SDHF Newsletter No.414 The Road to the Greater East Asian War No. 31 Ch.9-3

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 31, Chapter 9: Contending with Attempts to Communize China-III

October 11, 2024

Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi’s cabinet took office on April 20, 1927. Tanaka, serving concurrently as foreign minister, announced his administration’s policy guidelines on April 22. According to those guidelines, the Japanese government was prepared to offer empathy and support to China, but needed to give due consideration to the procedures and methods used to satisfy the requirements of the Chinese people. They state that Japan was fully committed to the achievement of world peace, at the same time emphasizing the importance of Japan’s keeping abreast of developments in the CCP, and cooperating with other nations if necessary. Aside from the reference to communism, Tanaka’s guidelines were not radically different from the philosophy underpinning Shidehara diplomacy.

As the NRA advanced northward, the irresistible force of Chiang’s army put a damper on the prospects of the northern armies. The Shandong army was defeated along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, the Fengtian army suffered an even worse defeat along the Beijing-Hankou Railway, and a crisis was imminent in Jinan and locations in the Beijing-Tianjin area, where approximately 24,000 Japanese civilians resided. The prime minister decided to dispatch troops to protect Japanese civilians. Two thousand members of the 33rd Infantry Brigade, under the 10th Division based in Port Arthur, landed in Qingdao on June 1. However, Chiang’s army suffered serious defeats later and the Northern Expedition was suspended. In early September the Japanese government decided that there was no longer a need to station troops in Shandong, and as it had previously promised, withdrew its troops.

Prime Minister Tanaka decided to summon Japanese officials assigned to China to Tokyo for a major liaison conference. Those men would work together with central government officials to formulate a
China policy. The gathering became known as the Eastern Conference. On July 7, the last day of the conference, Tanaka produced his Overview of China Policy, which was distributed in Japan and abroad. Its essential points follow.

(1) As far as the domestic conflict in China is concerned, we shall respect the will of the Chinese people, rather than favoring any one party or faction.
(2) We shall cooperate wholeheartedly with legitimate national demands from moderate elements in China.
(3) The position of the Japanese government regarding each of the Chinese government shall be exactly the same; in the event that there is progress toward the establishment of a common government, we shall welcome and support that progress.
(4) In the event that Japan’s rights and interests in China, and the lives and property of Japanese residents of China are unlawfully compromised, we reserve the right to take robust defensive action.
(5) Manchuria and Mongolia, especially the three eastern provinces (Manchuria), are of great importance to Japan from the standpoint of our national defense and survival. We believe that those regions require special consideration from Japan, and it is our responsibility as a neighboring nation to ensure that both nationals and foreigners can live peacefully in those regions. We shall promote economic activity of both nationals and foreigners in Manchuria and Mongolia in accordance with the principles of the Open Door Policy and equal opportunity.
(6) We shall support influential individuals in the three eastern provinces who respect our special status in Manchuria and Mongolia, and who make sincere efforts to stabilize the political situation there.
(7) In the unlikely event that unrest spreads to Manchuria and Mongol, and Japan’s special rights and interests in the region are likely to be compromised, we must be prepared to take appropriate steps immediately to protect said special rights and interests, and ensure that the affected regions remain places where nationals and foreigners can live and prosper in peace.

In connection with (5), Vice-minister Mori stated that Japan would not adopt a closed policy in Manchuria and Mongolia, but rather “shall welcome foreigners, including citizens of the UK, the US, France, and even Russia to invest there in the spirit of the Open Door Policy and equal opportunity.”

The conclusions reached by the Eastern Conference, as far as China proper was concerned, were in keeping with policies favored by Shidehara. But the latter part of the Overview of China Policy states that resolute defense measures would be taken against transgressions by communist elements against Japanese interests in China. This portion differed from Shidehara’s passive, ineffective policies, and probably gave rise to the term “assertive Tanaka diplomacy.”

After the Eastern Conference ended, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, minister to China, stopped in Nanjing prior to returning to his base in Beijing. He received a warm welcome from the Foreign Affairs Department and General Headquarters. In a speech Hu Hanmin, head of the GMD Legislative Yuan, said that he welcomed the China policy adopted by the Eastern Conference.

URL: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2244/
　PDF: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road31E.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact