the scene] in Chuo Koron, December 1987, p. 215 by the same author. Note further that Teradaira Tadasuke (a former Army lieutenant colonel assigned to the Beijing Special Agency as an aide in 1936), who witnessed the Marco Polo Bridge Incident stated, “Lin Gengyu of the Hebei-Chahar government’s Foreign Relations Committee requested that we give advance notice to the Chinese whenever Japanese troops planned to conduct maneuvers using blanks, especially at night. The Final Protocol Relating to the North China Incident specifies that we are to notify Chinese authorities when we use live ammunition, but there is no mention of such an obligation when blanks are used.” Teradaira described his reaction as follows: “We’ve been doing things this way for 30 years and have never had any problems.” See Teradaira Tadasuke,

Rokokyo jiken: Nihon no higeki [The Marco Polo Bridge Incident: A Japanese tragedy] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1970), p. 49.

6.
See dialogue among former Army Sgt. Abe Kyuroku, Pfc. Ishikawa Kotaro and Pfc. Takakuwa Yaichiro, all of whom witnessed the incident, in Showa shi no Tenno [The Emperor and Showa era history] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1971), p. 311f.

7.
Using blanks was standard practice during maneuvers, to avoid casualties to allies. Cf. Hata, “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no kaisetsu to bunseki,” p. 215. Note further that according to Company Commander Shimizu Setsuro (8th Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, China Garrison), who was fired upon during night maneuvers on the right bank of the Yongding River, “The men in our unit were wearing the clothing they always wore for maneuvers. We had neither helmets nor provisions, and our front ammunition pouches contained only blanks. But since we were in an area that harbored real danger, our rear ammunition pouches held 30 rounds of live ammunition. Unfortunately, it was sealed so securely that it was virtually inaccessible.” Cf. Araki Kazuo, Rokokyo no ippatsu: Jugun kenpei no shuki [A shot fired at Marco Polo Bridge: Memoirs of a military policeman] (Tokyo: Hayashi Shoten, 1968), p. 80f.

8.
Jin, Zhenzhong, “Moto Ryokokyo Shubi Daitaicho Jin Zhenzhong kaiso” [Recollections of Jin Zhenzhong, formerly a battalion commander stationed at the Marco Polo Bridge] Chuo Koron (December 1987), p. 209f.

9.
There were no Japanese tanks in the area until reinforcements arrived toward the end of July. Cf. Hata, “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no kaisetsu to bunseki,” p. 215.

10.
Jin, op. cit., p. 209.

11.
Hata, Rokokyo jiken no kenkyu, p. 140.

12.
According to Hata, “the soldier who was reported missing (Private Shimura) returned to his unit within 20 minutes, at about 11:00 p.m. on July 7. The Beijing Special Agency sent a report to that effect to the Chinese authorities at about 2:00 a.m. on July 8. Thereafter, Japanese troops no longer had a pretext for gaining entry into Wanping (they occupied the castle on July 29).” Cf. Hata, “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no kaisetsu to bunseki,” p. 215. See also Hata’s citations from “The Memoirs of Wang Lingzhai” in his Nicchu senso shi [History of the Second Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1961), p. 173. Note further that when Wang Lingzhai received the aforementioned report, Maj. Sakurai Tokutaro (adviser to the 29th Nationalist Army) proceeded to Wanping, accompanied by Wang, Lin Gengyu (member of the Foreign Relations Committee) and Teradaira Tadasuke, an aide on the staff of the

Beijing Special Agency). The party departed from the Beijing Special Agency at about 4:00 a.m. on July 8, the purpose of their journey being to convince Jin Zhenzhong, commander of the Chinese troops in Wanping, to prevent the hostilities from escalating. See Teradaira, op. cit., 104.

13.
Officers of the 29th Army insisted that none of the units under them had ever been sent outside the Marco Polo Bridge area. For statements made by Vice-Commander Qin Dechun and 37th Army Commander Feng Zhian, see Araki, op. cit., pp. 83, 87. However, at 5:30 a.m., when the Japanese began to retaliate, the 39th Army fled to the Marco Polo Bridge in front of Wanping. Also, a notebook in the pocket of a Chinese soldier found in a trench under the bridge contained the following information about his superiors: “Gen. Song Zheyuan, commander, 29th Army; Lt. Gen. Feng Zhian, commander, 37th Division; Maj. Gen. He Fengji, 110th Brigade; Col. Ji Xingwen, commander, 219th Infantry Regiment; Maj. Jin Zhenzhong, commander, 3rd Battalion; Capt. Geng Xixun, commander, 11th Company.” For further details, see Teradaira, op. cit., pp. 134f., 137. Note further that Jin Zhenzhong stated that the Japanese commenced firing between 11:00 p.m. on July 7 and 2:00 a.m. on the following morning. However, the fact is that the Japanese did not begin shelling until 5:30 a.m. on July 8 (See Jin, op. cit., p. 209f.)

14.
Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai [IMTFE Document Publishing Group], Tokyo Saiban kyakka miteishutsu bengogawa shiryo [Defense exhibits rejected by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East or prepared for but not submitted to] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1995), vol. 7, p. 296.

15.
See Hata, Rokokyo jiken no kenkyu, p. 171 and Nakamura Akira, Dai Toa Senso e no michi [The road to the Greater East Asian War] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1990), p. 395.

16.
Nakamura, op. cit., p. 402f.

17.
Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 56f.

18.
Ibid., p. 57.

19.
The following contemporaneous books authored by Americans refer to “the massacre of Japanese men, women and children at Tungchow by Chinese soldiers” or the “Tungchow massacre:” Frederick Williams, Behind the News in China (New York: Nelson Hughes Co., 1938), p. 22 and George C. Bruce, Shanghai’s Undeclared War (Shanghai: Mercury Press, 1937), p. 10.

20.
Nitta Mitsuo, ed., Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku [Reports of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East] (Tokyo: Yushodo Shoten, 1968), vol.5, p. 171.

21.
Ibid., p. 172.

22.
Ibid., p. 173.

23.
Shiba Sen, Shiki [Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s historical records], trans. Odake Fumio and Odake Takeo (Tokyo: Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 1995), vol. 2, p. 16.

24.
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 282.

25.
Ibid., p. 138.

26.
Yang Jialuo, ed., Xinxiao zizhitongjian zhu [Revised commentary of comprehensive mirror for aid in government] (Taipei: World Publishing Co., 1962).

27.
Abend, op. cit., pp. 66f., 72.

28.
Sasaki Toichi, Aru gunjin no jiden [Autobiography of a career officer] (Tokyo: Futsusha, 1963), p. 174.

29.
Agnes Smedley, Idai naru michi [The great road], trans. Abe Tomoji (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1955) vol. 2, p. 213.

30.
Tanaka Seigen, Tanaka Seigen Jiden [Autobiography of Tanaka Seigen] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1993), p. 283.

31.
Edgar Snow, Chugoku no akaihoshi [Red Star Over China], trans. Usami Seijiro (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1964), p. 239.

32.
Smedley, op. cit., p. 263.

33.
See Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl Wudun, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 73ff. The authors include descriptions of horrendous crimes: “Bodies were humiliated and destroyed, so that while the killing was awful, what came next was even worse. Take the case of three women: Lu Yu, of Siyang Commune; Huang Shaoping, a teacher at Guangjiang River Elementary School; Chen Guolian, of Hepu County’s Shikang Township. After they were beaten to death, sticks were poked into their vaginas and their corpses were left naked along the roadside.”

34.
Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 6.

35.
Claude Farrere, “Shina Kiko” (Travels in China) in Shina (China), Toa Dobunkai, (September 1938), p. 193. This article also appeared in the May 1938 issue of Revue des deux mondes.

36.
Ibid., p. 193.

37.
Toa Dobunkai, ed., Shin Shina gensei yoran [The current situation in China] (Tokyo: Toa Dobunkai, 1938), p. 65.

38.
See Edouard Helsey, “Shina Jihen mita mama” [Witness to the Second Sino-Japanese War] in Kokusai panfuretto tsushin [International news pamphlet] 1120 (01 August 1938), p. 14f. Helsey was a correspondent for Gringoire, a French weekly. The article’s original title was “La guerre en Chine.”

39.
See Toa Dobunkai, op. cit., p. 772 and BN, p. 11ff.

40.
As of July 12, Chinese forces numbered 50,000 as opposed to only 5,000 Japanese troops (a Special Naval Landing Forces unit). Cf. Boei Kenshujo

Senshishitsu [Defense Research Institute, Military History Department],
Senshi sosho: Shina jihen rikugun sakusen (1) Showa 13 nen 1 gatsu made
[Military history series: Army operations during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Part 1: 1933-1938] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1975), p. 261f.
41.
Toa Dobunkai, op. cit., p. 71ff.

42.
The China Year Book 1938 (Shanghai: The North-China Daily News & Herald, 1938), p. 352. Similar accounts appear in Farrere, op. cit., p. 194 and Helsey, op. cit., p. 25.

43.
Chugaku shakai: Rekishi [Middle school social studies: History] (Tokyo: Kyoiku Shuppan, 1999), p. 250.

44.
See Eto Jun, Wasureta koto to wasuresaserareta koto [What we have forgotten and what we have been forced to forget] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1979), p. 280. Chinese troops, already superior in number, received further reinforcements at the rapid rate of one division per day. By early September, nearly 40,000 Japanese soldiers had landed, but the Chinese had 190,000 men on the front lines alone, and forces at the rear had swelled to 270,000. Seventy thousand Japanese troops had landed by early October, but by then the Chinese forces were 700,000 men strong.

45.
Japanese troops required three months to bring the second Shanghai Incident to an end. According to Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu, op. cit., approximately 20,000 Japanese soldiers died in battle, and some 60,000 were wounded. Three thousand Japanese troops were killed during the first Shanghai Incident, but the statistics from the second incident defy comparison. They represented losses of life not seen since the Russo-Japanese War.

46.
Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu, op. cit.

47.
Erwin Wickert, ed., The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 9.

48.
SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 185, 210.

49.
Ibid., p. 133.

50.
SMBN, vol. 1, p. 428f.

51.
“Nakashina Homen Gun meirei” [Central China Area Army Order] in ibid., p. 432.

52.
“Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in ibid., p. 433.

53.
“Nankin nyujogo ni okeru shochi” [Course of action to be taken upon entering Nanking] in ibid., p. 432.

54.
“Nankinjo no koryaku oyobi nyujo ni kansuru chui jiko” [Precautions to be taken when attacking and entering Nanking) in ibid., p. 434.

55.
Testimony of Maj. Nakayama Yasuto, Central China Area Army staff officer, in Hora Tomio, ed., Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken

shiryoshu (1) Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen [Source material relating to the Nanking Massacre during the Second Sino-Japanese War: Sources from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1985), vol. 1, p. 203.

56.
Testimony of Lt. Gen. Nakazawa Mitsuo, 16th Division chief of staff, in ibid., p. 245.

CHAPTER 2: NANKING BEFORE THE FALL
1.
For the text of Wang Jingwei’s speech, “The Final Juncture,” delivered on July 31, 1937, see Matsumoto Shigeharu, Shanhai jidai [Shanghai Sojourn], vol. 3 (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1975), pp. 170-174, especially p. 172f.

2.
See Wakokubon seishi shinjo [Authorized history (reprinted in Japan)] (Tokyo: Kyuko Shoin, 1971), p. 1325. The purpose of the scorched-earth strategy was to leave no food, shelter or potential laborers behind for enemy troops to use. The Jin Shu [History of the Jin Dynasty] contains an exhortation to fortify cities, then to reduce all the land around them to ashes so that nothing remains for an invading army to steal or use. This exhortation is an indication that this strategy was employed at least as far back as the 4th century. Furthermore, we know that it endured well into the 20th century, since it was used by Chiang Kai-shek in the Battle of Nanking. Cf. Higashinakano Shudo, “Nankin koza dai ikkai: Sanko sakusen to Nankin gyakusatsu .Nankin no rekishi ni miru senpo” [First Nanking lecture: Sanguang (three-all) strategy and the Nanking Massacre

. tactics used throughout Nanking’s history] in Getsuyo Hyoron [Monday review] (January 2000).

3.
“Nenpyo (1798)” [Chronology for 1798] in Tanigawa Michio and Mori Masao, eds., Chugoku minshu hanranshi [The history of people’s rebellions in China] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1982), vol. 3, p.337.

4.
See “Li Zongren kaioku roku” in SMBN, revised edition, vol. 1, p. 639.

5.
Ibid.

6.
Ibid.

7.
For “undefended places,” see Kokusai Hogakkai hen [International Law Society of Japan], Kokusaiho jiten [International law dictionary] (Tokyo: Kajima Shuppankai, 1982), p. 661.

8.
For Bai Chongxi’s views, see “Li Zongren kaioku roku” in SMBN, vol. 1,

p. 639.

9.
Ibid. (for statements made by He Yingqin, Xu Yongchang, von Falkenhausen and Tang Shengzhi).

10.
Ibid.

11.
Ibid., p. 640.

12.
“Nanking Prepares to Resist Attack,” New York Times (01 December 1937).

13.
EABN, Part 3 in Kaiko (June 1984), p. 6.

14.
New York Times (07 December 1937).

15.
See Kasahara Tokushi, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki” [Conversations with Tillman Durdin] in Nankin jiken shiryoshu 1: Amerika kankei shiryo hen [Nanking Incident Source Material: American References], trans. Nankin Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai hen [Nanking Incident Research Group] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1992), vol. 1, p. 572.

16.
Tillman Durdin, “Chinese Make Stand,” New York Times (08 December 1937).

17.
Ibid.

18.
Tillman Durdin, “300 Chinese Slain on a Peak Ringed by Fires Set by Foe”, New York Times (09 December 1937).

19.
Abend, “Japanese in Drive to Take Nanking after Ultimatum,” New York Times (10 December 1937).

20.
Durdin, “300 Chinese Slain on Peak,” op. cit.

21.
As Durdin’s article dispatched from Nanking on December 9 indicates, the scorched-earth tactic was a Chinese defense strategy.

22.
Toa Dobunkai, op. cit., p. 760.

23.
Ibid. Cf. Wickert, op. cit., p. 26.

24.
Lily Abegg, “Wie wir aus Nanking fluchteten: Die letzten Tage in der Haupstadt Chinas” in Frankfurter Zeitung (19 December 1937).

25.
Ichiki Yoshimichi, ed., Nankin [Nanking] (Nanking Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1941), p. 22.

26.
The China Year Book 1938, (Shanghai: The North China Daily News & Herald, March 1938), p. 1.

27.
Ko Bunyu, Ari no mama no Chugoku [The Real China] (Tokyo: Nihon Bungeisha, 1996), p. 56.

28.
Abegg, op. cit.

29.
The 09 December 1937 edition of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun reported that “the valley containing Mausoleum Park is now a sea of furious flames.” The New York Times carried a story reading, in part: “Rumors of a plan to burn down Nanking, though they are daily officially denied, are causing terror among many sections of the populace.” Cf. Durdin, “Chinese Make Stand,” op. cit.

30.
Abegg, op. cit.

31.
Ibid.

32.
EABN, Part 3 in Kaiko (June 1984), p. 7.

33.
Abegg, op. cit.

34.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee: November 1937 to April 1939, in Miner Bates’ Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 102, Folder

867, p. 5.

35.
Cf. Testimony of Hidaka Shinrokuro, Japanese consul general in Shanghai, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, “Sanjuman hinanmin no chichi, Jakino sojo wo tou” [A visit with Father Jacquinot, protector of 300,000 refugees] in Hora, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 185, 271 for a description of the Jacquinot Zone in Shanghai; Tsu Y.Y., “The Christian Church in War-time Service,” China Quarterly (Winter 1938-39),

p. 79.

36.
For information about members of the Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, see Tillman Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking after Chinese Command Fled,” New York Times (09 January 1938); Wickert, op. cit., p. 43.

37.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 3.

38.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 125f.

39.
The China Year Book 1939 (Shanghai: The North-China Daily News & Herald, 1939), p. 562. The Safety Zone was approximately the size of New York’s Central Park.

40.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 130.

41.
“Nanking was transformed into a huge fortress.” Yomiuri Shinbun (02 December 1937, evening edition) in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 642.

42.
Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” New York Times (18 December 1937).

43.
Durdin, “Chinese Make Stand.” Note further that Durdin’s coverage of the Nanking Safety Zone included the following: “The movement of noncombatants elsewhere [in the city] will be banned, except for persons holding special permits to be indicated by a symbol on yellow arm bands.”

44.
Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun (08 December 1937) in BN, p. 273.

45.
John Rabe’s letter to Dr. Rosen dated January 30, 1938 in Hsu Shuhsi, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1939), p.

114.

46.
Harold J. Timperley, ed., What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), reprint of 1938 edition, p. 143.

47.
Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (08 December 1937) in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai [Meiji, Taisho, Showa Period Newspaper Research Group], Shinbun shusei Showa hennenshi: Showa 12 nendoban IV [Annual chronology from newspapers in the Showa era: 1937 Edition] (Tokyo: Shinbun Shiryo Shuppan, 1990), vol. 4, 619. This information was disseminated by the Domei News Agency on the basis of an Associated Press wire sent from New York on December 7.

48.
Encrypted telegram (No. 1007) sent by Gray and dated 11:00 a.m.,

December 12, in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 94.

49. Archibald T. Steele, “Chiang Quits Nanking as Foes Advance,” Chicago Daily News (08 December 1937), in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 459.

50. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (06 December 1937), in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 590.

51. For details about Commander-in-Chief Matsui’s gift of￥10,000 to the International Committee in Nantao, Shanghai, see the testimony of Shanghai Consul General Hidaka Shinrokuro at the Tokyo Trials, in Hora, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 185. For French authorities’ plans for and attitude toward the Jacquinot Zone, see ibid., p. 185f.

52. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (06 December 1937), in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 590.

53. “Nankin anzen chitai fushonin seimei” [Announcement of refusal to recognize Nanking Safety Zone], Gaiko Jiho [Foreign Affairs Review], No. 794 (01 January 1938), p. 340.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. “Foreigners Urged to Evacuate; Notification Sent to Shanghai Consular Association,” Osaka Asahi Shinbun (09 December 1937) in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 638.

57. “Fleeing Chinese Soldiers Refused Entry; Hostilities Continue on Outskirts of Nanking,” Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (10 December 1937), in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 645.

58. Durdin, “300 Chinese Slain on a Peak Ringed by Fires Set by Foe,” New York Times (09 December 1937).

59. EABN, Part 4 in Kaiko (July 1984), p. 8.

CHAPTER 3: ASSAULT ON THE GATES OF NANKING
1. Hora, op. cit., p. 176.

2. For the China Area Army’s organization chart and staff list, see SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 685-725, especially p. 696. During the Russo-Japanese War, which took place right before Japan signed the Hague Convention of 1907 Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, four legal scholars accompanied Japanese troops to Russia. Thus began a tradition, which continued with the assignment of Saito Yoshie, doctor of law, to China. See Shinoda Harusaku, “Hokushi jihen to rikusen hoki” Gaiko Jiho [Foreign Affairs Review], No. 788 (01 October 1937), p. 50f.

3. “Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land”, in Yamamoto Soji, Kokusai Joyakushu 1995 [Anthology of International Treaties: 1995] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1995), pp. 510-513, especially p. 512.

4. Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” New York Times (18 December 1937).

5. Shimada Katsumi: “Do not destroy the Zhongshan Mausoleum.”

6. Georg Rosen, “Nankings Ubergang, 20. Januar 1938”, in Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 203.

7. Steele reports that the International Committee proposed a two-day cease-fire. See “Death Rains on Nanking in Furious Bombardment,” Chicago Daily News (10 December 1937).

8. Entry for December 10, 1937, in “Yamazaki Masao nikki” [Journal of Yamazaki Masao] (major) in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 289.

9. “Nankinjo koryaku yoryo”, in ibid., p. 433.

10. In China, the practice of annihilating enemy troops who refuse to surrender is called屠城(tucheng: literally, “butcher the city”). The entry in the 13-volume Dai kanwa jiten (大漢和辞典) edited by Morohashi Tetsuji draws on the chapter of Xunzi that relates to military affairs for the example it gives: “Do not obliterate cities.” (In this case, “obliterate” means destroying the walls of a city and slaughtering its residents.) Xunzi, who flourished during the 3rd century BC, cautions virtuous men to refrain from obliterating cities and their inhabitants. The word “annihilate” (屠る), as the aforementioned note tells us, describes attackers’ acts of destroying a resisting enemy’s city walls, and then slaughtering the inhabitants of that city, just as they would animals. There is a clear distinction between tucheng and抜城 (bacheng), which means simply to storm or capture a city. Chinese military leaders adopted the堅壁清野 (jianbi qingye) or “fortify and burn” strategy, which, according to the same dictionary, describes a military tactic whereby city walls are strengthened and fields burned, leaving no spoils for the vanquishing enemy. When this strategy was employed, conquering armies found no food, shelter or laborers. We know that jianbi qingye dates back to the 4th century AD, since晋書 [Jinshu, or History of the Jin Dynasty] contains a reference to it: “All the city walls were fortified, and all the fields burned, so that nothing remained.” It is common knowledge that the strategy persisted until the 20th century, when it was adopted by Chiang Kai-shek for the Battle of Nanking. See Morohashi Tetsuji, ed., Dai kanwa jiten [Comprehensive Chinese-Japanese dictionary] (Tokyo: Taishukan, 1955-60), vol. 6, p. 162.
11. Hohei dai 36 rentai [36th Infantry Regiment], “Chushi homen ni okeru kodo gaiyo: 1937 nen 9 gatsu kokonoka – 1939 nen 7 gatsu 11 nichi” [Operations in central China between September 9, 1937 and July 11, 1939] (mimeographed on October 1, 1939), p. 26; BN, p. 175. For a description of the situation at Guanghua Gate, see Sasaki Motokatsu, Yasen Yubinki [Field post office flag] (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryo Center

Shuppankai, 1973), p. 223.

12.
Cheng Kuilang, “Nankinjo fukukaku jinchi kochiku to shujo sento” [The complex architecture of Nanking’s walls and the defensive battle] in SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 485-494, especially p. 492.

13.
Testimony of Ouchi Yoshihide (Defense Exhibit No. 2686) in Hora, op. cit.,

p. 237f.

14.
For details concerning hostilities at Guanghua Gate, see BN, p. 175ff.

15.
For more information concerning soldiers’ hiding places, see Nanjing: Tourist Map, (Jiangsu: Jiangsu People’s Publishing, 1992), which explains that “Zhonghua Gate, built in the 14th century, it consists of 3 citadels, 4 archways and 27 caves big enough for hiding 3000 soldiers.”

16.
For details about the hostilities at Zhonghua Gate, see BN, p. 218f.

17.
“Yamazaki Masao nikki” entry dated December 14, 1937 in SMBN, vol. 1,

p. 295.

18.
Testimony of Osugi Hiroshi (Defense Exhibit No. 2238) in Hora, op. cit., p.

235.

19.
Cheng Kuilang, op. cit. in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 494; “Li Zongren kaioku roku” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 640.

20.
Wickert, op. cit. p. 63.

21.
In a journal entry dated December 17, Maj.-Gen. Iinuma Mamoru writes that he observed approximately 20 units of enemy soldiers, comprising, 10,000 men, in the neighborhood of Nanking. Cf. SMNB, vol. 1, p. 159. Tillman Durdin wrote the following on this subject:

It is difficult to say just what the strength of the Chinese Army in and around Nanking was. Some observers estimated that there were as many as sixteen divisions participating in the battle for the city. This could be true. Chinese divisions even in normal times have an average of only 5,000 men. The battered divisions that defended Nanking were, possibly, at least in some cases, composed of only 2,000 or 3,000 men each. It is fairly safe to say that some 50,000 troops took part -and were trapped -in the defense of Nanking.
It is very likely that the source of Durdin’s figures was a prior briefing. He continues:
The Japanese themselves announced that during the first three days of cleaning up Nanking 15,000 Chinese soldiers were rounded up. At the time, it was contended that 25,000 more were still hiding out in the city.
Durdin adds that “about 20,000 were executed.” Cf. Durdin, “Japanese
Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese Command Fled,” op. cit.
22.
Tang Shengzhi, “Nankin boei no keika” [The Defense of Nanking] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 621-626, especially p. 624.

23.
“Nanjing baoweizhan zhandou xiangbao (1937 nian 12 yue) Nanjing weishujun zhandou xiangbao” [Battle report: Battle waged in defense of Nanking: Nanking Garrison, December 1937] in ibid., pp. 608-614, especially pp. 609, 614.

24.
Kasahara, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 572.

25.
“Makihara Nobuo nikki” [Journal of Makihara Nobuo] in SMBN, vol. 1, p.

406. Makihara was a private first class in the 23rd Infantry Regiment.

26.
Kasahara, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 569.

27.
Kasahara, “Archibald Steele shi kara no kikigaki” [Conversations with Archibald Steele] (September 4, 1987), in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p.

584.

28.
Abend, op. cit., pp. 170, 176. He describes groups of regular Chinese soldiers as “bandit armies” and the Chinese Army as a whole as a “predatory organization.”

29.
“Nanjing baoweizhan zhandou xiangbao” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 614.

30.
Ibid.

31.
Ibid.

32.
BN, pp. 348, 358.

33.
Cheng Kuilang, op. cit. in SNBM, vol. 2, p. 494.

34.
“Nanjing baoweizhan zhandou xiangbao” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 613.

35.
“Li Zongren kaioku roku” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 640.

36.
Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.

37.
Steele, “Nanking Massacre Story,” Chicago Daily News (15 December 1937).

38.
Kasahara, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 571.

39.
Kasahara, “Archibald Steele shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 577.

40.
B.K., “Events and Comments: The War in China” in The China Journal, XXVIII (January 1938).

41.
“Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War: A Day-to-Day Summary” in The China Weekly Review (29 January 1938).

42.
“Enemy stragglers converging at Anqing,” Osaka Asahi Shinbun (26 December 1937).

CHAPTER 4: THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS”
1.
Rikugun hohei gakko [Army Infantry School], “Tai Shina gun sentoho no kenkyu” [A study of combat methods used against Chinese troops], 1933 in Fujiwara Akira, Shinpan Nankin daigyakusatsu [The Nanking Massacre:

New edition] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), p. 26.

2.
Hora Tomio, Nankin daigyakusatsu no shomei [Proof of the Nanking Massacre] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1987), p. 316.

3.
Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 26.

4.
“Article 8 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” in Yamamoto, op. cit.,

p. 511.

5.
For “Kosen hoki kanrei ni kansuru kisoku” [Application of customary rules of warfare], a notice issued by the vice-minister of war on August 5, 1937 (Top Secret China Army Notice No. 198), see Defense Research Institute, Army Operations During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Part 2, p. 465; SMBN, vol. 1, p. 457.

6.
Ibid., p. 465f.

7.
Ibid., p. 466.

8.
“Article 23 of Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” in Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 512.

9.
“Dai 13 shidan sento shoho besshi oyobi fuzu” [13th Division battle instructions] in Hata, Nankin Jiken [The Nanking Incident] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1992), p. 68f.

CHAPTER 5: POINTS IN DISPUTE (1)
1.
Kojima Noboru, Nicchu senso [The Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Bunshun Bunko, 1993 (first printing, 1984)), vol. 4, p. 225.

2.
Hohei Dai 66 Rentai Dai 1 Daitai [1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment], Sento shoho [Battle report] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 560- 572, especially p. 567.

3.
Sento shoho: Showa 12 nen 12 gatsu toka kara 12 gatsu 13 nichi made [Battle report: December 10-13, 1937] of the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment contains five types of battalion orders, including one issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12. It also contains five types of 66th Infantry Regiment orders, one of which was issued at 12:20 a.m. on December 13. The recipient is designated on the first of the five battalion orders, but the others are marked simply “transmitted verbally and later in writing.”

4.
“114 shimei ko 62 go dai 114 shidan meirei” [114th Division Order No. A62] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 450.

5.
“Ho dai 128 ryo mei dai 66 go: uyokutai meirei” [128th Infantry Brigade Order No. 66 (right flank order)] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 451.

6.
“114 shimei ko dai 59 go dai 114 shidan meirei” [114th Division Order No. A59] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 449.

7.
“Dai 13 shidan sento shoho besshi oyobi fuzu” in Hata, op. cit.

8.
Oyake Isaburo was deputy commander of the 1st Platoon, 4th Company.

See Ara Kenichi, “Jorui: Heishitachi no Nanking jiken 19” [Fortress: Soldiers’ recollections of the Nanking Incident 19] in Maru (July 1990), p.
213.
9.
According to a battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12, at Zhonghua Gate, “some enemy officers refused to surrender, opting to fight to the death; others shot their subordinates in the back when they attempted to surrender.” See SMBN, vol. 1, p. 561. The Chinese supervisory unit was notorious for its habit of shooting soldiers who attempted to escape or surrender.

10.
Battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12, ibid. The order was issued (and signed by) Captain Shibuya, deputy commander, 1st Battalion.

11.
Battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12; 66th Infantry Regiment order issued at 12:20 a.m. on December 13 in ibid., p. 562ff.

12.
“Oyake Isaburo daiichi shotaicho dairi no shogen” [Testimony of Oyake Isaburo, deputy commander, 1st Platoon] in Ara, op. cit., p. 212.

13.
Ibid., p. 213.

14.
Battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12 in ibid., p. 561.

15.
Battalion order issued at 7:50 p.m. on December 12 in ibid., p. 562.

16.
Nishizawa Benkichi, Warera no tairiku senki: Hohei dai 66 rentai dai 3 chutai no ayumi [Our battles in China: History of 3rd Company, 66th Regiment], self-published, 1972, p. 92.

17.
Ibid., p. 97.

18.
Oyake, in Ara, op. cit., p. 213.

19.
Ibid.

20.
Ara Kenichi, who has pointed out how difficult it is to accurately depict the events that transpire during hostilities, believes that the battle report prepared by the 1st Battalion is more fiction than fact. Cf. Ara, “Jorui: Heishitachi no Nanking jiken” in op. cit, p. 209.

21.
Oyake, in Ara, op. cit., p. 213

22.
Ibid., p. 97.

23.
Testimony of Shimada Katsumi (commander, 2nd Machine-gun Company, 33rd Infantry Regiment) in BN, p. 163.

24.
Oyake in Ara, op. cit., p. 213.

CHAPTER 6: POINTS IN DISPUTE (2): “TAKE NO PRISONERS”
1.
See “Nakajima Kesago nikki” [Journal of Nakajima Kesago] (16th Division commander), in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 197-251, especially p. 220.

2.
Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 30f.

3.
Hata, The Nanking Incident, pp. 69, 117.

4.
Testimony of Onishi Hajime, Shanghai Expeditionary Force staff officer (later head of the Nanking Special Agency) in Ara Kenichi, Kikigaki: Nankin jiken [Interviews with witnesses to the Nanking incident] (Tokyo: Tosho Shuppansha, 1987), pp. 6-23, especially p. 10.

5.
See Chapter 4, Note 1.

6.
“Dai 13 shidan sento shoho besshi oyobi fuzu” in Hata, op. cit., p. 69.

7.
“Nakajima Kesago nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 220.

8.
“Article 8 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” in Yamamoto, op. cit.,

p. 511.

9.
“Iinuma Mamoru nikki” [Journal of Iinuma Mamoru] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 156f.

10.
The several thousand Chinese soldiers who surrendered near Xianhe Gate, “waving white flags,” bore strips of cloth on their chests on which “Our unit will fight to the death to defend the capital” had been written. The unit comprised regular soldiers and civilian volunteers, all of whom were wearing uniforms. For details, see the testimony of 2nd Lt. Sawada Masahisa in BN, pp. 254-257, especially p. 255f. For details of the conflict at Xianhe Gate, see Chapter 8, p. 155 of this book.

11.
“Sento shoho” [Battle report], No. 12, 38th Infantry Regiment (December 14, 1937) in BN, pp. 483-488, especially p. 488. A chart is attached to the end of this battle report, on which is written: “The 200-man 10th Company received orders to guard the area around Yaohua Gate. There, at about 8:30 a.m. on [December] 14, several thousand enemy soldiers were observed approaching, waving white flags. At 1:00 p.m. said soldiers were disarmed and transported to Nanking.” Sasaki Motokatsu, who ran the field post office established after the fall of Nanking describes an encounter with “large groups of disarmed Chinese soldiers” in front of Zhongshan Gate on December 17. (See Sasaki Motokatsu, op. cit., p. 220. Furthermore, Staff Officer Sakakibara Kazue attests to having “escorted four to five thousand prisoners to the Central Prison (No. 1 Penitentiary) in Nanking on December 16 and 17, where they were confined.” See BN, p. 324.

CHAPTER 7: POINTS IN DISPUTE (3): WE ARE TOLD TO KILL ALL PRISONERS; ALL UNITS DESPERATELY SHORT OF FOOD
1.
“Yamada Senji Nikki” [Journal of Yamada Senji ] (Hohei Dai 103 Ryodancho, Rikugun shosho) [Major general and commander of 103rd Infantry Brigade] in SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 283-338, especially p. 330 (journal

entry dated December 11).

2.
Ibid. (journal entry dated December 12).

3.
Yamada had been ordered to capture the forts at Wulongshan and Mufushan, and to facilitate the advance of the Sasaki Detachment. When he received his orders, the 65th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment departed, at 5:00 p.m. Theirs was a night march, as it was already dark.

4.
Maj.-Gen. Yamada had planned to spend the night at Xiaqijie, “but all houses there had been burned to the ground . there were no usable buildings.” See SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.

5.
“Yamada Senji nikki” [Journal of Yamada Senji] in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.

6.
Ibid.

7.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki (Hohei dai 65 Rentaicho: Hohei taisa)” [Journal of Col. Morozumi Gyosaku: Commander, 65th Infantry Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 339-341, especially p. 339.

8.
“Yamada Senji nikki,” SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.

9.
“Saito Jiro jinchu nikki” [War journal of Saito Jiro] (pseudonym, private first class) in Ono Kenji, Fujiwara Akira, Honda Katsuichi, eds., Nankin daigyakusatsu wo kiroku shita kogun heishitachi: Dai 13 shidan Yamada shitai heishi no jinchu nikki [Imperial Army soldiers’ accounts of the Nanking Massacre: War journals kept by soldiers in the Yamada Detachment, 13th Division] (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1996), pp. 3-55, especially p. 37; “Endo Shigetaro jinchu nikki” [War journal of Endo Shigetaro] (pseudonym, private first class) in ibid., pp. 87-95, especially p. 89.

10.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 339; Ono et al., op. cit., pp. 255, 325, 351, 373.

11.
“Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” [War journal of Miyamoto Shogo] (pseudonym, 2nd lieutenant) in ibid., pp. 123-140, especially p. 133; “Amano Saburo gunji yubin” [Military mail posted by Amano Saburo] (pseudonym, 2nd lieutenant) in ibid., pp. 245-258, especially p. 251.

12.
Testimony of Hirabayashi Sadaharu in Suzuki Akira, Nankin daigyakusatsu no maboroshi [The Nanking Massacre illusion] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1982), p. 198.

13.
The journal entry in “Yamada Senji nikki” cited by Suzuki Akira reads: “On December 15 I dispatched 2nd Lt. Honma to the Division regarding the disposition of the prisoners. We are told to kill them. All units are desperately short of food.” Cf. ibid., p. 193.

14.
“Yamada Senji nikki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.

15.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in ibid., p. 339.

16.
See conclusion stated at end of Chapter 4.

17.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 339.

18.
Ibid.

19.
“Odera Takashi jinchu nikki” [War journal of Odera Takashi] (pseudonym, private first class) in Ono et al., op. cit., pp. 183-209, especially p. 196.

20.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 339.

21.
“Endo Takaaki jinchu nikki” [War journal of Endo Takaaki] (pseudonym, 2nd lieutenant) in Ono et al., op. cit., pp. 211-229, especially p. 219.

22.
“Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” in ibid., p. 134.

23.
“Nakano Masao jinchu nikki” [War journal of Nakano Masao] (pseudonym, private first class) in ibid., pp. 113-121, especially p. 116.

24.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 340.

25.
Ibid., p. 339.

26.
Ibid., p. 340.

27.
Testimony of Navy Lt. Hashimoto Mochitsura in BN, p. 264.

28.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 340.

29.
Ibid.

30.
Testimony of Hirabayashi Sadaharu in Suzuki, op. cit., p. 196f.

31.
“Araumi Kiyoe nikki” [Journal of Araumi Kiyoe] (pseudonym, private first class) in SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 342-346, especially p. 345.

32.
Suzuki, op. cit., p. 196f.

33.
“Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 340.

34.
Ibid.

35.
“Meguro Fukuji jinchu nikki” [War journal of Meguro Fukuji] (pseudonym, corporal) in Ono et al., op. cit., pp. 359-374, especially p. 373.

36.
Ibid.

37.
“Endo Takaaki jinchu nikki” in ibid., p. 219.

38.
Ibid., p. 219f.

39.
Ibid., p. 220.

40.
“Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” in ibid., p. 134.

41.
Ibid.

42.
Testimony of Hirabayashi Sadaharu in Suzuki, op. cit., p. 198.

43.
“Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” in Ono et al., op. cit., p. 133f.

44.
Ibid.

CHAPTER 8: FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALLS OF NANKING AFTER THE FALL OF THE CITY
1.
“Nakajima Kesago nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 220 (cited in Chapter 6, p. 115?).

2.
“Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki (Hohei dai 30 ryodancho/rikugun shosho)” [Diary of Maj. Gen. Sasaki Toichi (Army major general and commander

of 30th Infantry Brigade)] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 263-276, especially p. 270.

3.
Ibid. Maj. Gen. Sasaki continues with a comment about Chinese troops: “The enemy at hand was Chiang Kai-shek’s pet division . rightly so, since they fought most bravely till the bitter end.”

4.
“Hohei dai 38 rentai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 11 go: 12.12.12. yori 12.12.13 made” [Battle report No. 11 prepared by 38th Infantry Regiment and covering December 12-13, 1937] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 475-483, especially p.

479.

5.
“Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki” in ibid., p. 271.

6.
Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.

7.
“Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 271.

8.
Ki 3 shi hensan iinkai [Committee for the compilation of the history of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment], Kihei dai 3 rentai shi [History of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment] (Tokyo: Kisankai, 1978), p. 157; BN, p. 251.

9.
Ibid., p. 155.

10.
Ibid.

11.
Ki 3 shi hensan iinkai, op. cit., p. 158.

12.
Ibid., p. 158.

13.
Ibid., p. 158; testimony of Kato Masayoshi, clerk at 3rd Cavalry Regiment Headquarters in BN, p. 251.

14.
“Iinuma Mamoru nikki” [Journal of Iinuma Mamoru] in SMBN, vol. 1, p.

155.

15.
Ibid., p. 156.

16.
Testimony of Capt. Kodama Yoshio in BN, pp. 341, 344.

17.
“Sento shoho” [Battle report], No. 11, 38th Infantry Regiment in SMBN, vol. 1, p.476.

18.
Hata, Nankin jiken, p. 118.

19.
“Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 272.

20.
Testimony of Nishiura Setsuzo in BN, p. 164

21.
“Iinuma Mamoru nikki,” p. 155.

22.
“Hohei dai 30 ryodan meirei (12.12.14)” [30th Infantry Brigade order (12/14/1937)] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 439.

23.
Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese Command Fled,” op. cit.

24.
Excerpt from entry dated December 14, 1937 in war journal of Sgt. Shimizu Kazue, 38th Regiment, 16th Division in Hata, Nankin jiken, p. 120f.

25.
Testimony of 2nd Lt. Muguruma Masajiro in EABN, Part 8 (November 1984), p. 7.

26.
Muguruma Masajiro, Sekishunfu: Waga seishun no omoide [Memories of my youth], self-published, 1990, p. 391f.

27.
“Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets” in Yamamoto, op. cit.,

p. 523.

28.
EABN, Part 5 in Kaiko (August 1984), p. 8.

29.
“Hohei dai 68 rentai dai 3 daitai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 8 go: 12.11.27. yori

12.12.13 made” [Battle report No. 8 prepared by 3rd Company, 68th Infantry Regiment and covering November 27 - December 13, 1937] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 534-541, especially p. 538.

30.
Ibid.

31.
Ibid.

32.
Ibid.

33.
“Yamazaki Masao nikki” (entry dated December 15, 1937), p. 296.

34.
“Iinuma Mamoru nikki” (entry dated December 15, 1937), p. 158.

CHAPTER 9: THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING
1.
Ichiki, op. cit., p.5.

2.
See Chapter 2, p. {54}; Cf. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 562.

3.
Testimony of Capt. Sekiguchi Kozo and Capt. Hashimoto Mochiyuki in EABN, Part 10 (January 1985), p. 30.

4.
Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese Command Fled,” op. cit.

5.
Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.

6.
James Espy, “Nankin ni okeru jokyo” [The Situation in Nanking] in Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 151.

7.
Testimony of Sumiya Iwane in EABN, Part 10 (December 1985), p. 31

8.
Capt. Yasuyama Kodo (Army Medical Corps physician), Shanghai War Journal cited in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 417-426, especially p. 426.

9.
Kasahara, “Archibald Steele shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 582.

10.
According to testimony of Muraoka Minoru and Enoki Katsuharu, “We did shoot at Chinese stragglers to lure them out, but we never used tank guns.” Cf. BN, p. 194.

11.
Statement made by William Webb (IMTFE presiding justice) at the Tokyo Trials on April 25, 1947 in Nitta, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 174.

12.
Nanking Incident in Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, eds., Kokusai kensatsukyoku: Jinmon chosa [International Prosecutor’s Office: Interrogations] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1993), vol. 50, pp. 31-94. See also interrogation of Lt. Gen. Nakazawa Mitsuo on April 30, 1946 in ibid., pp. 45, 52.

13.
“Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 433.

14.
Testimony of 2nd Lt. Muguruma Masajiro in EABN, Part 8 (November 1984), p. 7.

15.
Testimony of Takeuchi Goro, medical corpsman, in ibid.

16.
“Hohei dai 38 rentai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 10 go” [Battle report No. 10 prepared by 38th Infantry Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 485.

17.
Response of 3rd Division Commander Fujita Susumu in Awaya et al., op. cit., pp. 60f., 64.

18.
Testimony of Master Sgt. Fujita Kiyoshi in EABN, Part 6 (September 1984),

p. 6.

19.
Interview with 2nd Lt. Inukai Soichiro on February 3, 1998.

20.
“Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in SMBN, vol. 1, p.433.

21.
Ibid.

22.
Ibid.

23.
“Yamazaki Masao nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 296.

24.
“Kisaki Hisashi nikki” [Journal of Kisaki Hisashi] (major and administrative staff officer, 16th Infantry Division) in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 307-329, especially p. 320.

25.
Testimony of 1st Lieutenant Tsuchiya Shoji in BN, p. 179.

26.
“Orikono Suetaro nikki” [Journal of Orikono Suetaro] (captain and commander of 3rd Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment) in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 337-340, especially p. 337.

27.
“Hohei dai 38 rentai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 12 go” [Battle report No. 12 prepared by 38th Infantry Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 484-488, especially p. 484.

28.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 15.

29.
“Rokuryo sakumei: Ko dai 138 go uyokutai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichi gogo 4 ji han” [6th Brigade Operation Order A No. 138 (right-flank brigade order) issued at 4:30 p.m. on December 13] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 444.

30.
“Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in ibid., p. 444.

31.
“Nankinjo no koryaku oyobi nyujo ni kansuru chui jiko” in ibid., p. 434.

32.
“Soto jisshi ni kansuru chui” [Precautions to be taken when implementing the sweep] in ibid., p. 444f.

33.
“Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 106 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichi gogo 9 ji 30 pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 106 issued at 9:30 p.m. on December 13] in ibid., p. 514.

34.
“Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 107 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 14 nichi gogo 1 ji 40 pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 107 issued at 1:40 p.m. on December 14] in ibid., p. 515.

35.
“Dai 9 shidan sototai meirei” [9th Division Sweep Unit Order] in ibid., p.

445.

36.
“Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 109 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 14 nichi gogo 10 ji” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order A No. 109 issued at

10:00 p.m. on December 14] in ibid., p. 515.

37.
“Isa Kazuo nikki” [Journal of Isa Kazuo] (colonel and commander, 7th Infantry Regiment) in ibid., pp. 331-336, especially p. 334.

38.
The battle report indicates that the 7th Regiment was near No. 1 Park, which was located southwest of the Gugong airfield. Cf. “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 105 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichi gogo 5 ji 30 pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order A No. 105 issued at 5:30

p.m. on December 13] in ibid., p. 514; “Hohei 7 sakumei ko dai 106 go” in ibid., p. 514.

39.
“12 gatsu 13 nichi yori 12 gatsu 24 nichi made: Nankin jonai soto seika hyo: hohei dai 7 rentai” [7th Infantry Regiment: Chart showing results of Nanking sweep conducted from December 13 to December 24] in ibid., p.

524.

40.
Durdin presented as facts events that never took place, e.g., “In one slaughter a tank gun was turned on a group of more than 100 soldiers at a bomb shelter near the Ministry of Communications. See Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.

41.
“Mizutani So nikki ‘Senjin’ (Hohei dai 7 rentai dai 2 chutai, itto hei)” [Journal of Mizutani So (The Winds of War) (private first class, 2nd Company, 7th Infantry Regiment)] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 393-399, especially 396.

42.
“Inoie Matakazu nikki (Hohei dai 7 rentai dai ni chutai, itto hei)” [Journal of Inoie Matakazu (private first class, 7th Infantry Regiment) in ibid., pp. 363-375, especially p. 370.

43.
“Isa Kazuo nikki” in ibid., p. 334.

44.
“Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 111 go: Hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 15 nichi gogo 8 ji 30 pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 111 issued at 8:30 p.m. on December 15] in ibid., p. 516.

45.
Ibid.

46.
Ibid.

47.
According to a 7th Regiment battle report, “I remained in my current location until my departure on the 26th.” Cf. “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 117 go: Hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 24 nichi gogo 6 ji” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 117 issued at 6:00 p.m. on December 24] in ibid., p. 517.

48.
Ibid.

CHAPTER 10:
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS

1.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 1.

2.
Ibid., p. 14f.

3.
Ibid., p. 5.

4.
See Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, pp. 40,

109. At the Tokyo Trials, Magee testified as follows: “We consider them as civilians.” However, that would certainly have been in violation of the Hague Convention of 1907. For more information on this point, see Higashinakano Shudo, “Nankin no Shina hei shokei wa iho ka: Yoshida Yutaka kyoju no hihan ni kotaeru” [Were executions of Chinese soldiers in Nanking unlawful? A response to criticism levied by Prof. Yoshida Yutaka] in Getsuyo Hyoron (March 2000).

5.
Adachi Sumio, Gendai Senso Hokiron [Theory of modern regulations governing war] (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1979), p. 52f.

6.
Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 511.

7.
Okumiya Masatake, Watashi no mita Nankin jiken [Witness to the Nanking incident] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1997), p. 60.

8.
Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese Command Fled,” op. cit.

9.
Tsutsui Jakusui, Gendai shiryo: Kokusai ho [Modern references: International law] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1987), p. 184f.

10.
Eidgenossisches Justiz und Polizeidepartment [Federal Justice and Police Department], ed., Zivilverteidigung [Civil defense] (Aarau: Miles-Verlag, 1969), p. 218.

11.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 179f.

12.
Ibid., p. 180.

13.
Wickert, op. cit., p. 56.

14.
“Orikono Suetaro nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 337-340, especially p. 337.

15.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 15.

16.
B. K., op. cit., p. 4.

17.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 26f.

18.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 12.

19.
Erwin Wickert, ed., John Rabe, Der Gute Deutsche von Nanking (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1997), p. 107; Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p.

66.

20.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 107; Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 66.

21.
Headquarters of the 7th Infantry Regiment were located at No. 1 Park, southwest of the airfield in the wall of Nanking, i.e., in the Dongchang street of Nanking. See “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 105 go” and “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 106 go” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 513f.

22.
“Iinuma Mamoru nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 157.

23.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 108; Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 67.

24.
“Hohei dai 66 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichi gogo 9 ji rei fun” [66th Infantry Regiment order issued at 9:00 p.m. on December 13] in SMBN,

vol. 1, p. 568.

25.
James Espy, “Nankin ni okeru jokyo” [The Situation in Nanking] (January 1938) in Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 149ff.

26.
For details about Steele’s article, see Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 466.

27.
Okumiya, op. cit., p. 50.

28.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 182f.

29.
John Rabe, Nankin no shinjitsu [The truth about Nanking], trans. Hirano Kyoko (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997), p. 118.

30.
Ibid.

31.
Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.

32.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, pp. 417, 426.

33.
Ibid., p. 288.

34.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 38.

35.
Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 152.

36.
Ibid., p. 308.

37.
Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese Command Fled,” op. cit.

38.
Abend, “Japanese Curbing Nanking Excesses” in New York Times (19 December 1937).

39.
“Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War,” in The China Weekly Review (29 January 1938), p. 246.

40.
A typical example of this was Rev. John Magee’s testimony. He testified that on December 17, 1937, “I only personally witnessed the killing of one man.” However, in his diary he wrote “The actual killing we did not see as it took place.” Magee perjured himself at the Tokyo Trials. Cf. Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 89; Martha L. Smalley, ed., American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938 (Connecticut: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997), p. 23.

41.
Gray telegram dated February 3, 1938, No. 793.94/12303 in Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations between China and Japan, Roll 49.

42.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 312.

43.
Gray telegram in ibid.

44.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 29.

45.
Cobuild English Dictionary (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), p. 94.

46.
Ibid., p. 1565.

47.
Ibid., p. 1023.

48.
Ibid.

49.
Fujioka Nobukatsu, Kingendaishi kyoiku no kaikaku [Reforming Modern and Contemporary History Education] (Tokyo: Meiji Tosho, 1996), p. 233.

50.
Gray telegram in op. cit.

51.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 204.

52.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 5.

53.
Peter Nielsen, “The Nanking Atrocities” in China Today (January 1938).

54.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 548.

55.
B.K., op. cit.

56.
“War in China” in Time (14 February 1938), p. 17.

57.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 543.

58.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu 2: Chugoku kankei shiryo hen [Nanking Incident Source Material: Chinese References], trans. Nankin Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai hen [Nanking Incident Research Group] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1992), vol. 2, p. 31.

59.
Anonymous, “Japan’s ‘Dance Macabre’ in Nanking” in China Forum (19 March 1938), p. 130f.

60.
“Cabot Coville no Nankin ryokoki” [Travel journal of Cabot Coville] in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 112.

61.
Ibid., p. 116 62 Ibid.

CHAPTER 11:
DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)

1.
See Chapter 9, p. 175f.

2.
EABN, Part 4 in Kaiko (July 1984), p. 14.

3.
“December 15: We fell in at 8:00 a.m. and proceeded along Zhongshan Road to our new quarters. We passed by the Japanese Consulate and part of the international refugee zone, where the residences of foreigners are located, and where the sweep to round up enemy stragglers is being conducted. I caught cold a while ago, and my stomach hurt so much I could hardly walk. Street vendors are already plying their trade. Most of them are selling food, but I also saw a barber cutting hair on a main road. The houses and main roads are packed with people. Some of them are eating standing up. (…) Nine stragglers have taken over a foreigner’s house, and have put up a sign reading ‘Home of nine refugees.’ How ridiculous!” Entry for December 15, 1937 in “Inoie Matakazu nikki,” SMBN, vol. 1, p. 369.

4.
Maeda Yuji, Senso no nagare no naka ni [Caught in the current of war] (Tokyo: Zenponsha, 1982), p. 125. After graduating from Tokyo University with a degree in French literature, Maeda was hired by the Domei News Agency, which he served as war correspondent. After the war, he became executive director of the Japan National Press Club. Senso

no nagare no naka ni is based on the journal he kept during the war years. An excerpt follows.
After our troops had occupied Nanking, I heard about a foreign news report that described wholesale looting, violence and arson in the refugee zone. We were totally mystified, because immediately after the occupation, the refugee zone was designated off-limits to military personnel. Furthermore, after the ceremonial entry, vendors opened stalls both inside and outside the refugee zone. And precisely because order had been restored there, the Domei staff members moved back to our branch office, located in the refugee zone.
When we arrived, we noticed that the cooks and other servants who had been working for us had also returned. We had just missed Li Xingquan, who had served us faithfully; after being given a large bundle of war currency and an identification card, he disappeared into the crowd.
Soon afterwards, rumors about acts of violence committed by Japanese soldiers, emanating from Shanghai, reached our ears. According to the accusations, those acts would have been perpetrated immediately before we commenced our peaceful daily routine at our branch office in the now lively refugee zone. My colleagues and I stared at each other, dumbfounded. Not Arai, not Horikawa, not Nakamura . not one photographer or cinematographer (and they had all made the rounds of the city) had heard about any violent crime in Nanking once order was restored. The sweep for stragglers, and the apprehension of Chinese troops hiding in the refugee zone had ended on [December] 14th. If any unlawful acts had been committed, not just people from my agency, but the 100 other journalists assigned to Nanking from Japan’s news media would have heard about them.
5.
“Inoie Matakazu nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 371.

6.
Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), p. 90.

7.
Rabe writes that requests for burial permits submitted between December 13 and the end of January were, without exception, rejected by Japanese military authorities. Not until February 2 was it possible to bury the dead. See Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 170.

8.
Saito Jiro, Endo Takaaki, Amano Saburo, Kondo Eishiro and Kurosu Tadanobu (pseudonyms) all participated in the ceremonial entry. See Ono, et al, op. cit., pp. 38, 220, 254, 326, 351.

9.
Ibid., p. 79

10.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p.5; Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 5.

11.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 17.

12.
Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 39.

13.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 20.

14.
Ibid., p. 49.

15.
Ibid., p. 53.

16.
According to a proclamation issued by Japanese military authorities, “No one is allowed to get a passport for another person.” See ibid.

17.
Ibid., p. 5.

18.
BN, p. 387

19.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 20.

20.
“Nankin zokuzoku kaiten” [Vendors’ stalls in Nanking open for business], Yomiuri Shinbun (10 January 1938).

21.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 57.

22.
Ibid., p. 84.

23.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 29.

24.
See Chapter 10, Note 41.

25.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 74.

26.
Ibid. (title page).

27.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 121.

28.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 160.

29.
Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 163.

30.
Honda Katsuichi, “Nachi Doitsu wo mo kyogaku seshimeta Nankin daibogyaku jiken: chu” [Atrocities in Nanking that astonished even Nazi Germany: Part 2 of 3], Asahi Journal (01 February 1991), p. 70.

31.
See Chapter 2, Note 47.

32.
Kasahara, Nankin nanminku no hyakunichi [One hundred days in the Nanking refugee zone] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), p. 254f.

33.
Honda, Nankin e no michi [The Road to Nanking] (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1994), pp. 198-202.

34.
Senso giseisha wo kokoro ni kizamu kai hen [Association for the Commemoration of the War Dead], Nankin daigyakusatsu to genbaku [The Nanking Massacre and the atomic bomb] (Osaka: Toho Shuppan, 1995), p. 15ff.

35.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 143.

36.
Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 29.

37.
Ibid., p. 27.

38.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 216.

39.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 78.

40.
Ibid.

41.
Sasaki Toichi, Aru Gunjin no Jiden, p. 199.

42.
SMBN, vol. 1, p. 562.

CHAPTER 12:
DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)

1.
John B. Powell, My Twenty Years in China (New York: Macmillan Company, 19545), p. 156.

2.
Ibid.

3.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 150.

4.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 105.

5.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 61.

6.
Ibid., p. 47.

7.
Ibid., p. 123f.

8.
Ibid., p. 89.

9.
Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu (2) Eibun shiryohen [Source material relating to the Nanking Massacre during the Second Sino-Japanese War: English-language sources] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1985), vol. 2, p. 182.

10.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 205. “Dieser Wang ist in Nanking unter den Namen Jimmy als Altwarenhandler gut bekannt (…) Zu Jimmy’s ersten Amtshandlungen gehorte die Einrichtung von Bordellen (…).”[This particular Wang, a dealer in second-hand goods, goes by the name of “Jimmy” in Nanking. His first official duties involved establishing brothels.]

11.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 54f.

12.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 192, 198.

13.
Ibid., p. 192.

14.
Ibid.

15.
Ibid.

16.
Ibid.

17.
Masayo Duus, Haisha no okurimono [Gifts from the Vanquished] (Tokyo: Kodansha Bunko, 1995), p. 78ff.

18.
Entry for December 17, 1937 in “Orita Mamoru nikki (Hohei dai 23 rentai dai 3 chutaicho dai 1 daitaicho dairi hohei taii” [Journal of Orita Mamoru, captain, acting commander of 1st Battalion, commander of 3rd Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 342.

19.
EABN, Part 8 in Kaiko (November 1984), p. 9.

20.
Reginald Sweetland, “Japanese Punish 10 Soldiers in Connection with Looting in Nanking” [as translated], Chicago Daily News (09 February 1938), in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 476.

21.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 22.

22.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 191.

23.
“Uemura Toshimichi nikki (Shanhai hakengun sanbo fukucho, hohei taisa)” [Journal of Uemura Toshimichi (Infantry colonel, deputy chief of staff, Shanghai Expeditionary Force)], in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 277.

24.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 192, 298.

25.
“Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” [War journal of Gen. Matsui Iwane] in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 169.

26.
“Iinuma Mamoru nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 188.

27.
“Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 145.

28.
Ibid., p. 149.

29.
Ibid.

30.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 11.

31.
Ibid.

32.
Ibid.

33.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 10.

34.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 33.

35.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 117.

36.
Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 77.

37.
Minnie Vautrin, “Sharing the Abundant Life in a Refugee Camp” in The Chinese Recorder (July-August 1938), p. 365.

38.
Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 99.

39.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 56.

40.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 78f.

41.
Ibid., p. 55.

42.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 39f.

43.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 131.

44.
Ibid., p. 133.

45.
Ibid., p. 154.

46.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 53.

47.
North China Daily News (22 January 1938) in Nankin jiken shiryoshu 2: Chugoku kankei shiryo hen, vol. 2, p. 31.

48.
“Cases 114-143 not among the documents secured.” Cf. Hsu, op. cit., Table of Contents.

49.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 33.

50.
“The Family Letters of Dr. Robert Wilson” in Timothy Brook, ed., Documents on the Rape of Nanking (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 52.

51.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 52.

52.
Joshua Hammer, “Reipu de umareta kodomotachi” [English title: Born under a Bad Sign], Newsweek (Japanese edition) (25 September 1996), pp. 35-37.

53.
Powell, op. cit., p. 551.

54.
“Ex-Chinese Officers Among U.S. Refugees: Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking,” New York Times (04 January 1938).

55.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 21.

56.
Nakazawa Mitsuo (chief of staff, 16th Division), “Moshitsugisho: Nankin ni okeru moshiokuri yoten” [Noteworthy events in Nanking] (c. January 22, 1938) in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 474f.

57.
“Chinese Troops Sought Refuge in Nanking’s Camps, Japanese Say,” The China Press (25 January 1938) in Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p.

195.

58.
“Iinuma Mamoru nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 173, 175.

59.
James McCallum, letter to his family, 09 January 1938, in Smalley, op. cit.,

p. 43.

60.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 104.

61.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 30.

62.
Ibid., p. 34.

63.
Ibid., p. 40.

64.
Ibid.

65.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 117; James McCallum, letter to his family, 29 December 1937, in Smalley, op. cit., p.

34.

66.
Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 190.

67.
“Uemura Toshimichi nikki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 278.

68.
“Arison jiken kaiketsu su” [The Allison incident is resolved] in Kokusai chishiki oyobi hyoron [International knowledge and commentary] (March 1938), p. 152.

CHAPTER 13: FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED CORPSES POSE THREATS
1.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 16.

2.
“Kisaki Hisashi nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 317.

3.
BN, p. 141. Note further than the order issued on December 10, at about noon, by Tang Shengzhi (Defense Operation Order No. 1) dictated that all gunpowder and ammunition be detonated, all communication networks inside the city be destroyed, and all bridges over main thoroughfares be demolished. Cf. “Tang Shengzhi no meirei genko” [Original order issued by Tang Shengzhi] in SMBN, p. 618.

4.
“Nankin ni jichi iinkai seiritsu su” [Self-Government Committee established in Nanking], Kokusai chishiki oyobi hyoron (February 1938), p.

143.

5.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 5.

6.
“Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” in op. cit., vol. 2, p. 169.

7.
Maruyama Susumu, letter to author, February 5, 1997. For details about Maruyama’s assignment to the Nanking Special Agency, see Higashinakano Shudo, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan (Mantetsu shain) Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” [Recollections of former Manchurian Railway employee Maruyama Susumu] in Higashinakano Shudo, ed., Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2002 [The front line of research on the Nanking Massacre 2002] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2002), p. 215. See also Imura Tetsuro, “Tokubetsu rensai Mantetsu chosa kankeisha ni kiku: Dai 30 kai Kumagaya Yasushi: Mantetsu Shanhai jimusho no senbu katsudo, joho katsudo” [Special series featuring interviews with former Manchurian Railway employees: Interview No. 30 with Kumagai Yasushi, formerly in charge of pacification and intelligence-gathering efforts at the Shanghai office], Ajia Keizai [Asian Economies] 29:12 (1988), p. 90.

8.
Maruyama Susumu, letter to author, February 5, 1997.

9.
Ibid.

10.
“Kanamaru Yoshio gunso shuki (Dai 16 shidan keiribu)” [Journal of Sgt. Kanamaru Yoshio, Intendance Dept., 16th Division] in SMBN, vol. 1, p.

257.

11.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 83f.

12.
Ibid., p. 87 13 Ibid., p. 114.

14.
Ibid., p. 87.

15.
Ibid., p. 90.

16.
Ibid., p. 112.

17.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 6.

18.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 84.

19.
Ibid., p. 53.

20.
Higashinakano, “Nankin tokumu kikan (Mantetsu shain) Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 218.

21.
Nankin tokumu kikan hen [Nanking Special Agency, ed.] (revised by Higashinakano Shudo), “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (1)” [Nanking Special Agency Report No. 1] in Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen saizensen 2004 [The front line of research on the Nanking Massacre 2004] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2004).

22.
“Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2)”, in ibid., p. 85

23.
Yomiuri Shinbun (10 January 1938).

24.
“Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” in op. cit., vol. 2, p. 145.

25.
Lewis S.C. Smythe & Assistants, War Damage in the Nanking Area, December 1937 to March 1938: Urban and Rural Surveys, On Behalf of

The Nanking International Relief Committee, footnote under Table 1.

26.
Ichiki, op. cit., p. 22.

27.
Chang, op. cit., p. 139.

28.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 59.

29.
Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 44f.

30.
Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 562.

31.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 68.

32.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 143.

33.
Ara, Kikigaki: Nankin jiken, p. 18.

34.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 14.

35.
EABN, Part 8 in Kaiko (November 1984), p. 5.

36.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 90.

37.
Ibid., p. 157.

38.
Ibid., p. 163.

39.
Ibid., p. 166.

40.
Ibid., p. 99

41.
Rikugun Gahosha, Shina jihen: Senseki no shiori [The Second Sino-Japanese War: A guide to former battle sites] (Tokyo: Rikugun Juppeibu, 1938), p.

183.

42.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu 1: Amerika kankei shiryo hen, vol. 1, p. 311.

43.
Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 147.

44.
Nakazawa, Moshitsugisho in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 475.

45.
The following sentence appears in records kept by the Nanking Special Agency describing the situation in March 1938: “They may call them burials, but most of the time, they appear only to be dumping straw-wrapped corpses in the designated areas.” Cf. Nankin tokumu kikan (revised by Higashinakano Shudo), “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (3)” in Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2004, p.121.

46.
Nakazawa, Moshitsugisho in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 475.

47.
Ibid., p. 474.

48.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 99.

49.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 386.

50.
“Kisaki Hisashi nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 318.

51.
Rabe, [Report to Hitler] in Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 315.

52.
Higashinakano, ed. “Nankin tokumu kikan (Mantetsu shain) Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 222.

53.
Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 170.

54.
Rabe, [Report to Hitler] in Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 317.

55.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 66.

56.
Georg Rosen, “Endgultiger Rucktritt des Vorsitzendes des Nankinger ‘Selbstverwaltungskomites’ Tao Hsi-san” in Deutsche Gesandschaft

/Botschaft in China, p. 80. 57 Ibid.
58.
Higashinakano, ed. “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 222.

59.
“Though they have been burying 200 bodies a day, they find there are still 30,000 left to bury, mostly in Hsiakwan.” See Miner Searle Bates, “Relief Situation in Nanking” in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 102, Folder 866, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

60.
Higashinakano, ed. “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 223.

61.
Ibid., p. 224.

62.
Ibid., p. 225.

63.
Higashinakano, ed., Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2004, p. 121.

64.
Higashinakano, ed., “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 225.

65.
Rabe, [Report to Hitler] in Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 317.

66.
Higashinakano, ed., “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 228.

67.
Georg Rosen, “Die Lage in Nanking” in Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 107f.

68.
Hsu, op. cit., p. 67.

69.
Bates, op. cit.

70.
Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 562.

71.
Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 2, p. 263f.

72.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 145.

73.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 19.

74.
Higashinakano, ed., Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2004, p.87.

CHAPTER 14:
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

1.
Robert Wilson, letter to his family, 18 December 1937 in Zhang Kaiyuan, ed., Eyewitnesses to Massacre (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 394.

2.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 47f.

3.
Ibid., p. 49.

4.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 50.

5.
Ibid., p. 50f.

6.
Miner Bates’ letter to Harold Timperley, 12 April 1938 in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group 10, Box 4, Folder 52.

7.
Smythe et al., op. cit., p. 8.

8.
Woodhead, The China Year Book 1938, p. 352.

9.
Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 640.

10.
Woodhead, The China Year Book 1938, p. xv; The China Year Book 1939, p.

xv.

11.
Ibid., p. xxiv.

12.
China at War, vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1938), see comment above Table of Contents.

13.
Ibid., p. 70.

14.
Hsu Shuhsi, ed., The War Conduct of the Japanese (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1938), p. 146.

15.Mo Takuto [Mao Zedong], “Jikyusen ni tsuite” [On protracted war], in Mo Takuto senshu [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Gaiko Shuppansha, 1968), p. 237.
16.
Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 435f.

17.
“Editorial: A Year of Undeclared War” in Kwei Chungshu, ed., The China Critic (07 July 1938), p. 6.

18.
China Forum, 09 July 1938, pp. 51, 58.

19.
Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 417.

20.
Arthur de Carle Sowerby, “One Year of Undeclared War in China,” in The China Journal, vol. XXIX (July 1938), p. 7.

21.
C.H., “One Year of Sino-Japanese Conflict” in China Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 3, (08 January 1938), p. 271.

22.
“Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War,” p. 246.

23.
“Review of the First Year of the War (By a Chinese Contributor)” in The China Weekly Review, vol. 85, no. 6, (09 July 1938), p. 188.

24.
Robert Norton, “One Year of War” in China Today, vol. 4, no. 10, (July 1938), p. 7.

25.
The Character and the Activities of the Anti-Japanese College for Military and Political Training, trans., Mikami Taicho, Ishikawa Tadao, Shibata Minoru (Osaka: Kansai University Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies, 1965), pp. 60, 151.

26.
Ibid., p. 191.

27.
Ibid., p. 48.

28.
Ibid., p. 159.

29.
See Chugoku kyosanto shi shiryoshu [Collected Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1974), p. 388.

30.
Miner Searle Bates, letter to his friends, 29 November 1938 in Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 52, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

31.
Tsu, op. cit., p. 79.

32.
Hsu, The War Conduct of the Japanese, p. 146; Hsu, ed., A Digest of Japanese War Conduct (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1939), p. 11; “The War Conduct of the Japanese” in Hsu, ed., Chinese Year Book 1938-39, p. 185; Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 106.

33.
Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia (New York: World Publishing Co., 1941-1942), p. 57.

34.
Lily Abegg, Chinas Erneuerung: Der Raum als Waffe (Frankfurt: Societats-Verlag, 1940), p. 183.

35.
Woodhead, “Preface,” The China Year Book 1939.

CHAPTER 15: AN OVERVIEW OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”
1.
Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York: Knopf, 1943), p. 213.

2.
See John Pritchard and Sonia Zaide, eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), vol. 2, p. 2630.

3.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen vol. 1, p. 13.

4.
Nitta, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 50.

5.
Espy, “Nankin ni okeru jokyo,” in op. cit., p. 150.

6.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 142f.

7.
Ibid., p. 143.

8.
Ibid., p. 300.

9.
Ibid., p. 339.

10.
Nitta, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 768.

11.
Ibid., p. 800.

12.
Ara, “Jorui: Heishitachi no Nanking jiken,” p. 210ff.

13.
“Tokyo Saiban no Uebbu Saibancho, ‘Misemonoteki Kokaisaiban ni Hantai’” [“Presiding Justice Webb Opposed to ‘Showcase Trial’” ] in Asahi Shinbun (08 February 1995), p. 9.

14.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 111.

15.
Maruyama, “Waga showashi” [My Showa era] (24)], in Mantetsu wakabakai kaiho [Manchurian Railway Employees Journal], no. 138, October 1998, p. 80.

16.
Zhen Shunchen, Chugoku rekishi no tabi [Travels through Chinese history] (Osaka: Toho Shoten, 1991), p.180.

17.
Chan Yik Cham, New Chinese History: New Edition (Hong Kong: Ling Kee Publishing Co., 1975), p. 130.

18.
Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), pp. 92-124.

19.
Zhongxiaoxue tongyong jiaocai bianxiezu bian [Middle and Elementary School Textbook Editorial Committee], ed., Zhongguo lishi [History of China] (Beijing: Renmin Shubanshe [People’s Education Press], 1979), p. 51

CHAPTER 16:
THE “NANING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

1.
Atsuta Ko et al., Chugaku shakai (Rekishiteki bunya) [Middle school social studies (history)] (Osaka: Osaka Shoseki, 1999), pp. 252-253.

2.
Department of History, People’s Education Publishing, Chinese History, Vol. 4, 1997, p. 54.

3.
Suzuki Akira, Shin Nankin daigyakusatsu no maboroshi [The illusion of the “Nanking Massacre”: New edition] (Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha, 1999), p. 285.

4.
Ibid., p. 292.

5.
Esther Tappert Mortensen papers, Record Group No. 21, Box 7, Folder 120, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

6.
See Editors’ Note in The China Monthly, January 1940, Vol. 1, No. 2.

7.
Timperley, op. cit, p. 24.

8.
Ho Yingching, Chunichi kankei to sekai no zenshin [Sino-Japanese relations and the advancement of the world], trans. Association of Sino-Japanese Culture and Economy (Taipei: Shochu Publishing, 1974), p. 87.

9.
Guo Moruo, Konichisen kaisoroku [Reflections on the war against Japan], trans. Okazaki Toshio, (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1959), pp. 20, 25, 48, 50, 58, 191, 202. Guo Moruo was a famous revolutionary and historian.

10.
Ibid.

11.
Guo Moruo, op. cit., p. 62.

12.
“Bo tekitai senden” [5. Propaganda against the enemy] in ”Daisanbu kokusai senden” [International Propaganda Section 3] in Chuo sendenbu hantoshi chushin kosaku keikaku, [Central Information Department’s six-month central plan (March- August 1939), property of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Central Committee for the Compilation of Documents Relating to Party History], mimeographed, [1939?].

13.
Guo Moruo, op. cit., p. 113.

14.
Ibid., p. 154.

15.
Chinese Nationalist Party, ed., Chuo sendenbu kokusai sendensho kosaku gaiyo 1938 nen kara 1941 nen 4 gatsu [Overview of the activities of the Central Information Division’s International Information Division (1938-April 1941). Since this publicaton contains no serial page numbers, please refer to “Activities of the Division for Propaganda Against the Enemy.”

16.
Ibid. Gaijin mokuto no Nichigun boko is followed by Kamino shison wa Chugoku ni ari [God’s children are in China]. The correct title of Gaijin mokuto no Nichigun boko [Japanese atrocities witnessed by foreigners] is Gaijin mokuto chu no Nichigun boko [Japanese atrocities while witnessed by foreigners], which is the Chinese version of Timperley’s What War Means.

17.
“Overview of the Activities of the External Affairs Section.”

18.
Wang Ling Xiao, Chugoku Kokuminto shimbun seisaku no kenkyu [Study of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Newspaper Policy], Party History Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Central Committee, 1996, p.

209.

19.
Zeng Xubai, Autobiography of Zeng Xubai (Shokukei Publishing Co., 1988), Vol. 1, pp. 200-201.

20.
Harold Timperley’s letter to Miner Bates, March 14, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 65.

21.
Timperley, ed., Japanese Terror in China, p. 9f.

22.
Ibid., p. 71

23.
Miner Bates’ letter to Harold Timperley, March 3, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 65.

24.
Harold Timperley’s letter to Miner Bates, March 28, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 65.

25.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 9.

26.
Ibid., p. 20

27.
Ibid., p. 18.

28.
Professional Record, M.S. Bates, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 126, Folder 1132.

29.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 19; copy of a report by Dr. M. S. Bates of the University of Nanking.Confidential, Anlage zum Peiping-Bericht, Nr. 2722/4579/37 vom 30. Dezember 1937, in 2205 Chinesisch-Japanischer Konflikt, Bd.3,11/ 1937-3/1938, Botschaft in China (Bestand R9208), Bundesarchiv, Berlin.

30.
Ibid., p. 20f.

31.
Ibid., p. 21.

32.
Ibid., p. 21.

33.
Ibid., p. 22.

34.
Ibid., p. 22.

35.
See the cover of Japanese Terror in China (New York: Modern Age Books, 1938).

36.
Bates’ testimony at the Tokyo Trials. See R. John Pritchard and Sonia M. Zaide, ed., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Vol. 2 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), p. 2626f.

37.
Timperley, ed., op. cit., p. 161.

38.
Tomisawa Shigenobu, Nankin jiken no kakushin [At the core of the Nanking Incident] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2003), pp. 83-84.

39.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p.78; Higashinakano, ed., Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2002, p. 128. John Magee testified, “I saw a Chinese being killed,” when he was asked during the Tokyo Trials actually how many murder cases he witnessed. But it is extremely likely

that he bore false testimony. Magee wrote in his diary that he did not see “the actual killing.” See Letter of John Magee to his wife, December 19, 1937, in Martha L. Smalley, ed., American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938, (New Haven: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997), p. 23.

40.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 31.

41.
Ibid., p. 33.

42.
Wickert, The Good Man of Nanking, p. 77.

43.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 18.

44. Bates’ letter to his wife, February 1, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 1, Folder 8. After the war ended, Tokuyasu Fukuda, who had been “in charge of handling complaints” at the Japanese Embassy in Nanking (he later became Minister of Postal Affairs), testified as follows: “My duty was to go to the office at No. 5 Ninghai Road No. 5 from time to time to negotiate with the International Committee there. One day, I saw two or three Americans busily typing. When I took a quick glance at them, I noticed that they were typing reports, such as “Japanese soldiers assaulted a woman at such and such a place at such and such a time today.” I scolded them: “Just a minute! I don’t know who told you that, but never type such a thing without checking. Why don’t you investigate the matter before you report on it?” Later, it occurred to me that they must have been preparing material for Timperley’s book [What War Means]. After that, I cautioned them any number of times: “Don’t you think there’s something strange about recording what a Chinese tells you (which might have been invented) without conducting an investigation?” [...] My duty was to receive Chinese complaints. They protested against this and that, mixing truth and falsehoods. My patience was wearing thin. [...] For instance, one day the American vice-consul came to the office and said, “Japanese soldiers are stealing lumber from an American warehouse in Xiaguan and loading it into a truck.” “We can’t have that. Come with me!” I sent for a staff officer, and the three of us drove over there. It was around 9 o’clock on a cold morning; it was snowing heavily. When we arrived, we found the place deserted. The warehouse was locked, and there was no sign of its having been opened. I berated the vice-consul: “There’s nothing amiss here! You’ve wasted my time and the staff officer’s time! Next time, do some checking before coming to me! The Army is concerned about every incident, no matter how minor, as I’m sure you can see since we rushed over here.”
“Please make sure this doesn’t happen again.” The vice-consul said he’d be more careful in the future. [...] There were many similar incidents.
[...] It is true that the Japanese Army was to blame in some cases, but there was absolutely nothing remotely resembling a massacre, especially one claiming 200,000, 300,000 or even 1,000 victims. [...] There was no place to hide there. There would have been countless witnesses, and the consequences would have been horrible. This accusation is totally without basis. It’s a propagandist plot.
Tanaka Masaaki, Nankin gyakusatsu no kyoko [The fallacy of the “Nanking Massacre”] (Tokyo: Nihon Kyobunsha, 1984), pp. 35-37. Similar testimony can be found in Fukuda Tokuyasu,“Timpare hodo no shinso” [The truth about Timperley’s report], Ichiokunin no showashi: Nicchu senso I [The history of one hundred million people in the Showa era: Sino-Japanese War I] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1979), p. 261.
45.
Bates witnessed men and women responding to the Japanese Army’s classified advertisements. Their responses were completely voluntary … they welcomed the opportunity. The women must have gone to apply for work at a house of prostitution that Wang Changtien of the Red Swastika Society was in the process of establishing. Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 89; George Rosen, Nankings Ubergang, den 20 Januar 1938, in Deutsch Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China. Japanisch-Chinesischer Konflikt (Microfilm), Deutsches Bundesarchiv, S.205.

46.
Higashinakano, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2),” op. cit., p. 96.

47.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 26.

48.
See Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, pp. 571, 577.

49.
Wickert, The Good Man of Nanking, p. 201f.

50.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 19.

51.
Ibid., p. 30.

52.
See Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 582 (translated from Japanese version).

53.
Higashinakano, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2)”, op. cit., p. 99.

54.
Smythe Letter, December 15, 1937, in Zhang Kaiyuan, ed., Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 258.

55.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 5. No Chinese soldier was disarmed in the Safety Zone by the Japanese Army. The International Committee may have disarmed some of them. But they did not return the disarmed soldiers and weapons to the Japanese army. Instead, they hid them. In March 1938, the Japanese army wrote, “The weapons which were already found reached the amount of fifty trucks.” Higashinakano, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (3)”, op. cit., p. 119.

56.
Gray telegram, op. cit.

57.
DoD News: Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability en route to Camp-X-Ray, United States Department of Defense News Transcript, January 27, 2001.

58.
Ibid.

59.
DoD News: DoD News Briefing.Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United States Department of Defense News Transcript, January 30, 2001.

60.
DoD News: Dod News Briefing.Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United States Department of Defense News Transcript, February 8, 2001.

61.
Ibid.

62.
DoD News: DoD News Briefing.Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United States Department of Defense News Transcript, January 11, 2001. I have to say that Perry Link’s “Forward” which criticized my paper in Nanking 1937 completely ignored this point, and was a criticism beside the point. Cf. Perry Link, “Forward,” Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David Liu, ed., Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. xvii.

63.
Ibid.

64.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 51.

65.
Ibid. Harold Timperley’s letter to Miner Bates, March 14, 1938.

66.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 19.

67.
See The Chinese Nationalist Party, “ Henshuka kosaku gaiyo” [Overview of Editing Section activities], Chuo Sendenbu Kokusai Sendensho Kosaku Gaiyo [Overview of the activities of the Central Information Division’s International Information Division]

68.
Guo Moruo, op. cit., p. 69.

69.
See “4. Kokusai Senden” [4. International Propaganda], Chinese Nationalist Party, Overview of Propagandist Activities, mimeographed, n.d..

70.
China Year Book 1939, pp. 416-420. More attention should be paid to the fact that the Special Issue Commemorating the First Anniversary of Sino-Japanese War, an English-language magazine published by Europeans, Americans and Chinese in Shanghai did not mention the “Nanking Massacre.” See Chapter 14.

71.
Note written by Miner S. Bates, April 12, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 52, Yale Divinity School Library.

72.
Steele, “Nanking Massacre Story: Japanese Troops Kill Thousands,” in Chicago Daily News, December 15, 1937.

73.
Durdin, “Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking”, in New York Times, December 18, 1937.

74.
Timperley, op. cit., p. 14f.

75.
Ibid., p. 143. Minnie Vautrin’s Diary (1937-1940), Miscellaneous Personal

Papers Collection, Record Group No. 8, Box 206, Yale Divinity School Library, p. 123. Wickert (Hrsg.), John Rabe, S.186; Wickert, ed., The Good Man of Nanking, p. 131.

76.
See Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 583.

77. What should be noted is that the battle was not over even when the city gates fell. On December 13, the day the city fell, at Shanghezhen near the bank of the Yangtze River, to the west of the South Gate (Zhonghua Gate), the 11th Company, attached to the 45th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division, entered into a fierce battle after having been surrounded by a tremendous number of Chinese soldiers. In his diary, veteran soldier Fukumoto Tsuzuku wrote that the 11th Company was “surrounded by approximately 40,000 enemy troops.” A counterattack by a battery of mountain artillery could repulse the Chinese soldiers. But Company Commander Ozono Shozo and his 14 subordinates were killed. Thirty-five Japanese soldiers were injured. It was a very fierce battle. At that time, according to the testimony of Lieutenant Takahashi Yoshihiko (who was under the command of the 11th Company as the platoon leader of the battery of mountain artillery), the Chinese whose escape was blocked “stripped naked and jumped into the river.” They became the victims of the Japanese army’s continued attack, and many of them died in the Yangtze River. Another entry in Fukumoto Tsuzuku Nikki [Fukumoto Tsuzuku’s diary] mentions that on December 20, the divisional commander supervised a count of the corpses. “In the afternoon a small platoon went out to Shanghezhen, where we counted 2,377 enemy corpses. I heard many of them drowned in the river.” At 8 pm, on December 13, outside Taiping Gate in the east, Chinese soldiers who had been taken prisoner noticed that were not many Japanese Army soldiers guarding them. They threw hand grenades and escaped, killing or injuring six Japanese soldiers. At 4:30 pm on December 14, three Japanese soldiers were killed instantly by Chinese troops’ trench mortars on a street near a munitions factory (in the vicinity of the South Gate (Zhonghua Gate)) outside the city. Regiment Commander Ide Tatsuo died the next morning. The city gates had fallen, but fierce battles still raged in some areas outside the city on December 13 and 14. For this reason, some Japanese units had the largest number of dead and injured since the Shanghai conflict. Even inside the city, Chinese soldiers attacked the Japanese army.
There was no street fighting inside the city, but there was sporadic shooting. SMBN, p. 385. Kobayashi Masao, ed., Sakigake: Kyodo jinbutsu senki [Pioneer: Diary of a Japanese soldier] (Ise Shimbun Sha, 1984), p. 536.
Kajimura Itaru, Tairiku o tatakau: Kansoku shotaicho no nikki [Fighting in China: Diary of an observation platoon commander], self-published, 1979, p. 50.
78.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 1

79.
Ibid., p. 10f; Timperley, op. cit., p. 144.

80.
See Nankin jiken shiryoshu , vol. 1, pp. 110-121.

81.
Conversation of Consul Tanaka with M.S.B., March 31, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No.10, Box 102, Folder 867, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

82.
Based on data made available to biographical dictionaries and dated December 1, 1972 (profile of Bates’ last years) in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 126, Folder 1132.

83.
Theodore H. White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), p.76.

84.
The Nationalist Party’s Central Information Division held a news conference for foreign correspondents and military officers who were living in China almost every two days. This amounts to a total of 600 news conferences during the 42 months between December 1937 and April 1941; protests were not registered against the “Nanking Massacre” at any of them. Wang Ruowang, a Chinese writer born in 1918 and stripped of his party membership in 1987 recalled, “During the war I never heard anything about a Nanking Massacre.” For his observations, see Suzuki, Shin Nankin dai gyakusatsu no maboroshi, pp. 34, 36.

85.
The words of William Logan, Jr., a lawyer at the Tokyo Trials. As Logan stated, by admitting transcribed oaths of witnesses, the tribunal disregarded the common sense “which is well recognized in all English speaking countries, to see them, hear their testimony, and have the opportunity of cross-examination of the witness.” The prosecution did not [establish perjury], and accepted even testimony by hearsay. Logan’s testimony was as follows: “That being so, if the Tribunal pleases, The defense are unanimous in opposition to a trial of this case on affidavits. This raises the fundamental proposition of law, which is well recognized in all English speaking countries, that the accused in a criminal case is entitled to be confronted by the witnesses, to see them, bear their testimony, and have the opportunity of cross-examination of the witness. If the witness is not produced, the opportunity of cross-examination is lost; and this trial would be presented by testimony from an unseen, unknown, and unheard of witness.” See Hora, Nichu senso Nankin daigyakusatu jiken shiryoshu (1), p. 111. See also Pritchard and Zaide, ed., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, vol. 2, p. 4451f.

As many have indicated, those who sat as judges at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, represented only the victorious nations. Those from neutral nations did not sit there. All persons on trial were from Japan. This was not a trial, but retaliation. Moreover, they ignored the grand rule, “The law should not influence the past,” resorting to the use of ex post facto law.
86.
General Matsui was heard to say that the “Nanking Massacre” was a fiction created by the foreign press. See Miner Bates’ letter, December 10, 1946, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, RG10, B4, F53.

87.
Based on the late Professor Muramatsu Takeshi’s speech entitled “Recollections of the Japanese Emperor’s Visit to China” at Sankei Kaikan in Tokyo on May 16, 1992. The population of 200,000 (according to Prof. Muramatsu) is confirmed by the following:

Daily press conferences at the Chinese-British Cultural Association spanned a period beginning 20 days before the fall of Nanking and ending on the day after the city fell. Participants at the conferences, which focused on events in Nanking, included the mayor, military personnel, news correspondents, missionaries and businessmen. There is no record of a government representative (or anyone else, for that matter) stating that the population of Nanking was 500,000 during any of those conferences. On November 28, Wang Gupan, head of the Police Department, made the following announcement: “At present, there are 200,000 people living here in Nanking.” Thereafter, the conventional wisdom in the foreign community was that Nanking’s population was 200,000.
Nanking was surrounded by massive walls with a circumference of 34 kilometers. Not until February 25, 1938 were ordinary citizens allowed to travel into or out of the city. Despite the fact that there was no appreciable civilian traffic into or out of Nanking, the city’s population increased.
Five days after the fall of Nanking, the International Committee reported that the population was “200,000.” On December 21, the [Foreign Community of Nanking] mentioned that there were currently “200,000 civilians in Nanking.” Therefore, we must conclude that the population of Nanking did not change before or after the city fell. If there had indeed been a massacre, the population would have decreased.
On January 14, 1938, one month after the fall of Nanking, the International Committee estimated the population to be “250,000 to 300,000 civilians inside the city” . in other words, inside the Safety Zone. The Committee’s estimate (based on figures from a census taken by the Japanese military) was later corrected to “250,000 civilians.” The population increased because the Japanese Army did not execute all the soldiers hidden in the Safety Zone, but recognized them as civilians. The assertion that the population at the time of the fall of Nanking was 500,000 shows blatant disregard for or ignorance of the information stated in contemporary documents. See Minnie Vautrin.s letter: A Review of the First Month, December 13, 1937 to January 13, 1938, in Archives of the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, Record Group No.11, Box 145, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut; Wickert, ed., John Rabe, p. 28; Wickert, The Good Man of Nanking, p. 39; Higashinakano, ed., Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2), p. 99; Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 20; Letter of the Foreign Community of Nanking to the Imperial Japanese Embassy, December 21, 1937, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 102, Folder 864, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut; Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 84; Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 81.
CHAPTER 17: NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO MASSACRE IN NANKING
1. Archibald Steele, Nannking Massacre Story: Japanese Troops Kill Thousands, in: The Chicago Daily News, December 15, 1937.

2. Tillman Durdin, Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking, in: New York Times, December 18, 1937.

3. Maeda Yuji, op. cit., p.125.

4. Ara, Kikigaki: Nankin jiken p.209, 210.

5. John Pritchard and Sonia Zaide, ed., op. cit., vol. 2, p.2,626.

6. Tomisawa Shigenobu, op. cit., p.iii, vi, viii.

7. Higashinakano（revized）, .Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2). in Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen saizens2004, p.90.

8. See p.55 of this book.

9. See p.137 of this book.

10. See Kasahara, .Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki. in Nankin jiken shiryoshu 1: Amerika kankei shiryo hen, vol. 1, p. 577.

11. Ibid., p.564.

12. Isii Itaro, Ishii Itaro Diary (continued), Monthly Chuo Koron (June, 1991),

p.271.

13. Tomisawa, op. cit. p.v, vii, ix.

14. See p.155. of this book.

15. See p.220. of this book.

16. See p.222 of this book.

17.
Timperley, ed., Japanese Terror in China, p.19, 21, 51.

18.
The Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 9, 1945, p.4.

19.
Letter of John Magee to his wife, dated Dec. 19, 1937, in: Martha L. Smalley, ed., American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938 (Connecticut: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997), p. 23.

20.
Pritchard and Zaide, ed., op. cit., p.2, 630.

21.
Ibid., p.2,630f.

22.
Statement of M.B.Bates, dated February 6, 1947, in : Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No.10, Box 126, 4, Folder1132, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

23.
A proposed three days armistice reads as follows: .For the sake of 200,000 helpless civilians, the International Committee for a Safety Zone in Nanking respectfully proposes to the Chinese and Japanese authorities a truce of exactly three days….. See Plumer Mills letter to his family, dated on January 31, 1938 in: Plumer Mills Papers, Record Group No.8, Box 141, Folder ?, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut; China Bulettin No.7, issued on March 28, 1938 reads as follows: .NANKING: As the siege of Nanking developed rapidly, 80 % of its one million people left for parts unknown. As many as possible of the remainng 200,000 sought the Safety Zone conducted by a group of foreigners, with George Fitch, International Committee secretary, as director in charge.. See Plumer Mills Papers, Record Group No.8, Box 281, Folder 1. When arguing the population in Nanking, we must also take into consideration the following fact that they thought on Dec. 28, 1937 .we do not know when people will be allowed to move in and out of the city freely.. It was on February 25, 1938 that the Japanese allowed to move freely. On these points, see Ernest Forster.s letter to his wife, in: Plumer Mills Papers, Record Group No.8, Box 263, Folder 5;

24.
Letter of the Foreign Community of Nanking to the Imperial Japanese Embassy, December 25. 1937, in: Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No.10, Box 102, Folder 864.

25.
Hsu, ed., Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p.84.

26.
Hora, ed., Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu (1), vol. 1,

p.396.

27.
Tanaka Masaaki, .Nankin gyakusatu. no kyoko, p.37; The similar testimny is in Fukuda Tokuyasu, .Timpare hodo no shinso., Ichiokunin no Showashi

I : Nicchu senso, p.261.
28.
Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department, Ministry of Information 1941, p.1 of the Counterintelligence Division.

29.
Ibid., p.2.

30.
Institute for Modern History Research of China Social Science Academy,

ed., Dictionary of Notable Visitors to China in the Modern Era (Beijing: China Social Science Publishing, 1981), p.477.

31.
This is based on a newspaper clip carrying an article with a photo of Bates which is supposed to be on just before the fall of Nanking. However, the name of the newspaper is not identified. Esther Tappert Mortensen papers, Record Group No.21, Box 7, Folder 120, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

32.
See the editor.s note, in: The China Monthly, January 1940, Vol1, No.2.

33.
Note of Miner S. Bates, April 12, 1938, in: Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No.10, Box 4, Folder 52, Yale Divinity School Library.

34.
Some data available for directories ― Miner Searle Bates, dated December 1, 1972, im: Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No.10, Box 126, Folder 1132.

35.
Tillman Durdin, Japanese Atrocites Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese Command Fled, New York Times, January 9, 1938.

36.
Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department,

p.2 of the Counterintelligence Division.

37.
Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department,

p.1 of the Foreign Affairs Division.

38.
Hihgashinakano, The Overall Picture of the .Nanking Massacre., in: Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David Liu, eds, Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing (New York: M.E.Sharpe 2002), p.111.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER: REREADING RABE’S DIARY
1.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 170f.

2.
Ibid., p. 99.

3.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 1.

4.
Robert Wilson’s letter to his family, 14 December 1937 in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 277.

5.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 1.

6.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 107.

7.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 14f.

8.
Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 150f.

9.
Rabe’s Report to Hitler in Nankin no Shinjitsu, p. 96.

10.
Fukuda Kazuya, “John Rabe no nikki ‘Nankin daigyakusatsu’ wo do yomuka?” [What are we to make of the “Nanking Massacre” described in John Rabe’s diaries?], in Shokun! (December 1997), p. 37.

11.
John Rabe’s Report to Hitler in Nankin no Shinjitsu, p. 314.

12.
Ibid., p. 315.

13.
Ibid., p. 316.

14.
Ibid., p. 303.

15.
Yokoyama Hiroaki, “Commentary: The Tragedy in Nanking and Rabe’s Diary” in Wickert, Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 328.

16.
For further information about the comment made by P.R. Shields of the British Export Co. in Nanking, see Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 120.

17.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 96.

18.
Ibid., p. 268.

19.
Kasahara, Nankin nanminku no hyakunichi, p. 153.

20.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 105.

21.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safey Zone, p. 21.

22.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 195.

23.
BN, p. 175.

24.
See Chapter 12, Note 59.

25.
Smalley, op. cit., p. 43.

26.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 130.

27.
EABN, Part 8 in Kaiko (November 1984), p. 7.

28.
Wickert, John Rabe, p. 121f.

29.
Ibid., p. 122.

30.
Ibid., p. 261.

31.
Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 5.

32.
Bates, op. cit. He refers to prisoners of war as “military prisoners.”

33.
For example, see Hsu, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 60.

34.
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 19.

35.
See Chapter 13, Note 54.

36.
See Chapter 13, Note 65.

37.
See Chapter 13, Note 64.

38.
See Chapter 13, Note 67.

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Sources written after September 1945
I. In Japanese
Ara Kenichi. “Jorui: Heishitachi no Nankin Jiken” (Fortress: Soldiers’ Recollections of The Nanking Incident). Maru, January 1989 – December 1990.
Ara Kenichi. Kikigaki: Nankin Jiken (Interviews With Witnesses to the Nanking Incident). Tosho Shuppansha, 1987.
Adachi Sumio. Gendai Senso Hokiron (Theory of Modern Regulations Governing War). Keiseisha, 1979.
Aso Tetsuo. Shanhai yori Shanhai e (From Shanghai to Shanghai). Sekifusha, 1993.
Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, eds. Kokusai Kensatsukyoku: Jinmon Chosa (International Prosecutor’s Office: Interrogations), Vol. 50. Nihon Tosho Center, 1993.
Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu. (Defense Research Institute, Military History Department). Senshi Sosho: Shina Jihen Rikugun Sakusen 2 (Military History Series: Army Operations During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Part 2). Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1976.
Chen Shunchen. Chugoku Rekishi no Tabi (Journey Through China’s History). Shueisha Bunko, 1997.
Chen Shunchen. Chugoku no Rekishi 6: Sekai Teikoku e (Chinese History 6: Toward a World Empire). Heibonsha, 1978.
Date Muneyoshi. Chugoku Kyosanto Ryakushi (A Short History of the Chinese Communist Party). Takushoku University, 1991.
Doi Shinji. Hana to Shi: Omoide no Izumi (Flowers and Poems: A Wellspring of Memories). Self-published, 1976.
Duus, Masayo. Haisha no Okurimono (Gifts from the Vanquished). Kodansha Bunko, 1995.
Eto Jun. Wasureta Koto to Wasuresaserareta Koto (What We Have Forgotten and What We Have Been Forced To Forget). Bungei Shunju, 1979.
Fuji Nobuo. Nankin Daigyakusatsu wa Ko Shite Tsukurareta (How the
Great Nanking Massacre Was Manufactured). Tendensha, 1995.
Fuji Nobuo. Watakushi no Mita Tokyo Saiban (Witness to the Tokyo Trials). Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1989.
Fujioka Nobukatsu. Jigyaku Shikan no Byori (Pathology of a Masochistic Historical View). Bungei Shunju, 1997.
Fujioka Nobukatsu. Kingendaishi Kyoiku no Kaikaku (Reforming Modern and Contemporary History Education). Meiji Tosho, 1996.
Fujioka Nobukatsu. Ojoku no Kingendaishi (The Disgraces of Modern and Contemporary History). Tokuma Shoten, 1996.
Fujiwara Akira. Shinpan Nankin Daigyakusatsu (The Great Nanking Massacre: New Edition). Iwanami Shoten, 1992.
Fukuda Tokuyasu. “Timperley Hodo no Shinso” (The Truth About Timperley’s Reports). Ichiokunin no Showashi: Nicchu Senso I (Showa Era History: The Sino-Japanese War I). Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1979.
Goto Kosaku, ed. Nankin Sakusen no Shinso: Kumamoto Dairoku Shidan Senki (The Truth about the Nanking Campaign: War Records of the 6th (Kumamoto) Division). Tokyo Johosha, 1966.
Government of Switzerland. Minkan Boei (Civil Defense). Hara Shobo, 1995.
Guo Moruo (Okazaki Toshio, tr.) Konichisen Kaisoroku (The Memoir of the War Against Japan). Chuo Koronsha, 1959.
Hamasaki Tomizo. Doronko no Hei (Mud-Covered Soldiers). Self-published, 1970.
Hamasaki Tomizo. Zoku Doronko no Hei (Mud-Covered Soldiers, Part 2). Self-published, 1983.
Hammer, Joshua. “Reipu de Umareta Kodomotachi” (Born Under a Bad Sign). Newsweek. December 25, 1996.
Hata Ikuhiko. Gendaishi no Soten (Modern History: Issues). Bungei Shunju, 1998.
Hata Ikuhiko. Nankin Jiken (The Nanking Incident). Chuko Shinsho, 1992.
Hata Ikuhiko. Rokokyo Jiken no Kenkyu (Study of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident). Tokyo University, 1997.
Higashinakano Shudo. “Aratamete Rabe no Nikki wo Tettei Kensho Suru” (Reexamining Rabe’s Diary). Seiron, April 1998.
Higashinakano Shudo. “Nankin Jiken no Shinso” (The Truth About the Nanking Incident). Nihon Bunka Kenkyujo Kiyo (Japan Cultural Research Institute Bulletin), No. 2. Asia University: Japan Cultural Research Institute, 1996.
Higashinakano Shudo. “Nankin Tokumu Kikan (Mantetsu Shain) Maruyama Susumu Shi no Kaiso” (Mission in Nanking: (Manchurian Railway Employee) Maruyama Susumu’s Recollections). Asia University: Japan Cultural Research Institute, 1996.
Higashinakano Shudo. “Tsukurareta Jiken: Nankin Daigyakusatsu (1 – 8)” (Fabricated Incident: The Great Nanking Massacre, Parts 1 -8). Bunbu Shinron (Civil and Military Affairs: New Theories), Nos. 22 – 28, 1993.
Higashinakano Shudo. “Yahari Rabe no Nikki wa Santo Shiryo: Itakura Yoshiaki Shi no Hihan ni Kotaeru” (Rabe’s Diary Is a Third-Rate Resource: Responding to Criticism from Itakura Yoshiaki). Seiron, July 1998.
Higashinakano Shudo, ed. Nankin Gyakusatsu Kenkyu No Saizensen 2002 (The Frontline of the Study on the “Nanking Massacre,” 2002), Tokyo: Tendensha, 2002.
Higashinakano Shudo, ed. Nankin Gyakusatsu Kenkyu No Saizensen 2003 (The Frontline of the Study on the “Nanking Massacre,” 2003), Tokyo: Tendensha, 2003.
Higashinakano Shudo, ed. Nankin Gyakusatsu Kenkyu No Saizensen 2004 (The Frontline of the Study on the “Nanking Massacre,” 2004), Tokyo: Tendensha, 2004.
Honda Katsuichi. “Nachi Doitsu wo mo Kyogaku Seshimeta Nankin Daibogyaku Jiken” (Atrocities in Nanking that Astonished Even Nazi Germany). Asahi Journal, January 25, 1991.
Honda Katsuichi. Nankin e no Michi (The Road to Nanking). Asahi Shinbunsha, 1987. (Paperback: Asahi Bunko, 1994.)
Honda Katsuichi, ed. Sabakareta Nankin Daigyakusatsu (Judgement on the Great Nanking Massacre). Banseisha, 1989.
Honda Katsuichi. Travels in China, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1972.
Hora Tomio. Ketteiban: Nankin Daigyakusatsu (The Authoritative Version of the Great Nanking Massacre). Tokuma Shoten, 1987.
Hora Tomio. Nankin Daigyakusatsu no Shomei (Proof of the Great Nanking Massacre). Asahi Shinbunsha, 1987.
Ichiko Chuzo. Sekai no Rekishi 20: Chugoku no Kindai (Twentieth-Century World History: China in the Modern Age). Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1990.
Ishii Itaro. Gaikokan no Issho (A Diplomatic Career). Chuko Bunko, 1992.
Ishikawa Tadahisa. Nankin Monogatari (The Story of Nanking). Shueisha, 1987.
Itakura Yoshiaki. “Nankin Daigyakusatsu no Shinso (Zoku)” (The Truth About The Great Nanking Massacre). Sekai to Nihon (The World and Japan), No. 420, 1984.
Itakura Yoshiaki. “Nankin Jiken: Gyakusatsu no Sekininron” (The Nanking Incident: Responsibility for the “Massacre”). Gunji Shigakkai Hen. Nicchu Senso no Shoso (Aspects of the Second Sino-Japanese War). Kinseisha, 1997.
Itakura Yoshiaki. “Nankin Jiken no Suryoteki Kenkyu (The Nanking Incident: Quantitative Research). Gunjishigaku (Military History), Vol. 26, No. 1. Gunjishi Gakkai Hen, 1991.
Itakura Yoshiaki. Tettei Kensho: Nankin Jiken no Shinjitsu (An Exhaustive Investigation: The Truth About the Nanking Incident). Nihon Seisaku Kenkyu Center, 1995.
Kaizuka Shigeki, Oshima Toshikazu. Sekai no Rekishi 3: Chugoku no Akebono (World History 3: The Emergence of China). Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1989.
Kasahara Tokushi. Nankin Jiken (The Nanking Incident). Iwanami Shoten, 1997.
Kasahara Tokushi. Nankin Nanminku no Hyakunichi (One Hundred Days in the Nanking Refugee Zone). Iwanami Shoten, 1995.
Katogawa Kotaro. “Shogen ni yoru Nankin Senshi: Sono Sokatsuteki Kosatsu” (Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking: A Comprehensive Examination). Kaiko, March 1985.
Kawabe Torajiro. Ichigayadai kara Ichigayadai e (From Ichigayadai to Ichigayadai). Jiji Tsushinsha, 1962.
Kawakatsu Yoshio. Chugoku no Rekishi 3: Gishin Nanbokucho (History of China 3: The Era of Two Dynasties). Kodansha, 1964.
Kimura Kuninori. Koseiha Shogun: Nakajima Kesago (A Rugged Individualist: General Nakajima Kesago). Kojinsha, 1987.
Kimura Kuninori. “Nankin Koryakusen: Nakajima Daijuroku Shidancho Nikki” (The Assault on Nanking: Diary of 16th Division Commander Nakajima). Zokan Rekishi to Jinbutsu (History and People: Special Edition), December 1984.
Kisanshi Hensan Iinkai (Committee for the Compilation of the History of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment). Kihei Daisan Rentaishi (History of the 3rd Cavalry Division), 1978.
Kitamura Tsunenobu, ed. Rikukaigun Fukuso Soshuzuten (Illustrated Encyclopedia of Army and Navy Uniforms). Kokusho Kankokai, 1996.
Kiyose Ichiro. Hiroku: Tokyo Saiban (Secret Records from the Tokyo
Trials). Chuko Bunko, 1992.
Kobayashi Yoshinori. Shin Gomanizumu Sengen Supesharu: Sensoron (A New Declaration of Arrogant-ism: Military Theory Special). Gentosha, 1998.
Ko Bunyu. Ari no Mama no Chugoku (The Real China). Nihon Bungeisha, 1996.
Ko Bunyu. Netsuzo Sareta Nihonshi (The Fabrication of Japanese History). Nihon Bungeisha, 1997.
Ko Bunyu. Norowareta Chugokujin: Chugoku Shokujinshi no Judaina Imi (The Chinese Curse: The Significance of Cannibalism Throughout Chinese History). Kobunsha, Kappa Books, 1990.
Kobori Keiichiro, ed. Saikensho: Tokyo Saiban (Reexamination of the Tokyo Trials). PHP Kenkyujo, 1996.
Kobori Keiichiro, ed. Tokyo Saiban: Nihon no Benmei (The Tokyo Trials: Japan’s Defense). Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1995.
Kojima Noboru. Nicchu Senso (The Sino-Japanese War). Bunshun Bunko, 1993 (First printing: 1984).
Kokusai Hogakkai Hen (International Law Society of Japan). Kokusaiho Jiten (International Law Dictionary). Kajima Shuppankai, 1982.
Komuro Naoki, Watanabe Shoichi. Fuin no Showashi (Sealed Showa Era History). Tokuma Shoten, 1995.
Komuro Naoki, Watanabe Shoichi. Mizukara Kuni wo Tsubusu no ka? (Are We Going To Destroy Our Own Nation?). Tokuma Shoten, 1993.
Lattimore, Owen (Haruki Takeshi, tr.). Ajia no Kaiketsu (Solution in Asia). Aoyama Gakuin Law Society, 1970.
Lindbergh, Charles A. (Shinjo Tetsuo, tr.). Lindbergh Dainiji Taisen Nikki (The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh). Shinchosha, 1974.
Maeda Yuji. Senso no Nagare no Naka ni (Caught in the Current of War). Zenponsha, 1982.
Maruyama Susumu. “Nankin Jiken no Jisso” (The Realities of the Nanking Incident). Mantetsu Wakabakai Kaiho (Machurian Railway Wakaba Group Report), No. 138, January, 1998.
Matsumoto Shigeharu. Shanhai Jidai (Shanghai Sojourn). Chuko Shinsho, 1975.
Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai (Meiji, Taisho, Showa Period Newspaper Research Group). Shinbun Shusei Showa Hennenshi: Showa Juninenban (Annual Chronology from Newspapers in the Showa Era: 1937 Edition). Shinbun Shiryo Shuppan, 1990.
Mitamura Taisuke. Sekai no Rekishi 14: Min to Shin (World History
14: Ming and Qing Dynasties). Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1990. Morohashi Tetsuji. Daikanwa Jiten (Chinese Character Dictionary). Taishukan Shoten, 1968. Muguruma Seijiro. Sekishunfu: Waga Seishun no Omoide (Memories of My Youth). Self-published, 1990. Nagoshi Futaranosuke. Hannichi Kokka: Nippon (Japan, the Anti-Japanese Nation). Yamate Shobo, 1984. Naito Chishu. Shigaku Gairon (An Outline of Historiography). Fukumura Shoten, 1961 (First printing, 1932). Nakamura Akira. Dai Toa Senso e no Michi (The Road to the Great Asian War). Tendensha, 1990. Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai (Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee). Nankin Senshi (The Battle of Nanking). Kaikosha, 1993.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai (Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee). Nankin Senshi Shiryoshu I (Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1). Kaikosha, 1993.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai (Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee). Nankin Senshi Shiryoshu II (Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2). Kaikosha, 1993.
Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo (Japanese Institute for the Study of International Problems). Chugoku Kyosantoshi Shiryoshu (Chinese Communist Party History: Source Materials), Vol. 9. Kyoso Shobo, 1974.
Nishio Kanji. Kotonaru Higeki: Nihon to Doitsu (Disparate Tragedies: Japan and Germany). Bunshun Bunko, 1997.
Nishio Kanji. Rekishi wo Sabaku Orokasa (The Folly of Judging History). PHP Kenkyujo, 1997.
Nishio Kanji, Fujioka Nobukatsu. Kokumin no Yudan: Rekishi Kyokasho ga Abunai (An Indifferent Nation: Imperiled History Textbooks). PHP Kenkyujo, 1997.
Nishizawa Benkichi. Warera no Tairiku Senki: Hohei Dairokujuroku Rentai Daisan Chutai no Ayumi (Our Battles in China: 3rd Company, 66th Regiment). Self-published, 1972.
Nitta Mitsuo, ed. Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku (Reports of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East). Yushodo Shoten, 1968.
Oi Mitsuru. Shikumareta “Nankin Daigyakusatsu” (How the “Nanking Massacre” Was Invented). Tendensha, 1995. Okada Yuji. Nicchu Senso Urakataki (The Second Sino-Japanese War: Behind the Scenes). Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1974.
Okumiya Masatake. Shinjuwan made no Gojunen (The 50 Years Preceding Pearl Harbor). PHP Kenkyujo, 1995.
Okumiya Masatake. Watakushi no Mita Nankin Jiken (Witness to the Nanking Incident). PHP Kenkyujo, 1997.
Ono Kenji, Fujiwara Akira, Honda Katsuichi, eds. Nankin Daigyakusatsu wo Kiroku Shita Kogun Heishitachi (Imperial Army Soldiers’ Accounts of the Great Nanking Massacre). Otsuki Shoten, 1996.
Rabe, John (Hirano Kyoko, tr.). Nankin no Shinjitsu (The Truth About Nanking). Kodansha, 1997.
Rengogun Soshireibu Minkan Joho Kyoikukyoku Shiryo Teikyo (Civil Information and Education Division, Allied Headquarters) (Nakaya Ken’ichi, tr.). Taiheiyo Sensoshi (History of the Pacific War). Takayama Shoin, 1946.
Sankei Shinbunsha. Sho Kaiseki Hiroku (Chiang Kai-Shek’s Secret Records). Sankei Shinbunsha Shuppankyoku, 1976.
Sasaki Motokatsu. Yasen Yubinki (Field Post Office Flag). Gendai Shiryo Center Shuppankai, 1973.
Sasaki Motokatsu. (Zoku) Yasen Yubinki (Field Post Office Flag, Part 2). Gendai Shiryo Center Shuppankai, 1973.
Sasaki Toichi. Aru Gunjin no Shogai (Journal of a Career Officer). Futsusha, 1963.
Sasayama Haruo, Okuda Yoshio. Chugaku Shakai: Rekishi (Middle-School Social Studies: History). Kyoiku Shuppan. Approved by the Ministry of Education on February 29, 1996.
Sato Kazuo. Kenpo Kyujo, Shinryaku Senso, Tokyo Saiban (Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, War of Aggression, and the Tokyo Trials). Hara Shobo, 1991.
Sato Kazuo, ed. Sekai ga Sabaku Tokyo Saiban (The Tokyo Trials: The World Passes Judgement). Jupiter Shuppan, 1996.
Senso Giseisha wo Kokoro ni Kizamu Kaihen (Association for the Commemoration of the War Dead). Nankin Daigyakusatsu to Genbaku (The Great Nanking Massacre and the Atomic Bomb). Toho Shuppan, 1995.
Smedley, Agnes (Takasugi Ichiro, tr.) Chugoku no Utagoe (Battle Hymn of China). Misuzu Shobo, 1966.
Smedley, Agnes (Abe Tomoji, tr.). Idai naru Michi (The Great Road). Iwanami Shoten, 1963.
Snow, Edgar (Takahashi Tadashi, tr.). Konichi Kaiho no Chugoku (Edgar Snow’s China). Simul Shuppankai, 1986.
Snow, Edgar (Usami Seijiro, tr.). Shinpan Chugoku no Akai Hoshi (Red
Star Over China: Revised Edition). Chikuma Shobo, 1972.
Suzuki Akira. Nankin Daigyakusatsu no Maboroshi (The Illusion of a Great Nanking Massacre). Bungei Shunju, 1982.
Suzuki Chusei. Shincho Chukishi Kenkyu (Research on Mid-Qing Dynasty History). Aichi Daigaku Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1952.
Suzuki Akira. Shin Nankin Daigyakusatsu No Maboroshi (New Edition, The Illusion of the .Nanking Massacre.), Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha, 1999.
Takahashi Shiro. Kensho: Sengo Kyoiku (An Examination of Postwar Education). Koike Gakuen Shuppanbu, 1995.
Takahashi Shiro. Rekishi no Soshitsu (The Forfeiture of a National History). Sogo Horei, 1997.
Takikawa Masajiro. “Yoshu Tokaki to Nankin Daigyakusatsu Jiken” (Ten Days in Yangzhou and the Great Nanking Massacre). Sokoku to Seinen (The Fatherland and Young Men), July and August, 1985.
Tanaka Masaaki. Nankin Gyakusatsu no Kyoko (The Fabrication of the Nanking Massacre). Nihon Kyobunsha, 1984.
Tanaka Masaaki. Nankin Jiken no Sokatsu (A Comprehensive Study of the Nanking Incident). Kenkosha, 1987.
Tanaka Seigen. Tanaka Seigen Jiden (Autobiography). Bungei Shunju, 1993.
Tanigawa Michio, Mori Masao, eds. Chugoku Minshu Hanranshi (The History of Rebellion in China). Toyo Bunko, Heibonsha, 1983.
Tokyo Saiban Kenkyukai (IMTFE Research Association). Kyodo Kenkyu: Paru Hanketsusho (Joint Research: The Pal Judgment). Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1989.
Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai Hen (IMTFE Document Publishing Group). Tokyo Saiban Kyakka Miteishutsu Bengogawa Shiryo (Defense Exhibits Rejected by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East). Kokusho Kankokai, 1995.
Tsutsui Jakusui. Gendai Shiryo: Kokusai Ho (Modern References: International Law). Yuhikaku, 1987.
Ukai Toshisada, ed. Shina Jihen: Dai Toa Senso Shashinshu (The Second Sino-Japanese War: Photographs from the Great Asian War). Hohei Daiyonjugo Rentaishi Hensan Iinkai, 1983.
Unemoto Masami. Shijitsu no Waikyoku (Distorting Historical Fact). Kakubunsha, 1992.
Unemoto Masami. “Shogen ni yoru Nankin Senshi (1) – (11)” (Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, 1-11.) Kaiko, April 1984 – February 1985.
Watanabe Shoichi. Mankenkyo ni hoeru: Kyokasho Mondai no Okori wo Tsuku (How Rumors Begot Rumors: Pinpointing the Origin of the Textbook Problem). Tokuma Bunko, 1997.
Watanabe Shoichi. Nihonjin no Kigai (Japanese Pride). PHP Kenkyujo, 1998.
Yamamoto Shichihei. Watakushi no Naka no Nihongun (What the Japanese Army Means to Me). Bunshun Bunko, 1983.
Yamamoto Soji, ed. Kokusai Joyakushu 1995 (Anthology of International Treaties: 1995). Yuhikaku, 1995.
Yoshida Yutaka. Tenno no Guntai to Nankin Jiken (The Emperor’s Soldiers and the Nanking Incident). Aoki Shoten, 1988.
Zawodny, Janusz K. (Nakano Goro, tr.). Katein no Mori no Yoru to Kiri (Night and Fog in the Katyn Forest). Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1963.
II. In other languages
Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
Chen Yizhan, ed. Chinese History: A New Edition. Hong Kong: Lingji Publishing Co., 1972 (Second printing, 1975).
Cobuild English Dictionary. Harper Collins Publishers, 1995.
Dyregrov, Atle, Magne Raundalen, and Rolf Gjestad. Children’s Exposure to War Scenes in Rwanda. UNICEF, 1994.
Eidgenossiches Justiz und Polizeidepartment (Hrsg.) (Federal Justice and Police Department). Zivilverteidigung (Civil Defense). Aalau: Miles Verlag, 1969.
Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David Liu, ed. Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
Grosser Atlas zur Weltgeschichte: Von der Entstehung der Welt bis zur Gegenwart (Comprehensive Atlas of World History: From the Beginning of the World to the Present). Koln: Lingen Verlag, 1988.
Hammer, Joshua. “Born Under a Bad Sign.” Newsweek, September 23, 1996.
Ho Yingching. Chunichi Kankei To Sekai No Zenshin (Chinese-Japanese Relations and the Advancement of the World) translated by the Association of Chinese-Japanese Culture and Economy, Taipei: Shochu Publishing.
Kristof, Nicholas D., Sheryl Wudunn. China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power. Vintage Books, 1995.
Lattimore, Owen. Solution in Asia. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945.
Office of History, ed. Chinese History, Vol.4, Beijing: People.s Education Publisher, 1997.
Roling, Bert, C. F. Ruter, eds. The Tokyo Judgement, 2 vols. Amsterdam: APA-University Press, 1977.
Tao Jizhong, ed. Nanjing Tourist Map. Jiangsu People’s Publishing Co., 1992.
Wang Ling Xiao. Chugoku Kokuminto Shimbun Seisaku No Kenkyu(A Study of Chinese Nationalist Party.s Newspaper Policy), Party History Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party.s Central Committee, Taipei: 1996.
Wang Zhijiu, Song Guozhu. Handbook for Middle-School History Teachers. Shanghai Educational Publishing Company, 1958.
Wickert, Erwin, ed. (John E. Woods, tr.). The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe. Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.
Zawodny, K. Zum Beispiel Katyn: Klarung eines Kriegsverbrechens (Katyn: Elucidation of a War Crime). Munich: Verlag Information und Wissen, 1971.
Zeng Xubai. Zeng Xubai.s Autobiography , Taipei: Shokukei Publishing, 1988.
Other Sources
I. In Japanese
Abend, Hallett (Azusa Takio, tr.). Kuzureyuku Shina (Tortured China). Nihon Koronsha, 1938.
Atsuta Ko and others. Chugaku Shakai Rekishi Bunya (Social Studies for junior high schools: The Field of History). Osaka: Osaka Shoseki, 1999.
Farjenel, Fernand (Ishikawa Yu, Ishikawa Fumi, trs.). Shingai Kakumei Kenbunki (Witness to the Xinhai Revolution). Toyo Bunko, Heibonsha, 1975.
Fujii Sen’ei. Shinshaku Kanbun Taikei 5: Junshi (New Anthology of Chinese Literature with Commentary 5: Xunzi). Meiji Shoin, 1968.
Li Luzhou. Nankin Seifu no Jisso (The Realities of the Nanking Government). Toakai, 1935.
Lindley, Augustus F. (Masui Tsuneo, Imamura Yoshio, trs.). Taihei Tengoku (History of the Taiping Rebellion). Toyo Bunko, Heibonsha, 1974.
Luo Guanzhong (Tatsuma Shosuke, tr.). Chugoku Koten Bungaku Taikei 27: Shiengi (Anthology of Classical Chinese Literature 27: Romance of the Three Kingdoms). Heibonsha, 1979.
Maeda Toru. Ruuzuberuto Hiroku-gekan (Roosevelt’s Secret Records, vol. 2). Tokyo: Fusosha, 2000
Shiba Goro, Hattori Unokichi. Pekin Rojo Hoka (Siege in Beijing and Other Stories). Heibonsha, 1977.
Shiba Sen. Shiki (Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Historical Records). Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 1995.
Wakokubon Seishi Shinjo (Authorized History (Reprinted in Japan). Kyuko Shoin, 1971.
II. In other languages
Abend, Hallett. Tortured China. New York: Ives Washburn, 1930.
Bacque, James. Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans After World War II, Toronto: Stodart Publishing 1990.
The China Year Book 1914. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1914.
The China Year Book 1928. Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, 1928.
The Chinese Year Book 1935-1936: Premier Issue. Shanghai: The Chinese Year Book Co., 1935.
Yang Jialuo, ed. Xinxiao Zizhitongjian Zhu (Revised Commentary of Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government). World Publishing Co., 1962.
Theodore H..White. In Search of History: A Personal Adventure, New York: Harper Row Publishers, 1978.
INDEX
A
Abegg, Lily ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 209, 235, 236, 241 Abend, Hallett ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 1, 9, 13, 16, 140, 141 Akiyama Yoshimitsu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 119, 121 Allison, John ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 148, 184, 272, 283, 284, 292 Ara Kenichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 71, 74, 81, 193, 245, 308 Araumi Kiyoe ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 94 Asahi Shinbun ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 57, 201, 241, 295 Asaka Yasuhiko (Prince) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 18 Atcheson, George ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 37
B
Bacque, James ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ i Bai Chongxi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 24, 25, 36 Bates, Miner Searle ・・・・・・ 385, 34, 132, 141, 143, 145, 148, 169, 174, 175, 176, 177,
179, 182, 183, 199, 202, 203, 204, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 221, 228, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 252, 254, 260, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 294, 295, 297, 299, 312, 313
Battle of Nanking, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・47, 54, 75, 93, 105, 107, 114, 117, 152, 217 Baying ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 102 Boxer Rebellion ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 2 Buck, Lossing ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 183, 211
C
Chang, Iris ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ ii, 150, 178, 198 Cheng Huanlang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 47 Chiang Kai-shek ・・・・・・・・・・ v, 1, 5, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 36,
45, 46, 47, 53, 61, 101, 120, 141, 220, 225, 226, 228, 230, 236, 237, 240, 249, 277,
297, 306
Generalissimo.s Statement to Friendly Nations, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 225, 226 Chicago Daily News ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 37, 45, 114, 137, 147, 171, 251, 253, 278, 287 China at War ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 220, 221, 222, 224, 292 China Critic, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 223, 224 China Forum ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 385, 147, 220, 224, 225 China Journal, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 57, 131, 147, 226, 227 China Press ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 180, 224, 309 China Quarterly ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 198, 227, 233 China Today ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 228, 229, 230 China Weekly Review, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 57, 58, 141, 167, 228, 229 China Year Book, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 13, 30, 35, 178, 193, 203, 213, 219, 220, 222, 225,
228, 236, 237 Chinese Recorder, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 174, 311 Chinese Red Cross Society ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 203 Chinese Year Book, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 214, 215, 234, 235, 240, 241, 277 Chongshantang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 201, 204, 312 Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9 Coville, Cabot ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 148, 221, 283
D
Daily reports of serious injuries to civilians ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ iii, 291, 294, 299 Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 109 Defense Exhibits Rejected by the IMTFE ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 5 Deng Longguang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 47 Deng Xiaoping ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 250 Digest of Japanese War Conduct, A ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 214, 234, 241, 277 Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone ・・・・・・・・・・・・ 126, 136, 140, 153, 154, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 182, 183, 185, 214, 234, 235, 241, 267, 273, 277, 289, 302, 303, 308 Durdin, Tillman ・・・・・・・・・・・ 27, 28, 29, 36, 40, 45, 53, 54, 55, 56, 102, 107, 112, 113, 123, 127, 138, 139, 140, 142, 172, 228, 229, 230, 241, 270, 278, 279, 280, 282, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 297 Duus, Masayo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 170
E
Endo Takaaki ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 91, 97, 98, 99 Espy, James ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 113, 136, 139, 148, 241, 243, 283, 304 Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 230, 232 Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 27, 32, 40, 103, 108, 109, 111,
113, 115, 149, 171, 310
F
Falkenhausen, Alexander von ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 26 Farrere, Claude ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 10, 11 Final Protocol Relating to the North China Incident ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 2 Fitch, George ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 132, 133, 136, 139, 140, 141, 171, 173, 175, 177, 182, 183,
189, 194, 211, 236, 254, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 297 Foreign Affairs Review ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 39 Fortify-and-burn strategy ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 24, 27 Forster, Ernest ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 168, 195 Frankfurter Zeitung ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 30 Fuji Nobuo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 245 Fujioka Nobukatsu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 144 Fujita Kiyoshi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 116 Fujiwara Akira ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 60, 61, 62, 78, 90, 193 Fukuda Tokuyasu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 189, 296
G
Gao Zu, Emperor ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9 German military advisors ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 12 Gonghe Gate (Tongji Gate) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19, 68 Gu Weijun ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 223 Guanghua Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 117, 159, 306 Gui Zhongshu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 224 Guo Moruo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 231, 232, 255, 256, 278
H
Hague Convention ・ iii, 44, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 105, 126, 127, 128, 129, 145 Han Fuju ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 1 Hanxi Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 117, 213, 214 Hata Ikuhiko ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 4, 63, 78, 93, 104, 107, 108, 217, 303, 311, 312, 313 Hatz, Rupert ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 163, 164, 182, 301, 302 He Jian ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 1 He Yingqin ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 24, 25, 232 Helsey, Edouard ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 11, 12, 16 Heping Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19, 78, 97, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106 Hidaka Shinrokuro ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 38 Higuchi Kiichirou ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ vi Hirabayashi Sadaharu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 87, 93, 100 Historical Records ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 8 Hitler, Adolf ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ vi, 177, 197, 200, 235, 301, 304, 305, 309 Honda Katsuichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 161, 164, 165, 295 Hora Tomio ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 60, 61, 62, 193, 217, 302 Horikoshi Fumio ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 151 Hsu Shuhsi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 154, 214, 221, 234, 277, 289, 302 Hudson, Manley O. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 167
Hwan An (Huang An) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 180
Ichiki Yoshimichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 191 Ide Nobutoki ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 121 Iinuma Mamoru ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 82, 83, 103, 110, 134, 171, 180, 309 IMTFE (International Military Tribunal for the Far East) ・・・・・・・・・・ iii, 4, 6, 10, 20, 38,
48, 51, 114, 116, 126, 139, 140, 142, 158, 159, 162, 163, 168, 170, 173, 176, 177, 180, 181, 183, 196, 203, 207, 242, 243, 245, 246, 252, 283, 284, 285, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 299, 309
Inoie Matakazu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 123, 150
International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 45, 46, 118, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133, 136, 146, 151, 152, 153, 154, 162, 164, 175, 176, 183, 188, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 202, 203, 205, 207, 216, 226, 235, 244, 291, 301, 302, 304, 306, 308, 309, 312
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Jacquinot Zone, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 35, 38 Jeffery, E.W. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 142, 143, 148, 154, 217, 220, 241, 244, 272, 283 Jin Zhenzhong ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 2, 4, 23 Jinling Girls College ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 173, 174, 311 Jodai Takuzen ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 245, 246
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Lattimore, Owen ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 236 Lazarus (IMTFE defense attorney) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 4, 10 Leaf, Earl ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 259 League of Nations resolution ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 222, 223 Levine (IMTFE defense attorney) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 6, 7 Li Hongzhang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 2 Li Zongren ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 24, 25, 26, 36, 55 Lin Biao ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 230 Liu Bang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9 Logan (IMTFE defense attorney) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 246 Luo Yinong ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9, 307, 309
M
Ma Pou-shang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 180, 309 Maeda Yuji ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 150 Magee, John ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 126, 140, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 168, 181, 294 Makihara Nobuo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 53 Mao Zedong ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ iv, 1, 9, 221, 222, 237, 240, 247, 248, 249, 254, 292 Marco Polo Bridge Incident ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 1, 2, 4, 5, 10 Maruyama Susumu ・・・・・・・・・・ 186, 187, 190, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 247, 312, 313 Matsui Iwane ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 16, 17, 18, 38, 43, 44, 45, 171, 186, 191, 244, 245, 247 Matsumoto Shigeharu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 23 McCallum, James ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 173, 180, 181, 183, 309 Meguro Fukuji ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 97 Mi Shin-shi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 180, 309 Mills, W. Plumer ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 183 Ming Xiao Tomb ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 20 Miyamoto Shogo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 87, 91, 98, 99, 100 Mizutani So ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 123 Mori Hideo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 194 Morozumi Gyosaku ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 Muguruma Masajiro ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 108, 109, 115 Mukai Toshiaki ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 247
N
Nakajima Kesago ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 101 Nakamura Akira ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 4, 311 Nakayama Yasuto ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 20, 46 Nakazawa Mitsuo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 20, 179, 185, 195, 196 Nanking Garrison Battle Report ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 54 Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References ・・・・・ 56, 138, 142, 148,
195, 203, 211, 308 Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 2: Chinese References ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 203, 207 Nanking Invasion Outline ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19, 44, 46, 114, 115, 116 Nanking Japanese Chamber of Commerce ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 30, 111 Nanking Safety Zone ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 45, 52, 53, 55, 56,
57, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 158, 159, 164, 179, 180, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 203, 211, 212, 213, 226, 233, 282, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 311
Nanking Self-Government Committee ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 153, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190,
195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205 Nanking Sweep Outline ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 118, 119 Nanking, sweep of ・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 18, 19, 46, 65, 68, 69, 107, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118,
119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150,
194, 211, 217, 240 Nanshi (southern Shanghai) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 38, 52 New York Times, The ・・・・・・・・・・・ iii, 13, 27, 28, 36, 45, 55, 102, 107, 112, 123, 138, 139,
140, 141, 172, 178, 227, 253, 278, 279, 281, 287, 297, 308, 309 Newsweek ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 177 Nielsen, Peter ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 229, 230 Nishiura Setsuzo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 105 Nishizawa Benkichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 72 Noda Tsuyoshi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 247 North China Daily News ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 147, 176, 178, 218, 219, 228 Norton, Robert ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 229
O
Ogisu Ryuhei ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 88 Okumiya Masatake ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 127, 128, 137, 217 Okura Kimimochi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 171 Onishi Hajime ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 81, 193, 197, 201 Order of battle, CCAA ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 18 Orikono Suetaro ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 131 Orita Mamoru ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 170 Osaka Asahi Shinbun ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 31, 198, 288 Osugi Hiroshi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 51, 52 Ouchi Yoshihide ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 48, 49 Oyake Isaburo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 69, 71, 73, 74, 75 Oyama Isao ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 10, 11, 13
P
Panay, U.S., The・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 46, 219, 229 Powell, John ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 141, 167, 178, 228 Prisoners of war, legal qualifications ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 127, 128, 129, 142, 148, 312
Q
Qualifications of belligerents ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 127, 128, 129
R
Rabe, John ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 17, 34, 35, 53, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 150, 151, 158, 165, 169, 173, 174, 177, 182, 183, 186, 195, 197, 199, 200, 205, 207, 228, 229, 235, 241, 268, 270, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313
Records of the Department of State Regarding Political Relations between China and Japan, 1930-1944 ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 142, 144 Red Swastika Society ・・・・・・・・ 36, 169, 185, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204,
205, 207, 208, 211, 212, 216, 244, 276, 303, 312, 313 Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee ・・・・・・ 35, 143, 151, 154, 276, 312 Riggs, Charles ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 174, 175, 183, 211 Rosen, Georg ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 45, 145, 146, 148, 156, 198, 202, 206, 207, 241, 313 Rosholt, Malcolm ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 259 Rumsfeld, Donald ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 274, 275
S
Saito Yozo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 10 Saito Yoshie ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 44 Sakakibara Kazue ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 82 Sakata Shigeki ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 197 Sakurai Fumio ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 7 Sasaki Motokatsu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 82 Sasaki Toichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9, 77, 81, 85, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 110, 118, 152, 153, 165 Scharffenberg, Paul (Chancellor) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 183, 311 Scorched-earth strategy ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 23, 226 Seeckt, Hans von ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 12, 26 Sekiguchi Kozo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 111 Shanghai Incident ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 10, 13, 16, 17 Sheng Shicai ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 1 Shields, P.R. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 306 Shimada Katsumi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 45, 75 Shimizu Kazue ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 107, 108 Shuixi Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19 Sima Qian (Ssu-ma Ch.ien) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 8, 9 Sino-Japanese Conflict, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 45, 145, 146, 156, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165,
169, 227, 302 Smedley, Agnes ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9, 241 Smith (Reuters correspondent) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 137, 140 Smythe, Lewis ・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 148, 175, 179, 182, 183, 189, 211, 216, 217, 281, 283, 289 Snow, Edgar ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9, 235, 241 South China Morning Post ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 211 South City (Shanghai) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 130, 156 South, Peter ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 228 Sowerby, Arthur ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 227 Sperling, Eduard ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 168 Steele, Archibald ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 34, 37, 45, 54, 56, 114, 137, 140, 142, 147, 183, 241, 251,
283, 312 Sumiya Iwane ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 113 Sun Quan ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9 Sun Yatsen ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 20, 25, 26, 35 Supervisory unit, Chinese ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 47, 52, 53, 55, 56, 104, 131, 136, 209, 303, 306 Suzuki Akira ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 87, 93, 95, 100, 253
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Tada Hayao ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 17 Taiping Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19, 77, 78, 81, 82, 101, 102, 105, 196, 197 Takeuchi Goro ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 115 Tanaka Gunkichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 247 Tanaka Seigen ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9 Tang Shengzhi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 24, 26, 29, 36, 40, 43, 46, 52, 53, 57, 78, 102, 127, 131,
273, 280, 281, 289, 304, 306, 307, 309 Tangshuizhen ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 49, 51, 102, 103, 104, 106, 115 Tani Hisao ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 247 Tanida Isamu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 149 Tao Xishan ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 185, 198 Third Cavalry Regiment ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 103 Three-All strategy (Sanguang) ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 24 Time Magazine ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 147, 233, 234 Timperley, Harold ・・・・・・・・・・・ iv, 37, 132, 173, 174, 176, 213, 214, 239, 252, 253, 254,
256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 267, 268, 281, 284, 292, 296, 302 Tokyo Asahi Shinbun ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 29, 37, 38, 40 Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 36, 37, 38, 159, 242 Tokyo Trials ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ See IMTFE Tong, Hollington ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 297 Tongzhou Massacre ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 Training unit, Chinese ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 101, 102, 116 Tsuchiya Masaharu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 117 Tsukada Osamu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 46 Tsukamoto Koji ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 170, 171 Tsutsui Jakusui ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 128 Tuqiaozhen ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 109
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U.S. Marines, Report from 2nd Brigade ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 144 Uchida Yoshinao ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 152, 153 Uemura Toshimichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 171, 183 Umezu Yoshijiro ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 60
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Wang Chengdian ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 169 Wang Gupan ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 36, 151 Wang Hanwan ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 307, 309 Wang Hsing-lau ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 180, 181, 309 Wang Jingwei ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 23, 24, 25, 29 Wang Lingzhai ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 4 War Conduct of the Japanese, The ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 214, 221, 240, 241, 277 War Damage in the Nanking Area ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 191, 216 Watanabe Shoichi ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 303 Webb, William ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 6, 114, 246 Wilson, Robert ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 138, 177, 183, 211, 212, 213, 242, 303 Wudunn, Sheryl ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9
Xia Shuqin ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 160, 161, 162 Xiang Ying ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 232 Xianhemenzhen ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 82, 102, 103 Xingzhong Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 113 Xiong Shihui ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 232 Xu Chuanyin ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 126, 162, 163, 196, 242 Xu Yongchang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 24, 25, 26 Xuanwu Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 78, 101
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Yamada Senji ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95, 96, 97, 150, 151 Yamamoto Osamu・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・288 Yamazaki Masao ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 46, 51, 110, 117 Yan Xishan ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 1 Yanagawa Heisuke ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 16, 18 Yasuyama Kodo ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 114 Yijiang Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 52, 55, 56, 57, 111, 112, 113, 117, 202, 209, 270, 290, 306 Yin Rugeng ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 5 Yomiuri Shinbun ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 36, 153, 190 Yuhuatai ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 48, 50, 247, 248 Yuhuatai, Martyrs’ Tomb at ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 247, 248
Z
Zeng Xubai ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 253, 256, 258, 260 Zhao Ziyang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 31 Zhonghua Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19, 28, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 70, 111, 117, 159, 247, 305 Zhongshan Gate ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 19, 47, 78, 101, 108, 115, 117, 123, 134 Zhongshan Mausoleum ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 25, 45 Zhongshan North Road ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 35, 55, 133, 135 Zhu Youyu ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 198, 233
AUTHOR PROFILE
Born in Kagoshima in 1947, Dr. HIGASHINAKANO Shudo is professor of history of political thought and Japanese intellectual history at Asia University in Tokyo. He majored in the history of German political thought and socialism at Kagoshima University and Osaka University. Prior to his appointment as professor at Asia University in 1995, he served as visiting professor of Japanese intellectual history at Western Washington University (1985-86), and visiting scholar at the University of Hamburg (1988-89).
In 1990, a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Dr. Higashinakano started to research the situation in Nanking in 1937. And since 1995, the main focus of his research interest has been this subject. He has been president of Japan Nanking Society since 2000. The original title of this translated work is “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei kensho [An exhaustive study of the “Nanking Massacre”] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1998).
He has published many books, among them Nankin jiken “shoko shashin” wo kensho suru [Analyzing the “photographic evidence” of the Nanking Massacre] (co-authored with Kobayashi Susumu and Fukunaga Shinjiro, Tokyo: Soshisha, 2005), Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen, vols.1-4 [The front line of research on the Nanking Massacre, vols. 1-4] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2002-2005), 1937 Nankin koryaku sen no shinjitsu [ The truth about the capture of Nanking in 1937] (Tokyo: Shogakukan Bunko, 2003), An Overview of the Nanking Massacre (Osaka: Kokumin Kaikan, 1999), Za reipu obu Nankin no kenkyu [A Study of the Rape of Nanking] (coauthored with Fujioka Nobukatsu, Tokyo: Tendensha, 1999), Higashi Doitsu shakaishugi taisei no kenkyu [A study of the socialistic System in East Germany] (Tokyo: Nansosha, 1996), and Kokka hasan: Higashi Doitsu shakaishugi no 45 nen [Bankruptcy of a state: 45 Years of Socialism in East Germany] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1992). One of his research papers, titled “The Overall Picture of the Nanking Massacre,” is included in Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).